Hundreds of documentary works, journalistic articles and even works of art have been written about the "Caribbean Crisis" of October-November 1962, which brought our planet to the brink of an atomic catastrophe. But not everyone knows about the feat of the crews of four Soviet submarines, forced to resist 85% of the ships and aircraft of the US Atlantic Fleet.
Here is the story of one of them …
Hike no one knows where
In March 1962, several Project 641 submarines from the 211st brigade of the 4th squadron of the Northern Fleet (Polyarny) began to prepare for a cruise to who knows where. There were vague rumors about Ghana and Guinea, but there was no clarity. Money certificates were issued for the families remaining in the Soviet Union, and all submarines of the 69th brigade were relocated to Sayda Bay. "B-36" began to catch up with the rest of the brigade ships in replenishment of spare parts and consumables. There were no particular difficulties with the replenishment of spare parts in other combat units, but our request to the hydrography was answered that everything had long been issued to other ships and nothing of the requested items was in the warehouses.
Submarines of project 641
Even additional refrigerators were previously offered from household technical equipment to boats of the 69th brigade. But they had to be abandoned, because the ZIL refrigerators did not fit into the strong hull of the submarine even through removable sheets for loading batteries. Even the desktop electric fans were not enough for the "catching up" "B-36". There were no air conditioners on Project 641 submarines at that time. In order to escape the heat and stuffiness, I had to attach a propeller cut out of a tin can to one of the spare selsins to the gyrocompass and provide airflow in the navigator's cabin.
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Worst of all, the ship for navigation support did not have the KPI and KPF pulse-phase devices, which had already appeared in the Navy to determine the location of ships using the ROUTE system. They made it possible for the same purposes to use the American LORAN systems, which worked reliably in the Atlantic and in the places where the 69th submarine brigade was supposed to be based. The only possible way to determine a place in the ocean turned out to be astronomical observations by the stars and the sun, as in the time of Columbus. The presence on the ship of three well-trained observers (two navigators and an assistant commander), who carried out observations at the same time, made it possible to obtain an "averaged place" with high accuracy. An additional control was served, though less accurate, but still useful "averaged place"received by all the officers of the watch and the command of the ship by observation from the sun.
Unfortunately, all astronomical observations were possible only on the surface when the tactical situation allowed. With the increase in the activity of the US Navy's anti-submarine forces, astronomical observations were made extremely rarely and with a great risk of being discovered due to the decrease in stealth. Nevertheless, during the entire campaign, it was possible to provide the necessary navigation accuracy.
The unknown is ahead
From Sayda Bay, all the boats of the brigade made several one-day trips to check the readiness of the ships for the campaign by the officers of the headquarters. Occasionally officers were allowed to visit their families in Polyarny, and in other free time, if it appeared, we walked along the hills and ate blueberries.
On the night of September 30, all four submarines, in the strictest secrecy and enhanced berth security, in the presence of a group of officers and generals, loaded one torpedo with a nuclear warhead into torpedo tubes and, in addition to them, one officer from the 6th Division of the Fleet with the rank of captain- lieutenant as an observer. Towards evening, submariners of the 69th brigade were built on the quay near the Dmitry Galkin floating base. First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral V. A. Fokin, made a speech before us wishing us a happy voyage to the port of one of the friendly countries. At the same time, he warned that, despite the peaceful situation, one must be prepared for any change in it.
In response to VA Arkhipov's question about the use of special weapons, he cursed strongly, he said: “So, guys, write in the journals:“Use special weapons in the following cases. The first is when you get bombed and you get a hole in the solid case. The second is when you surface and they fire at you and again get a hole. And third - by order from Moscow!"
Immediately after the formation, preparations for battle, campaign and diving began on the ships. On the night of October 1, 1962, the B-Z6 and the rest of the brigade's boats with an interval of 30 minutes began to move away from the pier and began to move to a new base.
Before leaving for all submarines, one special group (OSNAZ) arrived to ensure the conduct of radio reconnaissance and radio interception of reports from foreign anti-submarine forces. In addition, the brigade's flagship mechanic, Captain 2nd Rank Lyubimov, went on a campaign against the B-36.
