The intelligence activity of any state is always shrouded in a dense veil of secrecy. This is not surprising - the purpose of intelligence is to reveal other people's secrets, while leaving their own intact. Perhaps, following the principle of "the forbidden fruit is always sweet", any society at all times always has a constant curiosity about the secrets of intelligence. Our country is no exception.
Taking into account the recent increased interest in the history of pre-revolutionary Russia, below we will discuss the history of Russian intelligence before 1917. Preference will be given to state, not military intelligence. Although for a long time, these directions of intelligence will very often go hand in hand.
The history of intelligence is an extraordinarily difficult work. Documents related to intelligence operations and information, as a rule, are not saved - conspiracy and secrecy are the foundations of any state secret service. Therefore, the researcher of the history of intelligence inevitably encounters a lot of difficulties when trying to recreate the structure, goals and objectives of the relevant bodies at any stage of the country's history. In most cases, you have to use fragmentary and scant information.
Intelligence in ancient times
As you know, intelligence is considered to be the oldest profession on Earth - in the Bible, in ancient epics and legends (for example, in the Sumerian and Akkadian epics dedicated to Gilgamesh), historians find the "first" intelligence officers. The Bible (chapter 3 of the Book of Numbers), in particular, says the following:"
In other words, the "intelligence officers" were asked to carry out a series of operational-search measures in order to collect information on a foreign country on a large scale.
In the monument of ancient Indian literature "Arthashastra" it is also said about intelligence ("… that with whom you see evil, report immediately"); about the creation of a developed system of a group of agents - "poisoners" (saboteurs), spies who must be deprived of permanent means of livelihood in order to faithfully serve the state, since they are in strong material dependence on it.
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When states began to emerge in different parts of the world, foreign intelligence certainly became their integral part. However, there was no talk of creating special intelligence agencies at that time - they would arise only under a powerful centralized state. Intelligence as an independent service could appear only in the presence of developed statehood and developed foreign policy ties.
The need of the heads of state (princes, kings) to know as much as possible about their neighbors, especially about potential opponents, was a natural driving force for the development of intelligence business.
Intelligence in Ancient Russia
In Ancient Russia, intelligence performed practically only tactical (in most cases, military) tasks due to objective and subjective reasons. In particular, a person of that era did not have a broad outlook, and traveling in conditions of feudal fragmentation (even under the “roof” of a merchant or a monk) was a very dangerous business - a scout could easily be killed by “robbers”. The use of strategic intelligence data (foreign, state) played a limited role.
Tactical reconnaissance was actively used by the ancient Russian princes to carry out raids on neighbors or for long-distance campaigns of conquest. For example, for the well-known expedition of the Russians in 860 to Constantinople (when the forces of the Byzantines were weakened by internal strife), it was necessary to carry out certain intelligence work on a large scale. Intelligence reports of a strategic nature were used, for example, by Prince Alexander Nevsky, adhering to neutrality with the Horde and actively fighting the German knights.
Until the end of the 15th century. there were no government bodies in Russia. Reconnaissance was carried out under the leadership of grand or appanage princes. He combined in his own persona "Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service", "Minister of Defense", etc. In Russia, there has not yet been a special body dealing with foreign intelligence. Therefore, for a long time between the words "intelligence officer" and "diplomat" you can safely put an equal sign. Moreover, almost until the beginning of the twentieth century. foreign intelligence management will be concentrated in the hands of the departments involved in diplomatic work.
Intelligence in Russia (XV-XVII centuries)
With the beginning of the process of collecting the lands of Rus into one whole, the Grand Dukes of "All Russia", in particular, Ivan III, began to pursue an active foreign policy. Consequently, the demand for intelligence services is increasing. The scouts of Ivan III are personally known and accountable people to him, first of all - ambassadors. Messengers, merchants, representatives of the clergy and foreigners, who occupied the most diverse social and social positions, were attracted.
The establishment of the first central government bodies responded favorably to the information awareness of the princes (kings). During the reign of Ivan IV the Terrible, in 1549 an important event took place: the Ambassadorial Prikaz was established - the first special state institution in Russia in charge of the Tsar's foreign policy, incl. foreign intelligence, which occupied a leading place among other orders, one way or another related to abroad (only about a dozen who have contacts with abroad - for example, Streletsky, Secret Affairs). Before the departure of diplomatic missions, the Ambassadorial Prikaz worked out in detail the instructions assigned to the head of the mission - incl. and intelligence nature.
