Part 1. Forward to scientific conspiracy theories.
Part 2. Or back to pure Machiavellianism?
Part 3. From Clausewitz to Stirlitz.
Part 4. Trump as a trump symbol of the threat.
Part 5. Threat to all threats.
Part 6. Global spite of the day.
At the beginning of the year, the global balance pendulum swung to the right. Trump decided to rely on the pro-Israel militarists, the "old elites" of the military-industrial complex, providing them, in addition to a record defense budget, orders from the Saudis and other allies pressed to the wall. The desire of the White House to tear off the militarists from the financial udder of "banksters-pirates" could not but cause a double reaction. On the one hand, there is a split in the camp of the “rightists” and the movement of a part of the elites towards Trump, on the other hand, the mobilization and activation of an irreconcilable financial wing, which is being pushed away from the mediator's trough. The late Senator McCain was the symbol of this irreconcilable part of the "pirates".
The simultaneous unleashing of "trade wars" and threats of new sanctions against clients of "money changers" - Venezuela, Iran, China, Turkey, even India, opposed Trump's recent shadow allies in the fight against "pirates". Therefore, at this stage, a forced "right-left" alliance between the two ousted wings of the global financial elite, based on supranational political and economic institutions, was inevitable. Putin's "heartfelt" message of March 1 has also shifted the balance to the right. The demonstration of military superiority played into the hands of the militarists from the American military-industrial complex, but at the same time, the restoration of nuclear missile parity severely limited the American military threat as the main instrument of the "pirates". So their counteroffensive, relying on the "hawks" and the "deep state", riddled with henchmen of the banksters, was inevitable.
Promotional video:
With the offensive attitude of the banksters-“pirates”, their colleagues-“money changers” cannot refuse to be involved in the alliance, if only because of threats of physical destruction, which behind the “pirates” will not rust even in relation to allies and clients. Orders from partners, who are accustomed not even for thirty, but for all seventy years to command, are not discussed (but often bypassed and sabotaged). Another question is that over the same decades, all the more creatively thinking elements were squeezed out of the dominant branch of the elite, cleaned out, and gone. Therefore, this reactionary political machine can only operate according to a template that once long ago led the "right guys" to success. Including for this reason of stereotypical thinking, the plan of action against the Kremlin ally of the hated Trump was to impose another "reform" according to the long-outdated liberal recipes of the IMF.
The question is, what political dividends at the global level and at the level of the American elections can be given by the next liberal "reform" somewhere in Russia? This is when viewed from an outside observer. But for the "true believers" themselves, the recipes for the global success of liberals are not trifles, but a symbol of victory, success, support from above. As for the decrepit elders from the Brezhnev Politburo, the symbol of success was the "socialist orientation" of some Afghanistan or Nicaragua. And if suddenly the main ally of your inner enemy proclaims an "ultraliberal orientation" in our case, then this is at all evidence of complete and unrestrained success. That is, in their liberal view, the "pension reform" according to the IMF templates in Putin's Russia is as if at the turn of the 1990s, in support of Ligachev or Polozkov in their dispute with Gorbachev, Gorby's main ally, London, suddenly announced its "socialist orientation". Not Thatcher herself, of course, but her deputy for the conservative government, and the "iron lady" pretended that she, of course, did not like all this, but there was nothing to be done …
Probably, even among the globalists, especially Londoners, there are adequate politicians who understand that all this is a dead poultice. However, it is useless to argue with the maddened by humiliating defeats and fear of losing everything by the "neocons", especially if you can be the first to fall under financial and physical (well, or chemical) repression. Better to succumb and use the energy of the forcing ally for your own purposes. Including in order to preserve political positions in Moscow, as well as to save the project of the world championship in common with the Kremlin. You can convince Putin not to reject outright a backstage ultimatum with threats to disrupt the championship for the beginning, to play for time, and then it will be seen.
Accordingly, Kudrin, as a confidant of the "pirates" in Putin's entourage, was ordered to prepare a draft liberal reform demonstrating the strength of the "Washington consensus." An offer that cannot be refused under the threat of losing more than just personal offshore reserves. London partners were also harshly ordered to recommend their friend Medvedev to support Putin's initiative. Or another option, when Medvedev, realizing the threat to his political career, could not support Kudrin's initiative directly, but left the issue to Putin's decision. Tom had to solve this political conundrum anyway. So the prime minister might well have been surprised when Putin, instead of criticizing and procrastinating, instructed him to voice the initiative.
Why exactly on June 14, the opening day of the World Cup? Because that was the ultimatum of the liberal revanchists from the "deep state" in the United States - to accept the "reform" before the start of the World Cup. Otherwise, there is a threat of failure and further escalation. So the "reform" was signed literally at the last moment, so that the "partners" did not have time to change their minds and impose an even tougher option or additional requirements.
You can, of course, fantasize about what would have happened if Putin did not go to meet rabid scumbags like McCain and Hillary, who dream of returning to the already bygone unipolar era with the help of the magic of proclaiming liberal reforms. However, Putin did exactly what he had done before for eighteen years - he met halfway, strangled his Western partners in his arms, used the enemy's energy to achieve his own goals, to release the brakes and free himself from the suffocating grip. It would be strange if a successful politician used other tactics and strategies than the previously successful one, and suddenly tried some innovations precisely in a critical period.
Of course, before agreeing to the "reform", the options, pros and cons were calculated. Surely, the options were calculated from the side of the enemy, and there, too, besides the stubborn and blinkered "ideologists", for sure, there are "pragmatists" of the struggle. One of the development options expected by such technologists, based on the experience of Kiev and other capitals, is the outrage of citizens, support for the opposition, weakening of Putin personally, reliably distracting the Kremlin from behind-the-scenes support for Trump. However, if someone had such hopes, it was only from a complete lack of understanding of Russian realities. Rather, Putin even played up to such hopes when he sent Medvedev forward, while he silently supported the intrigue that the "reform" could be withdrawn. If he supported the "reform" right away, then our monarchical people would sigh and calm down: once the tsar said, then there really is no other way. Although the hope for the good king-shtirlitsa has not died to this day, what if he is - as always, pretending to deceive the adversaries.
