Battle of Cannes 216 BC e. Among the many battles of the ancient era, the Battle of Cannes occupies a special place, which became the largest battle of the Second Punic War - the war for domination in the Mediterranean between the two great powers of that era, the Roman and Carthaginian republics. Although this battle could not predetermine the outcome of the war in favor of Carthage, it is today one of the most striking examples of tactical prowess in military history.
First of all, it is one of the most famous examples of encirclement of numerically superior enemy forces. In addition, it is believed that in terms of the number of lives lost in one day, Cannes is one of the 30 bloodiest battles in the entire human history to our times. And besides, this is an example of the fact that even the greatest military victories cannot always decide the outcome of the war itself …
By the time of the great battle, the position of the two warring parties was very uncertain. On the one hand, the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca, who began in 218 BC. e. his trip to Italy, won a number of victories. At the Trebbia River, and then at Lake Trasimene, he was able to defeat two large Roman armies. On the other hand, Rome, realizing in the end all the danger of a war with such a talented commander, was able to muster forces that significantly exceeded those of Hannibal.
Before the battle, the Roman army numbered 86,000 soldiers, of which 80,000 were infantry and 6,000 cavalry. Hannibal had only 50,000 soldiers, but he had a great superiority in cavalry: his African cavalry numbered 10,000. We can also say about the psychological advantage of the Carthaginians - the Roman army consisted mostly of recruits, while Hannibal had only veterans who had repeatedly defeated the Romans.
Nevertheless, the significant numerical superiority led to a surge in revanchist sentiments in Rome. Democratic circles of the popular assembly demanded decisive action, and in 216 BC. e. The experienced military leader Lucius Aemilius Paul and the popular supporter of immediate decisive action, Guy Terentius Varro, were elected consuls. They were put at the head of the united army, while, as was customary among the Romans, they commanded it in turn: one on even days, the other on odd days. And this consular diarchy became one of the important reasons for the subsequent catastrophe.
The mood of the troops of the Roman allies was unstable, the enemy ravaged the country. In this situation, the Senate spoke in favor of giving a decisive battle. The consuls Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paul received instructions from the Senate "to end the war with courage and worthy of the fatherland when the moment is favorable for that." The consuls announced the decision of the Senate, explained to the soldiers the reasons for the previous failures and stated that under the present circumstances, it is impossible to name a single reason, not a single obstacle to victory. After that, the Roman legions advanced to Cannes and two days later they camped two kilometers from the enemy.
In terms of numbers, the Roman army outnumbered the forces of the Carthaginians by almost two times, but the Carthaginian army had an important advantage: the quantitative and especially qualitative superiority of the cavalry, which the completely open plain allowed to use. Under these conditions, Aemilius Paul considered it necessary to refrain from fighting, to push the army further, to carry the Carthaginians with him and then to give battle in a position convenient for the infantry. Terentius Varro was of the opposite opinion and demanded a battle on the plain near Cannes.
August 1 - Varro commanded the Roman army; he gave the order to the legions to withdraw from the camp and to advance towards the enemy. Aemilius was against these actions, but Varro ignored all his protests. Hannibal moved his cavalry and light infantry to meet the Roman army and suddenly attacked the Roman legions while on the move, causing confusion among their ranks.
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But after the Romans pushed forward a detachment of heavily armed infantry, reinforcing it with javelin throwers and cavalry. The attack of the Carthaginians was repelled, and they were forced to retreat. This success further strengthened Varro in his desire for a decisive battle. The next day, Emilius could no longer safely withdraw the legions, since the Romans were in direct contact with the enemy.
August 2 - as soon as the sun appeared, the Roman troops left both camps at once and began to build a battle formation on the left bank of the Aufid River, with the front to the south. Part of the Roman cavalry was placed near the river on the right wing; the infantry adjoined it in the same line, while the maniples were placed much closer than before, and the whole formation was given greater depth than width. Another part of the cavalry (cavalry of the allies) became on the left wing. In front of all the troops, at some distance, there were detachments of archers and slingers. The battle formation of the Romans occupied about two kilometers along the front.
The heavily armed infantry was lined up in three lines of 12 ranks in each, that is, in depth - 36 ranks (according to other sources, in three lines of 16 ranks, that is, a total of 48 ranks). Such a powerful depth of formation could imply one and only tactic - a frontal offensive. There were no reserves at all in the event of unforeseen enemy actions.
Legions and maniples lined up at reduced intervals and distances; on the left flank there were 4,000 cavalry under the command of Varro, on the right flank - 2,000 cavalry under the command of Emilia. 8,000 lightly armed infantrymen covered the battle formation. 10,000 legionnaires remained in the camp, 7,000 people guarded the train. Thus, 69,000 Romans became direct participants in the battle.
Reducing the intervals and distances and increasing the depth of the formation of the Romans actually meant abandoning the more than once proven advantages of the manipulative structure of the legions. The Roman army turned into a huge phalanx that was unable to maneuver on the battlefield. Moreover, the Romans did almost nothing to combat the main disadvantage of the phalanx - its inability to repel attacks from the flanks. In the conditions of an open plain, this mistake was fatal.
