Recently, it has become popular in the media and in various forums that Russian anti-aircraft missile systems are unlikely to cause any harm to American stealth fighters. First of all, the F-35 is called the ideal aircraft. Therefore, despite the delivery of the Russian S-300 systems to the Syrian army, the Israeli "invisible men" will continue to strike with impunity at any targets in Syria. Moreover, all S-300 launchers will be destroyed from the air in the very near future.
It has come to the point that the S-400 air defense system is no longer put into anything. And "iron" proofs are cited: since "Triumph", while in Syria, has not yet shot down a single plane or intercepted a single missile, then this is a fiction, a simulacrum, a hollow ball inflated by Kremlin propaganda.
And all this is because the Russians are incapable of creating anything worthwhile. They can only steal technologies in the USA, but at the same time copy them out of hand.
This can be answered by making an excursion into a not so distant history. When in Vietnam, "antediluvian" Russian anti-aircraft missile systems instilled terror in the pilots of American "ideal" fighters to such an extent that they ejected from operational aircraft only when they saw the launch of an anti-aircraft missile.
American air raids on North Vietnam began in February 1965. The balance of forces of the opposing aircraft was such that only a week later would have left only memories of the meager fleet of North Vietnamese aircraft.
The DRV Air Force had only 60 aircraft. These were mainly Chinese copies of the Soviet MiG-17 transonic fighter, as well as several Il-28 front-line bombers.
The Americans, preparing for the air intervention, have been rebuilding old air bases in the region and building new ones for more than a year. In addition, two aircraft carriers were brought into the Gulf of Tonkin. As a result, the United States created a powerful aviation fist, which included about a thousand aircraft of various types - fighters, bombers, attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, radar patrol aircraft, transport workers, tankers … Later, even B-52 strategic bombers appeared. All in all, from 1965 to 1973, the United States threw almost 5 thousand aircraft into the Vietnamese meat grinder.
F-100 and F-105 fighter-bombers were presented the most massively. The most modern at the time of the beginning of the air intervention was the F-4 Phantom II, which was equally capable of winning air supremacy, striking the ground, and performing reconnaissance flights. It had a record supersonic speed of 2,400 km / h, a record ceiling for strike aircraft of 19,000 m, and a significant range of 2,400 km.
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It is quite understandable that at first the American pilots made easy walks behind enemy lines, since nothing in the air threatened them. This happened at an altitude of 4-5 thousand meters, on an echelon to which the Vietnamese anti-aircraft artillery was not able to reach. The bombs were dropped at supersonic speeds, after which the bombers calmly returned to their bases.
The situation changed dramatically on July 24, 1965, when the Soviet S-75 "Dina" air defense systems were first used in Vietnam. On that day, firing four missiles, the anti-aircraft gunners shot down three Phantoms. Moreover, one of the missiles did not pass by, but hit the plane already struck by the previous shot.
The Americans were forced to change their brazen tactics to a more prudent one, based on the capabilities of the complex, which "does not miss." The speed of the aircraft did not matter for Dvina, it was capable of hitting targets flying at a speed of 2300 km / h. Of course, the Phantom's speed was 100 km / h higher. But this is if he flew at high altitude and light, without a bomb load. The radius of destruction of the complex was 34 km, and the range of target destruction heights was from 3 km to 22 km.
Therefore, in the air defense zone, bombers began to descend below three kilometers. But then they were awaited by anti-aircraft artillery fire.
But still, at first, the change in tactics reduced the losses of American aircraft, which had previously reached two hundred downed aircraft per month. The effectiveness at the beginning was phenomenal - on average 1.5 missiles were spent on one shot down plane. Then she began to decline.
In addition to flights at altitudes inaccessible to the C-75, the Americans began to use radio interference, which was exhibited by escort aircraft. This was an effective method of dealing with anti-aircraft missiles, since they had a radio command method of targeting. As a result of these measures, the effectiveness of the air defense missile system dropped to 9-10 missiles spent on one aircraft.