We go to Cuba
After leaving the Kola Bay, I turned to the commander with the question of where to plot the course. In response, the commander gave the coordinates of the start and end of the next course and the distance between them. This continued until the passage of the Faroe-Icelandic border and exit to the Atlantic Ocean. With the exit to the Atlantic, the ship announced that we were going to Cuba to the port of Mariel for permanent basing, and that on the approach to the port we would be met by a Cuban torpedo boat. Passage to the port of destination was not prescribed by the shortest route through the Florida Strait, but through the Caicos Strait between the Bahamas and further along the long, narrow and winding Old Bahamas Canal. Covert, trouble-free passage through such a channel seemed at least problematic, but it was decided to deal with this issue on the spot.
Already in the first hours of the transition, the calculation of the average speed of the ship on the cruise according to the given time intervals surprised the commander unpleasantly. Instead of the average speed of 5-6 knots adopted in the fleet for the covert passage of diesel-electric submarines, a speed of 10 knots was assigned to us. And if you observe secrecy and have a margin of time for diving when evading anti-submarine forces, then you will have to have a speed of at least 12 knots, which in a stormy sea will require diesel engines to work at full speed, that is, a very intense and unfavorable operating mode of the main engines.
Stormy weather that accompanied the submarine in the Barents and Norwegian Seas did not leave us in the North Atlantic either. The impact of the waves became more powerful, especially at the forced speed of 12 knots. The first losses appeared: the waves tore off the bow emergency buoy and damaged the upper cover of the VIPS device (a launcher for setting signal equipment and electronic warfare devices). During the next storm, the same waves pressed down on the guardhouse of the control room Lieutenant Commander Mukhtarov, who did not dodge them, and broke two of his ribs, “freeing” him from watch for almost two weeks. As the deputy political officer of the ship, captain of the 3rd rank Saparov, wrote in a report to the political agencies, the injured officer Mukhtarov was replaced on the watch by the communist Saparov. By the way, Mukhtarov was also a communist.
As a navigator, the weather did not make it possible for me to clarify the numbered position of the ship by means of astronomical observations, and there were simply no other ways in our campaign after leaving the coast of Norway. As a result, after passing the Faro-Icelandic anti-submarine line on all four ships (as it turned out after the cruise) there was a discrepancy about 13-18 miles back on the course, which indicated the presence of the North Atlantic Current, which, having no absolute lag on the ships, we simply didn't know how to count.
But in every phenomenon there is not only a negative, but also a positive side, and in bad weather. Due to bad weather on all three anti-submarine lines, NATO anti-submarine aviation did not bother us, which helped us almost withstand the given average speed of the transition.
If the intelligence of the NATO countries discovered the brigade's exit from the Kola Bay, then they counted on our crossing at an average speed of 5-6 knots and were late with an increase in the activity of anti-submarine forces on the lines. There were no storms in the Central Atlantic, yes, and the probable enemy had not yet shown increased activity, which made it possible to carry out astronomical observation of the place not only in the evening and morning twilight, but also group determination of the place by the sun by the forces of watch officers and the ship's command group under the command of the commander.
Soon the air and water warmed significantly. We entered the subtropics. During the night watch, taking advantage of the tropical downpour, I happily took a shower on the bridge with soap and a washcloth.
In the morning twilight on October 23, 1962, "B-36" approached the Caicos Strait at a distance of 25 miles and began to prepare to cross the strait underwater.
The storage battery was fully charged by this moment, it only remained to reliably determine the location, which was done by three observers in three or four stars. The reconnaissance of the situation indicated the presence of two American destroyers operating by radars in the strait area. Having delayed at periscope depth for a communication session, we received a radiogram, according to which the B-36 was assigned a position southeast of the Caicos Strait, where we headed away from the strait.
Meanwhile, the tactical situation began to deteriorate sharply. The activity of the US Navy's anti-submarine forces has increased incredibly. PLO aviation so often made overflights of the water area that "B-36" lost the ability to fully charge accumulator batteries (AB), and recharging became a very problematic event. Soon, our radio intelligence officers intercepted messages about the announcement by US President John F. Kennedy of a naval blockade of Cuba and about a ban on all warships from approaching the US coast closer than 400 miles.
