The topic of the Tatar-Mongol yoke still causes a lot of controversy, reasoning and versions. Was it or was not, in principle, what role did the Russian princes play in it, who attacked Europe and why, how did it end? Here is an interesting article on the topic of Batu's campaigns across Russia. Let's get some more information about all this …
Historiography about the invasion of Mongol-Tatars (or Tatar-Mongols, or Tatars and Mongols, and so on, as you like) to Russia is over 300 years old. This invasion has become a generally accepted fact since the end of the 17th century, when one of the founders of Russian Orthodoxy, the German Innokenty Gisel, wrote the first textbook on the history of Russia - "Synopsis". According to this book, Russians hammered their native history for the next 150 years. However, until now none of the historians have taken the liberty of making a "road map" for the campaign of Batu Khan in the winter of 1237-1238 to North-Eastern Russia.
That is, take and calculate how much the indefatigable Mongolian horses and warriors passed, what they ate, and so on. The Interpreter's blog, due to its limited resources, tried to correct this flaw.
A bit of background
At the end of the 12th century, a new leader appeared among the Mongol tribes - Temuchin, who managed to unite most of them around him. In 1206 he was proclaimed at the kurultai (analogue of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR) by the All-Mongolian Khan under the nickname Genghis Khan, who created the notorious "state of nomads". Without wasting then not a minute, the Mongols began to conquer the surrounding territories. By 1223, when the Mongol detachment of the commanders Jebe and Subudai clashed with the Russian-Polovtsian army on the Kalka River, the zealous nomads managed to conquer territories from Manchuria in the east to Iran, the southern Caucasus and modern western Kazakhstan, defeating the state of Khorezmshah and conquering part of northern China along the way.
In 1227, Genghis Khan died, but his successors continued their conquests. By 1232, the Mongols reached the middle Volga, where they waged a war with the Polovtsian nomads and their allies - the Volga Bulgars (ancestors of the modern Volga Tatars). In 1235 (according to other sources - in 1236) at the kurultai, a decision was made on a global campaign against the Kipchaks, Bulgars and Russians, as well as further to the West. This campaign had to be led by the grandson of Genghis Khan, Khan Batu (Batu). Here it is necessary to make a digression. In 1236-1237, the Mongols, who by that time were fighting in vast areas from modern Ossetia (against the Alans) to the modern Volga republics, captured Tatarstan (Volga Bulgaria) and in the fall of 1237 began concentration for a campaign against the Russian principalities.
In general, why the nomads from the banks of Kerulen and Onon needed the conquest of Ryazan or Hungary is not really known. All attempts by historians to laboriously substantiate such agility of the Mongols look rather pale. Regarding the Western campaign of the Mongols (1235-1243), they came up with a tale that the attack on the Russian principalities was a measure to secure their flank and destroy the potential allies of their main enemies - the Polovtsy (in part, the Polovtsy went to Hungary, the bulk of them became the ancestors of modern Kazakhs). True, neither the Ryazan principality, nor the Vladimir-Suzdal, nor the so-called. The "Novgorod Republic" were never allies of either the Polovtsians or the Volga Bulgars.
Promotional video:
Steppe Yubermensch riding a tireless Mongolian horse (Mongolia, 1911)
Also, almost all historiography about the Mongols does not really say anything about the principles of forming their armies, the principles of managing them, and so on. At the same time, it was believed that the Mongols formed their tumens (field operational formations), including from the conquered peoples, nothing was paid for the soldier's service, and the death penalty threatened them for any offense.
Scientists tried to explain the success of the nomads this way and that, but each time it came out pretty funny. Although, in the end, the level of organization of the Mongol army - from intelligence to communications, could envy the armies of the most developed states of the 20th century (however, after the end of the era of miraculous campaigns, the Mongols - already 30 years after the death of Genghis Khan - instantly lost all their skills). For example, it is believed that the head of Mongolian intelligence, the commander Subudai, maintained relations with the Pope, the German-Roman emperor, Venice, and so on.
