Battle of Orsha - took place on September 8, 1514 during the Russian-Lithuanian war of 1512-1522, in which the Russian army under the leadership of governors Ivan Chelyadnin and Mikhail Bulgakov-Golitsa opposed the combined troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland under the command of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania Konstantin Ostrozhsky.
Preceding events
The strengthening of the Moscow state led to the fact that the Grand Duke Ivan III, continuing to pursue the policy of uniting the Russian lands, refused to recognize the power of the Golden Horde, annexed the Novgorod land, Pskov, Tver and Ryazan principalities. The territory of the Moscow State has become 3 times larger. It was natural to try to annex to the Moscow state the Russian lands that had ceded to the Polish-Lithuanian state, where the population professed Orthodoxy. This was largely due to the cultural isolation of Muscovy, which was surrounded from the east and south by Muslims, and from the west by Catholic Poland and Livonia.
In the Polish-Lithuanian state at that time, the role of the Polish lords increased, the national and religious persecution of the Ukrainian and Belarusian population increased. In connection with the secession of Muscovy from the rule of the Golden Horde, there was a tendency for the Lithuanian princes, along with the lands, to become citizens of the Moscow sovereign. The contradictions between the Polish and Lithuanian nobility intensified.
The course of the war before the battle of Orsha
Taking advantage of the situation, the Moscow army, in alliance with the Moldavian ruler and the Crimean khan, entered into military operations against Lithuania and Livonia. The first war ended in 1503 with an armistice. 1508 - the parties concluded "eternal peace", according to which 19 Russian cities, which had previously come under the rule of Lithuania, retreated to Moscow.
Promotional video:
1512 - the war resumed. The numerous Russian army chose the Smolensk region as the target of their offensive - a key point on the way from Lithuania to Moscow. 1514 - Smolensk was besieged and a month later capitulated. Russian troops advanced further to Orsha and 100 km west of Smolensk, on the banks of the Dnieper, met with the Lithuanian army under the command of Prince Ostrog.
The balance of forces. Army of the Russian state
The army of the Moscow state at that time was, as it were, in a transitional stage. The role of the local noble cavalry, who was in the service of the Grand Duke of Moscow, sharply increased. The core of the army was made up of the grand-ducal "court", which consisted of the children of boyars and nobles. Throughout the entire 15th century, especially in the second half, there was a distribution of estates to "boyar children" of different cities, military servants and even military servants of the disbanded princely and boyar "households"; All these people were taken to his service by the Grand Duke. The number of servicemen increased sharply due to the natives of "the Horde", Tatar soldiers who went into the service of Moscow as a result of the collapse of the Golden Horde. Some of the researchers believe that up to half of the Russian noble families are of Turkic (Tatar) origin.
The "city regiments", which consisted of city militias, continued to play a significant role. The core of these regiments was the "Moscow army", which consisted of residents of Moscow.
An integral part of the army consisted of a “chopped army” (or “a trooper army”), collected from a certain number of “sokh” (a cohapodat unit of 12 people). "A horse and a warrior in armor" in the event of a war put up 10 plows or even 4 plows.
On a contractual basis, the "Tatar princes" and "Horde princes" with their squads served in the Moscow army.
In the border areas, the city and village Cossacks began to play a significant role. There was also a "notch guard".
Conventionally, the entire army was divided into "forged men" and "ship men", i.e. on cavalry and infantry; the latter, as a rule, moved along rivers on ships.
The organization of the army remained the same: it was divided into regiments - large, right and left hand, sentry and ambush. At the head of the regiments were regimental commanders, several per regiment. At the head of the entire army, the Grand Duke put a great governor.
The number of troops, weapons
According to foreigners, the number of the Moscow army at that time reached 400 thousand people, others cite a more modest figure - 150 thousand, mainly cavalry. The cavalry was kept on alert all the time. Every two or three years the service people were revised in the regions. The government had to know their number and how many each of the noblemen or boyar children could put up servants and horses. Foreigners noted the low quality of horses. One minor remark - “few have spurs, most use a whip” - shows that the cavalry of the Moscow army was trained not in the European, but in the Turkic tradition. According to foreigners, it was the eastern horse militia.
Equestrian equipment consisted of bows, arrows, axes and flails; only the noble and wealthy had swords. Foreigners noted "long daggers like knives", probably they could mean konchars or sabers. They used spears. It was noted that the riders, "although at the same time they hold a reins, a bow, a sword, arrows and a whip in their hands, they could deftly handle all these things."
