The Afghan war lasted ten years and, according to many historians, hastened the collapse of the USSR and the Communist Party. Let's see what would have happened if the troops had not entered Afghanistan.
What happened?
Until the mid-1970s, Afghanistan was a peaceful, but completely backward country, where an absolute monarchy existed for many years. Total illiteracy, complete absence of industry, poverty and, as a result, the desire for change. The only advantage is calmness and peace. After the events preceding the introduction of Soviet troops, Afghanistan lost them too.
In 1973, a kaleidoscope of revolutions and coups began in the country, which grew into a civil war that has not subsided until now. In July of that year, the monarchy was overthrown in the country. King Zahir Shah, who was trying to carry out democratic reforms, was ousted from power during his visit to Italy, where he eventually remained. His cousin Mohammed Daoud came to power. He promised changes, but in fact he established a regime of personal dictatorship, and very harsh - with the physical suppression of any opposition. The main opponents of Daoud at that time were the communists, or rather the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which professed Marxism. Initially, there was no unity in its ranks, for long before Daoud came to power, the party split into radicals and moderates.
Hafizullah Amin.
However, under the dictatorship, the PDPA briefly united in the name of survival, and its leader, Nur Mohammed Taraki, eventually organized a military coup. These events in Afghanistan itself are called the Saur revolution, and in Russia - the April one. Daoud was overthrown and killed. The official version is that he was shot while trying to kill parliamentarians who came to him with a proposal to resign. It is surprising that during the self-defense of parliamentarians, not only Daud died, but also 18 members of his family.
PDPA was unable to take power under control. The Islamic opposition intensified almost instantly. The Muslim communities of Afghanistan did not want to build communism and saw it as a direct threat to their religion. A few months after the victory of the PDPA, a civil war began in the country. Taraki understood the precariousness of his position. His only hope was the powerful northern neighbor - the USSR. Taraki was a friend of the Soviet Union. He visited Moscow more than once even before he became the leader of Afghanistan. He had close ties with the CPSU, Brezhnev sympathized with him. Taraki began to ask for help, moreover, for military help. Moscow refused at first. The USSR was ready to provide any support, but without forceful intervention. The Central Committee rightly believed that the introduction of troops would aggravate international relations and lead the Cold War to a new level.
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In 1979, a special Politburo commission on Afghanistan rejected 20 requests from the PDPA for military assistance. This does not mean that the Soviet Union abandoned its southern neighbor to the mercy of fate. Since the summer of 1978, both military consultants from the USSR and KGB officers have worked in Afghanistan, helping local colleagues in creating their own special services. The number of military advisers grew every month. From January to June 1979, it increased tenfold, from 409 people to four and a half thousand.
The situation changed in September, when the split within the PDPA turned into a direct conflict. Taraki was suddenly removed from all posts, arrested and removed from the public field. Officially, "comrade Taraki for health reasons could not bear the burden of the leader of the nation", unofficially, the PDPA General Secretary was deposed by his own deputy. His name was Hafizullah Amin. As it turns out later, Taraki was strangled by a pillow on Amin's orders. And just at the moment when it became clear that Amin would be the new leader of Afghanistan, the USSR began to think about a force scenario.
Could it be otherwise?
The Central Committee had exactly one fixed idea about Afghanistan - in no case should pro-American politicians come to power there. Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov believed that with such a development of events in Afghanistan, American military bases would immediately appear, which would pose a serious threat to the southern borders of the Union. Another influential Politburo member, the head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, held a similar point of view. Amin in the understanding of the Politburo was unreliable. Kind of like a communist, on the other hand, clearly not ideological. Such a person will do anything for the sake of personal power. And when the Kremlin suspected that Amin could make a deal with Washington, the probability of the introduction of troops increased dramatically. Brezhnev seemed to be against it, but Ustinov and Andropov were convincing enough.
Apparently, the stake was made on the swiftness of action. The key goal is the removal of Amin. In his place, the CPSU wanted to see Babrak Karmal, completely loyal to the USSR. And this goal was achieved. On December 27, KGB special forces fighters stormed Amin's palace. The Afghan leader was killed, his chair was taken by the faithful Karmal. The task of the troops was to establish control over the territory of the country and quickly suppress the resistance of the Mujahideen. This task turned out to be unsolvable. First, the Mujahideen avoided open confrontation, preferring small, exhausting attacks. Second, the Islamic opposition instantly received the support of almost the entire world community.
Entering Soviet troops.
The USSR found itself in tough international isolation. Even irreconcilable enemies united against the Soviet Union for a time. In addition to the United States (later ex-CIA head Robert Gates admits that President Carter made the decision to supply weapons to the Mujahid six months before the introduction of Soviet troops) and NATO countries, the Islamic opposition was supported by China, France, Japan, the Arab world and even Israel. Each had their own motives, but the USSR was declared an outcast. It is worth recognizing that the turning point in this story is the overthrow of Taraki. Had he stayed in power, the Soviet Union might not have brought in troops.
What would change?
The Afghan war spurred an arms race, and international isolation grew ever stronger. The people who made the decision to bring in troops did not live to see their withdrawal. Brezhnev, Andropov and Ustinov died in the mid-1980s. The number of losses “across the river” grew, the resources of the Soviet Union were depleted, and discontent with the war, which many considered senseless, arose and grew stronger in society. It was not possible to suppress the resistance of the Mujahideen. The more strongly the Union got bogged down in the conflict beyond the Amu Darya, the more precarious its own position became. The war did not make the USSR stronger, and its goals became more and more vague and blurred.
Ronald Reagan and the Mujahideen delegation at the White House.
Another thing was obvious. Whoever sits in Kabul does not control most of the country. Without the introduction of troops, the Brezhnev Politburo could continue to enjoy the delights of the so-called "detente". This period of relative calm in relations between Moscow and Washington lasted fifteen years. He was not even shaken by the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. But the conflict in Afghanistan destroyed the shaky peace completely. If it had not been for him, the USSR would have been able to further accumulate forces and build up its military potential in the hope of winning the arms race, in which it had a good chance of winning. The economy would not receive an additional breach in the form of exorbitant military spending, society would be more loyal. True, the risk of the appearance of US military bases in Afghanistan would also increase, although Washington was not going to directly get involved in the war.
It is quite possible that if Soviet troops had not crossed the Afghan border, we would still be living in the USSR.
Author: Alexey Durnovo