This special service - the military counterintelligence SMERSH ("Death to Spies"), which has terrified the enemies of the USSR since its inception in 1943, is still being spoken about. Only after almost 70 years was the “Top Secret” stamp removed from dozens of successful operations carried out by counterintelligence officers.
Agent at the Supreme Headquarters
To recreate the picture of those years, the author of these lines was helped by the testimony of the former head of the SMERSH division of the rifle division, retired colonel A. I. Afonin. At one time, Aleksey Ivanovich performed the tasks of the head of the special department of the Stalingrad Front, captured a German resident in Kursk, acted in Berlin, participated in the seizure of the intelligence center and the Abwehr, was awarded by the chief of SMERSH Abakumov himself.
According to Afonin, the main purpose of the military counterintelligence was not only to counter the Abwehr, but also the introduction of our employees into the higher echelons of the Reich, into German intelligence schools, the elimination of sabotage groups, the conduct of radio games with the enemy, the fight against traitors to the Motherland. The most interesting thing is that Stalin came up with the name SMERSHU. On the proposal to name the counterintelligence SMERNESH ("Death to German spies"). The Supreme Commander objected: “This is not only about the fight against German spies. We have intelligence agencies of other countries grazing. Let's just call it SMERSH. All members of the State Defense Committee (GKO) agreed with Stalin. The new body was created under his personal control to fight the Abwehr, who even reached … the Kremlin. As stated in his book "Intelligence and the Kremlin" P. A. Sudoplatov, starting in the spring of 1942, the Abwehr drew the main attention to the years that were preparing ",her offensive of the Wehrmacht in the Caucasus and Stalingrad. For this purpose, the brigade commissar Vladimir Minishky, who was captured in October 1941 near Vyazma, was introduced into the GKO secretariat, before the war - an employee of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Agent 438 - he received such a nickname in the Abwehr - a few days before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad, he submitted full information to the German intelligence center (“He took the minutes of the GKO meeting,” Afonin specified). On the composition of the troops of the Stalingrad direction and on measures to protect the city. It was not possible to capture Agent 438. Stalin was beside himself with rage. The catastrophe near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the march of Paulus's army near Stalingrad, the activation of German intelligence schools and sabotage groups dictated the need to create a special service capable of not only resisting the Abwehr, but also surpassing it. For this purpose, brigade commissar Vladimir Minishky, who was captured in October 1941 near Vyazma, was introduced to the GKO secretariat, before the war - an employee of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Agent 438 - he received such a nickname in the Abwehr - a few days before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad, he submitted full information to the German intelligence center (“He took the minutes of the GKO meeting,” Afonin specified). On the composition of the troops of the Stalingrad direction and on measures to protect the city. It was not possible to capture Agent 438. Stalin was beside himself with rage. The catastrophe near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the march of Paulus's army at Stalingrad, the activation of German intelligence schools and sabotage groups dictated the need to create a special service capable of not only resisting the Abwehr, but also surpassing it. For this purpose, brigade commissar Vladimir Minishky, who was captured in October 1941 near Vyazma, was introduced to the GKO secretariat, before the war - an employee of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Agent 438 - he received such a nickname in the Abwehr - a few days before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad, he submitted full information to the German intelligence center (“He took the minutes of the GKO meeting,” Afonin specified). On the composition of the troops of the Stalingrad direction and on measures to protect the city. It was not possible to capture Agent 438. Stalin was beside himself with rage. The catastrophe near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the march of Paulus's army at Stalingrad, the activation of German intelligence schools and sabotage groups dictated the need to create a special service capable of not only resisting the Abwehr, but also surpassing it.captured in October 1941 near Vyazma, before the war - an employee of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Agent 438 - he received such a nickname in the Abwehr - a few days before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad, he submitted full information to the German intelligence center (“He took the minutes of the GKO meeting,” Afonin specified). On the composition of the troops of the Stalingrad direction and on measures to protect the city. It was not possible to capture Agent 438. Stalin was beside himself with rage. The