Foreword
We bring to your attention a declassified draft of the plan of world imperialism represented by the US intelligence community to use the fact of Stalin's death in the class struggle against communism.
The first thing I would like to note. The fact that the CIA declassifies such documents without hesitation shows that capital in the United States feels very confident and is not afraid of any accusations from the outraged public.
Second. It should be noted that the aim of the imperialists was precisely the leadership of the Communist Party. The bourgeoisie is well aware that the weakest point of the communist movement is the continuity of leadership. The second most important goal was the destruction of the unity of the world communist movement, which Khrushchev successfully did for the United States.
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TOP SECRET
March 13, 1953
Memorandum for the Psychological Strategy Committee
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TOPIC: Plan for the psychological use of Stalin's death
What is reported here is a revised text of the draft related to Stalin's death, and prepared for consideration at the Committee's meeting scheduled for March 18. As instructed, I have combined written and oral comments in this revision. Since editing was not allowed, the article remained vague and some discrepancies related to the urgency of preparation.
I would especially like to emphasize the importance of assumption 3 d on page 2. The drafting team felt that the main value of the proposed speech in the paragraph is to serve as a turning point when it is incorporated into a new policy initiative that differs from the current policy approach. Apparently, only the most careful precautions in this regard can prevent new steps from being perceived as "psychological warfare."
Acting
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application
Plan for the psychological use of Stalin's death
Part I. Introduction
1. Task
a. The challenge is to draw up a plan of psychological operations that is part of a comprehensive and crucial program of exploiting Stalin's death and transferring power to new hands, aimed at achieving real progress towards our national interests.
b. At the present time it is impossible for a psychological plan to exist that would be suitable for all cases. Psychological operations, like other actions, must have the ability to quickly and flexibly respond to changes in the situation. Consequently, a strong, high-level inter-agency team needs to be established with the aim of continuously reviewing psychological plans and operations in line with national policy.
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2. Key considerations
a. Psychological operations by themselves cannot have a sufficient impact on the Soviet system, causing changes in it, which we would regard as real progress towards our national goals. They can only contribute to the success of the diplomatic, political, military and economic actions that the United States Government is taking. They can also exacerbate tensions within the Soviet system itself. Such operations must be part of a comprehensive and decisive program of exploiting Stalin's death.
b. A discussion of what all the elements of such a program should be is outside the scope of this document. However, when drawing up this plan of psychological operations, it was necessary to make certain assumptions about national policy. These assumptions, adapted for the purposes of this document, are set out below in paragraph 3. If these assumptions prove to be wrong, the plan of psychological operations must be adjusted accordingly.
3. Assumptions
a. The fundamental goals of the United States in relation to the Council system are intended to remain as set out in the relevant National Security Council documents, namely NSC 20/4, NSC 68, NSC 114, and NSC 135. In essence, these fundamental goals are:
(1) Reduce the strength and influence of the Soviets, in the satellite countries and in communist China, and thereby reduce the strength and influence of the Soviets in international affairs;
(2) Implement a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system - which will be reflected in the international relations of the Soviet regime in a manner that is consistent with the spirit and purposes of the UN Charter.
b. It is assumed that the United States Government, in order to achieve these goals, intends to use all the opportunities that have arisen in connection with the death of Stalin, and the attendant problems of transferring power.
c. The United States Government is expected to pursue a comprehensive and critical program of action - including all appropriate diplomatic, political, military, and economic measures at our disposal. The goal is to make real progress towards our national goals. It is also expected that this plan of psychological operations, revised from time to time, will be part of this large and integrated campaign.
d. Finally, a key initial step in this national campaign is envisioned to be a speech by the President, which outlines the United States' peace program [and possibly a proposal for an early high-level meeting to address certain important issues to be resolved]. This will be seen as a major step that we hope will lead to serious negotiations to resolve these issues. As a result, such a move must be interpreted and advertised as an important effort on the part of the United States to move towards world peace.
4. Psychological assessment of the situation
(This paragraph is to be read in conjunction with the Special Intelligence Situation Assessment (SE-39, 12 March 1953))
a. It has long been assumed that one of the most promising opportunities for real progress towards our national goals in relation to the Soviet system could emerge after Stalin's death. The inevitable need to transfer power into new hands, no matter how carefully it was prepared, creates a moment of crisis for the Soviet Union and the Soviet system as a whole. We should not be fooled by the apparent smoothness of the transfer of power. A despotic system can only be ruled by a despot, and history is littered with examples of failed efforts to replace a tyrant with a workers' committee. The real question is whether Malenkov (or anyone else) will be able to keep or keep all the factors of power under the same tight control as Stalin was able to do.
b. Among the facts that have already become known, the following facts are of particular importance for the development of a program of psychological operations created to support national efforts in making progress towards our goals:
(1) The transition of power to the new regime took place in a dramatically quick and obviously decisive manner. This event and the announced changes in the structure of government indicate careful preparation and advance planning.