So, in 1557 I. E. Zamytsky, who went to the King of Sveev (Sweden), was instructed to do the following: “Yes, being Ivan has a lot to do with the king: how Gustav the king with … the Danish king and the Lithuanian king and the master [master] of Livonian, whether in peace with those and other sovereigns foreign, and with whom the sovereigns about what the link, and what, God willing, he will find out, and then having come tell the king and the grand duke."
During this period, no distinction was made between the diplomatic and intelligence services, therefore, this circumstance placed great responsibility on the "sovereign people" - the ability to negotiate with the heads of state of Western Europe and at the same time obtain secret information required from the ambassadors extraordinary abilities and great intelligence.
A striking figure among such people is, for example, Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovaty - the first head of the Ambassadorial Prikaz, about whom foreigners said that he "had no equal at that time in Moscow." During his stay with an important diplomatic mission in July-August 1562 in Denmark (it was required to persuade her to an alliance with Russia) during the Livonian War (1558-1583) I. M. Viskovatov had to achieve his goal by acquiring "agents of influence".
In other words, I. M. Viskovaty resorted to direct bribery of the right people - the work is very delicate, since it was required to offer money to dignitaries who had to take "gifts" (bribe).
It would be very unpleasant if the dignitary refused and said "where to go." Therefore, initially it was required to carry out a lot of preparatory work, finding out the tastes, needs, weaknesses of the alleged object in order to make it "work" for itself. Such methods - bribery of influential dignitaries - will be used by Russian intelligence officers (diplomats) for a very long period of time.
In addition, I. M. Viskovaty was engaged in the analysis of important state reports, incl. he also worked with messages to the tsar from abroad, prepared draft answers, planned further actions, using his own talents and wide erudition.
To obtain secret information, Ivan IV (and not only he) resorted to the help of defectors. “We [in Lithuania] have a large number of Moscow defectors, who, having found out our deeds, means and customs, freely return to their own people, while they are with us, secretly transmit our plans to theirs … Between the Moscow defectors who killed people in Vilna on dark nights [Vilnius] and freed their fellow countrymen prisoners from dungeons, there was one priest who sent copies to his prince from contracts, decrees and other papers secretly obtained in the royal chancellery … This sly man [Ivan IV] appointed a reward to returning defectors, even empty ones and useless: a slave - freedom, a commoner - nobility, a debtor - forgiveness of debts, a villain - absolution of guilt … ".
During the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, centralized power was strengthened. In 1654, the tsar created the Order of Secret Affairs, subordinate only to the tsar and exercising control over the activities of all state institutions. This special chancellery dealt with issues of intelligence, counterintelligence, encryption services, the protection of the king and his entourage. A striking example of the imperfection of the concept of "intelligence service" were the following circumstances. Intelligence as an integral part of the Order of Secret Affairs was engaged in … the search for minerals!
For work in the Prikaz, the most capable and proven clerks were selected from other orders, who underwent a special training school at the Spassky Monastery. They received a large "salary" in comparison with their colleagues from other orders (during the 17th century there were about 80 orders) and had - in modern parlance - significant social security.
The tsar delivered especially important letters to ambassadors only with the help of secret affairs clerks (serving and couriers), who were given additional intelligence tasks, for example, to collect information about the mood of the local population of the countries and regions through which they had to pass. Great importance is attached to ciphering, "gibberish".
In 1676, after the death of Alexei Mikhailovich, the Secret Affairs Order was disbanded and the affairs of the foreign intelligence went back into the scope of the Ambassadorial Order.
Every family has its black sheep
The history of intelligence would probably not be complete if we did not mention the traitors, who, sadly to admit, are an integral part of it. One of the first known traitors is Grigory Karpovich Kotoshikhin, who served as clerk of the Order of Secret Affairs during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich. He turned out to be an original traitor - after treason, living in Sweden, G. K. Kotoshikhin wrote a work "On Russia in the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich", published in Russia at the end of the 19th century, which was a success among researchers on the history of our country.
Of course, we will never know the real reasons for the betrayal, but we can assume the following. First, the resentment against the king-father. When writing the letter, instead of “great sovereign” I wrote “great”, omitting the word “sovereign”. In the XVII century. They did not forgive such mistakes - "the clerk Grishka Kotoshikhin, who wrote that reply, was ordered … for that to impose the punishment - to beat batogs."
