Part 1: "The myth of the disclosure by Richard Sorge of Hitler's plans and plans for the defeat of the USSR";
Part 2: "In July 1941, the attack on the USSR became one of the main goals of Japan."
The start of the Japanese offensive against the USSR was scheduled for August 29, 1941.
Continuing to inform the Center about the transfer of Japanese units to the continent, Sorge closely monitored changes in the mood of the Japanese leadership. On August 12, 1941, he reported:
“The Germans put pressure on Japan every day to enter the war. The fact that the Germans did not capture Moscow by the last Sunday, as they had promised the highest Japanese circles, diminished the enthusiasm of the Japanese.
INSON.
And on the same day:
“With the aim of influencing Japan so that she speaks, Ribbentrop sends telegrams daily. On this occasion, there were conversations with Generals Doihara and Okamura. Ambassador Ott thinks that the Japanese are waiting for the moment until the Red Army is weakened, since without these conditions it will not be safe to enter the war, especially since their fuel resources are very small.
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INSON.
And the third telegram on the same day, August 12, 1941:
“The military attaché of the German Embassy in Tokyo traveled to Korea and Manchuria and told me that six divisions had arrived in Korea for a possible attack on Vladivostok. 4 divisions arrived in Manchuria. BAT (military attaché - A. K.) found out for sure that the Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea together number 30 divisions. Preparations for operations will end between the 20th and the end of August, but BAT personally telegraphed to Berlin that the decision on the Japanese move has not yet been made. If Japan moves forward, the first blow will be at Vladivostok, where most of the Japanese forces are aimed. 3 divisions are directed against Blagoveshchensk.
INSON.
Sorge was unable to find the exact date of the Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union. But he named the last week of August as a likely option for the attack. And this corresponded to the Kantokuen plan of war against the USSR developed by the Japanese General Staff. Sorge almost accurately set the date for the Japanese attack. As it became known later, Japan's decision to start a war against the Soviet Union was scheduled for August 10, and the beginning of the Japanese offensive - on August 29, 1941.
And on August 29, a special message from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, based mainly on information from the "Ramsay group", went to Stalin's table:
“Disagreements in the ruling circles in Japan about the timing of the attack on the Soviet Union.
According to credible intelligence reports from Tokyo, in connection with a more decisive US policy towards Japan, the struggle within the Japanese government has recently intensified between supporters of immediate entry into the war on the side of Germany and a group advocating a policy of waiting. Moreover, the point of view of the latter is allegedly supported by Konoe.
On this issue, there is no unity in the army itself. In the leading circles of the army and navy, there are also two groups: one, the head of the military department of the Ministry of War, Major General Muto and others, demands an immediate action against the Soviet Union, and the other, relying mainly on the command of the Japanese troops in China and the navy, stands for active operations in the South Seas region.
The Germans show great dissatisfaction with the slowness of Japan's entry into the war against the USSR and continue to pressurize the Japanese government.
In support of Konoe's position, RU sources report that Konoe instructed the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Umezu, to avoid any provocative actions on the border of the Soviet Union.
According to Minister of War Tojo, the time has not yet come for Japan to enter the war with the USSR, nevertheless, the strengthening of the group of Japanese troops against us continues.
During the two months of the Soviet-German war, the Japanese command more than doubled the number of its troops in Manchuria and Korea. Instead of the 12 infantry available on June 22. divisions, 6 tank regiments, 12 art. regiments of the ARGK, 23 combat air detachments by August 29, 28 infantry were concentrated in Manchuria and Korea. divisions, 12 tank regiments, 20 art. regiments of ARGK, 35 combat squadrons and other specials. units, totaling about one million people, 5000 guns of all calibers, up to 1000 tanks and about 1500 aircraft …
In addition, there is information about the forthcoming additional mobilization in Japan of reservists of the 3rd and 4th stages, with a total of 300-400 thousand people.
Thus, it is indisputable that a significant strengthening of the grouping of Japanese troops in Manchuria and Korea was undertaken to attack the Soviet Union.
The existing disagreements within the Japanese government about the timing of Japan's entry into the war against us are apparently explained by the desire of the Konoe group to wait for the most favorable moment for an attack."
Japanese documents and studies published in the post-war period confirm the amazing accuracy of Richard Sorge's messages and the correctness of the generalizations and conclusions of the reports of the General Staff of the Red Army on the preparation of the Japanese command for an attack on the USSR, as well as disagreements over the timing of the strike. There were also important reports that an alternative to action in the north was the opening of hostilities in the south, against the United States and Great Britain.