(2) The ongoing reorganization of the party and state apparatus is almost identical to that used during the Second World War. This unambiguously indicates efforts to concentrate power in the hands of a small and manageable group of people, and creates both an internal and an external sense of toughness, unity and continuity of the top leadership.
(3) Three characteristics of this reorganization deserve special mention. First, [the new regime, clearly trying its best] for some time has continued to make every effort to strengthen control over the military, and to ensure their loyalty, [as can be judged by the increasing role of the military, and in particular, by the new appointment of Zhukov]. Second, the recently criticized internal security apparatus was consolidated and openly transferred into the hands of the most experienced and ruthless of them all - Beria. Third, there was an intensive regrouping and consolidation of industrial, transport and economic ministries, control over which was transferred to the hands of a small number of deputies.
(4) The initial statements of the new regime emphasized the leading role played by the great Russian people. [This suggests that the regime will continue to base its physical and political strength on the great Russian people, etc.]. The speech at Stalin's funeral emphasized the multinational character of the USSR. That is, the regime could fear the need to strengthen repressive measures, so that not the Russian republics, as well as the satellite countries, whose reliability is questionable, remain in the ranks. The fact that Stalin was Georgian and Malenkov was Russian may be of symbolic importance in this regard. However, the population of the Soviet Union certainly does not play a significant role in this situation.
(5) In addition, there is currently nothing that would indicate changes or the nature of changes, if any, in the conduct of foreign and domestic policies. Except for a sharp increase in internal or external stress, such changes do not seem likely to occur in the near future.
c. On the other hand, the very speed with which the transfer of power was carried out, the nature of this change, the severity of the control applied, the speed with which Stalin was buried, and the warnings against "disorder and panic" (an unusually frank quote from the newspaper Pravda) - all this suggests that nervousness and anxiety about the stability of the new regime prevail in the upper echelons of power. As for Malenkov, in particular, his dominant concern is efforts to consolidate his own power and control the regime.
d. It can probably be assumed that the regime hopes to avoid serious external difficulties, as long as there is a consolidation of power, or until the struggle for power reaches the stage at which one or another challenger does not see an opportunity to achieve his interests by pursuing an aggressive and risky course of action. … However, in the nature of such a new regime lies the need to demonstrate its rigidity or, to put it negatively, the need to avoid any manifestation of weakness. Taking all this into account, the following conclusions can be drawn:
(1) The regime, for some time, is unlikely to take any hasty action or put forward significant new initiatives.
(2) The new rulers are likely to be "more Catholic than the Pope," for some time adhering to the policies pursued by Stalin.
(3) The new rulers will react quickly, harshly, and even, perhaps, excessively, to any external threat.
e. The evidence available to date suggests that the new regime may be particularly concerned about:
(1) loyalty and subordination of the regimes of the satellite countries, (2) relations with communist China, (3) loyalty to the army, (4) internal security, (5) relations of national minorities in the USSR, (6) party control over the government and the police, and strengthening ties between the party and the people.
f. Regardless of its outspoken attitude to the outside world, the main concern of the new regime and Malenkov, in particular, is related to the strengthening of their position within the country. [In addition, it is likely that, with the exception of serious external problems, the nature of which was not taken into account by the policies established by Stalin, serious friction within the regime will more often arise in connection with internal issues than with any other.] Serious friction within the regime over external questions, most likely, can arise in cases where such questions are too new to be adequately addressed within the framework of the policy established by Stalin.
5. Strategic vision
a. The psychological operations plan should be drawn up in the context of the strategic concept. Although its formulation is outside the scope of this document, it is necessary to outline the basic principles of the strategic concept as a basis for the psychological plan. When revising this concept, the plan of psychological operations should be revised accordingly.
b. Objectives. In line with our fundamental interests, and as the most promising ways to achieve real progress towards these interests, our main goals in today's situation are to use the opportunities and difficulties of transferring power into new hands that have appeared as a result of Stalin's death:
[In relation to the communist system:
(1) contribute to a split in the upper echelons of the regime;
(2) foster discord between the Soviet Union and communist China;
(3) foster discord between the Soviet Union and the satellite countries of Eastern Europe;
(4) promote conflicts between major leaders or groups within the Soviet Union;
In relation to the free world:
(5) promote strengthening and unity;
(6) develop and maintain confidence in US leadership in the free world;
(7) destroy the power of the communists]
Option A:
(1) To involve the new regime of the Soviets in making important and difficult political decisions, which, according to existing estimates, can increase the divergence of interests among those who are currently leading the Soviets. In doing so, pressure should be avoided that could lead to their union.