The battle formation of the Carthaginian army was dismembered along the front: the worst troops were located in the center, the wings consisted of selected units of infantry and cavalry. On his far right flank, Hannibal built a Numidian cavalry (2,000 horsemen) under the command of Hannon, on the far left flank was the heavy African cavalry (8,000 horsemen) under the command of Hasdrubal, while on the way of this cavalry attack there were only 2,000 horsemen of poorly trained Roman cavalry.
Beside the cavalry, on both flanks, there were 6,000 heavy African infantrymen (Libyans), built in 16 ranks. In the center, 10 ranks deep, were 20,000 Gauls and Iberians, whom Hannibal ordered to advance. The center was built with a ledge forward so that a curved line like a crescent was formed, gradually thinning towards the ends. Hannibal himself was also here. 8,000 lightly armed infantrymen covered the battle formation of the Carthaginian army. Thus, despite the smaller numbers, the Carthaginians had a wider formation than the Romans.
The beginning of the great battle was commonplace. As in other battles of antiquity, the first word was said by archers and slingers. The lightly armed infantry of both opponents, starting a battle, then retreated to the location of their armies. Following this, the cavalry of the left flank of the Carthaginian battle formation defeated the cavalry of the right flank of the Romans, went to the rear of their battle formation, attacked the cavalry of the left flank and scattered it. The Carthaginians drove the Roman cavalry from the battlefield. At the same time, an infantry battle was unfolding.
The Roman phalanx moved forward and attacked the Carthaginians. For a time, the ranks of the Iberians and Celts withstood the battle and fought bravely against the Romans; but then, under the pressure of the heavy mass of the legions, they gave up and began to retreat backward, bending the line of the crescent moon in the opposite direction. In fact, among the Carthaginians, the flanks and the center did not enter the battle at the same time, the center before the flanks, because the Celts, lined up in the form of a crescent, with a convex side facing the enemy, advanced far ahead.
Stepping on the Celtic infantry, the Romans pressed to the center, where the enemy was being fed, and went so far forward that on both sides they found themselves between the heavily armed Libyans, who were located on the flanks. The Libyans of the right wing made a left turn and, advancing from the right, lined up against the Romans from the flank. Left wing Libyans made the same turn to the right.
Everything turned out as Hannibal had expected: in pursuit of the Celts, the Romans were surrounded by the Libyans. No longer able to fight along the entire line, the Romans, alone and with separate maniples, fought with the enemy, pushing them from the sides.
The whole course of events on the battlefield created the prerequisites for the coverage of the flanks of the Roman army by the Carthaginian infantry and the completion of the encirclement of the Romans by cavalry and the destruction of the surrounded Roman army. The battle formation of the Carthaginians took a concave enveloping shape. The Romans wedged themselves into it, which facilitated the two-way coverage of their battle formation. The rear ranks of the Romans had to turn to fight the Carthaginian cavalry, which, having defeated the Roman cavalry, attacked the Roman infantry.
Thus, the Carthaginian army ended the encirclement of the Romans. The dense formation of the legions robbed them of their maneuverability. The Romans were knocked together, and only the warriors of the outer ranks had the opportunity to fight. The numerical superiority of the Romans lost its significance; inside this huge mass there was a crush, the soldiers could not turn. A terrible massacre of the Romans began. As a result of the 12-hour battle, the Romans lost 48,000 killed and about 10,000 prisoners. The losses of the Carthaginians were 6,000 killed.
The Roman army was defeated because it did not realize the tactical advantages of its battle order; in particular, no strong reserve was allocated, which later became the rule in the Roman army. They returned to the undivided phalanx, which nullified the Roman superiority in forces. The depth of the formation hampered the actions of the fighters, and the narrow front contributed to their encirclement. The enemy's maneuverability in this case led the Romans to disaster. The order of battle of the Carthaginian army was built with the expectation of complete destruction of the enemy by encircling him with strong flanks in the presence of a weak center.
The flanks not only ceased to be a weak spot in the battle formation, but became a means of encircling large enemy forces with smaller forces. At the Battle of Cannes, the well-armed, organized and trained cavalry of the Carthaginians defeated the first-class Roman infantry at that time. She completed the encirclement of the Roman army, which in fact decided the outcome of the battle. The Carthaginian cavalry maneuvered well on the battlefield and interacted well with the infantry.
After the defeat of the Romans at Cannes, some of the major cities of southern Italy fell away from Rome. Hannibal was able to create an anti-Roman coalition from Macedonia, Syracuse and the individual Greek cities of Sicily. In fact, Rome was surrounded by enemies. But the Carthaginian army did not go to Rome. The Carthaginian Senate, fearing the strengthening of Hannibal's power, did not support her army in Italy with either the fleet or money. The major victory of the Carthaginian army was not fully utilized by Carthage.
But the Roman government, on the contrary, drew conclusions from this defeat and took the most energetic measures. Internal strife between the Democratic Party and the Senate ceased. The advocates of decisive military action lost their political credibility, and the influence of the Senate increased dramatically. With promises and threats, Rome was able to maintain loyalty to more of its Latin and Italian allies. At the cost of an incredible effort, new troops were assembled, led by Fabius Maximus and the resolute Claudius Marcellus. From 215 BC e. a new stage of the war began, which on the whole can be defined as a stage of relative equilibrium.
A. Domanin