Vladimir Putin recently announced that about 600 enemy spies and their agents had been neutralized in Russia in 2018. Who they are and how they were caught is, of course, a mystery. If the truth is revealed one day, it will not happen soon. The magazine "Your secret counselor" decided not to wait for favors from the special services and spoke with several veterans of the KGB of the USSR. Petersburg counterintelligence officers, whose duties included surveillance of foreigners and their recruitment, anonymously opened the curtain of an exciting secret war that was waged in the city and country, and, one must think, has not fundamentally changed over the past half century.
KGB entrance exams
Employees got into serious KGB units through strict selection. In each university there was a curator from the authorities, with the help of student agents and group leaders, he identified promising, ideologically stable guys, and recommended them to the Big House. After graduating from the institute, a man in civilian clothes came to a meeting with a candidate for whom there were great views and made an unequivocal proposal. If the student agreed, a lengthy test began.
Several divisions worked there for foreigners. Some supervised overseas students, others - tourists, third - businessmen who came to our country, fourth - diplomats. The latter direction was considered the most prestigious.
Promotional video:
Tests from the KGB
1: Write characteristics to your friends
2: Come up with a legend and enter the apartment of a stranger.
3: Get to the secret data of one of the enterprises.
Surveillance: Artists vs. Magicians
The task of the Chekists was to spy on consular officers in order to identify foreign agents. All diplomats, without exception, were in development, and the most "interesting" of them also relied on the tail - 5-6 people plus a car. During the surveillance, they even had the right to violate traffic rules. If they were to be seen by a traffic cop at that moment, a special sign was shown with his hand from the car.
A letter case was conducted at each consulate, which consisted of several sections - "employees", "regime and security service", "visitors". For the convenience of surveillance, KGB officers were housed in the apartments of houses adjoining the walls of the consulates. Observation posts in the houses opposite were also used. After all, on the street in the car you are not very much on duty and you cannot send agents to walk near the diplomatic mission - the guards will quickly decipher them.
The consulates themselves were packed with KGB special equipment. It was laid at the stage of overhaul of buildings. All rooms and telephones were monitored. Periodically, the security services of the consulates arranged checks - special groups with equipment came to look for bugs. But they did not always manage to find microphones (the main secret was not in them, but in the sound guides that transmit the signal through the thickness of concrete).
The holes for the sound tubes were even smaller than the holes for modern hidden cameras.
At first, diplomatic missions in Leningrad were accommodated in hotels. This also made it possible to observe the diplomats through the ceiling with the help of sighting devices. Why in the rooms of the upper floor, in certain places, the floor was disassembled and tubes with optics were inserted into it, through which it was possible to inspect the premises of the lower floor into the eyepiece.
Surveillance through the ceiling - one of the methods of the special services.
If an unknowing person enters such an observation room, he will never find the vizier. It could only be accessed by opening an almost invisible lock in the floor. The Chekists had secret coordinates by which they determined the location of these locks, opened them by pressing a needle in the right place.
After that, it was possible to lift the square of the parquet and gain access to the sight. An optical plug was opened with a special button on it. The lens of this miniature spyglass was only a millimeter in diameter, so it was impossible to see it from below.
However, once in Moscow such an incident happened. The security officer, pressing the button, opened the lens and walked away from the sight, and since it was light in the room, a thin sunbeam went down. The Japanese man who was being watched stood on a chair, climbed to look at the amazing phenomenon and discovered a spy accessory.
The line of sight was very helpful. Thanks to such a device, for example, it was possible to find out where the head of the office of one of the Western consulates, leaving work, hid the key to the safe. It was decided to "take" the safe during the Christmas holidays, when diplomats go home en masse.
They sent a bugbear from Moscow - a unique specialist in opening safes (by the way, three times winner of the state prize). He brought 10 suitcases of equipment with him, including an X-ray. We worked at night. On the key and on the safe itself, a counter of the number of openings was found. This was not a problem. The safe was opened, the documents in it were photographed, the bugbear disassembled the counters and installed one less opening in it.