Secondly, G. K. Kotoshikhin showed dissatisfaction with his own salary. In addition, in the summer of 1661, he learned that his father, the monastery treasurer, had been accused of embezzlement. The background of the waste turned out to be forever dark, because when G. K. Kotoshikhin, for the debts of his father, the house with the property was confiscated, and soon it turned out that the monastic treasury lacked … 15 kopecks! In addition, the confiscated property of G. K. Kotoshikhin, of course, was not returned.
However, both the spelling mistake and the father's debt did not serve as a reason for the “dismissal” of G. K. Kotoshikhin from the Old Russian special service. So, if in 1661 he received "thirteen rubles" in a year, in 1663 - thirty. However, it is possible to assume with a high degree of certainty that G. K. Kotoshikhin was a vindictive person and could not forgive the "punishment" that fell to his lot, considering himself a capable and talented person.
Be that as it may, “in the past in 172 [1664] Grishka stole, changed, and left for Poland”. Earlier, G. K. Kotoshikhin successfully "worked" for the Swedes. So, at the end of 1663, he sold a certain kind of information to the Swedish ambassador in Moscow, Adolf Ebers, receiving forty rubles (later it turned out that G. K. Kotoshikhin was allocated one hundred rubles, and A. Ebers put the difference in his own pocket).
After G. K. Kotoshikhin offers his services to the Polish king Jan Casimir, expressing his readiness to give the king "useful" advice, from which even "the way in the war will be useful." In addition, the traitor offered the king his own inventions in the "military-technical" sphere - to make slingshots (ie spears), which are "better and lighter than the Moscow ones."
However, Jan Casimir did not like the deserter, and the latter went to the German city of Lubeck (one of the main cities of the Hansa - the famous trade union of the Middle Ages), from where the traitor moves to Narva, to the Swedes. However, he risked a lot - in the footsteps of G. K. Kotoshikhin, the archers were already walking with the order to deliver him to Moscow. But the traitor was lucky - the Swedes became interested in his person and on November 24, 1665, Charles XI signed a special decree about "a certain Russian Gregory Kotosikni", which said:
"Since it came to our attention that this man knows the Russian state well, served in the office of the Grand Duke and expressed his readiness to send us various useful messages, we decided to all-mercifully welcome this Russian two hundred Riksdalers with silver." At the same time G. K. Kotoshikhin was informed that he was accepted into the royal service, and under the name of Johann Alexander Seletsky arrived in Stekoln (the old Russian name for Stockholm). As a result, the traitor was enrolled in the civil service with a good salary.
It seemed that the future life of Johann Seletsky was assured. However, one unpleasant event happened, the origins of which will probably remain unclear. At the end of August 1667, he came home drunk and "in a state of alcoholic intoxication" stabbed the owner of the house from whom he rented an apartment (a work colleague) and his relative; "From received stab wounds" in two weeks the man died.
On September 11 and 12, 1667, a trial was held, which pronounced the verdict: “For the Russian clerk Ivan Alexandrovich Seletsky, who also calls himself Grigory Karpovich Kotoshikhin, confessed that he had stabbed his master Daniil Anastazius on August 25 in a drunken state, as a result of which the latter he died two weeks later, the court cannot spare him and, on the basis of Divine and Swedish laws, condemns him to death."
The death sentence was immediately carried out - after all, the traitor received what he deserved. In conclusion, it remains to add that due to the later searches carried out in 1837 by the Russian scientist S. V. Soloviev, the traitor was not buried and “his bones are still [ie by the 30s. XIX century] are kept in Uppsala as a kind of monument strung on copper and steel wires”.
Scouts of Peter I the Great
At the beginning of the XVIII century. the Russian throne is occupied by one of the outstanding rulers of our country - Peter I the Great. Based on the achievements of the socio-economic development of Russia by the XVIII century. Peter started large-scale reforms. In particular, it cancels outdated orders and creates colleges. Intelligence work is concentrated primarily in the hands of the Foreign Collegium in charge of foreign policy - diplomats are still intelligence officers.
At the beginning of the XVIII century. Russia is actively being drawn into the whirlpool of international politics, its ties with the Western European powers are developing; since 1700 Russia starts the Northern War for access to the Baltic Sea. Therefore, it is not surprising that under Peter the Great, intelligence was developed further - and not only military.