Moreover, the Mongols, naturally, during their military campaigns acted without any radio communications, railways, road transport, and so on. In Soviet times, historians interspersed the traditional by that time fantasy about the steppe yubermensch, who did not know fatigue, hunger, fear, etc., with the classical ritual on the field of the class-formation approach:
With the general recruitment of the army, every ten wagons had to put up from one to three soldiers, depending on the need, and provide them with food. Weapons in peacetime were stored in special warehouses. It was the property of the state and was issued to soldiers when they set out on a campaign. Upon returning from the campaign, each soldier was obliged to surrender his weapon. The soldiers did not receive salaries, but they themselves paid the tax with horses or other livestock (one head per hundred heads). In war, each soldier had an equal right to use the spoils, a certain part of which he was obliged to surrender to the khan. In the periods between campaigns, the army was sent to public works. One day a week was allotted for the service to the khan.
The organization of the troops was based on the decimal system. The army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands (tumyn or darkness), at the head of which were foremen, centurions and thousand. The chiefs had separate tents and a reserve of horses and weapons.
The main branch of the troops was the cavalry, which was divided into heavy and light. The heavy cavalry fought against the main forces of the enemy. The light cavalry carried out patrol service and conducted reconnaissance. She struck up a battle, upsetting enemy ranks with arrows. The Mongols were excellent archers from a horse. Light cavalry pursued the enemy. The cavalry had a large number of clockwork (spare) horses, which allowed the Mongols to move very quickly over long distances. A feature of the Mongol army was the complete absence of a wheeled train. Only kibitki khan and especially noble persons were transported on carts …
Each warrior had a saw for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle, threads and a sieve for sifting flour or filtering turbid water. The rider had a small tent, two tursuks (leather bags): one for water, the other for kruty (dried sour cheese). If food supplies ran out, the Mongols bled and drank their horses. In this way, they could be content for up to 10 days.
In general, the very term "Mongol-Tatars" (or Tatar-Mongols) is very bad. It sounds something like Croatian Hindus or Finno-Negroes in terms of its meaning. The fact is that Russians and Poles, who faced nomads in the 15th-17th centuries, called them the same - Tatars. Later, the Russians often transferred this to other peoples who had nothing to do with the nomadic Turks in the Black Sea steppes. Europeans also contributed to this mess, who for a long time considered Russia (then Muscovy) Tataria (more precisely, Tartaria), which led to very bizarre designs.
The French look at Russia in the middle of the 18th century.
One way or another, that the "Tatars" who attacked Russia and Europe were also Mongols, society learned only at the beginning of the 19th century, when Christian Kruse published "Atlas and tables for reviewing the history of all European lands and states from their first population to of our times”. Then the idiotic term was happily picked up by Russian historians.
Particular attention should also be paid to the issue of the number of conquerors. Naturally, no documentary data on the size of the Mongol army has come down to us, and the most ancient and unquestioning source of trust among historians is the historical work of a team of authors led by an official of the Iranian state Hulaguids Rashid al-Din "List of Chronicles". It is believed that it was written at the beginning of the 14th century in Persian, however, it surfaced only at the beginning of the 19th century, the first partial edition in French was published in 1836. Until the middle of the 20th century, this source was not completely translated and published at all.
According to Rashid ad-Din, by 1227 (the year of Genghis Khan's death), the total number of the army of the Mongol Empire was 129 thousand people. If you believe Plano Carpini, then 10 years later the army of phenomenal nomads amounted to 150 thousand Mongols proper and another 450 thousand people recruited in a "voluntary-compulsory" order from the subordinate peoples. Pre-revolutionary Russian historians estimated the size of Batu's army, concentrated in the fall of 1237 at the borders of the Ryazan principality, from 300 to 600 thousand people. At the same time, it seemed self-evident that each nomad had 2-3 horses.
By the standards of the Middle Ages, such armies look completely monstrous and implausible, we must admit. However, to reproach pundits with fantasy is too cruel for them. Hardly any of them could even imagine even a couple of tens of thousands of mounted warriors with 50-60 thousand horses, not to mention the obvious problems with managing such a mass of people and providing them with food. Since history is a science inaccurate, and indeed not a science at all, everyone can evaluate the run-up of fantasy researchers here. We will use the already classical estimate of the size of Batu's army at 130-140 thousand people, which was proposed by the Soviet scientist V. V. Kargalov. His assessment (like everyone else, completely sucked from the finger, if we speak very seriously) in historiography, however, is prevalent. In particular,it is also shared by the largest contemporary Russian researcher of the history of the Mongol Empire, R. P. Khrapachevsky.