In addition to aviation, American destroyers began to appear within sight in the form of paired patrols, continuously working with their radio and sonars. In the daytime, due to excellent visibility, it was possible to observe the actions of the destroyers at a great distance when they spotted any civilian ships. They quickly approached the stranger and, after a short delay near the ship, continued to patrol. The ship, on the other hand, lay on the opposite course and moved away from Cuba.
The actions of US anti-submarine aircraft have become more aggressive. Assuming that an underwater target could be found in the area according to radar contact data or according to the SOSUS hydrophone system unknown to us at that time, American aircraft began to clarify the location of submarines using the JULI sonar buoys. This system also included explosive devices to clarify the location of the submarine with buoys due to the direction finding of the reflection of the blast wave from its hull. Since the explosions were very intense, and we were also unfamiliar with the JULI system, their appearance initially caused some concern.
Loading sonar buoys into the Grumman S-2E Tracker aircraft carrier anti-submarine group CVSG-55.
Soon our assumption about their purpose was confirmed by an intercepted radio report from an airplane about the coordinates of the submarine. They differed from the numbered coordinates by ten miles. When the chief officer asked if these were our coordinates, I answered evasively. At the next determination of the position, I was convinced that the plane transmitted the most accurate coordinates of the B-36 at that moment, and they could be taken for further reckoning of the ship's position, since the accuracy of determining the position of the American aircraft significantly exceeded our capabilities.
Soon, a rather difficult situation for us turned into an extreme one. Approximately a day later, in the ensuing darkness, the commander decided to recharge the battery that had been discharged during the day at periscope depth during the night when the diesels were operating in the RPM mode (the diesels were operating underwater). We got under the RDP and laid down on a course to the east.
After some time, I suddenly remembered that before setting under the RDP in the westerly direction, there was a weak operation of two ship's radars, which after turning were in the RDP shaded by the mine for observation in the periscope aft sector. Hydroacoustic observation in this sector is also impossible, both due to design features and due to the roar of operating diesel engines. Taking into account the possibility of approaching ships appearing in the shaded sector and the B-36 being in the center of the position, I reported to the commander about the time of turning to the left by 90 degrees according to the compass.
The commander agreed with this: “That's right, we have nothing to go towards Shumkov's position. There are old batteries on the B-130, you cannot bring it down and bring the US anti-submarine forces to it. " With the beginning of the circulation, an alarming report from acousticians followed about the appearance of strong and rapidly growing noises from the propellers of two destroyers. "B-36" urgently sank, but even before arriving at a depth safe from a ramming strike, the submariners heard a strong whistling noise of the destroyers' propellers in all compartments.
The destroyers began to walk around the B-36 in a circle with a radius of about 15-20 cables at a speed of about 20 knots, working with sonars at their heading angles of 90 degrees to the left side, moving counterclockwise and shifting the circle, as if throwing loops in the direction of displacement submarine from the center of this circle. Contact was maintained reliably and did not leave us any chance of breaking away from tracking with our discharged battery.
We were maneuvering at 3-4 knots, making aperiodic course changes, with little hope for a possible change in the situation or weather. The entire crew knew about the presence of destroyers all this time, listening to the parcels of sonars, which loudly beat on the hull of the boat and human nerves, interfering with rest.
About a day later, only the Charles P. Cecil radar patrol destroyer remained to guard us with the support of PLO aviation.
We decided to break away from tracking. When the destroyer, continuing to circle around the B-36 counterclockwise, traversed the boat on the starboard side, the B-36, increasing its speed to 9 knots, turned it aft, and the destroyer, continuing its circulation to the left, moved away from the boat … At the end of the circulation, discovering that the B-36 was out of the circle, the destroyer rushed after her, inevitably closing the traverse distance. Having brought the submarine to the traverse of its port side, the destroyer again began to circulate to the left, and the B-36 again turned 90 degrees to the right behind the destroyer, leaving the circle, and began to quickly move away from the destroyer, which, continuing the circulation, also departed from the boat, at least by the diameter of its circulation.
