“We express our best wishes for difficult times. We will all work hard here."
Another anniversary is coming on June 22, 1941, when the Nazi hordes, having trampled all the norms of international law, treacherously invaded the territory of the Soviet Union. Among military historians, political scientists and ordinary people, the question of why the enemy caught the Soviet political leadership and command unawares still remains relevant. After all, warnings about the inevitability of an attack regularly fell on the table of Soviet leaders, including I. V. Stalin. Among them were the encrypted messages of the legendary resident of the Soviet military intelligence, Richard Sorge, who reported from Tokyo about the aggressive designs of the enemies. However, during the reign of N. S. Khrushchev, the meaning and content of these messages were falsified.
A legend was created, or rather a myth that distorted reality, about the alleged complete disclosure by Richard Sorge of Hitler's plans and plans for the defeat of the Soviet Union in a lightning war. Until the date of the start of the invasion is indicated - Sunday morning June 22, 1941. Khrushchev, who hated Stalin, did this to create an image of the country's leader as a gloomy misanthrope who did not believe in anyone or anything, through whose fault the Nazi troops, inflicting powerful blows on the poorly trained Red Army in the first months of the war, reached the walls of Moscow.
The myth-making around Sorge continues to this day. Take, for example, the "information" that recently appeared in the TV movie about Sorge that our intelligence officer in Japan allegedly sent to Moscow from Tokyo … the "Barbarossa" plan.
What and when did Richard Sorge really transfer to Moscow from the Japanese capital?
The first serious information about the danger of Hitler's attack came from Sorge on April 11, 1941. He reported:
The following important information about the approaching German attack on the USSR Sorge sends to Moscow on May 2, 1941:
As can be seen from this report, the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities against the USSR "after the war with England" was admitted. Was it possible to draw final conclusions on the basis of such mutually exclusive information? Of course not! Was this Sorge's fault? Again, no. He transmitted all the information that he obtained, including the contradictory ones. The conclusions were to be drawn in Moscow.
The subsequent reports from Sorge about the timing of Germany's attack on the USSR were also not very clear. It was assumed that the war might not start. Here is a transcript from Tokyo on May 19, 1941:
A very serious message was contained in an encrypted message dated May 30, when Sorge transmitted to the Center:
German Ambassador to Tokyo Eugen Ott.
Sorge's message about Berlin informing its ambassador to Japan about the time of the attack on the USSR raises certain doubts. Hitler, having strictly forbidden to inform the Japanese of anything about the "Barbarossa" plan, could hardly entrust his diplomats in Tokyo with highly important information without fear of its leakage. Hitler concealed the date of the attack on the USSR even from his closest ally Mussolini; the latter learned about the invasion of German troops into the territory of the USSR only in the morning of June 22, while still in bed.
Although Sorge's message about the likelihood of a German offensive "in the second half of June" was correct, could the Kremlin fully rely on the opinion of the German ambassador to Tokyo? Moreover, not long before that, on May 19, Sorge conveyed that "this year the danger may pass."
The fact that Ambassador Otto drew information about the war of Germany against the USSR not from official sources in Berlin, but from the Germans who visited Tokyo, is evidenced by Sorge's encryption of June 1, 1941. The message text read:
Richard Sorge.
Again, Moscow could not rely on the information of a German lieutenant colonel, a military diplomat associated with intelligence in a third-rate country, and not with the development of operational and strategic plans. Nevertheless, the information attracted the attention of the Center. Sorge was asked for clarification: to inform "the essence of the great tactical error that you are reporting and your own opinion about Scholl's truthfulness about the left flank" is more clear.
A Soviet intelligence resident telegraphed June 15, 1941 to the Center:
The importance of this message cannot be underestimated, but the date of the attack, contrary to what is mistakenly believed, was not named. It should be borne in mind that other information came from Tokyo as well. So, Soviet intelligence intercepted a telegram from the military attaché of the French Embassy (Vichy) in Japan, who reported:
Here the term is indicated, but it is immediately admitted that it can be "either an attack on England or an attack on Russia."
After the German invasion of the USSR, information about the position of Japan, allied with Germany, became critically important for the Kremlin. After confirming the authenticity of Sorge's messages about the approaching German attack in Moscow, confidence in the Soviet resident in Japan increased. Already on June 26, he sends a radio message:
Although the efforts of the journalists striving to please Khrushchev, Sorge's main merit was the "determination of the exact date" of the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, in reality his main feat was the timely opening of Japanese strategic plans and informing the Kremlin about the postponement of the Japanese attack on the USSR from the summer-fall of 1941 to next spring, 1942. That, as you know, allowed the Soviet high command to free part of the grouping in the Far East and Siberia to participate in the battle of Moscow, and then for a counteroffensive. More on this next time.
Continuation: "In July 1941, the attack on the USSR became one of the main goals of Japan."