Back in the 17th century. abroad there are a number of permanent missions of Russia - in Sweden (1634), Holland (1699) - which Peter turns into centers for obtaining intelligence information about European states. Each ambassador who went abroad was given instructions from the tsar, which sometimes occupied more than one page. So, for the newly appointed ambassador to Turkey (April 2, 1702) Peter Andreevich Tolstoy, the tsar made 17 special points of an intelligence nature (similar instructions were given to every Russian ambassador).
P. A. Tolstoy had to give a detailed description of the Sultan and his entourage, report whether the Sultan himself rules or through his favorites, whether he has a penchant for war or likes "peace." Whether the treasury of Turkey is experiencing "contentment" or "impoverishment". The ambassador was required to find out comprehensive information about the composition of the Turkish army, its deployment, and forms of training. About the fleet, Peter asked to find out the number of ships, their armament, composition, support. The ambassador was supposed to find out the plans of the Turks to modernize the Armed Forces of the Ottoman Empire.
Carefully reading through 17 articles, which, unfortunately, cannot be reproduced due to too much volume, one can only marvel at the statesmanship and outlook of Peter.
Ambassador to Holland A. A. Matveyev in 1701, thanks to previously obtained intelligence in September 1708, provided Peter with valuable information about Charles XII's plans to turn to Ukraine to unite his own forces with the Crimean Khan, the Poles.
The great intelligence work in Stockholm by the Russian ambassador, Prince A. Ya. Khilkov, interned in the capital of Sweden since the beginning of the Northern War (1720-1721). Arriving in the capital on July 18, 1700 with the aim of "detailed reconnaissance, with what affairs and for what envoys of foreign powers live in Stockholm", A. Ya. Khilkov, I think, did not even imagine that he would never see Russia again …
Despite being kept under more than close surveillance by the Swedes, the prince continued to obtain information for Peter and forward it - through Copenhagen - to the king! It was A. Ya. Khilkov forwarded information to Peter in 1701 about the upcoming action of the Swedes against Arkhangelsk (the plot of which formed the basis of the feature film "Young Russia").
The fate of A. Ya. Khilkov was tragic - at the beginning of 1718, six months before the Aland armistice, through which the last prisoners were returning to Russia, the prince died. His body was transported to St. Petersburg, to the cemetery of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra (the grave has not survived).
The intelligence successes of Peter I are associated with a certain I. R. von Patkul, a Livonian nobleman. Being an ardent opponent of Sweden, to which he harbored a genuine hatred, he became a good scout for the Russian tsar, who “worked” not so much for money, but “for an idea”. Of course, it is for the latter reason that such people turn out to be invaluable sources of expensive information.
In the first years of the XVIII century. I. R. Patkul became the conductor of the Russian anti-Swedish policy in the West, and not without his help, Peter I created the Northern Alliance (consisting of Russia, Saxony, Poland, Denmark), directed against Charles XII. Possessing a talent for persuasion and an extraordinary ability to establish connections with any people, I. R. Patkul obtained a lot of information about the details of Western European policy for Peter and recruited the Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz in favor of Russia (unfortunately, because of the death of I. R. Patkul, ties with the Chancellor were cut off).
Unfortunately, in 1707 I. R. Patkul was handed over to the Swedes by the King of Poland August II, who conducted separate negotiations for a peace with Sweden. Former Swedish citizen for "high treason" faced only one punishment - the death penalty. Despite the efforts of Peter, who demanded the release of I. R. Patkul "like our minister" did not lead to anything. October 10, 1707 I. R. Patkul was brutally executed by the Swedes.
Among the foreigners who voluntarily "worked" for Peter, one can name the Italian F. Benevini, who concluded on behalf of Russia a defensive treaty with Bukhara against the Khiva Khanate; S. V. Vladislavich-Raguzinsky (a native of Serbia), who, during the Northern War, was engaged in the West (in particular, in Venice) actively promoting the success of Peter in the war against the Swedes.
Peter I attached great importance to foreign intelligence, but was unable to create an appropriate structure. In the field of organizing foreign intelligence, only individual people remained from Peter, the rudiments of the quartermaster-general (staff) service and the military regulations approved by the tsar on March 30, 1716, which stated that "this service is obliged … to conduct reconnaissance." Under Peter the first attempts were made to have their own representatives in foreign armies. The role of military agents (attachés) was played by diplomats who were simultaneously carrying out foreign intelligence missions. Under Peter I, one of the features of Russian intelligence, which will exist until the beginning of the twentieth century, clearly stands out. - combining the goals and objectives of military and foreign intelligence (just look at Peter's requirements for the ambassador to Turkey P. A. Tolstoy).