There were unique bugbears among the KGB officers.
But he made some mistake and the counter broke down. And there were no such safes in the USSR. They urgently drove a plane to one of the European countries. There, their people helped to get the necessary safe, from which they removed the counter. After returning from vacation, the diplomats did not notice anything.
By the way, they opened not only other people's safes, but also their own. For educational purposes. One day the Soviet consul in Mexico would have been summoned to a meeting in Moscow. To the question of the Chekists "To whom did he leave the consulate?" replied that he simply locked the building - they say, there are ingenious, super-reliable locks. The KGB, without warning the diplomat, immediately sent a technical group to Mexico, which opened the super-locks, took the secret documents from the consulate and delivered them to Moscow, where they were presented to the arrogant diplomat.
And the scouts - "podkryshnikov" (for example, who worked under the roof of Soviet trade missions abroad) were brought up by the KGB in a different way. When they came to the Union for retraining, they were spied on. Those who did not find it were detained in the country at the end of the retraining and forced to perform more and more new tests. So the KGB spies hated their own employees more than foreign spies.
Finding the tail and pulling away from it are essential spy skills. Going out for an operation, even with complete confidence that he is not being followed, the scout still has to make two breaks from the imaginary surveillance. This is the law.
The art of spy tracking
Watch a fragment of the cartoon "Spy Passions" until 5:21 (~ 2 minutes):
There is an unwritten rule: a professional intelligence officer should evade surveillance like a magician - so that she thinks she has lost him herself. To do this, you need to know well the city in which you work.
There was a case - two military attachés wandered around Peter for 6 hours. Then we returned to the hotel. Auditory control (wiretapping) showed that they were chatting freely in the room, and the observer saw through the vizier that both were lying on their beds in exhaustion. Because they did not just walk, but studied the streets, alleys, courtyards - they gave all their strength, practicing convenient routes for detecting surveillance and avoiding it.
By the way, in the subway it is also very easy to break away from surveillance. Or pass something to someone unnoticed - say, running down an escalator, shove microfilm to the passenger on the right. There are many such "dead" spy zones in the city. The diplomat entered a second-hand bookstore and, looking at various books, left a bookmark in one of them. And after a couple of minutes, another "bibliophile" starts flipping through the same book. How can a security officer, without revealing himself, prevent this transfer of information?
Or a foreigner drives a car outside the city, suddenly brakes on the side of the road and goes deep into the forest. The surveillance agent obviously won't go there. He will only have to guess why the foreigner stopped - to relieve himself or take something from a container disguised as a stone, a branch or an old tin can lying in some heap of shit. And one consular officer just bought himself a bicycle and rode it out late at night, putting the surveillance in a difficult situation. It is ridiculous to follow him along the deserted streets by car, but you won't have time on foot.
Metro - ideal place for discreet meeting of agents.
Ambushes: be able to jump out at the sound of footsteps in time
There is an unwritten code of espionage and diplomatic games. It does not imply notes of protest, but, as it is now fashionable to say, a mirror response.
For example, an employee of our consulate in San Francisco (the one that the Americans recently closed) was detained while seizing a cache. At the same time, the Soviet diplomat was handcuffed. This was taken as an insult. Our Chekists were tasked with carrying out exactly the same operation in Leningrad in response. The object of development was the deputy consul general, a CIA staff member. They began an operational game with him, which was supposed to end with his red-handed arrest while seizing a cache in the wall of the hospital building. Botkin. In order not to frighten the "object", the "outdoor" created the appearance as if it had been lost. And a group of operatives on the spot prepared at the right moment to jump out of the ambush at the signal. This signal from the observation post on one of the upper floors was to be given by the head of the operation - to press a button on a special transmitting device. The diplomat drove up, got out of the car, but there was no command to arrest him. The operatives had to react to the sound of footsteps. During the arrest, the diplomat fell to his knees, tried to scratch his face on a crust of frozen snow so that traces of violence would remain on it. But he was not allowed. And they found the contents of the cache in his pants. During the "debriefing" it turned out that there was no signal from the observation post because the chief at the decisive moment confused the buttons and pressed the wrong one!that there was no signal from the observation post because the boss at the decisive moment confused the buttons and pressed the wrong one!that there was no signal from the observation post because the boss at the decisive moment confused the buttons and pressed the wrong one!