The most distinguished warriors had chain mail, armor, breastplates and helmets.
According to Tatar tactics, the advance of the Moscow cavalry was accomplished quickly. Herberstein, who served in the Moscow army, noted with amazement how little a Moscow warrior needed in a campaign. Whoever had six or more horses, on one could fit all the vital supplies, which consisted of a small amount of oatmeal, ham and salt, the rich took pepper with them on the campaign. Both the nobleman and his servants were content with this food, while the latter could not eat for two or three days. Perhaps in endurance, the Moscow warriors inherited the Mongols. But in tactics they were clearly inferior. Eyewitnesses noted that the Moscow cavalry boldly attacked, but did not hold out for long, as if telling the enemies: "Run, or we will run." Entering the battle, the Moscow regiments hoped more for numbers than for art, in particular they tried to surround the enemy, to go to his rear.
The presence of a large number of musicians in the shelves was noted; the predominant instruments were trumpets and surnas.
The camp was not fortified, except that the terrain itself protected it with a forest or a river, a vast place was simply chosen where the nobles pitched tents, others built huts and covered them with felt.
Speaking about the fighting qualities of the Moscow army, Herberstein compared Muscovites with Tatars and Turks: a Tatar, thrown from a horse, devoid of weapons, seriously wounded, still defends himself to his last breath with his hands, feet, teeth, as much as he can; the Turks, seeing themselves in a hopeless situation, begins to humbly ask the enemy for mercy; the Moscow warrior does not defend himself and does not ask for pardon.
Lithuanian army
The Lithuanian army was the same feudal militia. 1507 - The Vilnius Sejm decreed that the lords, princes and all the gentry should rewrite all their people who were obliged to serve on their estates and provide the lists to the king. Seimas decrees speak of weak discipline of the militia. As S. M. Solovyov wrote, the resolution said: “Taking into account the previous negligence, which has become a custom, that half of the land will come by the appointed time, and the other will not come, and it would be very cruel to execute all those who did not come to death. three, and it would be extremely unfair to have mercy on others; taking this into account, the Seimas decides: whoever does not arrive on time, pays 100 rubles; whoever does not come a week after the deadline is executed by death. A more precise schedule of who and how many soldiers should exhibit appeared later, in 1528.
The militia gathered in "povet gonfalons" - territorial military units.
Polish army
The Polish army was built on a different principle, which played a decisive role in the battle at Orsha. Although the noble militia continued to play a large role, the Poles used mercenary infantry much more widely, recruiting mercenaries in Livonia, Germany, and Hungary.
A distinctive feature of the mercenary army was the massive use of firearms. It was at that time that a new tactic began to emerge and take shape, based on the massive use of rifle and artillery fire. This tradition formed the basis of all European armies and coincided with a new historical period.
The heavy Polish cavalry was also distinguished by its originality. Further property stratification among the Polish nobility led to the fact that a small number of noble nobles had their own detachments and sufficient funds for personal equipment. The bulk of the nobility (gentry) became poorer due to the fragmentation of land allotments. Only a few could have had weapons like the old knights. A way out was found in a selective recruitment of nobles in the heavy cavalry. It was first used by the Hungarians in the wars with the Turks. Every 20 nobles fielded one heavily armed cavalryman. This happened for the first time in 1485. The new heavy cavalry was named "hussars". The Poles adopted the same kind of cavalry from the Hungarians.
The Polish hussars have established themselves as the best European cavalry in Europe in the 17th century, but their origin took place in the wars of the 16th century. The hussars had heavy, akin to knightly, protective weapons: helmets with cheeks, cuirasses, shoulder pads, legguards, shields. Over time, the distinctive features of the hussars developed, which subsequently had a kind of semi-mystical meaning - a device behind the back, imitating wings, and a long flag-ensign on a spear. The length of the warrant officer was slightly inferior to the length of the spear itself.
Unlike poorly disciplined knights, the hussars acted in close-knit ranks, obeyed the commander like a soldier and delivered swift horse strikes, "threw themselves into spears." The ensigns and feathers on the wings produced a peculiar sound during rapid movement, which did not affect the trained hussar horses, but plunged the enemy's horses into fear.
Unlike the Moscow army, the army, led by Konstantin Ostrozhsky, relied on the interaction of all types of troops on the battlefield. The combined action of heavy and light cavalry, infantry and field artillery was supposed.