Messages about the danger of a Japanese strike from the east, undoubtedly, had a great influence on the decision of the Soviet political and military leadership and personally I. V. Stalin in the most difficult and dangerous period of the war with Germany in the summer-fall of 1941. To show restraint and not significantly weaken the grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East and Siberia. There is every reason to believe that the Japanese attack on the USSR in 1941 did not take place mainly because the Soviet Far Eastern troops, contrary to the expectations of the Japanese command, retained high combat efficiency and were able to repulse the aggressor.
At the regular Imperial meeting held on September 6, 1941, the document "Program for the Implementation of the State Policy of the Empire" fixed the decision to refrain from attacking the USSR in 1941. It was deemed advisable to postpone the advance in the north until the spring of 1942. The participants in the meeting of the coordination council of the government and the imperial headquarters (September 3), which preceded the Imperial meeting, concluded that "since Japan will not be able to deploy large-scale operations in the north until February, it is necessary to quickly carry out operations in the south during this time."
And this decision became known to Moscow thanks to the Sorge reconnaissance group. On September 11, a Soviet intelligence officer reported:
“The German Ambassador Ott has lost all hope of Japan's action against the USSR. Shiratori (former Japanese ambassador to Italy, currently working at the Foreign Ministry) told Ott that if Japan starts a war, it will only be in the south, where they can get raw materials - oil and metals. In the north, they (supposedly the Germans) will not be able to get enough help.
A friend of the (military) navy told Paula (naval attaché of the German embassy in Tokyo) that Japan's opposition to the USSR was no longer an issue. The sailors do not believe in the success of Konoe's negotiations with Roosevelt and are preparing to march against Tai and Borneo. He thinks Manila should be taken, which means war with America.
INSON.
On September 14, Sorge sent a message to Moscow, which, one might say, crowned his many years of work in Japan:
“Source Invest has left for Manchuria. He said that the Japanese government decided not to oppose the USSR this year, but the armed forces will remain in Manchuria in case of a possible action next spring, if the USSR is defeated by that time. Invest noted that the USSR can be absolutely (the word is inaudible) free after September 15th.
An Intern source (Y. Miyagi) reported that one of the battalions of the 14th Infantry Division, which is to be sent north, has been left in the barracks of the Guards Division in Tokyo.
From the letters of officers and soldiers received from the border line in the Voroshilov sector (now Ussuriysk - A. K.), it is known that they were drawn to the Mudanjiang region.
INSON.
On the same day, Sorge confirmed this report, citing information from the German embassy:
“According to Ambassador Ott, Japan's opposition to the USSR is now out of the question. Japan will be able to act only if the USSR transfers its troops on a large scale from the Far East.
In various quarters, heated conversations began about the responsibility for mobilizing on a large scale and about the maintenance of the huge Kwantung Army, which will undoubtedly bring the country great economic and political difficulties.
INSON.
This information, confirmed by other sources, had a direct impact on the decision of the Soviet leadership to transfer 16 Far Eastern and Siberian divisions to Moscow in the fall of 1941.
However, it should be noted that Sorge's phrase that "after September 15, the USSR can be absolutely free" did not quite accurately reflect the situation. As it became known after the war from Japanese documents, in the event of the fall of Moscow, the Japanese planned to immediately occupy the Soviet Far East and Siberia with little blood. In this case, simultaneous operations were allowed in both the south and the north. The General Staff of the Japanese Army developed a version of the Kantokuen plan, which was to be implemented in the event of the fall of Moscow and a sharp change in the balance of forces in the Far East in favor of Japan. The Japanese troops allocated for the war against the USSR were not included in the plans for the war in the south and continued to intensively prepare for operations in the north.
However, he could no longer convey this information to Moscow - the arrests of members of his group that followed in October 1941, and then of himself, meant the end of the activities of one of the most effective and strategically important intelligence organizations during the Second World War. This did not mean that Moscow was deprived of information about Japan's plans and intentions. Equally important intelligence came from China, which, when making fundamental strategic decisions, was used to double-check and confirm intelligence from the Sorge group.
Working in areas of China occupied by Japanese troops (Shanghai, Harbin), Soviet intelligence officers regularly informed Moscow about all redeployments of Japanese troops near the Soviet borders. Information from Manchuria about the relative weakness of the technical equipment of the Kwantung Army, the insufficient number of tanks and aircraft for offensive operations was very significant. Therefore, without in any way doubting the outstanding merits of the Sorge group, one should also appreciate the contribution of other Soviet intelligence officers to the cause of disrupting the Japanese plans to attack the USSR.