Surprisingly, some of these stupid and unsuitable employees have risen to very high positions, while others today lead the security services of the largest business empires.
CIA queue
One of the goals of monitoring consulates was to prevent unwanted contacts between foreign diplomats and Soviet citizens. Some of them themselves sought to get in touch with the Western special services. These potential traitors in the KGB were called "initiators". One day, someone fired a slingshot at the territory of the US Consulate General, in which he offered cooperation to American intelligence. The note was picked up by a Soviet diplomat and handed it over to where it should be. We started the game with the initiator. He asked in a note, in case of a positive answer to his proposal, to give two conditional signals. KGB operatives were able to do this. But the cautious traitor sent a new launch and demanded new signals. A lot of time and effort was spent on their imitation. Finally, the "initiator", having played enough conspiracy, made an appointment. He was detained. To the disappointment of the Chekists, he turned out to be a young guy from Sverdlovsk, who did not know any state secrets, but simply squandered the money of friends allocated to him to buy musical instruments. Not knowing how to get them back, the guy decided to become a CIA agent. He was imprisoned for 7 years.
Often the initiators called consulates by phone. But since all the numbers were tapped, it immediately became known. If the traitor was able to immediately agree on a meeting with one of the diplomats, the Chekists sent a car with fake diploma numbers to the agreed place. She appeared a couple of minutes before the arrival of real foreigners and took the "initiator" straight to the Big House. And if the preparation of the meeting on the part of the consulate required time and at least one more telephone conversation, the Chekists switched the traitor's next call to their own line. A KGB officer picked up the receiver and, imitating a foreign accent, he himself appointed the "initiator" a place and time.
Struggle for the minds of Soviet citizens seduced by foreign special services
Watch a fragment of the cartoon "Spy Passions" until 13:16 (~ 3 minutes):
One traitor-scientist was exposed by his neighbor in a communal apartment. He met with the American diplomat in the dressing room of his apartment. The American called, but did not step over the threshold - he and the scientist were passing something to each other between the double front doors. This seemed strange to the vigilant pensioner, and she wrote a statement to the KGB that a spy was visiting her neighbor.
Sometimes the Chekists resorted to very tough methods. At one time, the Consulate General of France began to organize screenings of films for Leningraders. The people poured down on them. In the darkness of the cinema, it was impossible to keep track of possible contacts between diplomats and Soviet citizens who found themselves in neighboring chairs. Then the KGB leadership set the task of compromising these sessions. Two agents were dispatched to them - hefty bullies. While watching a movie, they defiantly nibbled seeds and loudly spoiled the air. After that, the French stopped their shows.
It is easier to recruit a consul general than a security guard
The most important of the arts for the Chekists was the recruitment of foreigners. Sometimes a diplomat would refuse three recruiters, but agreed to the offer of a fourth. Virtuosos from the first main directorate (PGU) of the KGB, even from a seemingly neutral conversation with a diplomat, could create a recruiting situation.
Immediately after even a seemingly successful recruitment, the foreigner's behavior had to be tracked using special equipment installed in the consulate, to find out whether the “recruited” would report the conversation to the consulate's security service or not.
According to Chekists' estimates, on average, about 5 percent of Western consulate employees succumbed to recruitment. The percentage of guests from developing countries was much higher, despite the fact that there were no consulates of these states in Leningrad at all.
The recruiting plan was done on the students. If the son of some African king or Arab sheikh suddenly began to fail to keep up with his studies, the Chekist would contact him and offer to help correct his grades. Otherwise, he threatened with expulsion. As a rule, it worked - the foreign student was afraid to return in disgrace and incur the wrath of his father.