(2) To present to the Soviet people and the population of the satellite countries a clear and fresh vision of American goals in order to more closely link their interests with ours.
(3) Unite the free world around a positive and sustained effort to find peace, and around a more transparent concept of goals common to our allies, "neutral" countries, and ourselves.
(4) Offer a new and more solid foundation within the United States to advance American interests and goals.
Option B:
(1) Encourage everything that causes disagreement within the top of the Kremlin hierarchy, with a special focus on the situation with Malenkov-Beria-Molotov-Bulganin.
(2) Stimulate disagreements between the Kremlin and the governments of satellite countries, including communist China.
(3) Maximize the enmity between the population of the Soviet Union and Malenkov.
(4) Maximize disagreements between Malenkov and the populations of the satellite countries, including communist China.
(5) Maintain and foster unity among the leaders of the governments of the countries of the free world.
(6) Maintain and foster unity among the people of the free world.
(7) Continue the successful construction of the security system for the United States and other countries of the free world.
(8) Achieve a solid economic position for the United States and other countries in the free world, with widespread confidence in the economic leadership of President Eisenhower.
c. Assets
(1) The most important asset we have to achieve these goals is the dynamic performance of President Eisenhower's personality and position in the United States.
(2) Next comes the diplomatic leadership that we have in all international organizations, led by Secretary of State Dulles and the US mission to the UN.
(3) Our third largest asset is our military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, with their deterrent power, which creates a sense of relatively high security for those associated with us.
(4) The fourth asset is our economic strength with its enormous production and our ability to help others.
d. The main obstacles for us are:
(1) A natural tendency on the part of other countries in the free world to be dissatisfied with the leading position of the United States.
(2) Difficulty maintaining the momentum for building security in the face of understandable desires for tax cuts, reduced military service, and increased social security.
(3) The danger of an attitude of complete dependence of other countries of the free world on the defense and economic might of the United States.
(4) Our allies' concerns about our long-term economic and political goals.
(5) Our legacy of significant debt and mistakes made in previous years.
e. Methods
(1) Main efforts: the chosen strategy. One of the most significant means of achieving the above goals is our opposition to the communist leaders by making it difficult for them to make important decisions. This opposition must be carried out in such a way as to increase their isolation and increase internal divisions, while strengthening humanism, especially in the countries of the free world. The above speech of the President should serve this purpose.
(2) Supporting efforts.
In relation to the communist world:
(a) We must overload the new regime with other incentives that can provoke internal divisions, such as events requiring a decision or mistakes that lead to recriminations - while avoiding threats or saber-rattling.
(b) We must put doubts in them - for example, about the reliability of individuals and groups.
© We must stimulate internal contradictions by other appropriate means, such as strengthening nationalist feelings.
(d) We must use the carrot-and-stick policy, both to directly support major efforts and to apply other supportive actions. The essence of such a policy is to create a push-pull situation, a combination of pressures and incentives that will show the disadvantages of decisions that are contrary to our interests, and demonstrate the advantages of decisions that are favorable to us.
(e) Changes in direction and emphasis (between carrots and sticks) should be used as additional means of confusion, unless stability is desired for a specific reason.
(f) Feeling (see d (2) below).
In relation to the free world:
(g) The most promising ways to achieve our goals in relation to the free world are:
(1) emphasizing the importance of increasing strength and unity, with emphasis on new elements of danger and opportunity in a given situation, (2) the proclamation of the desire and intention to cooperate in the development of the unity of efforts of the free world. In this regard, it would be desirable to approach our allies in a spirit of mutual concessions, (h) We must exploit the potential weakening of ties between the Kremlin and communist parties around the world, resulting from Malenkov's lack of position, experience and ideological prowess, in order to become the new leader of world communism.
f. Stages
(1) Initial dash. Over the coming weeks, the high risk and expense of extending and exploiting the conditions of nervousness caused by the sudden change of power is well justified. The President's speech suggested above is specifically designed for this.
