In foreign historical literature, almost an axiom is the assertion that the most important reason for the failure of large military campaigns against Russia was the so-called "General Frost".
According to this theory, well-trained European armies easily coped with the enemy, but fell victim to the harshest weather conditions.
Emperor's "European Union" could not stand the sub-zero temperature?
Over time, "General Frost" entered Russian folklore, and today many Russians sincerely believe: the victories over Napoleon and Hitler became possible thanks to the severe frosts, for which the heat-loving Europeans and their technology were simply not ready.
The founders of the myth about "General Frost" can be considered the French, who, relying on the recollections of Napoleonic generals, argued that more than 550 thousandth of the Great Army in Russia was destroyed not by a meeting with a stubborn and skillful enemy, but by the terrible cold.
By the way, the Great Army was only half French. The attack on Russia was attended by about 130,000 Germans from the states united in the Rhine Union, up to 100,000 Poles, about 40,000 Austrians, about 35,000 Italians, 22,000 Prussians, 12,000 Swiss, almost 5,000 Spaniards, 2,000 Croats and Portuguese each.
And now, according to the version of Western historians, all this well-armed "European Union" of Napoleon froze to death in the Russian open spaces.
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Denis Davydov refutes
Russian veterans of the Patriotic War of 1812 were seriously offended by such statements. In 1835, the poet and partisan Denis Davydov, somewhat irritated by the French memoirs, wrote a whole article entitled "Did Frost Destroy the French Army in 1812?"
To begin with, Denis Vasilyevich reminds in it that Napoleon's army began to make its sad return march along the Smolensk road for a reason, but after the battle of Maloyaroslavets, when Russian troops did not allow the Great Army to break through to the southern provinces rich in food.
And then Denis Davydov finds evidence of what the weather really was like in the works of the French authors themselves: “During the entire procession of the French army from Moscow to Berezina, that is, for twenty-six days, there was a cold, although not extreme (from twelve to seventeen degrees), lasted no more than three days, according to Shaumbray, Jomini and Napoleon, or five days, according to Gurgo.
“Meanwhile, the French army, on its way from Moscow, consisted, according to the list of the French headquarters, which we repulsed during the pursuit, of one hundred ten thousand fresh troops, and, according to all historians of the campaign, represented only forty-five thousand upon its arrival to the shores Berezina. How can one think that a hundred-ten thousandth army could lose sixty-five thousand people from just three or five-day frosts,”Davydov sneers.
Napoleon won even in the cold
The artillery-general, the Marquis de Chambray, says: "The cold, dry and moderate, which accompanied the troops from Moscow to the first snow, was more useful than fatal."
The weather in Russia at the end of 1812 is described in sufficient detail. Before the battle of Krasnoye, which took place on November 15-18, 1812, frosts were kept from minus three to minus eight degrees. And then, right up to the battle on Berezina on November 26-29, there was a thaw. A real frost with temperatures below -20 hit only after the battle on the Berezina. But by that time, little was left of the Great Army.
But maybe -5 degrees is already fatal for heat-loving Europeans?
Nothing like this. On February 7-8, 1807, Napoleon's army defeated the Russian-Prussian troops at the Battle of Preussisch-Eylau. The frost was much harder in those days. Until 1812, French soldiers had to face frosty weather, but this did not carry any fatal consequences.
Pitchfork to the side: what broke the Great Army?
So what happened in the fall of 1812? There is every reason to talk about a huge miscalculation of Napoleon, who was not ready for the fact that he would have to conduct a large-scale military campaign in winter conditions. When such a need arose, it was impossible to provide the troops. The Great Army, having suffered a series of defeats from the Russian forces, was gripped in a vice and left Russia, deprived of food for the people, forage for horses, normal overnight stay and rest.
But General Moroz would not have mattered if it were not for the efforts of the Russian army, flying partisan detachments, and popular resistance. It was not the mythical Frost, but ordinary Russian peasants, who lifted the French suppliers who were trying to get food in the villages.