The fundamental principle of successful recruitment is to create a hopeless situation for a person. But everyone has their own threshold of hopelessness.
In Moscow, one foreign military attaché, whom they tried to recruit on the basis of compromising evidence, even committed suicide. But this is an exceptional case out of the ordinary. Any diplomat, agreeing to recruitment, always hopes that if his own people expose him, they will not be shot or imprisoned, but will be offered to become a double agent - to continue the game on their side and neutralize the harm caused to them. This often happens. In this sense, the suicide of the notorious Alexander Ogorodnik, who became the prototype of the "agent Trianon" in the film "TASS is authorized to declare …", raises big questions. Ogorodnik, the second secretary of the USSR Embassy in Colombia, was recruited by the CIA for sex-incriminating evidence (a connection with an employee of Columbia University, Pilar Suarez, could ruin his entire career). He started working for the Americansbut was exposed by the KGB and during his arrest in his Moscow apartment he took poison. According to our interlocutors, this story is very muddy. Trianon had nothing to poison himself for. But since Ogorodnik had compromising evidence on the top of the country (his mistress was the daughter of the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Konstantin Rusakov), it was more profitable to eliminate this particular traitor. And by the way, none of the KGB officers who allowed the spy to take poison, for some reason, was not punished for this flagrant failure.who allowed the spy to take poison, for some reason they were not punished for this blatant failure.who allowed the spy to take poison, for some reason they were not punished for this blatant failure.
Watch an excerpt from the 8th episode of the film "TASS is authorized to declare …" until 50:21 (~ 20 seconds):
Alexander Ogorodnik (left) became the prototype of "agent Trianon" in the film "TASS is authorized to declare …", played by Boris Klyuev (right).
Contribution of prostitutes to state security
The most reliable way to recruit is to catch a foreigner for sex. In the 70s and 80s, foreign exchange prostitutes and secular lionesses acted as agents of the KGB. There were about fifty foreign exchange prostitutes in Leningrad. The KGB controlled everyone. Without consent to cooperation, the prostitute would not have been allowed into any of the five hotels with currency bars visited by foreigners - Pribaltiyskaya, Moscow, Leningrad, Evropeyskaya and Astoria (and in the latter, the girls managed to serve clients directly under the tables, on which the tablecloths hung almost to the floor, and the bar was semi-dark).
Working with socialites was more difficult. In currency bars, they did not particularly shine - they would go into a hotel, seal a foreigner, and then try to meet him in neutral places. Unlike prostitutes, who were primarily interested in clients' money, these ladies wanted to marry a foreigner and always strove to deceive the Chekists. Sometimes, the apartment was already prepared for a decisive date, equipped with the necessary photographic equipment, and the agent disrupts the whole operation at the very last moment - she does not go to the meeting. And this could happen several times in a row. In those years, a special photographic film with photosensitivity was used, which made it possible to shoot in the dark without a flash. But it had a short shelf life of 4 days. Therefore, each time we had to load a new film, for which a specially trained person from Moscow was called. And even when,it seemed that everything was already on the ointment - the lioness and the diplomat had retired in the right place - still expect a catch. For example, some ladies tried to hang the bed somehow so that it was not visible what was happening on it.
One of the first covers for Ajax models was a button for a coat, warm jacket or jacket. Through a hole in the bandage, a photographic cable was brought out, which was screwed onto the release button of the camera.
Sometimes a socialite was not even required to be intimate. Her task was simply to give a prearranged signal at the right moment so that the Chekists with cameras entered the room and recorded a naked diplomat. But the ladies even here violated the instructions - they gave the signal not "before", but "after."
The prostitutes worked much more efficiently. One of them even hooked up the consul general. Togo was photographed in her apartment. When the diplomat was accurately informed about this (allegedly he was filmed by "some criminals" for the purpose of blackmail), he himself asked the "well-wisher" to connect him with the leadership of the KGB.
Consul General of France in the Soviet public bath
By the way about the French. Once a new Consul General of this country arrived in Leningrad. Outside surveillance, established for him, began to report interesting details about his behavior.