(2) Continued. It is very important that the jerk, especially the main effort, does not become a one-shot operation. First of all, there must be an adequate "stick" at the ready for the expected evasion of the Soviets from the "carrot" proposed by the President's speech. It is necessary to use all the energy so that the germs of discord will germinate. For this purpose, actions may be desirable that by themselves will not have much effect, but will allow probing the situation to find where the thrown seeds have sprouted. If events develop very favorably, then this phase can move on to the next.
(3) The culmination in which the communist system comes into open internal conflict. This third phase in our strategy should begin if (and when) such a conflict begins to approach. If it never happens, then the strategy will still prove useful in achieving our main goal.
Part II. Psychological operations plan
1. General questions
a. The importance of psychological pressure in the present situation lies in the availability of a convenient moment not only for the concentration of all our psychological means on the stated goals, but also for the decisive development of broader and more effective opportunities. It is possible that even more important is the determination to seize and consistently support the initiative through psychological operations - creatively thought out and impressively executed. Before we can win hearts or influence the intelligence of our targets, the psychological strategy of the United States must capture their imaginations.
b. The main hope in achieving the goals of this plan lies in the real actions of the government, which are of psychological importance. The President's speech, envisioned in Part I, paragraph 3 d, is the cornerstone on which this psychological strategy is based. This intended speech, and the various formal steps that will arise directly from it, must, however, be complemented by a number of important psychological actions [in Part III, a list of suggested possible actions with their psychological significance is given]. All, except for some open and secret psychological programs proposed in the following paragraphs of this part, are intended mainly to use, prolong and increase the psychological influence of various political, economic and military actions [comparable in their effect to thosesuggested or proposed in the plan]. (Should be removed if Part III is removed)
from. For administrative reasons, the submission plan merely summarizes the effort demanded in the area of covert operations, but it assumes that such effort will be adequate in its materialization, and that it will be effective and original in its application to justify the serious trust placed on a secret unit in achieving the goals of the plan - these operations are secondary only in relation to official actions.
With regard to the general direction, the covert efforts will be guided by the following general considerations:
In covert propaganda operations, we must be guided primarily by credibility. Within the framework of these restrictions, wide freedom of action and independence is allowed. In the area of political action, we must, as usual, be guided by national goals and the need to avoid provocations to such an extent that can cause the strengthening of the Soviet regime or their forceful reaction. Our secret propaganda should not worry about consistency, both in terms of thematic or regional relations, and until it becomes necessary to avoid actions that may be mutually exclusive, or that may undermine or visibly discredit operations conducted openly.
Covert information operations must develop believable material from open information sources.
Clandestine activities should be directed to pressure at many points by causing concern and spreading doubt, confusion and suspicion. It is recognized that such operations are most effective in the following areas:
(1) stimulating defectors among the officials of the Soviets and the satellite countries through covert pressure on them;
(2) the spread of doubt and uncertainty in the ranks of the communist parties in the satellite countries and in the countries of the free world.
The government unit carrying out covert operations, however, must be susceptible to the emergence of any opportunities to influence the leading groups in the USSR itself and create suspicion, uncertainty and pressure.
d. While the scope for rapid growth in the funds and effectiveness of our open information programs is limited - the scale of today's efforts is already impressive - these programs also have an important role to play in fulfilling the plan and meeting the demand for maximum energy, initiative and ingenuity in the development of the wide range of tasks listed below. They are no less important to this than covert operations.
In the situation to which this document refers, it can be assumed that all governments and people around the world are deeply interested, firstly, in accurate information and interpretation of events in the Soviet Union and their consequences. Secondly, they are interested in the attitude of the United States to the situation, its intentions and actions in this regard. Consequently, the main responsibility falls on the official media to disseminate facts and reliable commentary on developments from original and relevant sources, including the President's statements formulating the position of the United States. This is an important foundation on which effective advocacy is based.
The successful use of open media in psychological operations requires careful coordination of all aspects. Coordination of public statements will be very important, since such statements are the most effective weapon for open use. The supervisory committee provided for in this plan must specifically inform the media about the upcoming actions and their significance. (For example, if a public statement is published as a trial balloon, then the media should be encouraged to ensure that it is disseminated as much as possible.)
e. Our secret, as well as overt propaganda, operating in many areas, must take into account the fact that the Soviet system suffered an irreparable loss due to the death of Stalin, and that the time has come for purposeful, decisive and joint action on the part of the West.
f. In a regime change, defectors deserve high priority in covert and open media. The fundamental role of open media, in this case, is, of course, not in direct stimulation of defectors, but in their indirect support by publishing information about ongoing cases of this kind.
g. Congressional and media leaders must take part in a peaceful offensive operation with an urgent need to support our defense-building efforts.
h. This plan is subject to continuous review in light of the changing situation.