By this time, the acoustics reported to the commander of the B-36 submarine that the destroyer had lost contact with the submarine and switched to a circular search. Unfortunately, the commander immediately took advantage of the advice of the most competent acoustician - the instructor of the 69th brigade of the submarine warrant officer Pankov. From an acoustic point of view, he gave competent advice - to turn the nose to the destroyer to reduce the reflective surface of the submarine's hull, but did not take into account the factor that, turning to the destroyer, the B-36 would stop its separation and approach the destroyer, making it easier for him to search. Which is what happened as a result. The commander, trusting in the authority of the master of military affairs, did not listen to objections to such a maneuver, and the destroyer restored acoustic contact with the B-36. This attempt was the last opportunity to break away from tracking. Our rechargeable battery could not provide more than three nodes.
I could only hope for a miracle. But tropical wonders in the form of storms and hurricanes did not appear, the weather remained like a resort, and the battery was inevitably discharged.
In order to delay the impending need to ascend to the surface, the commander decided to minimize the power consumption to the point of stopping the propulsion motors and maintaining the required depth by pumping out and taking the necessary portions of water into the equalizing tank using the main bilge pump. And now, in the half-darkness that had come, the B-36 hovered without a move at a depth of 70 meters.
Pop up prompt
Suddenly, a stern bulkhead door opened in the central post and a healthy man literally burst through it, in a semi-faint state. "Where is the commander?" - asked the officer assigned to us on the campaign. "What happened?" - Anxiously reacted to the request as a senior officer, who is on the command watch. Pointing to the stern, the newcomer answered: "People are dying there, you need to surface and give battle!" “Nothing, some will be saved,” Arkady Kopeikin reassured. And the officer withdrew to the stern. The statement that people were "dying" in the compartments was not so far from reality. The microclimate in the compartments was close to the habitat limit. The temperature was in the range of 40-65 ° C with the highest humidity, high content of carbon dioxide and harmful vapors from fuel, oil, electrolyte in the air of the compartments that had not been ventilated for a long time.
Sweat-covered people constantly wore only slippers with cut backs and disposable panties torn into petals, like loincloths made of palm leaves among savages. Fresh water on the ship was in short supply, but if you managed to grab an extra glass, the water immediately appeared on the skin, and the person remained as hot, sweaty and tormented by thirst as before a glass of water. Despite the unfavorable situation, the entire crew resignedly performed their duty. At posts where the temperature approached 70 ° C, electricians, hydroacoustics, even with a reduced duration of the watch, had to carry it with ammonia due to frequent cases of loss of consciousness. Meanwhile, the American destroyer got tired of spinning around the stationary "B-36" and he began to detonate flare grenades, apparently inviting us to surface.
I had the experience of listening to grenade explosions imitating the explosions of depth charges during the joint exercises "S-178" and anti-submarine ships of the Kamchatka naval flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, but the intensity of the explosions of American grenades did not stand any comparison with what I heard at the Pacific Fleet. They echoed loudly on the hull of the boat, causing the lights to blink and crumbs of cork insulation to fall off the sides of the compartments.
When the "B-36" started its motors, the explosions stopped, and the discharge of the batteries accelerated, inevitably bringing the moment of the forced ascent closer. Finally, this moment has come. On "B-36" all the main ballast was blown off as soon as the destroyer passed our traverse and left the boat astern. At the same time, the radio began transmitting to the GKP of the Navy about the surfacing and pursuit of the submarine by US anti-submarine forces.
Before removing the conning tower hatch, it was necessary to equalize the pressure in the compartments with atmospheric pressure through the ventilation shaft. This action caused a hiss of slush evaporating from the decks in the compartments, for a short time the appearance of a lilac fog, with the disappearance of which the decks of the compartments were completely dry. The hatch was cleaned by the assistant commander, Lieutenant-Commander Anatoly Andreev. Before going up to the bridge, he stuck the Shtyr radio antenna with the USSR naval flag tied to it through the conning tower, and then went out onto the bridge holding the flag antenna high above the wheelhouse. At this point, the Charles P. Cecil was approaching the boat from its aft corners. Very low above the wheelhouse, almost touching the flag raised on a pole, an anti-submarine aircraft of the US Navy's basic patrol aircraft of the "Neptune" type flew.