In total, under the command of Hetman Prince Ostrozhsky, there were 30-35 thousand people (which, perhaps, is overstated), and he boldly began to push against the Moscow troops opposing him, hoping not for the number, but for the training of his army.
Russian troops led by the governors of Golitsa and Chelyadnin consisted of 80 thousand people. Some of the historians consider these figures to be clearly overstated. The senior in the army was the equerry Ivan Andreevich Chelyadnin. After a series of skirmishes with the Lithuanian army, he ordered to withdraw to the left bank of the Dnieper and not interfere with the Lithuanian army to cross. As you can see, he wanted to lure the enemy beyond the Dnieper, press them to the river and crush them with a mass, or cut them off from the crossing with a flank blow, i.e. Chelyadnin wanted to repeat the situation in 1500 on the Vydrosh River.
Battle of Orsha
On the night of September 8, the Lithuanian cavalry crossed the Dnieper and covered the laying of bridges for infantry and field artillery. The Moscow army did not interfere with the crossing. In the morning, the entire Lithuanian army was on the left bank of the Dnieper. From the rear, Ostrozhsky had a river, the right flank rested against the swampy river Krapivna. He built his army in two lines. The cavalry was in the first line. Polish men at arms made up only a fourth of it and were in the center, representing its right half. The second half of the center and both flanks were Lithuanian cavalry. In the second line, the infantry and field artillery stood (infantry in the center for the stability of the battle formation, artillery on the flanks).
The Russian army was lined up in three lines for a frontal attack. Two large cavalry detachments stood on the flanks somewhat at a distance in order to cover the enemy, break through to his rear and surround him.
According to eyewitnesses, Ostrozhsky initially distracted Chelyadnin with peace negotiations, and then unexpectedly attacked. But the first to start the battle was a right-flank Russian detachment under the command of Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Golitsy-Bulgakov-Patrikeev. He attacked the left flank Lithuanian cavalry. In case of a successful attack and a breakthrough to the crossings, the Lithuanians would be squeezed into a corner between the Dnieper and Krapivnaya and there they were killed in a swamp. However, the Lithuanian cavalry put up stubborn resistance to Golice, and the Polish infantry moved forward from the second line and opened fire on the Russian cavalry from the flank.
The Russian chronicler claimed that Chelyadnin, out of envy, did not help Golitsa. The Russian cavalry was shot down, and Ostrozhsky himself with the Lithuanians pursued her and even cut into the main Russian forces. Now, as the chronicler says, Golitsa did not help Chelyadnin. But the main forces of the Moscow army were able to resist.
The left-flank detachment of the Moscow cavalry went on the attack and faced the right flank of the Lithuanian first line. Some historians claim that the Russians successfully overturned the Lithuanian cavalry and began to pursue it. Herberstein believes that the Lithuanians, after stubborn resistance, deliberately fled and brought the Russians under their guns. Be that as it may, a volley of Lithuanian artillery crushed the pursuers, leading them to frustration. Either the Russian cavalry, evading the fire, took the left, or the counterstrike of the Polish men at arms played its role, but the entire left-flank cavalry detachment of the Moscow army was pressed against the swamps near Krapivna and was destroyed there. The Krapivna River was filled with bodies of Muscovites, who in flight rushed into it from the steep banks, Herberstein recalled.
The chroniclers noted that Golitsa was again attacked, and "Chelyadnin again betrayed the latter." Apparently, Golitsa continued to resist with his detachment, while Chelyadnin hesitated, preparing for a general attack with all his three lines. Perhaps he was deciding where to strike - right in front of him (Polish men at arms had just framed his flank, driving the Russians into Krapivna) or go to the aid of Holica.
The battle was decided by Polish men at arms, who repeated their attack, but now attacked the main Russian forces. The Moscow army fled.
Losses
King Sigismund, notifying the master of the Livonian Order of the Orsha victory, wrote that 8 supreme governors, 37 secondary chiefs and 1,500 nobles were taken prisoner. In total, allegedly 30 thousand of the 80 thousand army were killed. These data are clearly overstated. More accurate Polish sources report that a total of 611 prisoners were captured in the war. As for the killed, the death of the left-flank cavalry detachment of the Russians is beyond doubt, but it is unlikely that it could have consisted of 30 thousand people. And the rest of the Moscow army, mainly cavalry, after the strike of the Polish men at arms most likely dispersed, suffering minimal losses.
However, the consequences of the battle were recognized as terrible by Moscow sources.
S. Derkach