2. Actions of mass media in directions
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a. In relation to the Soviet Union.
In addition to standard topics, official media should try to accomplish the following tasks:
(1) To raise doubts about the stability of the top of the new regime. In this regard, it will be helpful to cite history and contemporary Soviet affairs experts such as Tito and the ex-communists, and publish reports from former refugees who participated in the communist apparatus reporting plots against each other between the four main Kremlin leaders. The goal is to demonstrate that despotism requires a despot, this will lead to the assumption that Malenkov does not control all the factors of power, and that the new organization does not work, and, therefore, the struggle for power together with new purges is inevitable.
(2) Provide useful advice to Soviet citizens for survival in this dangerous and turbulent time, carefully introducing into the psychology of the individual the idea of weakening the effectiveness of the system.
(3) Use the fact that the reorganization of the Soviet government and the Communist Party is very similar to what happened during the Second World War, and ask questions about how necessary this reorganization is in the light of the Soviets' claim that they are supported by the overwhelming majority of Soviet people. This topic should in no way use assumptions about the danger of an imminent unleashing of a new war.
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(4) Convey the feeling that the United States Government's position is "observant" and raise awareness that the situation contains new elements of danger that, if they materialize, we will face firmly, and that new elements of hope may emerge, justifying careful change United States politics.
(5) When publicly addressed to the Government of the Soviets by the Government of the United States, it should be used intensively to portray the important aspirations that prompted this action in order to achieve a relaxation of international tension. If this does not bring success, all responsibility should be placed directly on the USSR, (6) To take advantage of the fact that there was an apparent effort by part of the new regime of the Soviets to bribe the military by increasing their representation in power, and to question the success of these efforts, (7) Use factual assumptions made by American and Western militaries and other prominent individuals (but not senior leaders) with experience with the Soviets' military that it may be easier to reach reasonable agreements with a regime in which such people have power and influence. (Such assumptions might have been orchestrated in secret.)
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(8) Increase emphasis on the role of the United States and other countries of the free world in providing refugees from the tyranny of the Soviet communists with refuge and a new life of opportunity and freedom. The idea that the present offers better escape opportunities should be addressed in particular to the Russian-speaking audience in East Germany and to Soviet representatives abroad. One should be prepared to immediately publish in dramatically extensive terms any escapes of the Red Army and members of the Communist Party, and widely cover their escape abroad, with photographs and interviews.
(9) Introduce doubts about the loyalty of the leaders of the satellite countries to the new regime of Moscow, (10) Report any fact-based signs of policy and interest disagreement between satellite countries or the communist parties of other countries and the Soviet Union. (Such indications may result from clandestine operations, provided that these operations generate plausible indications.)
(11) Emphasize the apparent personal cooling of relations between Malenkov and Mao in such a way as to create an assumption of their strong hostility towards each other, because of which the two leaders do not want to meet.
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(12) Provide updated evidence of the peaceful intentions of the countries of the free world, while using expressions of friendship for the Soviet people, and such proposals as may be made to peacefully resolve major differences.
b. In relation to satellite countries in Eastern Europe
In the light of factual reports and a reliable interpretation of events in the USSR and their impact on the whole world, the official media should solve the following tasks in relation to the satellite countries of Eastern Europe:
(1) To support and inspire the deepening of national, including religious, sentiments, the emergence of which was stimulated by the events in the USSR.
(2) Remind in detail of the humiliation and exploitation suffered by the people of these countries as a result of their subordination to the interests of the Kremlin, together with the encouragement of the confidence that their fate under a new, inexperienced and uncertain regime is more likely to worsen than improve.
(3) Portray the United States as a strong, reliable government, whose official statements should be perceived as serious, balanced proposals for promoting freedom without unleashing a world war.
(4) Support the perception of the leaders of the satellite countries that they are all, to one degree or another, the protégé of a dead tyrant, and reinforce doubts about their relationship with the new masters of the Kremlin. At the same time, encourage suggestions that their survival may depend on new attitudes toward emerging nationalist sentiments, (5) To remind about the successful secession of Tito, about the successful cooperation of Yugoslavia as an independent state with Greece and Turkey, as well as with the countries of the West, and about the political importance of the Balkan partnership.