On the destroyer, a signal of four color flags was raised, which we could not make out for a long time until we saw that the same flags were painted on its conning tower. Then we guessed that these are the international callsigns of the destroyer, which he raised on the mast as a presentation when meeting. The next signal of three flags, raised by the destroyer, I easily found in the International Three-Flag Code of Signals (ISC). It meant asking: “What happened? Do you need help?"
I reported the content of the signal to the bridge, where the commander and chief officer of the B-36 were already there. In response, I heard the command of the commander: "Do not answer." He probably took my report for a report from the radio operators. After repeated radio transmission to the Naval State Commissariat of the Navy about the forced ascent, we received all the necessary receipts for radio requests, but did not receive any instructions in response, until we reported on the successful separation from pursuit and tracking.
Sailing accompanied by an American destroyer turned out to be unusually calm, and if it were not for the moral torment about losing in a kind of duel with the US Navy's submarine, it could even be called comfortable. On the B-36, the compartments were continuously ventilated, the battery was being fully charged, all debris and spoiled food was removed, the remaining vegetables were moved on the upper deck, and individual mechanisms were being repaired. The bilge ones were repairing the upper cover of the VIPS device, the minders were doing something with the gas outlets of the diesel engines, and on the bridge I was repairing a direction-finding repeater flooded with water.
Everyone involved in the maneuvering of the submarine was developing a plan for the forthcoming separation from tracking. "B-36", continuing to charge the battery, had a stroke of no more than 4 knots. Such a low speed was difficult for the American destroyer, so she constantly maneuvered along the left side of the submarine, not moving more than 5 cables away from it. After passing along the B-36 hull on a parallel course at a traverse distance of about 50 m and moving away from it by 5 cables, the destroyer turned left on the opposite course and passed the counter course, after which she again lay down on a parallel course.
This "delicate" maneuvering, corresponding to the high sea culture, continued continuously until the dive of the "B-36". The actions of the helicopters and aircraft of the US Navy could hardly be called delicate. They periodically flew over the boat at very low altitudes, making television and photographs.
Shortly before the completion of the necessary measures to prepare the "B-36" for a long diving experience, it seemed to us, a convenient opportunity to dive and detach from tracking. At dusk a ship appeared, judging by the lights, a tanker. When the tanker approached us one mile, the destroyer headed towards it. Bearing in mind what a difficult process in the Soviet Navy was the acceptance of fuel at sea on the move, the commander gave the command "Prepare to dive." To our amazement, the destroyer departed from the tanker, and radio intelligence intercepted its report to the shore about the transfer of 150 tons of fuel from tanker to boat. Having finished all the work, for the performance of which it was necessary to be on the surface, the crew of the B-36 faced the need to carry out a separation from the tracking. By this time, the prerequisites for a successful breakaway had increased significantly. A normal microclimate was established in the compartments, everything that required urgent repair was repaired. After the repair of the upper cover of the VIPS device, the boat was able to dive to a working depth of 240 m, and ship hydroacoustics - to shoot jamming devices. A fully charged rechargeable battery allowed the entire speed range of the submarine to be used.
Disengagement from tracking
But the main success factor in the separation from tracking was the decision of the commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank A. F. Dubivko. apply the technique of suppressing the destroyer sonar proposed by Warrant Officer Pankov. During the entire joint voyage with the submarine, the destroyer continuously worked with radar and sonar. Having determined the frequency of the sonar, Pankov noticed that it was in the frequency range of our Sviyaga hydroacoustic communications station and suggested tuning it to the destroyer's sonar frequency in order to make it useless at the right time with the help of the Sviyaga's continuous directional signal. The success of the take-off maneuver exceeded all expectations. Almost from the moment the B-36 was submerged, the destroyer could not even for a minute establish hydroacoustic contact with it.