From Ryazan to Vladimir
In the fall of 1237, Mongolian detachments, which had fought all spring and summer in vast areas from the North Caucasus, the Lower Don and to the middle Volga region, were drawn to the place of general gathering - the Onuza River. It is believed that we are talking about the modern Tsna River in the modern Tambov region. Probably also some detachments of the Mongols gathered in the upper reaches of the Voronezh and Don rivers. There is no exact date for the start of the Mongols' performance against the Ryazan principality, but it can be assumed that it took place in any case no later than December 1, 1237. That is, the steppe nomads with almost half a million herd of horses decided to go on a hike already in winter. This is important for our reconstruction. If so, then they probably should have been sure that in the forests of the Volga-Osk interfluve, still rather weakly colonized by the Russians by that time,they will have enough food for horses and people.
Along the valleys of the Lesnoy and Polny Voronezh rivers, as well as the tributaries of the Pronya River, the Mongol army, moving in one or several columns, passes through the wooded watershed of the Oka and Don. The embassy of the Ryazan prince Fyodor Yuryevich arrives to them, which turned out to be ineffectual (the prince is killed), and somewhere in the same region the Mongols meet the Ryazan army in the field. In a fierce battle, they destroy it, and then move upstream of the Prony, plundering and destroying small Ryazan cities - Izheslavets, Belgorod, Pronsk, burn down Mordovian and Russian villages.
Here we need to make a small clarification: we do not have accurate data on the population size in the then North-Eastern Russia, but if we follow the reconstruction of modern scientists and archaeologists (V. P. Darkevich, M. N. Tikhomirov, A. V. Kuza), then it was not large and, in addition, it was characterized by a low population density. For example, Ryazan, the largest city in the Ryazan land, counted, according to V. P. Darkevich, a maximum of 6-8 thousand people, about 10-14 thousand people could live in the agricultural district of the city (within a radius of up to 20-30 kilometers). The rest of the cities had several hundred people, at best, like Murom - up to a couple of thousand. Based on this, it is unlikely that the total population of the Ryazan principality could exceed 200-250 thousand people.
Of course, to conquer such a "proto-state" 120-140 thousand soldiers were more than an excessive number, but we will stick to the classic version.
On December 16, after a march of 350-400 kilometers (that is, the average daily transition rate is up to 18-20 kilometers here), they go to Ryazan and begin to siege it - they build a wooden fence around the city, build stone-throwing machines with which they drive shelling of the city. In general, historians admit that the Mongols achieved incredible - by the standards of that time - success in the siege business. For example, the historian R. P. Khrapachevsky seriously believes that the Mongols were able to bungle any stone-throwing machines on the spot from an improvised forest in literally a day or two:
For the assembly of stone throwers, there was everything necessary - in the united army of the Mongols there were enough specialists from China and Tangut …, and the Russian forests in abundance supplied the Mongols with wood for assembling siege weapons.
Finally, on December 21, Ryazan fell after a fierce assault. True, an inconvenient question arises: we know that the total length of the city's defensive fortifications was less than 4 kilometers. Most of the Ryazan soldiers died in the border battle, so there were hardly many soldiers in the city. Why did the giant Mongol army of 140 thousand soldiers sit for 6 days under its walls, if the ratio of forces was at least 100-150: 1?
We also do not have any clear evidence of what the climatic conditions were in December 1238, but since the Mongols chose the ice of the rivers as the way of movement (there was no other way to pass through the wooded area, the first permanent roads in North-Eastern Russia are documented only in the XIV century, all Russian researchers agree with this version), it can be assumed that it was already a normal winter with frosts, possibly snow.
The question of what the Mongolian horses ate during this campaign is also important. From the works of historians and modern studies of steppe horses, it is clear that they were talking about very unpretentious, small - up to 110-120 centimeters tall at the withers, bunks. Their main food is hay and grass (they did not eat grain). In their natural habitat, they are unpretentious and hardy enough, and in winter during tebenevka they are able to break snow in the steppe and eat last year's grass.
On the basis of this, historians unanimously believe that due to these properties, the question of feeding the horses during the campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 to Russia was not raised. Meanwhile, it is not difficult to notice that the conditions in this region (the thickness of the snow cover, the area of herbage, as well as the general quality of phytocenoses) differ from, say, Khalkha or Turkestan. In addition, the winter tebenevka of steppe horses is the following: a herd of horses slowly, passing a few hundred meters a day, moves across the steppe, looking for dead grass under the snow. Animals thus save their energy costs. However, in the campaign against Russia, these horses had to walk 10-20-30 or even more kilometers a day in the cold (see below), carrying a load or a warrior. Did the horses manage to replenish their energy costs under such conditions? Another interesting question:if Mongolian horses dug the snow and found grass under it, then what should be the area of their daily forage lands?