(6) Suggest that non-senior executives may soon be able to achieve their personal ambitions at the expense of their leaders.
(7) Remind us that the United States does not return refugees to countries behind the Iron Curtain.
(8) To condemn the exorbitant hopes and the resulting rash actions of part of the population that could cause brutal repression of patriotic citizens by worried leaders, (9) To put pressure on the dignity of the current leaders of the USSR and the satellite countries on the grounds that Mao is now beginning to play the role of the leading theoretician and revolutionary leader of international communism.
c. In relation to communist China
In addition to standard topics, the media should perform the following tasks:
(1) Promote friction at all levels and ultimately split between the leaders of the Chinese Communists and the Soviets, highlighting, among other things, that the Chinese Communists are the Kremlin's weapon.
(2) Purposefully promote rivalry and friction between the apparatus of the Chinese and Soviet Communist Party in Southeast and South Asia.
(3) To stimulate disunity between Moscow and Beijing over the Korean War, portray the growing determination of the United States to end the war by using force when necessary. This should be done by sowing doubts about whether the Soviet regime, at a time when it is trying to consolidate its own power, will be able to provide support to the Chinese communists if the United States resorts to forceful actions to end the Korean war. It is also necessary to sow doubts about the stability of the new regime of the Soviets, and in particular about Malenkov's ability to collect all the factors of power under his control, and to exercise ideological leadership.
(4) Exploit ideological divisions between Mao and Moscow.
(5) Play on Mao's notions of Malenkov as an ideological mediocrity, and present Mao as Lenin's only full-fledged heir.
(6) Create doubts about the validity of agreements and commitments on the part of Stalin to Mao, especially regarding aid in the Korean War, which were based on the theory that Mao was Stalin's man.
(7) Encourage the conviction that the Soviet Union is withholding material aid to maintain China's military and economic dependence.
d. In relation to Yugoslavia
In light of Tito's relationship with the Soviet regime, his apostasy in 1948, and his irreconcilable hostility not just to the dead tyrant, but to the entire system personified by the Kremlin and the Comintern, the need for the official media to broadcast to Yugoslavia in order to clarify the importance of events in the USSR, is small. At the same time, the example and current position of Yugoslavia are extremely important, especially for the satellite countries of Eastern Europe, and also, albeit to a lesser extent, for communist China. At the same time, reminders of successful secession, strengthening of cooperation with the countries of the free world on the basis of mutual respect and independence, as well as the potential of the Balkan partnership can be applied. In relation to Yugoslavia itself, the official media must fulfill the following tasks:
(1) Encourage the pride of Yugoslavia by the fact that they have left the Kremlin's influence and do not agree with the possible consequences of today's events in the USSR.
(2) To remind of the mutual benefits of recent cooperation with the United States and other countries of the free world, and to develop the security confidence derived from similar cooperation in the future.
(3) Develop confidence in the strength, reliability, and seriousness of the United States as the leader of the free world in this situation.
e. In relation to Western Europe (including Germany), the
media should mainly perform the following tasks:
(1) Emphasize that the threat to the free world has not diminished.
(2) Pedal the importance of swift ratification of the European Defense Treaty (EDC) and other goals to advance NATO.
(3) Point out the [possible danger of] weakness in a situation where Malenkov does not have Stalin's political experience, his ideological leadership or authority and control in the party and in the country. Even if he is already, or becomes a political leader, he will not become a "high priest." (Be careful not to imply that this is fraught with the danger of war.)
(4) Raise questions regarding the stability of the new regime.
(5) Promote confidence in the stability and reliability of the United States in its role as the leader of the free world.
(6) Inquire whether the communist parties should now turn their gaze to Moscow in all matters. Malenkov is a product of the Soviet bureaucracy, having insufficient knowledge of foreign countries, and not interested in the fate of the communists in them.
(7) To be interested in who is the more outstanding theoretician and exponent of world communism today - Mao or Malenkov.
(8) Mention the extinction of art, science and culture in the USSR at a time when Malenkov was coming to power.
f. In relation to the Near and Middle East
In view of the lack of a general prevalence in this region of concern about the threat of
Soviet communism, the official media in Arab countries should fulfill the following tasks:
(1) Emphasize that although the tyrant is gone, tyranny with its imperial ambitions remained.
(2) Demonstrate that even if there is a cessation of pressure from the USSR, this will not contribute to the national aspirations of the countries in this region. Such aspirations can only be helped by ending disputes in the region, eliminating sources of internal tension, reconciling differences with the West and building an adequate defense force.