The maneuver was started when the destroyer, following a parallel course, went 2-3 cables ahead. The boat urgently plunged into 12 knots on the move, crossing the wake of the destroyer, and put a simulation cartridge at a depth of 60 meters from the VIPS device, which created a cloud from bubbles that simulates the hull of a submarine for the sonar. Continuing the dive to a depth of 200 meters, she led the destroyer astern and began to quickly withdraw. When the destroyer began to use sonar in the direction of the boat, our B-36 Sviyaga acoustics suppressed its work, and the destroyer was forced to turn off its sonar. At the third turn on, the destroyer's sonar began to work in a circular search. But he was far enough away and no longer dangerous for the boat, so we decided not to interfere with him and continued to increase the distance. I was concerned about the need to increase the lead as quickly as possible. After making sure that the "B-36" was at least 12 miles away from the dive site, I reported this distance to the commander and suggested that it was possible to slow down in order to save battery power.
From that moment on, the B-36 had no meetings with the US Navy ships until the end of the cruise. The separation from the tracking was immediately reported to the GKP of the Navy, and a receipt for the receipt of our report was received. After a short time, the communication instructions came. The commander was waiting for a radio indicating our further actions. And only more than a day later, having received another official radiogram, the cipher officer said that, judging by his demonstration groups, the radio operators had missed one radiogram. It turned out that the second radio with the same group that was indicative for radio operators as the radio with instructions for communication, they took for a repeat of the first radio and did not pass it to the cipher, but sent it to the trash. Thus, through the fault of the transmitting radio center in Moscow, the B-36 submarine was left without control from the GKP for more than a day. In the B-36 radiogram taken from the basket, a new position was assigned five hundred miles northeast of our location, where we were already late. I had to surface and carry out the orders received at full speed. To everyone's surprise and delight, the first 400 miles of this passage passed in the complete absence of opposition from the enemy anti-submarine forces.
In the area of the positions assigned to the submarines of the 69th brigade, our radio reconnaissance recorded the presence of the American helicopter carrier "Tethys Bay" with escort ships and intensified patrolling of the area by the base anti-submarine aviation. As we approached our position by 50-40 miles, we felt their opposition in full. The surface position was out of the question because of the incessant signals from aircraft and ship radars.
The ship's officers assumed that such a timely concentration of anti-submarine forces in the areas of our submarine positions was impossible without the presence of a spy in the control system of the forces of the USSR Navy. And although much was explained by the operation of the "SOSUS" system, the existence of which in that trip we did not yet know, these assumptions were not completely dispelled. If there was Penkovsky, there could be others like him.
In a new positioning area
After taking up a given position, another trouble awaited us. On November 7, when an attempt was made to start the left diesel engine to work on a propeller under the RPD (diesel engine operation under water), the diesel engine was disabled due to hydraulic shock due to the ingress of seawater into its cylinders. The right diesel also contained water in all cylinders.
Before performing labor-intensive work in field conditions on opening the covers and inspecting all cylinders to find out the reasons for the ingress of water into them, both diesel engines were not operational. At the disposal of the submarine commander was only an average diesel engine, not adapted to work under the RDP. Long stay "B-36" in position threatened to completely discharge the battery and inevitable re-surfacing among the US Navy's anti-submarine forces. In this situation, the commander made the only correct decision to proceed with the commissioning of the right-hand diesel engine, for which to leave the area 60 miles for the duration of the work, in order to return to the assigned position at the end of the work.
Having moved 60 miles out of the area, we found a relatively calm situation, which made it possible to be on the surface at night without moving, in drift, and during the day - in a submerged position. Even before the end of the revision of the right diesel engine, we received a command to return to Sayda Guba. The return took place in a calm atmosphere. The anti-submarine forces of the potential enemy rested after the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis, yes, and the weather was unfavorable for the intensive flights of NATO aviation.
Return to base
The sea worn out us with its rolling, and me - the navigator, the impossibility to reliably determine the place of the ship due to inclement weather without the sun and stars.