True, in the conditions of the era, it seems that it would be at least premature to hope for anything more. Peter's merit lies in the fact that he prepared the foundations for the further development of the country in all areas, incl. and in intelligence.
Intelligence under Alexander I
From the middle of the 18th to the beginning of the 19th centuries. in the history of Russian foreign intelligence, there have been no significant changes either in organization or in structure. Information about the work of intelligence for this period is very scarce and does not allow us to judge in full the selfless work of our intelligence officers abroad for the benefit of Russia.
At the beginning of the XIX century. important events take place in the history of Russia - in 1802, instead of the collegia created under Peter the Great about a hundred years ago, Alexander I created a system of ministries. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) until the second half of the 19th century. continued to act as the successor of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs in the field of foreign intelligence, receiving a variety of intelligence information from the permanent missions and missions of Russia abroad, incl. and on military issues.
The beginning of the new, XIX century, was marked for Russia by the struggle with Napoleonic France. In the face of a formidable adversary, Russia more than ever needed valuable information to reveal his plans. In 1810, the fourth important event took place in the life of Russian intelligence - after the creation in 1549 of the Ambassadorial Prikaz, in 1654 - the Order of Secret Affairs and the acquisition of a legal basis by intelligence in 1716.
On February 1, 1810, General M. B. Barclay de Tolly is an outstanding personality, commander and a true patriot of Russia. In the summer of 1810, he develops and puts into operation, for the first time in history, the "Special Chancellery" - the body responsible solely for collecting and processing intelligence data from special agents (their initial number was determined at seven people). Great importance was attached to the conspiracy of her activities, and here M. B. Barclay de Tolly achieved significant success - in the memoirs and memoirs of the era, not a word is said about the chancellery.
First of all, the activities of the "Special Chancellery" were responsible for military intelligence in relation to Western European countries (since there was a military threat from Napoleon). The Minister of War ordered the scouts to collect data "on the number of troops, especially in each power [the first seven scouts operated in France, Austria, Saxony, Bavaria, Sweden, Spain, Germany], on the education and armament of them … on the state of fortresses, abilities and merits the best generals and the mood of the troops. " “It is no less desirable to have enough information about the number, welfare, character and spirit of the people, about the locations and works of the earth, about the internal sources of this empire [ie. the state in which this or that agent was located] or the means to continue the war … ". This circumstance testifiesthat as yet there was no clear division into military and foreign intelligence.
Colonel A. I. Chernyshev - according to the official version, the personal representative of Alexander I under Napoleon. In fact, A. I. Chernyshev was engaged in the collection of intelligence data and for contacts with one of the most famous "initiators" in the history of Russian intelligence … the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Napoleon Sh. M. Talleyrand (known under the pseudonyms "Handsome Leander", "Anna Ivanovna")!
About the activities of A. I. Chernyshev knows a lot. It is known that in a short time the colonel managed to create a network of informants in the government and military spheres of Paris, to establish and expand the activities of persons who were bribed for large (including personal) money. One of them is an employee of the French Ministry of War, Michelet, who was part of a special group that once every two weeks compiled a summary for Napoleon personally about the number and deployment of the French Armed Forces. Achievements in A. I. Chernyshev has recently inspired many Russian historians to create a successful image of a Russian intelligence officer.
However, let us ask ourselves a question: how exactly did his activity influence the further course of events? Despite the colonel's selfless activity, information from "Handsome Leandre" and other sources, Russia was unable to prepare for the upcoming war against Napoleon, who entered Moscow in September 1812.
Unfortunately, the fate of the "Special Chancellery" was short-lived. With the dismissal in September 1812, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, from the post of Minister of War, his brainchild - the first special intelligence agency in Russia and Europe - was disbanded and revived in the 30s. of the same century. The functions of the chancellery were transferred directly to the Minister of War, some of the intelligence officers were recalled to their homeland. With the final victory over Napoleon in 1815, the military threat over Russia disappeared, and the need to create special intelligence agencies - from the point of view of those in power - was not urgent.