An elderly man with an aristocratic appearance and manners, walking along Nevsky Prospekt, talked about something with young people, causing a strange reaction in those - some shied away from the Consul General, others almost tried to stuff his face. It became clear: the Frenchman is blue. Such behavior in a country where sodomy was criminalized was very imprudent. They decided to take advantage of this - to substitute the consul general of a young man, whom the homosexuals who gathered in Katka's garden that year had chosen as their "queen". A group of employees for several days hung on the tail of the Frenchman, tracking all his movements. This "queen" was with them in the car, waiting for the right moment. And the opportune moment soon arrived. To the surprise of the KGB, the Consul General, despite his high diplomatic status,came to an ordinary city bath in Fonarny lane. It turned out to be a meeting place for gays. "Tsarina", accompanied by six naked KGB officers who urgently bought washcloths and towels, entered the common room. It was there, on a par with Soviet citizens, that he soaped himself and doused himself from the gang and swept France. One of the Chekists contrived to take a seat next to the Frenchman in a crowded bathhouse, and then unobtrusively yielded to the "queen". Then everything happened very quickly. The "queen" and the consul looked at each other, exchanged a few words, and almost imperceptibly shook hands. After the bath, the diplomat went to his new acquaintance's apartment. The contact developed successfully. But the consul general was suddenly recalled to his homeland. Most likely, the French security service tracked down the unwanted connection and intervened."Tsarina", accompanied by six naked KGB officers who urgently bought washcloths and towels, entered the common room. It was there, on a par with Soviet citizens, that he soaped himself and doused himself from the gang and swept France. One of the Chekists contrived to take a seat next to the Frenchman in a crowded bathhouse, and then unobtrusively yielded to the "queen". Then everything happened very quickly. The "queen" and the consul looked at each other, exchanged a few words, and almost imperceptibly shook hands. After the bath, the diplomat went to his new acquaintance's apartment. The contact developed successfully. But the consul general was suddenly recalled to his homeland. Most likely, the French security service tracked down the unwanted connection and intervened."Tsarina", accompanied by six naked KGB officers who urgently bought washcloths and towels, entered the common room. It was there, on a par with Soviet citizens, that he soaped himself and doused himself from the gang and swept France. One of the Chekists contrived to take a seat next to the Frenchman in a crowded bathhouse, and then unobtrusively yielded to the "queen". Then everything happened very quickly. The "queen" and the consul looked at each other, exchanged a few words, and almost imperceptibly shook hands. After the bath, the diplomat went to his new acquaintance's apartment. The contact developed successfully. But the consul general was suddenly recalled to his homeland. Most likely, the French security service tracked down the unwanted connection and intervened. One of the Chekists contrived to take a seat next to the Frenchman in a crowded bathhouse, and then unobtrusively yielded to the "queen". Then everything happened very quickly. The "queen" and the consul looked at each other, exchanged a few words, and almost imperceptibly shook hands. After the bath, the diplomat went to his new acquaintance's apartment. The contact developed successfully. But the consul general was suddenly recalled to his homeland. Most likely, the French security service tracked down the unwanted connection and intervened. One of the Chekists contrived to take a seat next to the Frenchman in a crowded bathhouse, and then unobtrusively yielded to the "queen". Then everything happened very quickly. The "queen" and the consul looked at each other, exchanged a few words, and almost imperceptibly shook hands. After the bath, the diplomat went to his new acquaintance's apartment. The contact developed successfully. But the consul general was suddenly recalled to his homeland. Most likely, the French security service tracked down the unwanted connection and intervened. Most likely, the French security service tracked down the unwanted connection and intervened. Most likely, the French security service tracked down the unwanted connection and intervened.
“Blues are generally very good agents. Because they are excellent psychologists. And they are predisposed to espionage work by all their way of life. They have developed conspiracy. The person who was caught by the general consul then emigrated. And he settled down wonderfully in one of the Western states. He, a KGB agent, was even given a house there as a "Soviet prisoner of conscience."