After the capture of Ryazan, the Mongols began to move towards the Kolomna fortress, which is a kind of "gateway" to the Vladimir-Suzdal land. After passing 130 kilometers from Ryazan to Kolomna, according to Rashid ad-Din and R. P. Khrapachevsky, the Mongols were "stuck" at this fortress until 5 or even 10 January 1238 - that is, at least for almost 15-20 days. On the other hand, a strong Vladimir army is moving towards Kolomna, which, probably, the Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich equipped immediately after receiving news of the fall of Ryazan (he and the Chernigov prince refused to help Ryazan). The Mongols send an embassy to him with a proposal to become their tributary, but the negotiations also turn out to be ineffectual (according to the Laurentian Chronicle, the prince nevertheless agrees to pay tribute, but still sends troops near Kolomna. It is difficult to explain the logic of such an act).
According to V. V. Kargalov and R. P. Khrapachevsky, the battle of Kolomna began no later than January 9th and lasted 5 whole days (according to Rashid ad-Din). Here another natural question immediately arises - historians are sure that the military forces of the Russian principalities as a whole were modest and corresponded to the reconstructions of the era when an army of 1-2 thousand people was standard, and 4-5 thousand or more people seemed to be a huge army. It is unlikely that the Vladimir prince Yuri Vsevolodovich could collect more (if we make a digression: the total population of the Vladimir land, according to various estimates, varied between 400-800 thousand people, but they were all scattered over a vast territory, and the population of the capital city of the earth - Vladimir, even for the most daring reconstructions, it did not exceed 15-25 thousand people). Nevertheless, near Kolomna, the Mongols were shackled for several days,and the intensity of the battle shows the fact of the death of Genghis Kulkan, the son of Genghis Khan. With whom did the gigantic army of 140 thousand nomads fought so fiercely? With several thousand Vladimir soldiers?
After the victory at Kolomna, either in a three- or five-day battle, the Mongols cheerfully move along the ice of the Moskva River towards the future Russian capital. They cover a distance of 100 kilometers in just 3-4 days (the average daily march rate is 25-30 kilometers): according to R. P. The nomads began the siege of Moscow on January 15 at Khrapachevsky (according to N. M. Karamzin, on January 20). The nimble Mongols took the Muscovites by surprise - they did not even know about the results of the battle at Kolomna, and after a five-day siege, Moscow shared the fate of Ryazan: the city was burned, all its inhabitants were exterminated or taken prisoner.
Again - Moscow at that time, if we take the data of archeology as the basis of our reasoning, was a completely tiny town. So, the first fortifications, built in 1156, were less than 1 kilometer long, and the area of the fortress itself did not exceed 3 hectares. By 1237, it is believed that the area of fortifications had already reached 10-12 hectares (that is, about half of the territory of the present Kremlin). The city had its own posad - it was located on the territory of the modern Red Square. The total population of such a city hardly exceeded 1000 people. We can only guess what the huge army of Mongols, possessing supposedly unique siege technologies, did for five days in front of this insignificant fortress.
It is also worth noting here that all historians recognize the fact of the movement of the Mongol-Tatars without a convoy. Say, unpretentious nomads did not need it. Then it is not entirely clear how and on what the Mongols moved their stone-throwing machines, shells to them, forges (for repairing weapons, replenishing the loss of arrowheads, etc.), how they drove off prisoners. Since during the entire time of archaeological excavations on the territory of North-Eastern Russia not a single burial of "Mongol-Tatars" was found, some historians even agreed to the version that the nomads also took their dead back to the steppes (V. P. Darkevich, V. V. Kargalov). Of course, it's not even worth raising the question of the fate of the wounded or sick in this light (otherwise our historians will think of the fact that they were eaten, just kidding) …
Nevertheless, after spending about a week in the vicinity of Moscow and plundering its agricultural contado (the main agricultural crop in this region was rye and partly oats, but the steppe horses perceived grain very badly), the Mongols moved on the ice of the Klyazma River (crossing the forest divide between this river and Moscow river) to Vladimir. Having traveled over 140 kilometers in 7 days (the average daily march rate is about 20 kilometers), the nomads on February 2, 1238 begin the siege of the capital of the Vladimir land. By the way, it is at this crossing that the Mongolian army of 120-140 thousand people "catches" a tiny detachment of the Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat, either 700 or 1700 people, against whom the Mongols - from impotence - are forced to use stone-throwing machines to defeat him (it is worth considering that the legend of Kolovrat was recorded, as historians believe,only in the 15th century, so … it is difficult to consider it completely documentary).