Russian intelligence: new directions
The priority in intelligence business was, of course, the "European direction", but Russia had extensive borders in the East, in particular, with one of the strong and dangerous enemies - Persia (Iran), with which our country in the first third of the XIX century. (in 1804-1813 and 1826-1828) waged bloody wars.
In April 1828, the most educated person of his era, A. S. Griboyedov, author of the famous work "Woe from Wit". As before, during the time of Peter the Great, for A. S. Griboyedov, a secret instruction-mandate was drawn up, which indicated the areas of his intelligence activities.
For example, collecting statistical and political information about Persia, its history, geography, the state of its economy and trade; collection of information about Persia's neighbors, about its relationship with them, about the way of life, customs, trade of their population, about "friendly and hostile" relations between Persia and other countries. Particular attention was paid to the collection of "in the true light of the stated" information about Bukhara, its trade, relations with Khiva, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey.
However, A. S. Griboyedov did not manage to start fulfilling the tasks assigned to him - on January 30, 1829, an angry crowd of Persians broke into the territory of the Russian embassy, plundered and killed everyone who was there. Among the dead was A. S. Griboyedov.
Russia's interests extended far south - to the countries of South America, more precisely, to Brazil. The official appointment to the post of first consul in distant Rio de Janeiro took place in the summer of 1812 (he will arrive in Brazil in April 1813). It becomes a certain G. I. von Langsdorff (a native of Germany), who knows Portuguese, French, German, English, Russian, is well acquainted with the art of medicine. The difference between the work of the Russian consul and the work of his colleagues in Europe was as follows - he collected data for the successful trade of Russia with Brazil, i.e. collected intelligence information of an economic nature.
G. I. von Langsdorff obtained a wealth of information about a country practically unknown for Russia (and even for Europe). He painstakingly, with German punctuality, compiled and sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry a complete list of foreign ships that visited Rio de Janeiro in January-April 1813, indicating the time of arrival and departure of the ship, its name and class, the name and surname of the captain, character cargo, port of departure and destination, time spent by the vessel in transit, consignee (in Brazil).
Based on information from ship captains, foreign merchants G. I. Langsdorf made the necessary calculations and made recommendations on the most expedient dates for Russian merchant ships to sail to the shores of Brazil from the Baltic ports, as well as dates for sailing back and routes. G. I. Langsdorf provided detailed advice on the nomenclature, quality and other detailed characteristics of the goods to be delivered to Brazil.
However, due to the long distance and the priority of other state tasks, the most valuable information of the Russian consul, one might say, disappeared without benefit for Russia.
Intelligence in Russia in the second half of the 19th century
The case of M. B. Barclay de Tolly, by sending special agents to foreign countries, received a rebirth in the 30s. XIX century. with the arrival in the Ministry of War (in 1828) A. I. Chernysheva. Regular servicemen and employees of the Foreign Ministry were now involved in intelligence work. Sometimes even the latter managed to achieve greater success than the former, since intelligence (foreign and military) in all countries, as a rule, was carried out by officers, and the arrival of any military man (even officially retired) into the country already aroused certain suspicions.
One of the priority tasks facing foreign intelligence during this period was - in modern terms - industrial espionage. With the beginning of world development of progress in industry at the turn of the XVIII-XIX centuries. Russia began to lag far behind Europe in terms of economy. Therefore, all Russian embassies at European courts were instructed to pay special attention to the emerging inventions, discoveries and improvements "both in terms of the military, and in general in terms of manufactories and industry" and immediately "provide detailed information about them."
By the 30s. XIX century. There is a lot of evidence of how Russian intelligence officers obtained important military-technical information for Russia: in 1832, the ambassador in Paris for 600 francs bought a description with drawings of new carriages for the French field artillery; in 1835 the consul in Hamburg obtained in Belgium reports to the Belgian king about military roads, models of rifles and a telegraph of the latest models. However, the Crimean War (1853-1856) gave a severe test to Russia's industrial espionage and proved that, despite the dedication of the intelligence officers, the result - the introduction of new technologies into Russian production - was never achieved.
Due to the lack of military agents, Russian envoys were involved in obtaining intelligence data of a purely military nature. It is about this in a letter sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated May 8, 1852, A. I. Chernyshev says the following: “The Emperor, wishing that the Ministry of War should always have as complete and correct information as possible about the military forces of foreign states, the timely receipt of which is necessary for the ministry's considerations, he deigned to command the highest order: to those states where there are no special war correspondents, to deliver time-based, at certain times, information about the state of the military forces of these states according to a short and easy-to-implement program."