On the verge of a foul and a nervous breakdown
Western diplomats have often found themselves adherents of unconventional love. The Chekists especially remembered the lady - the secretary of the consulate of a large European country. According to the rules, if the diplomatic workers needed something, they applied to the Office for Servicing Foreign Missions.
This employee first turned there with a request to provide her with a vocal teacher, and then - a Russian language teacher. And both, as shown by auditory control, made unambiguous proposals. The first one rejected the harassment of the foreign woman, the second entered into a relationship with her. And when the KGB officer, using this, tried to recruit the secretary, she sent him away and even threatened to call the police. She behaved so confidently, because lesbianism, unlike pederasty in the USSR, was not considered a crime, not to mention the West. The relationship of the foreign woman with the teacher went so far that at the end of her business trip to Leningrad, she decided to take her friend to Europe across the Finnish border in the trunk of a car. The teacher, although she agreed to work for the KGB, was not averse to fleeing the country. Lesbians didn't talk about their plan directlybut the operative who was leading them guessed what they were up to. After a serious conversation, the teacher gave out the details of the plan.
A real security officer sees right through the spy
Watch a fragment of the cartoon "Spy Passions" until 16:07 (~ 50 seconds):
The diplomat was supposed to pick her up on the route to Finland at the appointed place. This moment had to be filmed. A trench was dug behind the side of the road, an operative hid in it and sat there all night. It started raining, and the poor fellow was flooded with water, after the operation he fell ill, but he completed the task - he managed to photograph how the consular secretary was pushing his mistress into the trunk. Then everything was a matter of technique. At the checkpoint in Torfyanovka, a border dog allegedly smelled something in the trunk of a car. The foreign woman was forced to open it and took out the teacher. They initiated a criminal case on illegal border crossing. The teacher, by the way, then ran away to her mistress anyway.
Inspection at the Soviet border.
The FRG consulate had its own risky employee. He played cat and mouse with the KGB - he seduced Soviet women on the road. Comes, let's say, to Pskov - meets and sleeps with a local resident. The Chekists quickly recruit this lady, and the German, knowing how the special services work, the next time he comes to Pskov, does not even call her and gets to know the new one. But in general, all sorts of insolence were fraught with trouble. People from outside surveillance sometimes put the insolent people in their place. They could, for example, puncture the tires of a car - first on one wheel, and after the diplomat puts the spare wheel on, on all four at once. Buckets of paint were poured on some of the foreigners from above, others were attacked on the street by hooligans. And also used special means - the so-called "compromising drugs". For example, at an official reception at the embassy with a diplomat who drank a glass of wine,there was a hurricane of diarrhea - he did not even have time to reach the toilet. Other special means made it possible to instantly put a person to sleep - so much so that, upon waking up, he did not even remember that he was sleeping.
These adult games are very addicting. But they also have a downside. Operational work in the KGB is very nervous. You have to be in good shape all the time. Otherwise, you risk incurring the wrath of your superiors. Even such luminaries as Conan Molodiy and Rudolf Abel were once charged with serious violations and miscalculations in their work. The first is currency overspending, the second is a loss of vigilance (the Americans have been developing it for a long time, and Abel did not even notice it).
Collective Trianon
The KGB recruited not only foreigners, but also its own citizens. The latter were almost never paid money for work on organs. Only sometimes some could get a premium of 30 rubles or women by March 8 - a box of chocolates. Moreover, the owners of safe houses rented their living space to the Chekists for money. Most of them helped the KGB free of charge out of a sense of duty.
Although the committee did not pay money to recruited compatriots, it became a guardian angel for them - it resolved their issues throughout their lives. He helped some with work, others with treatment, and still excused others from the police, women could be married off to a foreigner. However, this medal also had a downside. If a Soviet citizen did not agree to cooperate with the KGB, and this fact was recorded somewhere, on the contrary, a cross was put on the person. At work, he was denied a promotion, he was not given an apartment, he was not allowed to go abroad … And he did not even suspect to whom he owed such fatal bad luck.