Let's ask an academic question: what is an army of 120-140 thousand people with almost 400 thousand horses (and it’s not clear if there is a train?), Moving on the ice of some river Oka or Moscow? The simplest calculations show that even moving with a front of 2 kilometers (in reality, the width of these rivers is much smaller), such an army in the most ideal conditions (everyone goes at the same speed, observing a minimum distance of 10 meters) stretches at least 20 kilometers. If we consider that the width of the Oka is only 150-200 meters, then the gigantic army of Batu stretches for almost … 200 kilometers! Again, if everyone walks at the same speed, keeping the minimum distance. And on the ice of the Moskva or Klyazma rivers, the width of which varies from 50 to 100 meters at best? 400-800 kilometers?
Interestingly, none of the Russian scientists over the past 200 years have even asked such a question, seriously believing that giant cavalry armies literally fly through the air.
In general, at the first stage of the invasion of Khan Baty to North-Eastern Russia - from December 1, 1237 to February 2, 1238, the conditional Mongol horse covered about 750 kilometers, which gives an average daily rate of movement of 12 kilometers. But if we exclude from the calculations, at least 15 days of standing in the Oka floodplain (after the capture of Ryazan on December 21 and the battle at Kolomna), as well as a week of rest and looting near Moscow, the pace of the average daily march of the Mongolian cavalry will significantly improve - up to 17 kilometers per day.
It cannot be said that this is some kind of record pace of the march (the Russian army during the war with Napoleon, for example, made 30-40-kilometer daily marches), the interest here is that all this took place in deep winter, and such rates were maintained quite a long time.
From Vladimir to Kozelsk
Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir, having learned about the approach of the Mongols, left Vladimir, leaving with a small squad in the Volga region - there, in the middle of windbreaks on the Sit River, he set up a camp and awaited the approach of reinforcements from his brothers - Yaroslav (father of Alexander Nevsky) and Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich. There were very few warriors left in the city, led by Yuri's sons - Vsevolod and Mstislav. Despite this, the Mongols spent 5 days with the city, firing at it from stone throwers, taking it only after the assault on February 7. But before that, a small detachment of nomads led by Subudai managed to burn Suzdal.
On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War of the XIII century.
After the capture of Vladimir, the Mongol army is divided into three parts. The first and largest unit under the command of Batu goes from Vladimir to the north-west through the impassable forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed. The first march is from Vladimir to Yuriev-Polsky (about 60-65 kilometers). Then the army is divided - part goes exactly to the north-west to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky (about 60 kilometers), and after a five-day siege this city fell. What was Pereyaslavl like then? It was a relatively small city, slightly larger than Moscow, although it had defensive fortifications up to 2.5 kilometers long. But its population also hardly exceeded 1-2 thousand people.
Then the Mongols go to Ksnyatin (about 100 kilometers more), to Kashin (30 kilometers), then turn to the west and move along the ice of the Volga to Tver (from Ksnyatin in a straight line a little more than 110 kilometers, but go along the Volga, everything turns out there 250- 300 kilometers).
The second part goes through the dense forests of the watershed of the Volga, Oka and Klyazma from Yuryev-Polsky to Dmitrov (about 170 kilometers in a straight line), then after taking it to Volok-Lamsky (130-140 kilometers), from there to Tver (about 120 kilometers), after the capture of Tver - to Torzhok (together with the detachments of the first part) - in a straight line it is about 60 kilometers, but, apparently, they walked along the river, so it will be at least 100 kilometers. The Mongols reached Torzhok already on February 21 - 14 days after leaving Vladimir.
