The Main Secret Of The Battle Of Borodino - Alternative View

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The Main Secret Of The Battle Of Borodino - Alternative View
The Main Secret Of The Battle Of Borodino - Alternative View

Video: The Main Secret Of The Battle Of Borodino - Alternative View

Video: The Main Secret Of The Battle Of Borodino - Alternative View
Video: Тайны Бородинского сражения 1812 г., Battle of Borodino 2024, May
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Let's start with the fact that there was a period in the history of our country when all our achievements and discoveries were considered more significant than in other countries.

From 1917 to 1991, many books were published in the USSR that proved the advantages of the Soviet way of life in all its manifestations. And the history of the past was embellished in such a way that now you cannot understand where the truth is and where the fiction is. And only today historians, and then with considerable difficulty, are beginning to gradually get to the truth …

Who won the battle of Borodino?

What a question? Aren't the words of General Ermolov written down even in school textbooks:

"The French army crashed against the Russian."

Battle of Borodino August 26 (September 7) 1812 Painting by Peter von Hess (Hess). Canvas, oil. 224x355 cm. Germany. 1843 State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg

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It was we who defeated Napoleon, not he us! All this, of course, is true. But if you look not only in the textbook, but also, for example, on the Internet, you can see how the information found there differs. The data on the number of troops on the battlefield do not coincide, and even in the notes of eyewitnesses of this battle there are serious discrepancies.

For example, there is evidence that Napoleon had 135 thousand soldiers at Borodino, while Kutuzov - 120. But other figures: the French - 133.8, the Russians - 154.8 thousand. And which ones are correct? Moreover, this number includes 11

thousand Cossacks and 28.5 thousand militias. That is, numerically, we, it would seem, were superior to the French in this case, but they were qualitatively superior to us, since the combat capabilities of the militia were small. But in all sources the number of guns is the same: 640 guns for us and 587 for the French.

This means that we had 53 more guns, which at that time was a great force.

There is evidence that in the French army, only 10% of the guns could shoot at 1000 meters, and the rest - at 600-700.

Kutuzov lost the battle (?) … (fragment of S. V. Gerasimov's painting "Kutuzov on the Borodino field")

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On the other hand, the Russian army had more heavy weapons capable of firing at 1200 m. In addition, it is easier to defend than to attack, especially on fortifications, even if they are mediocre.

Therefore, the losses of the attackers were always greater than those of the defenders!

Now let's look at the results of the battle. The French themselves estimated their losses at 28 thousand people. Some books report that Napoleon lost 50, and Kutuzov - 44 thousand soldiers. However, there are other data, directly opposite, and there is still no clarity on this important issue!

The last argument of the kings

It is known that Napoleon began his biography as an artillery officer and that he received good knowledge in this area, which he then often used in battles. Choosing the direction of the main attack, Bonaparte collected a battery of a hundred or more guns, which ensured the continuity of fire. The fact is that the smooth-bore cannons of that time were reloading rather slowly, and the batteries were fired not in a volley, but with guns one by one. And if there were few guns in such a battery, then its commander had to wait until the servant charged them all. When the last of the cannons of Napoleon's "great batteries" fired, the first was already loaded, so they fired continuously. Bonaparte did the same in the battle of Borodino.

… and Bonaparte - the war with Russia (a fragment of the painting by P. Delaroche "Napoleon Bonaparte after his abdication in the Palace of Fontainebleau")

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The Russian army, however, used its cannons more traditionally. Several dozen cannons were installed on the Semenovskie flashes, at Kurgannaya heights and in many other places. However, their total number never reached a hundred guns. Moreover, by order of Kutuzov, 305 guns were withdrawn to the reserve near the village of Psarevo, where they remained until the end of the battle. It is clear that the knocked-out guns were constantly replaced with those in reserve. However, in reality, this led to the fact that their total number (especially at the beginning of the battle) turned out to be smaller for us than for Napoleon. By the time of the decisive attack on the flashes from the French, 400 guns were hitting them, but 300 were responding to them. In addition, then there was no radio or mobile communication … drawn by horsesIt took quite a long time to get to the place, while the horses were unharnessed and taken to the shelter, and the guns themselves began to shoot. That is, our numerical advantage in artillery did not play any role in this battle!