“And so the French army is marching along a devastated path without carts full of food, and does not dare to send foragers to roadside villages,” writes Denis Davydov. - What is the reason for this? The point chosen for the camp at Tarutin, the obstruction of the Kaluga road at Maloyaroslavets, the removal of the enemy army from the edge abounding in food supplies, forcing it to go along the Smolensk devastated road, the capture of enemy carts with food by our light cavalry, its encirclement of French columns from Maloyaroslavets to the Neman, which did not allow any soldier to be absent from the high road to find food and shelter for himself."
The Russian frost did not crush Napoleon's army at all. He, if you like, acted as a scavenger, finishing off the broken, tortured Europeans, driven into the most severe conditions by the iron will and efforts of the Russian military.
Frozen blitzkrieg: what the Wehrmacht generals complained about
It is curious that the French and English press wrote a lot about General Frost during the First World War, but for some reason he lost his miraculous powers.
Lost to regain them at the end of 1941, ruining the blitzkrieg so well thought out and organized by the Wehrmacht. There is probably no German general who would not blame the weather for the failure of the campaign on the Eastern Front.
General Heinz Guderian complained that the lack of winter uniforms prevented the war to win in 1941, as well as frosts of 35-50 degrees near Moscow in November-December, due to which not only the Wehrmacht soldiers suffered, but also the equipment went out of order.
But here's the thing: the November frosts made the second phase of the German offensive against Moscow possible. The first phase in October 1941 was stopped by the resilience of the Soviet soldiers and muddy roads that made the roads impassable. The frost that came in early November gave the Nazis a new chance.
What was the actual weather near Moscow at the end of 1941?
On November 4, 1941, the temperature near Moscow dropped to -7 degrees. This weather lasted for three days, after which a thaw began. In the period from November 11 to 13, frosts increased to 15-17 degrees, but then the temperature rose and stayed in the range from -3 to -10 degrees. And here, for example, one of the weather records for November 30: “Warming. The temperature is about 0 °. In the area of the location of the 13th Army Corps (army corps - Ed.), It rained in the evening. The state of the roads is the same."
In early December, the temperature really dropped, reaching minus 25 degrees at night. But by this time the German offensive was completely exhausted, unable to overcome the defense of the Red Army.
The really severe cold, when night temperatures drop to -35 and below, hit at the end of December 1941. At this time, the Wehrmacht was rolling back from Moscow, driven primarily not by frost, but by the power of the Soviet counteroffensive.
Goebbels' myth
The myth of frost as the root cause of the defeat of the Germans near Moscow was launched by Adolf Hitler and skillfully "promoted" by the propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. But it is unlikely that it would have taken root so easily in the minds of Europeans, if before that "General Frost" had not been raised on the shield by French authors who sought to cleanse Napoleon's reputation.
Curiously, the Germans blame the Russian winter for the defeat at Stalingrad much less. Although frosts in December 1942 - January 1943. on the banks of the Volga it sometimes reached -40 degrees. But, firstly, then one would have to admit that the Hitlerite leadership did not learn any lessons from the first winter campaign. And secondly, Paulus's army stalled in Stalingrad in the summer, when there was no smell of "General Frost". As in the case of Napoleon's army, as well as in the battle of Moscow, frost came to reap the fruits of the already accomplished defeat of the aggressor.
Good old chauvinism
In the myth of "General Frost", the good old chauvinism towards the "Mongol hordes" is most clearly manifested. Well, the brilliant genius Napoleon could not have lost to the dense bearded Russian men with bears and balalaikas! The irresistible forces of nature, force majeure is a completely different matter.
Sadly, but we ourselves are ready to believe in it. In recent decades, "General Frost" for some Russian historians is located between such persistent myths as "they filled up the Germans with corpses", "they won only with penal battalions" and "they raped two million German women."
Andrey Sidorchik