Thus, the first part of the Batu detachment in 15 days travels at least 500-550 kilometers through dense forests and along the Volga. True, from here it is necessary to throw out several days of siege of cities and it turns out about 10 days of march. For each of which the nomads pass through the forests 50-55 kilometers a day! The second part of his detachment travels together for less than 600 kilometers, which gives an average daily march rate of up to 40 kilometers. Taking into account a couple of days for the siege of cities - up to 50 kilometers per day.
Near Torzhok, a rather modest city by the standards of that time, the Mongols were stuck for at least 12 days and took it only on March 5 (V. V. Kargalov). After the capture of Torzhok, one of the Mongol detachments advanced another 150 kilometers towards Novgorod, but then turned back.
The second detachment of the Mongolian army under the command of Kadan and Buri left Vladimir to the east, moving along the ice of the Klyazma River. Having passed 120 kilometers to Starodub, the Mongols burned this city, and then "cut off" the wooded watershed between the lower Oka and the middle Volga, reaching Gorodets (this is still about 170-180 kilometers, if in a straight line). Further, the Mongol detachments on the ice of the Volga reached Kostoroma (this is still about 350-400 kilometers), individual detachments even reached Galich Mersky. From Kostroma, the Mongols of Buri and Kadan went to join the third detachment under the command of Burundai to the west - to Uglich. Most likely, the nomads moved along the ice of the rivers (in any case, let us remind you once again, this is so customary in Russian historiography), which gives another 300-330 kilometers of travel.
In early March, Kadan and Buri were already near Uglich, having traveled in three weeks from a little to 1000-1100 kilometers. The average daily pace of the march was about 45-50 kilometers among the nomads, which is close to the indicators of the Batu detachment.
The third detachment of Mongols under the command of Burunday turned out to be the "slowest" - after the capture of Vladimir, he set out for Rostov (170 kilometers in a straight line), then overcame over 100 kilometers to Uglich. Part of Burundi's forces made a march to Yaroslavl (about 70 kilometers) from Uglich. In early March, Burunday unmistakably found the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Trans-Volga forests, whom he defeated in the battle on the Sit River on March 4. The transition from Uglich to the City and back is about 130 kilometers. In total, the Burundian detachments covered about 470 kilometers in 25 days - this gives us only 19 kilometers of an average daily march.
In general, the conventional average Mongolian horse clocked "on the speedometer" from December 1, 1237 to March 4, 1238 (94 days) from 1200 (the lowest estimate, suitable only for a small part of the Mongol army) to 1800 kilometers. Conditional daily crossing ranges from 12-13 to 20 kilometers. In reality, if we throw out standing in the floodplain of the Oka River (about 15 days), 5 days of storming Moscow and 7 days of rest after its capture, a five-day siege of Vladimir, as well as another 6-7 days for the siege of Russian cities in the second half of February, it turns out that the Mongolian horses for each of their 55 days of movement covered an average of 25-30 kilometers. These are excellent results for horses, considering that all this happened in the cold, in the middle of forests and snowdrifts,with an obvious lack of food (the Mongols could hardly requisition a lot of food from the peasants for their horses, especially since the steppe horses did not practically eat grain) and in hard work.
The Mongolian steppe horse has not changed for centuries (Mongolia, 1911).
After the capture of Torzhok, the bulk of the Mongol army concentrated on the upper Volga in the Tver region. Then they moved in the first half of March 1238 on a broad front south in the steppe. The left wing, under the command of Kadan and Buri, passed through the forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed, then went to the upper reaches of the Moskva River and descended along it to the Oka. In a straight line, it is about 400 kilometers, taking into account the average pace of movement of impetuous nomads, this is about 15-20 days of travel for them. So, most likely, already in the first half of April, this part of the Mongolian army went into the steppe. We do not have information on how the melting of snow and ice on the rivers affected the movement of this detachment (the Ipatiev Chronicle only reports that the steppe inhabitants moved very quickly). What this detachment did the next month after leaving the steppe, there is also no information, it is only knownthat in May Kadan and Buri came to the rescue of Bat, who had been stuck by that time near Kozelsk.
Small Mongolian detachments, probably, as V. V. Kargalov and R. P. Khrapachevsky, remained on the middle Volga, plundering and burning Russian settlements. How they came out in the spring of 1238 in the steppe is not known.