Almost the entire transition was made on the surface. Initially, the commander decided to return under the RDP, but after the officers of the watch showed him a couple of times unknown vessels found in the stern sector that did not hear the acoustics, the commander changed his mind and the boat surfaced. In a stormy sea, the surface position more reliably ensured the safety of the ship. There remained concern about fuel consumption, which, according to all assumptions, might not be enough to reach the home base.
For me, this concern was worth the biggest discrepancy in determining a place in the ocean in my entire nine-year service as a navigator. Before determining the place, the flagship mechanic of the 69th brigade, Captain 2nd Rank Lyubimov, stood above me with a slide rule for two days. He compared the measured fuel consumption and compared it with the distance traveled by the boat. Based on the results of measurements, a decision was made to request assistance in the form of a tanker for refueling. Due to the underestimated speed readings on hydraulic lags when determining the location, the misclosure was 67 miles ahead of the course, which indicated the actual speed of the ship is 5.4 knots. A radio was sent ashore about the need to replenish fuel, which was really lacking. Someone suggested the remnants of fuel mixed by sea rolling in ballast tanks with water,pump into a service fuel tank, from which to drain the settled water and add engine oil to the tank. With this mixture, "B-36" entered the Barents Sea, and the Kola Bay had to enter on motors due to the battery.
The tanker met us in the Norwegian Sea, but the storm presented no opportunity to take fuel from it.
A notable event on my return was my presence on the bridge when the mechanics tried to inspect the diesel lines in the aft superstructure of the boat.
The motorist, securely tied with a throwing end, went out to inspect the pipelines, accompanied by an insuring sailor. Having reached the middle of the aft superstructure, he was washed overboard by the wave. Fortunately, the next wave, thanks to the tossing end, brought him back. The pipeline inspection operation was terminated immediately.
Meeting at Saida Bay
As a navigator, I was pleased with the performance of the Ramka antenna, despite the fact that it was flooded with seawater back in the Sargasso Sea. This antenna made it possible to confidently tether to the coast using Norwegian radio beacons with a residual of 7 miles received.
Our return from the hike to Sayda Guba cannot be called solemn. After mooring, I remember only one person who met - someone from the engineering and mechanical service, who asked if all the diesels on the B-36 were in service. Having received the answer that one diesel engine was broken, he desperately waved his hand at the boat and left.
From eyewitness accounts, the analysis of the campaign on the 4th squadron was rather strange. The officers of the squadron's submarine command groups were warned not to interrupt the speaker, a representative of the higher headquarters, or ask questions. In the report, the commanders of the ships of the 69th brigade were accused of all mortal sins. Not knowing the true state of affairs, the listeners were silent, but when the speaker accused the commanders of surfacing at a sufficiently high electrolyte density of 1,050 in the batteries, exclamations of bewilderment swept through the hall, since every submariner knows that the density simply cannot be below this value. can. There was a shout "Do not interrupt", the speaker finished the report and quickly left.
During the analysis from the Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal A. A. Grechko, according to the recollections of those present, there were even more oddities. It turned out that, criticizing the actions of the commanders of the 69th brigade, Marshal Grechko was sure that they were in command of nuclear submarines, and could not understand why they floated up to recharge their batteries. Having learned that the American destroyers were approaching up to 50 m to the surfaced submarines, the marshal asked why the submariners did not shower them with grenades. When he realized that in peaceful conditions surfacing was inevitable, he said that he "would be better off drowned than to be so disgraced."
To explain the behavior of submarine commanders, the background on which it was required to make decisions is important. Submarines had unstable radio communications with the Central Command Center of the Navy. They learned about developing events from fragmentary intercepts of messages from US broadcast stations. From this information they concluded that the situation was tense, but that the case was on the brink of war, they found out only at the base, when a member of the Armed Forces of the Northern Fleet, Vice-Admiral Sizov, at a meeting with submariners of the 69th submarine submarine, said: “And we are alive and not waited."
In the end, everything ended well. The participants in the campaign were not punished.
Author: V. V. Naumov, former navigator of the submarine "B-36", rear admiral, retired