In any case, regardless of Putin's conscious or other motives, the Russian political system has passed the most serious stress test for resilience in the face of an artificial political crisis in three months. I think Western and non-Western partners are impressed with the results. Otherwise, the leaders of Japan, China and South Korea would have postponed the race to sign up to visit Putin at the Eastern Forum. In addition, the procrastination with direct presidential support for the reform made it possible to suspend threats to the championship, mobilized Trump and his team not only to explicitly move towards Putin, but also to take more decisive actions against equally mobilized globalists. That is, in any case, it exacerbated the split of the global elite. At the very least, the results of the stress test did not affect the foreign policy positions, or had a positive effect. Maybe,for the GDP itself, these external political results are even more important than the forecasts for the gross domestic product, which depend only on the capacity of the available market, which means all the same on foreign policy.
But still, let's look at the balance of pros and cons in domestic politics. Was there an understanding that the "reform" would hit hard on the positions of United Russia in the regions? Of course it was. But who said that this is absolutely bad and unacceptable for the Kremlin? First, a stress test for the ruling party's asset would not hurt either. It is better to identify weak links in calm conditions. Secondly, the loss of two or three governors is also not a problem, but a continuation of the long-begun purge of the regional elites from the previous opposition and mutual responsibility. Again, the vertical of deputies for domestic policy built under Volodin and the corporation of political strategists subordinate to the Presidential Administration even under Surkov does not always necessarily help governors who are too closely connected personally with Medvedev or the pro-London "oligarchs." Rather the opposite. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the entry into the second round of an almost official spoiler of one governor.
Finally, is this not a demonstration in front of the European partners of a really working democracy, when the Kremlin actually provided the systemic opposition with an agenda and even a handicap in relation to United Russia. Moreover, there were cases when local authorities, with approximately equal chances, helped opposition candidates to city assemblies. Most likely, there was an unspoken directive from the Presidential Administration to support party diversity on the ground. The fact that many United Russia members won in the districts in difficult circumstances is also not a minus to them. On the other hand, non-systemic opposition stayed away from this celebration of democracy, proving political impotence and inability to mobilize the masses. Not to consider the Maidan guest workers from Kiev and the tempted children at Navalny's rally, and he himself, as a real political force in Russia?
The tendency, traditional for Russian society, towards mutual responsibility and shifting responsibility onto the "tsar" in this particular case played a rather dirty joke with the regional and sectoral elites. United Russia members almost unanimously supported the unpopular reform, including hoping for its quick softening by the president. Thus, the Kremlin's complete control over the political system was once again shown not only to external partners, but also to internal “oligarchs”. This allowed literally with one stroke of the governing hand to build a large export business and direct it in the right political direction. Since all the "oligarchs" understood perfectly well that even their closest clients in the legislature would also unanimously vote for the withdrawal of excess profits. And at the moment of this understanding, a political maneuver is made,finally transferring the government bureaucracy to the dependence on the political administration.
As predicted in this magazine a couple of years ago for the period after the presidential elections, the financial contours of large infrastructure and technology projects will be removed from the direct control of the government. That is, the government departments and staff will have to work on approving standards and conditions, state guarantees for project financing. However, the money itself for investment will not go in the form of corporate taxes through the budget, increasing the risks of corruption and incompetent decisions. For large corporations in this situation, the prime minister and the government apparatus are, of course, needed to formulate political decisions, but the decisions themselves on certain projects will be formed and agreed upon by the apparatus of the presidential aides. However, the pension reform also reduces financial flows that come with large losses through the budget and departments,and transfers responsibility for the income of persons near retirement age to the same corporations. And besides, without the demographic resource of the pre-retirement generation, corporations cannot raise large-scale projects. So the financial and political trend is common here.
And yet, let's not forget that all the advantages are more tactical and operational, and the damage to the basis of the political system - to the people's confidence in the leader was and remains strategic. Does Putin have a counterplay to turn minuses into pluses in this direction as well? Probably, there is, considering that his strategic task for the coming years is not re-election, but a legitimate transfer of power to a loyal successor. Then the negative of the “pension reform” can become the ballast that will help the future prime minister-successor quickly build up the confidence rating on the inevitable correction of the mistakes of his predecessors.
With all the attention to the purely political pluses and minuses, to the elections and the political positions of certain elite units - in Russia, as in the United States, this is the second thing - rather, an indicator of more significant political and economic changes. In his televised address, Putin also directly says this - that the problem that forced him to such a format of "reform" is not momentary and not even medium-term. Here it is necessary to clarify the important difference between Russian political culture and Naglo-Saxon or Ukrainian - our leader may be delusional himself, may conceal an important part of the truth, but he will not directly lie to the public. This is ruled out by much more powerful transpersonal psychological-historical forces than personal motivations and even personal intuitions. So, most likely, Putin was not lying when he tried to convince listeners that it was not about his personal fate, but about the fate of our children. That is, about the fate of Putin's children too, and the children of the elite, and not just the children and grandchildren of future retirees.
I repeat once again, purely political alignments and motivations, especially internal relations with the elites, are clearly not enough for the president to support such a controversial decision, which is detrimental to political capital not only for Putin personally, but for the political institution of the head of state. Therefore, again, it will be necessary to study more fully the political logic of a higher order associated with external financial and political threats, the layouts of the global financial crisis.
Continuation: Part 8. Global confusion.