Most of the Mongol army under the command of Batu and Burundai, instead of the shortest route to the steppe, which the troops of Kadan and Buri passed, chose a very intricate route:
More is known about Batu's route - from Torzhok he moved along the Volga and Vazuz (a tributary of the Volga) to the interfluve of the Dnieper, and from there through the Smolensk lands to the Chernigov city of Vshchizh, lying on the banks of the Desna, writes Khrapachevsky. Having made a detour along the upper reaches of the Volga to the west and northwest, the Mongols turned south, and crossing the watersheds, went to the steppe. Probably, some detachments were marching in the center, through Volok-Lamsky (through the forests). Tentatively, the left edge of Batu has traveled about 700-800 kilometers during this time, other units a little less. By April 1, the Mongols reached Serensk, and Kozelsk (chronicle Kozelesk, to be precise) - April 3-4 (according to other information - already on March 25). On average, this gives us about 35-40 kilometers of daily march (and the Mongols no longer walk along the ice of rivers, but through dense forests on the watersheds).
Near Kozelsk, where ice drift on Zhizdra could already begin and snow melting in its floodplain, Batu was stuck for almost 2 months (more precisely, for 7 weeks - 49 days - until May 23-25, maybe later, if we count from April 3, and according to Rashid ad-Din - generally for 8 weeks). It is not entirely clear why the Mongols needed to besiege an insignificant, even by medieval Russian standards, town that has no strategic significance. For example, the neighboring towns of Krom, Spat, Mtsensk, Domagoshch, Devyagorsk, Dedoslavl, Kursk were not even touched by the nomads.
Historians still argue on this topic, no sane argumentation is given. The funniest version was suggested by the folk-historian of the "Eurasian persuasion" L. N. Gumilev, who suggested that the Mongols took revenge on the grandson of the Chernigov prince Mstislav, who ruled in Kozelsk, for the murder of ambassadors on the Kalka River in 1223. It's funny that the Smolensk prince Mstislav Stary was also involved in the murder of the ambassadors. But Smolensk was not touched by the Mongols …
Logically, Batu had to hastily leave for the steppe, since the spring thaw and lack of fodder threatened him with a complete loss of at least "transport" - that is, horses.
The question of what the horses and the Mongols themselves ate, besieging Kozelsk for almost two months (using standard stone-throwing machines), none of the historians was puzzled. Finally, it is trivial to believe that a town with a population of several hundred, even a couple of thousand people, a still huge army of Mongols, numbering tens of thousands of warriors, and allegedly having unique siege technologies and equipment, could not take 7 weeks …
As a result, near Kozelsk, the Mongols allegedly lost up to 4,000 people, and only the arrival of the troops of the Buri and Kadan in May 1238 from the steppes saved the situation - the town was still taken and destroyed. For the sake of humor, it should be said that the former President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, in honor of the merits of the population of Kozelsk to Russia, awarded the settlement the title of "City of Military Glory." The humor was that archaeologists, for almost 15 years of searches, could not find unequivocal evidence of the existence of Kozelsk destroyed by Batu. You can read about the passions on this subject in the scientific and bureaucratic community of Kozelsk, you can read here.
If we sum up the estimated data in a first and very rough approximation, it turns out that from December 1, 1237 to April 3, 1238 (the beginning of the siege of Kozelsk), the conditional Mongol horse traveled on average from 1700 to 2800 kilometers. In terms of 120 days, this gives an average daily transition in the range from 15 to 23 kilometers. Since the time intervals are known when the Mongols did not move (sieges, etc., and this is about 45 days in total), then the scope of their average daily real march spreads from 23 to 38 kilometers per day.
In simpler terms, this means more than intense stress on the horses. The question of how many of them survived after such transitions in rather harsh climatic conditions and an obvious lack of food is not even discussed by Russian historians. As well as the question of the actual Mongolian losses.
For example, R. P. Khrapachevsky generally believes that for the entire time of the Western campaign of the Mongols in 1235-1242, their losses amounted to only about 15% of their original number, while the historian V. B. Koscheev counted up to 50 thousand sanitary losses only during the campaign against North-Eastern Russia. However, all these losses - both in people and in horses, the brilliant Mongols quickly made up for at the expense of … the conquered peoples themselves. Therefore, already in the summer of 1238, the armies of Batu continued the war in the steppes against the Kipchaks, and in 1241 Europe was invaded by whatever army, so Thomas of Splitsky reports that it had a huge number of … Russians, Kipchaks, Bulgars, Mordovians, etc. P. peoples. How many of them were the "Mongols" themselves is not really clear.