(3) Take advantage of the confusion and uncertainty that communist and related organizations in the region may face.
(4) Seize every opportunity to strengthen the reputation and position of the United States in the region and, if possible, its allies.
(5) Publish information on the actions of the Soviets in the direction of national minorities, including factual material about the repressions against Muslims in the 30s.
g. In relation to the countries of free Asia (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Indochina, Korea, Formosa (Taiwan) and Japan)
To the extent that confidence spreads in free Asia that conditions within the USSR [can ease its pressure to a certain extent, and] can reduce its aggressiveness, support may weaken the measures required to [prosecute conflicts] to fight the communists in Korea, Indochina and Malaya. A particular problem may arise for ethnic Chinese living abroad outside of Formosa, who can be persuaded that changes in the USSR weaken their ties to the Chinese communist regime, as a result of which they may begin to perceive Mao more favorably as a national leader rather than as a [one of the partners of the global communist conspiracy,] Moscow's tool. Another special problem may arise in connection with the communist parties and related organizations in the region. In spreading doubt and confusion among them, care must be taken to avoid creating [emerging - crossed out] other doubts that [perceived as "paper tigers"] lead to less perception of the communist threat than it is.
Therefore, the official media in this region must fulfill the following tasks:
(1) Emphasize that a change in leadership in the USSR does not include a change in the nature, capabilities or intentions of the regime.
(2) Emphasize that although Mao's [role] position may change due to events in the USSR, evidence of this must be demonstrated not in words, but in deeds, in Korea, Indochina and elsewhere, including communist China itself.
(3) Emphasize that national interests in the region can be achieved not as a result of unexpected events elsewhere, but only through the hard, energetic efforts of each nation in the region, and individuals in these countries.
h. In relation to Latin America
In Latin America, evidence of doubt, confusion and mistrust caused by events in the USSR and in communist parties around the world can be used to oppose communist parties and their supporters in the region. Therefore, the official media must fulfill the following tasks:
(1) Emphasize the continuity of the character of the Soviet regime independent of its leadership, especially its lust for power, its disregard for the world, its humiliation of culture, its perversion of education, its contempt for religion, and its use of anti-Semitism.
(2) Focus on the communists and their supporters who often visit Moscow.
(3) Demonstrate the facts of servility to the Kremlin expressed by some of the cultural, professional and trade union organizations, especially of the international type.
(4) Identify and demonstrate subservience to the Kremlin by political leaders.
(5) Encourage non-communist or extreme left opposition parties to shake up and be energetic about possible confusion among the local communist high command.
(6) Offer non-communist and non-extreme left regimes, some of which may take a cautious stance, to demonstrate force against the communists by taking measures that they may have feared to take before Stalin's death.
(7) Encourage doubts among communists and left-wing groups about the strength of the existing communist regime (Malenkov may be a political boss, but he is not a “high priest,” and communist cells are far from Russia or its allies. Their strength depended just as much on Stalin's enigma, as well as from everything else, and now this mystery is gone).
(8) To encourage and create comfortable conditions for Christians, for law-abiding people who want peace.
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1. Operations involving national security policy
Probably the greatest psychological impact we can have on the Soviet regime is that which stems from the preparedness of the United States. A clear acceleration of our military build-up, an increase in the tension of training programs, larger field exercises, unofficial statements showing pride in our military readiness, and reassignment of military units demonstrating readiness to move should all convince the Soviet regime of our firmness and the danger of "reckless" policies. from their side. In order not to cause concern with such statements and actions among our allies, they should be aimed at limited regions and not be overtly aggressive.
2. Operations involving military ties with allies and friendly countries
a. Secondary only in decisions and actions in relation to the armed forces of the United States, decisions and actions jointly with our allies aimed at strengthening our readiness to face any danger will have a profound psychological impact on the Soviet regime. New negotiations with Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, increased supplies to NATO, etc. - all this will require careful consideration in the Kremlin.
b. Fleet visits and aviation demonstrations in the near future in the Near and Middle East will also have a psychological impact. Specifically, the United States naval force can pass through the Suez Canal and pay a courtesy call to people like Egyptian President Mohammed Naguib. The fleet could make similar visits to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
c. The direction of the armed forces in symbolic quantities to the Near and Middle East was also considered, which, if it has a positive psychological impact in the region itself, will also present a certain problem for the Soviet regime.