There was another sneaky moment. For every foreign diplomat arriving in the USSR, an operational development case (DOR) was automatically started. These cases rarely ended with something. And the operatives who led them were not punished for their failures. It is another matter if Soviet citizens were involved in the development. If any of them received a signal that he was a traitor, a spy, or a currency dealer, the operational check case (DOP) appeared first. If the signal was at least partially confirmed, DOR was started - in this case, surveillance, equipment, agents were connected. And God forbid, if the development was unsuccessful. The operative received scolding from his superiors for the fact that forces and funds were wasted. Therefore, 90 percent of the DORs against Soviet citizens, on the contrary, were effective - they were sent to jail. It doesn't matter if the person was actually guilty or not. And representatives of the party elite and other influential people were more often given an official warning (that is, a warning is a special form of punishment introduced in 1972).
By the way, it was forbidden to recruit party functionaries. If one of the agents, the same prostitute, unknowingly, suddenly did it, the material was immediately handed over to the archive. And, by the way, some Chekists believe that this ban ruined the USSR: that's why the CPSU slept between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, because there was no one to bother them in time. Although some Western diplomats seem to have known that perestroika was expected in the country already in the 70s. For example, the same employee of the FRG consulate in Leningrad, Dieter Boden, was then declared persona non grata. Before leaving, he said that he was saying goodbye for a short while and would return to the city on the Neva again as a consul general. From the point of view of diplomatic relations, this forecast was absolutely unrealizable and even absurd. The expelled diplomat will never be reappointed in a country where he once became persona non grata. But Dieter Boden in 1992, indeed, returned as Consul General. But not to Leningrad, but to Petersburg, and not to the USSR, but to Russia. That is, as if to another state, and therefore his arrival became possible. But then it turns out, back in the 70s, Dieter Boden knew that in the place of the USSR there would soon be another country? He returned to St. Petersburg at a "golden" time for diplomacy. By 1996, in just five years, the KGB had carried out six (!) Reorganizations. Many staff members have left the special service. Sometimes there was not even enough gasoline for operational vehicles. It was then, in the 90s, that the foundations of the West's influence on the politics and economy of post-Soviet Russia were laid, and no KGB could prevent this …That is, as if to another state, and therefore his arrival became possible. But then it turns out, back in the 70s, Dieter Boden knew that in the place of the USSR there would soon be another country? He returned to St. Petersburg at a "golden" time for diplomacy. By 1996, in just five years, the KGB had carried out six (!) Reorganizations. Many staff members have left the special service. Sometimes there was not even enough gasoline for operational vehicles. It was then, in the 90s, that the foundations of the West's influence on the politics and economy of post-Soviet Russia were laid, and no KGB could prevent this …That is, as if to another state, and therefore his arrival became possible. But then it turns out, back in the 70s, Dieter Boden knew that in the place of the USSR there would soon be another country? He returned to St. Petersburg at a "golden" time for diplomacy. By 1996, in just five years, the KGB had carried out six (!) Reorganizations. Many staff members have left the special service. Sometimes there was not even enough gasoline for operational vehicles. It was then, in the 90s, that the foundations of the West's influence on the politics and economy of post-Soviet Russia were laid, and no KGB could prevent this …Many staff members have left the special service. Sometimes there was not even enough gasoline for operational vehicles. It was then, in the 90s, that the foundations of the West's influence on the politics and economy of post-Soviet Russia were laid, and no KGB could prevent this …Many staff members have left the special service. Sometimes there was not even enough gasoline for operational vehicles. It was then, in the 90s, that the foundations of the West's influence on the politics and economy of post-Soviet Russia were laid, and no KGB could prevent this …
“But now everything is different,” the reader will say. KGB veterans, skilled in the secret war, do not share this optimism. In their opinion, today the government and business in Russia are struck by enemy agents, like some sick plants with a poisonous fungus.
Author: Vladlen Chertinov