But the effectiveness of American aviation also declined, since planes began to spend up to 30-40% of flight time hunting for Dvina launchers.
The engineers of the "Strela" design bureau vigorously searched for and found ways to neutralize the American anti-missile tricks. The lower limit of damage was reduced from 3 km to 500 m. Only the newest American bombers with variable wing geometry F-111, which appeared in 1967, could slip into this "gap" from the earth's surface, which, due to the use of effective radar and excellent automation, could fly with rounding the terrain at supersonic speeds. That is why only two of these aircraft were lost during the entire Vietnam War.
Also, the jamming immunity of the missile control channel was significantly increased, in connection with which the installation by the Americans of jamming ceased to play an essential role in anti-missile defense. The tactics of using the air defense missile system was also improved. At the command post, they began to use false "missile launches", when the enemy aircraft is illuminated by a radio beam, and the missile does not leave the launcher. The pilot, having discovered an "attack" that did not actually take place, was forced to make a maneuver to avoid the "missile", which worsened his position in battle. All these measures contributed to the fact that for each downed aircraft they began to spend 4-5 missiles.
By the way, the use of the S-75 air defense system significantly increased the effectiveness of the Vietnamese anti-aircraft artillery, which used data from the radar stations of the complexes. SAM and artillery jointly covered the entire range in height and range. At the same time, the Vietnamese were supplied from the Soviet Union with quite modern rapid-firing anti-aircraft guns in a wide range of calibers from 30 mm to 100 mm.
Antiaircraft artillery, due to the mass scale, turned out to be more effective than the Dvina complexes. It accounted for almost 60% of the destroyed aircraft. However, anti-aircraft guns could not cope with all types of aircraft. The B-52 strategic bombers were invulnerable to them. But a truly huge number of "strategists" were shot down by "Dvina" - according to various estimates, from 32 to 54 aircraft. These are huge losses.
Despite catastrophic losses and a significant drop in performance, the US Air Force, Navy and ILC continued to carry out raids on North Vietnamese targets, among which were often civilians, as well as on South Vietnamese guerrilla bases. However, this did not last very long. By the end of 1967, air operations were practically curtailed. This was facilitated by the appearance in Vietnam of the Soviet MiG-21 fighter, which established unconditional dominance in the sky. "Phantom" could not be compared with him in maneuverability, climb rate, operational overload, missile armament.
The uniqueness of the Soviet aircraft in that war is evidenced by its losses and the losses of its main competitor. A total of 65 MiG-21s were lost. And this despite the fact that they were piloted by Vietnamese, not Soviet pilots. Phantoms were lost 895.
The total losses of aircraft for the United States were absolutely catastrophic. The Air Force, Navy and KMP lost 3,374 aircraft. The North Vietnamese aviation, which lost 150 MiG-17, MiG-19 and MiG-21 aircraft, destroyed 9% of American aircraft. The share of the S-75 air defense system accounts for 31%, the share of anti-aircraft artillery - 60%. However, a fair weight in these 60 percent belongs to the Dvina complexes, which drove the enemy to heights accessible to anti-aircraft guns. Also, do not discount the significant help with information from the air defense system radar, which was provided to anti-aircraft crews.
So we can safely say: Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems have made a turning point in the air war. And the statistics here are impressive. Over the years, the Soviet Union delivered 95 complexes of various modifications and 7658 missiles to Vietnam to Vietnam. Was used up, and also lost in battles or turned out to be faulty 6806 missiles. Thus, for every aircraft shot down by the air defense system (1046) there were 6.5 missiles. Considering that there were 3228 combat launches, we get 3.1 missiles for each downed aircraft.
The threat of being hit by an S-75 missile had such a profound effect on the psyche of American pilots that at times it took the form of psychosis. A significant number of cases are known when pilots, visually detecting a missile launch, left serviceable aircraft.
This is what critics of modern Russian anti-aircraft missile systems need to keep in mind. Almaz-Antey has not lost the tradition of creating effective systems capable of replacing the latest developments of American aircraft designers.
Vladimir Tuchkov
