Turkish Fortress Anapa - Alternative View

Turkish Fortress Anapa - Alternative View
Turkish Fortress Anapa - Alternative View

Video: Turkish Fortress Anapa - Alternative View

Video: Turkish Fortress Anapa - Alternative View
Video: Circassian Notes No. 8 - Black Sea Coastal line (Rus, eng subs) 2024, May
Anonim

Few people know about the remarkable victory of the Russian soldiers in 1791 during the Russian-Turkish war over the superior forces of the enemy, thanks to which, subsequently, the entire Black Sea coast of the Caucasus began to belong to the Russian Empire. But let's take a look at everything in order …

It is known from history that in the 15th-16th centuries Turkey declared itself in the international arena as a strong and powerful state. She declared the Caucasus to be the sphere of her political and economic interests. The situation in this region became especially aggravated when the Russians annexed Taman and Crimea to their empire. In retaliation, the Turks quickly expanded their presence in the Trans-Kuban region, making it the main outpost for the conquest of Crimea and the entire Caucasus. In order to fulfill their plans, the Turks erected a fortress (present-day Anapa). The uniqueness of this fortress, washed from almost all sides by the sea, is in its practical inaccessibility: seven bastions, united by embankments, are protected by a deep moat. The steep coastline and the impossibility of approaching enemy warships due to the numerous shoals served as additional protection for the Anapa fortress. Another function of the numerous bastions was to protect three stone gates. In 1783, several hundred families of refugees from Crimea lived on the territory of the fortress, state institutions functioned, an inn worked, services were held in 3 mosques, and numerous coffee shops and merchants served the population. About 40 thousand janissaries could be in the fortress at the same time.

The fortress provided military support to Turkish detachments sent deep into the territory to conduct agitation among the population of the Caucasus, through it the supply of mountain peoples with weapons and ammunition was carried out. At the same time, the fortress became the center of trade on the Black Sea coast. The Turks did not disdain to engage in the slave trade, selling slaves captured during raids on peaceful villages in the Caucasus.

For Russia, Turkey's activities in the Caucasus under the cover of the Anapa fortress posed a serious danger. And as events showed, this fortress was involved in a military confrontation between Russia and Turkey for many years.

Turkey well understood the importance of the fortress, calling it the "key" to the Asian coast of the Black Sea coast. Thanks to her, the Turkish navy controlled the Caucasian coast.

In Russia, it was believed that the destruction of the fortress would significantly undermine Turkey's influence in the Caucasus, which would cause the weakening of Turkey's influence over the entire region. Already at that time, Russian troops and settlers, having mastered the Kuban, began to gradually advance and settle in the Trans-Kuban region.

In 1788 Russian regiments set out on a campaign. Their path lay to the walls of the Anapa fortress. By the decision of Prince Potemkin, the army was led by General P. Tekeli.

A fierce battle took place under the walls of the fortress on an October day. The fortress was defended not only by the Turks, but also by the local population who came to their aid. The powerful artillery fire of the bastions and the skillful defense of the fortress did not allow the Russians to capture the citadel, and the siege was considered, under these conditions, a hopeless business. Tekeli's army retreated beyond the Kuban, having previously destroyed the Nagai settlements close to the fortress, which supported the Turks. The first campaign allowed the Russians to assess the enemy and find out the location of the main firing points, approaches to the fortress, the main military techniques used by the enemy and understand the reality of the threat posed by the local population and mountain tribes.

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Two years later, Commander Yuri Bibikov made an unprepared, ill-considered and uncoordinated campaign against Anapa. He decided that 8 thousand soldiers and 26 guns would be enough to take the Turkish fortress. In addition, he chose a very unfortunate time for the hike - early spring. Slush, frost, poor organization of logistics, lack of the necessary food were gross mistakes of the military commander, which significantly influenced the result of the campaign. In addition, the army on the campaign was subjected to numerous attacks by the mountaineers. In March, exhausted by the cold and hunger, the troops approached the Black Sea fortress in the Anapa bay. Numerous sorties of the janissaries, the absence of ladders for the assault and the constant shelling of the camp from the walls of the fortress ruled out the possibility of storming the Turkish fortress. Also,the bursting snow storm and severe frost led to the death of a large number of horses in the Russian camp. All these factors led to the fact that the Russian army left the walls of the Anapa fortress and went to the Kuban. Only a third of the troops reached the place of deployment, the rest either died in battles with the highlanders, or died from cold, disease and hunger. Bibikov was dismissed from service and put on trial.

In May of the same year, Admiral F. Ushakov, having defeated the Turks in the Sinop Bay, brought the ships to Anapa. Russian ships fired at the fortress from naval artillery, frustrating Turkey's plans to make a military raid on the Crimea. After measuring the depths of the Anapa Bay, Ushakov's squadron returned to Sevastopol.

To improve the situation in the Caucasus and destroy the "nest of the Turks" on the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea, Potemkin appointed General I. V. Gudovich, who had a reputation for being an intelligent and talented military leader. He took part in battles with the Turkish Janissaries on several occasions. The general perfectly understood all the complexity of the task assigned to him - the fortress was well fortified and armed, and also had the required number of soldiers. Gudovich carefully prepared the army for a new (already third) campaign against Anapa.

At the beginning of June, the 12 thousandth Russian army approached the walls of the fortress. The first step of the commander was the isolation of the garrison of the fortress from the support of local residents, as well as strengthening the rear of his army in order to avoid a sudden attack by the mountaineers. At the same time, preparations were underway for the capture of the fortress. Having timely received information that a Turkish squadron was coming to the aid of the Anapa garrison, Gudovich set the date for the assault. Despite the accelerated preparation, the Russians successfully placed artillery in order to suppress the emplacements in the fortress, prepared ladders to take the walls of the Turkish citadel.

Exactly at midnight on June 21, 1791, Russian batteries opened heavy fire on the fortress. After three hours of continuous shelling of the city, Russian soldiers went into battle. As the attacking side, the Russians suffered heavy losses, but Gudovich assumed such a development of events and brought in a reserve cavalry unit in a timely manner into battle, with the help of which it was possible to capture the gates of the fortress. The battles were already in the city itself. The Turks did not want to surrender, and the Russians, who had lost their comrades, considered it their duty to avenge their death. The fortress was taken. Killed 2 thousand Russians and 8 thousand Janissaries. Captured about 13 thousand janissaries, the commandant of the fortress, as well as the leader of the highlanders - Sheikh Mansur. Gudovich managed to arrange the battle in such a way that, simultaneously with the assault on the fortress, the troops successfully fought off 8 thousand strong and trained mountaineers who attacked the Russians from the rear.

After the victory, Gudovich, realizing that he could not hold the fortress, ordered to completely destroy it, and fill the wells.

And although the capture of the fortress significantly strengthened the position of Russia in the Caucasus, according to the peace agreement (Yassy Treaty, 1791) with Turkey, the fortress again went to Turkey, and the Crimea completely passed to the Russian crown.

But the story of Anapa does not end there. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1806, three more battles for Anapa took place.

And although the capture of the fortress by Russian troops under the leadership of Gudovich was only one of the events of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791, this battle entered the chronicle of military art, as an example of the use of unique tactics and battle strategy, as a confirmation of the unparalleled fortitude and courage of Russian soldiers and glory Russian weapons.