Intelligence in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century
At the turn of the twentieth century. Russia's foreign intelligence was concentrated mainly in the hands of the Foreign Ministry. According to the "Establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" of 1892, information of a political, economic, and military nature, received from abroad, was concentrated in the office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Abroad, the organization of the study of the host country (by any means) was entrusted to the heads of diplomatic missions. Before leaving on a business trip, each head of the foreign mission was introduced to secret written instructions prepared in the Foreign Ministry office and certified by the emperor.
Thus, in the instructions received by the new envoy in Addis Ababa, P. M. Vlasov in September 1897, said: "In addition to the general instructions already given to you, I consider it necessary to draw the attention of Your Excellency to some questions, the clarification of which on the spot will be one of the tasks of your Mission, which has … an exploratory character."
To provide financial support for activities related to "exploration", special amounts were allocated - to bribe the right people. In 1857, the Ministry of Finance allocated 2.973 rubles for this kind of expenses, in 1889 - 125.973 rubles, in 1901 - 162.473 rubles. (curious, how much money was deposited in the pockets of "enterprising" messengers?).
There were some peculiarities in the organization of intelligence work abroad. For example, the conduct of secret agent intelligence by Russian envoys (for which special funds were allocated) was not obligatory, but was provided "at their discretion", which gave rise to a passive attitude towards intelligence on the part of most of the Foreign Ministry employees.
The biggest success of Russian intelligence before World War I was the recruitment of Alfred Redl, colonel of the Russian department of the Austro-Hungarian intelligence. The colonel deliberately concealed from the Austro-Hungarian General Staff the intelligence information received by him personally, on duty, from the agents of Vienna in Russia. A. Redl handed over to Russia the Austro-Hungarian mobilization plans against Russia and Serbia.
Subsequently, A. Redl's treason helped, according to the English intelligence researcher E. Woodhole, to successfully confront the Serbian army against the Austro-Hungarian troops in the initial period of the war. It is curious that the colonel did some "services" out of his own motives, never asked for a fee, which the Russian side always paid him generously.
True, intelligence historians disagree about the usefulness of his documentary information for the Russian side. Probably the last word rests with future research.
Despite the Foreign Ministry's "monopoly" over intelligence abroad, sometimes individual Russian departments had their own agents abroad. A typical example is P. I. Rachkovsky, who headed the agents of the tsarist department of Russia in France, and combined his "work" for the police and intelligence. "Colleague" P. I. Rachkovsky in Berlin, A. M. Garting, played a prominent role in obtaining intelligence information.
The Ministry of Finance also collected information of state significance abroad, relying on its own agents - financial agents and representatives of banks. The Ministry of Trade and Industry, created in October 1905, had a number of individual agents abroad who were attached to Russian missions and were mainly engaged in the collection of economic intelligence data.
The Holy Synod also supplied its own information, using the spiritual missions of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad to achieve its goals. However, one should not overestimate the activities of individual departments. The information received, for example, from a banker or hieromonk, differed in varying degrees of interest, activity, regularity, depth, completeness and reliability.
If we outline the general position of Russian intelligence on the eve of World War I, it was in a very neglected state. As a rule, undercover activity abroad was based on fragmentary information from "well-wishers", ie. individuals who independently offered information, often one or more times. Intelligence structures did not have a clear organization, often received information haphazardly, in the absence of a common program.
The following example is typical. The commander of the Vyborg regiment, Tsernitsky, said that in Berlin, Count Shuvalov (ambassador to Germany) in the 90s. XIX century. gathered all the Russian officers, deciding to find out their "opinion about the German army and invited them all to give written answers, giving an hour of time for this work." He wrote it himself. When these answers were read, which put the German army very highly in all respects, Shuvalov confessed that he … recognized the German army as good, but not as brilliant as he now saw from the reviews he read, which means that he was misleading his government, not attaching any importance to this army in their reports … ".
Russian intelligence, of course, had its own shortcomings and shortcomings in its work. Traitors also served in its ranks, without whom no intelligence service in the world exists. But the most important and remarkable thing is the boundless courage of Russian intelligence officers, who sometimes at the cost of their lives obtained the information necessary for the country, which contributed to the prosperity of Russia.