Calculations and calculations

However, we do not yet know the effectiveness of our and French artillery fire, and this is a very important indicator. But it turns out that such comparative tests were carried out and gave very similar results. Why this is so is very simple to explain. The thing is that both the French and the Russians were armed with weapons similar in combat qualities, based on the design of General Griboval. When shooting at a target, the percentage of grape-shot bullets hitting it was approximately the same: at a distance of 600-650 meters, on average, eight hits.

At an artillery position (Russian battery on Bagration's flashes). Painting by R. Gorelov, 1955

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But this means that one artillery company in one salvo would have about a hundred hits and could incapacitate up to two platoons of infantry, which went on the attack in a dense formation, and even at full height! Now suppose that about a third of all shots fired in the Borodino field were grapeshot. It can be calculated that they would have disabled 240 thousand people, while the actual losses were three times less.

This suggests that the accuracy of fire in combat conditions was greatly reduced due to the smoke, return fire of the enemy, and also because people in battle are in a state of extreme stress.

Shoot rarely, but accurately

So, the human factor had a great influence on the shooting results. In the "General rules for artillery in a field battle", introduced just before the start of the Patriotic War, Major General A. I. Kutaisov wrote:

“In a field battle, shots over 500 fathoms (over 1000 meters - V. Sh.) Are dubious, over 300 (from 600 to 1000) are quite correct, and over 200 and 100 (from 400 and 200 to 600) are fatal. Consequently, when the enemy is still in the first distance, he should rarely shoot at him in order to have time to more accurately aim the gun, in the second more often and finally strike at all possible speed in order to overturn and destroy it."

The main force in the wars of the early 19th century was artillery (Artillerymen on the Borodino field. Illustration to the poem by M. Yu. Lermontov "Borodino". Artist V. Shevchenko. 1970s)

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That is, the main requirement was still to shoot rarely, but accurately. At the same time, in the Battle of Borodino, the combat experience of the Russian artillerymen of the 18th century, who even during the Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf, fired over the head of their troops, did not find application.

Accuracy in battle was greatly reduced, because the gunners, having taken up a firing position, were in a hurry to open fire, which led to less careful aiming. In addition, each next shot could occur only a minute after the previous one. During this time, the enemy column managed to walk almost 50 meters at a quick pace. This means that if an artillery company fired with grapeshot volleys, and each volley destroyed two enemy platoons, then from a distance of 600 meters, giving 12 volleys, this company would destroy an entire regiment of infantry, which really did not happen.

What would happen if …

Thus, we can conclude that the artillery fire during the Battle of Borodino, although unprecedented at that time, was still not as effective as it could have been, for a number of reasons.

The French fired more than 60 thousand shots in this battle, that is, during 15 hours of the battle, their artillery fired about 67 shells every minute.

According to one of the versions, Napoleon lost 50 thousand soldiers at the Borodino field, Kutuzov - 44 thousand (Battle of Borodino. Illustration for M. Yu. Lermontov's poem "Borodino". Artist V. Shevchenko. 1970s)

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At the same time, from the French side, the fire was distinguished by a greater frequency and intensity, especially at the initial stage of the battle. And this is where we begin to understand that, although the French army and "crashed against the Russian", it could "break" even more, if not for our artillery reserve of 305 guns, which immediately put the Russian army at a disadvantage in relation to the French! It so happened that, having 53 guns more than the French, we did not get any advantage in artillery anywhere and could not suppress the French batteries opposing us with fire.

Even two stacks of batteries installed on the left flank of the Russian troops, firing point-blank at the attacking French, would most likely inflict much greater losses on them than they actually did. And if some of the guns fired over the heads of our troops, then … here we can already talk about losses, which for the French are completely unacceptable.

Monument erected on the Borodino field where the Raevsky battery was located

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In any case, today a number of historians conclusively assert that the losses of the Russian troops were no less, but 1.5-2 times greater than those of the French. And that it was precisely because of this circumstance that our army was forced to retreat the next day. And although there are simply no people who would not make mistakes, it must be admitted that in this battle there may have been mistakes on the part of Kutuzov, but in the end the war against Russia was lost by Bonaparte, who was later forced to admit:

“Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I gave near Moscow. In it, the French showed themselves worthy to win, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible …"

Source: "Secrets of the XX century"