catastrophe near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the march of Paulus's army at Stalingrad, the activation of German intelligence schools and sabotage groups dictated the need to create a special service capable of not only resisting the Abwehr, but also surpassing it.captured in October 1941 near Vyazma, before the war - an employee of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Agent 438 - he received such a nickname in the Abwehr - a few days before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad, he submitted full information to the German intelligence center (“He took the minutes of the GKO meeting,” Afonin specified). On the composition of the troops of the Stalingrad direction and on measures to protect the city. It was not possible to capture Agent 438. Stalin was beside himself with rage. The catastrophe near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the march of Paulus's army at Stalingrad, the activation of German intelligence schools and sabotage groups dictated the need to create a special service capable of not only resisting the Abwehr, but also surpassing it. Agent 438 - he received such a nickname in the Abwehr - a few days before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad, he submitted full information to the German intelligence center (“He took the minutes of the GKO meeting,” Afonin specified). On the composition of the troops of the Stalingrad direction and on measures to protect the city. It was not possible to capture Agent 438. Stalin was beside himself with rage. The catastrophe near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the march of Paulus's army near Stalingrad, the activation of German intelligence schools and sabotage groups dictated the need to create a special service capable of not only resisting the Abwehr, but also surpassing it. Agent 438 - he received such a nickname in the Abwehr - a few days before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad, he submitted full information to the German intelligence center (“He took the minutes of the GKO meeting,” Afonin specified). On the composition of the troops of the Stalingrad direction and on measures to protect the city. It was not possible to capture Agent 438. Stalin was beside himself with rage. The catastrophe near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the march of Paulus's army near Stalingrad, the activation of German intelligence schools and sabotage groups dictated the need to create a special service capable of not only resisting the Abwehr, but also surpassing it. The catastrophe near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the march of Paulus's army near Stalingrad, the activation of German intelligence schools and sabotage groups dictated the need to create a special service capable of not only resisting the Abwehr, but also surpassing it. The catastrophe near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the march of Paulus's army near Stalingrad, the activation of German intelligence schools and sabotage groups dictated the need to create a special service capable of not only resisting the Abwehr, but also surpassing it.
Operation "Berezino"
Operation Berezino was a sensitive blow to Hitler's intelligence, according to General Sudoplatov, who was in charge of the NKVD sabotage department. In the summer of 1944, in the Belarusian forests, they were surrounded by more than two thousand Nazis under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Sherhorn. The Abwehr, having connected the ace-saboteur Otto Skorzeny, tried to make a sabotage detachment out of the encirclement, operating in the rear of the Red Army. But the three groups sent to establish contact with the detachment did not return. Only the fourth managed to find it. For two or three nights, Luftwaffe aircraft dropped cargo for the detachment. But all of them fell to the wrong destination, because instead of Lieutenant Colonel Sherhorn, taken prisoner, a very similar to him Lieutenant Colonel Maklyarsky, as well as State Security Major William Fisher (Rudolf Abel), was introduced into the group. The Abwehr leadership, after a radio session with "Sherhorn", ordered him to break through with a group to Germany. But not one of the Nazis made it to the Fatherland.
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The hunt for Stalin
One of the most successful SMERSH operations was the prevention of an assassination attempt on Stalin in the summer of 1944. He was attempted repeatedly, but this time the Abwehr thoroughly prepared for the attack. In the beginning, everything went according to plan. Having landed in the Smolensk region, the seasoned saboteur Tavrin and his wife, a radio operator, got on a motorcycle with a sidecar, and took the direction to Moscow. Dressed in the uniform of a Red Army major, with the Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union and orders on his chest, Tavrin had impeccable documents of the head of the SMERSH department of the 39th Army. Especially for the "major" in Berlin, a number of "Pravda" with a decree on awarding him with the Hero's Star was printed. However, the leaders of the Abwehr could not know that our agent had reported from the capital of Germany about the impending action. The Intercept plan was instantly put into action.