3. Operations including UN actions in Korea
a. Significant pressure could be exerted on the Kremlin, and on Sino-Soviet relations, if the United States did not fully have an explicit relationship with:
(1) Encouraging the development of a POW movement in Korea to associate with the POW Freedom Corps to fight against tyranny in their country, and which will lead to the petition of the UN military commander for permission to join Chiang Kai-shek's forces or UN forces.
(2) Creating an immediate proposal from Chiang Kai-shek to recruit POW volunteers to join the military in Formosa.
(3) Expanding explicit preparations for an offensive in Korea over the coming months through overt actions such as increasing training, increasing provocations, reporting troop movements if possible, explicitly expanding supply logistics to Korea, strengthening naval forces in local waters, and further public discussion of the expanding hostilities.
This concept of actions does not imply that they can be realized only in the sense of intensifying the war in Korea. They are also conceived as methods of inferring or exerting pressure on the orbit of the Soviets in Korea, and are intended to increase confusion, overload and slow down the political machine in the Kremlin and China.
b. You should also bear in mind the pressure on Soviet and Chinese shipping. Arresting Lendleigh ships engaged in shipments to Far Eastern ports when they are in neutral ports will increase the pressure on the regime
4. Operations involving political considerations
a. The creation of volunteer Liberty Corps, whose ranks are open to all opponents of tyranny, and willing to accept the leadership of the free world in determining when and what forces are required, can create another problem.
b. The high command of the allied forces of Europe could propose the creation of an international fund, formed from the contributions of the military and aimed at erecting a corresponding memorial in memory of those killed on both sides in World War II, which will be installed at the place of signing ceasefire agreements in Paris or in Berlin.
Such a memorial could be presented as a temple of peace, and its sponsors would be those who have the main reasons for wanting peace - the military. The Soviets should have been invited to participate in this event by directly addressing senior United States officers to their colleagues in the Soviet Army, and when the memorial was erected, they should have been invited to the opening. If this proposal is accepted, the United States will have an opportunity to seize the initiative in the campaign for peace, and if not, the Soviets will not look very well in the world perception.
c. The United States delegation to the UN could persuade the directors and heads of special agencies, especially UNESCO, WHO and FAO, to appeal for the return of the active participation of the Soviet Union to these humanitarian and peacekeeping organizations. One could try to persuade the leaders of these organizations to visit Moscow for this purpose. The United States could also consider supporting a resolution of this kind in the General Assembly.
d. The United States could have convinced Nehru to send high-level representatives to Beijing - or maybe even go there himself - to explore the possibility of resolving the standoff in Korea. In addition, the United States could convince a neutral politician such as Nehru to propose a new ceasefire in Korea, on land, at sea and in the air, and hold a new conference where the United States could quickly respond and express its desire to do this is.
5. Operations involving diplomatic activity with the Soviet regime
a. The United States could suggest, perhaps with the appointment of a new ambassador, that both countries lift their travel restrictions on diplomatic personnel.
b. In the interest of creating opportunities for compromising diplomatic personnel, the number of invitations to formal and informal social gatherings of certain elected representatives could be increased. Efforts of this type can be extended to other areas, for example, personal correspondence of prominent personalities of the free world with the new Soviet structures in order to renew old ties or, presumably, to transfer invitations to visits, etc. For example, General Bradley could invite General Zhukov, and Mr. Stassen could send a letter to Mikoyan.
c. Once again, attention could be paid to the psychological potential, actively trying, if possible, to ensure that carefully selected diplomatic or official personnel come over to their side. If this fails, one can try to discredit such persons, and if this fails, then use existing norms as a basis for declaring them persona non grata. Such a program should only be perceived as a targeted program of discrediting.
d. The United States could inspire, with the leaders of Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and possibly Muslims, to host a worldwide religious conference in Europe to promote religious solidarity. Such a program could directly target the threat of religion posed by communism.
e. In the future, the Secretary of State could propose a meeting in Berlin between Beria and the Deputy Secretary of State, with the aim of organizing the safe and orderly passage of those who would like to leave the Soviet Union and move to the West, and there become a participant in the program for the economic adaptation of refugees. Beria's departure from the center of power, and even the thought of it, would increase anxiety and suspicion, and at the same time, in the countries of the free world, humanitarian interest in refugees with their special appeal to many groups is still evident.
6. Economic transactions
a. The United States could offer economic assistance to a number of Middle Eastern countries.
Comment from [censored]
Economic war deserves high priority, both overtly and covertly. There are many things that can and should be done.
Source