The motorcycle was stopped on the Rzhev-Moscow road. The patrolmen carefully checked the documents. Tavrin hurried them, they say, they were taking an urgent package to Moscow. The patrol chief was alarmed by the behavior of the "major." When asked where they were coming from, he named a distant settlement. But it rained all night, and the motorcycle and its passengers were completely dry.
“We’ll have to go to the guardhouse, we have been instructed to contact the management when checking documents,” said the head of the patrol. The room was stuffy. Tavrin took off his leather jacket, and it immediately became clear that he was not who he claimed to be. Everything was foreseen by Skorzeny, who trained Tavrin, except for one - the new order of wearing awards introduced according to the "Intercept" plan. An instant fight - and the saboteur with twisted arms stared blankly at those around him. He tried to protest, but then the patrol brought in Tavrin's companion, bringing in a radio station removed from a motorcycle, explosives, wads of money and unprecedented weapons.
- Specially for the assassination attempt on Stalin in the laboratories of the main directorate of the imperial security, the Panzerknakke rocket weapon was developed, which was a miniature grenade launcher, - explained A. I. Afonin. - It fit easily into the sleeve of an overcoat. As a fallback, Tavrin was equipped with a powerful explosive device hidden in a briefcase. In case it was not possible to carry out a terrorist attack on the first try, the "major" had a guest ticket for a ceremonial meeting in Moscow on November 7, 1944. The saboteur planned to leave the briefcase near the presidium in the meeting room. I read Tavrin's personal file, interrogation protocol. The enemy told everything, although it did not save him. After being used in radio games with the Abwehr, he was shot.
Who are you, Frau Olga?
Since the spring of 1941, SMERSH began to receive information from Berlin from the famous actress Olga Chekhova, the wife of A. P.'s nephew. Chekhov. In the early 1920s, she went to live in Germany. Having brilliantly played dozens of roles, Olga became the "state actress" of the Reich, Hitler's own favorite, Eva Braun's friend. The actress was also friends with Himmler's wives. Goering. Goebbels. Everyone was fascinated by her beauty and wit. Field Marshal Keitel, Gauleiters, ministers, industrialists, designers addressed her with a request to put in a word in front of the Fuehrer. It was about the development of "weapons of retaliation", about the construction of underground factories and missile ranges. The actress wrote down all the requests in a small gilded booklet. The content of these recordings became known not only to Hitler …
- It is impossible to establish when our intelligence service recruited her, but I am sure that Sudoplatov did it, - says A. I. Afonin. - From Olga since the spring of 1941, the Center has received top-secret information emanating from Hitler's entourage. The highest ranks of the Reich at receptions and celebrations blurted out state secrets, not suspecting that there was a Soviet intelligence officer next to them. From Chekhova, SMERSH learned about the date of the German offensive near Kursk, about the volume of production of military equipment, about the collapse of the atomic project on Hitler's orders, about separate negotiations between the Germans and Dulles. They planned to use Chekhov in an attempt on Hitler's life, but at the last moment, Stalin retreated. The Gestapo ran off their feet, figuring out where their information leaks. Soon they went to Chekhov. Himmler himself undertook to interrogate her. He turned up to her home, but the scout, knowing about the upcoming visit, invited Hitler to tea.
She was arrested at the very end of the war by the officers of SMERSH, charged with harboring Himmler's adjutant. At the very first interrogation, Chekhova named her operational pseudonym - "Actress". By order of Abakumov, she was secretly taken to Moscow. There Chekhova received truly royal honors. After a conversation with the head of SMERSH, Beria received her, followed by Chekhova invited to an appointment with Stalin. Her stay in Moscow was kept in the strictest confidence. Olga was not even allowed to see her daughter. Upon returning to Berlin, the Soviet occupation authorities provided Chekhova with life support. She wrote a book, My Watch Runs Different, but did not say a word about her intelligence ties. Only a secret diary discovered after Olga's death and Sudoplatov's testimonies speak of her as a deeply conspiratorial intelligence officer.
Magazine: Secrets of the 20th century №6. Author: Ivan Barykin