Beria was also killed twice, and if in defense of Stalin they speak out more and more often, then for some reason everyone is unanimous about Beria, except for Yuri Mukhin. Even Vadim Kozhinov, who has a good relationship with Stalin, writes: "Much of what is known about Beria does not give grounds to see him as a" positive "figure …", but at the same time he does not lead any of this "much". And, surprisingly, not only he, no one brings any real compromising evidence on this person. All the "dogs" that are hanged on him boil down either to the fact that he is responsible for the massive repression, or to the fact that he "wanted" something. I wanted to interrupt the Politburo, I wanted to stage a coup, but I was not allowed to seize power. At the same time, no evidence of this "desire" is also provided, some kind of telepathy is direct … Even in 1937, at least some were placed under all "wants"even fictitious facts - but here is nothing, only spells! Was this terrible person really so pure in life that not a line of real compromising evidence was found on him? Reading what he is accused of is such nonsense that his ears fade at the root!
We'll get to the official charges, but for now let's give the floor to the writers:
The funny thing is that a person who undertakes to write books about that time does not understand the elementary: in 1953, in the eyes of the people about which he talks so weightily, there was no "Stalinist tyranny" or "Stalinist crimes" - they appeared only after Khrushchev's report at the XX Congress. But it's not that. Among all this rhetoric, there is a real thing: even according to Khrushchev himself, Beria "abandoned" the intention to become the head of the party and state, that is, in 1953 he did not have these intentions. What, then, is he accused of?
“Not out of love for the people, not out of hatred for Stalin and not out of remorse for the crimes he had committed, but out of political calculations and personal interests in the new conditions, Beria decided to lead the movement for reforms. Glaring at the dying teacher, Beria, perhaps, also did not intend to rule differently than Stalin, however, the silent, but formidable joy of the people over the death of the tyrant advised him: we must take advantage of a rare case in history when the executioner himself can lead the movement of the people against the inheritance the greatest of tyranny. What Khrushchev did to Stalin three years later at the XX Congress, Beria wanted to start now. He started this by freeing the "doctors-saboteurs" on April 4, 1953, and himself accusing the Stalinist-Beria police system of falsification and fabrication of cases and the Inquisition."
I don’t know what Beria “wanted” and what he “didn’t want,” but glaring at the tattered pages of Avtorkhanov’s “samizdat” pages, I didn’t find anything in them except that Beria was “for reforms”. Moreover, as soon as he became a minister for the second time, he, like the first time, immediately stopped the wave of repression. What, then, is he accused of?
That is, having received a joint MGB-MVD under the command, Beria did not arrest anyone, did not even hint that he wanted to arrest someone, and even did something that raised doubts - does he even want to fight for power? What, then, is he accused of?
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And so, when you begin to deal with the accusations that "history" hangs on this person, then you are soon convinced with surprise that, apart from ritual incantations about cruelty, treachery and lust for power, there is nothing. That is, absolutely, ridiculously nothing! Here is the most striking example: the notorious "Beria repressions". The same Avtorkhanov calls him "the country's supreme inquisitor for almost 20 years." Yes, everyone knows about the "Beria repressions". But let someone tell me - when, in fact, did they pass? After all, repression is a very specific thing, with deeds, dates and sentences. So when?
With a banal comparison of dates, it is clear that this phenomenon is completely virtual: Beria came to the authorities at the end of 1938, replacing Yezhov and stopping his bloody activities, and left in 1945, returning briefly only after Stalin's death. Nevertheless, from book to book, including among historical writers and even among serious historians, the image of the almighty bloody chief of special services wanders, on whose conscience millions of human lives, and this image exists outside of any common sense and even outside of real history.
An example is an excerpt from Sergei Krasikov's book "Near the Leaders." By the nature of his main job, he was just "near" the leaders, nothing more, namely, he served in the Kremlin guard. In his book, he leads a dialogue with some "knowledgeable people" who tell him the following things:
“Question:… Khrushchev in his memoirs claims that the only person interested in Stalin's death was Lavrenty Beria.
Answer: In this situation, G. M. Malenkov was also interested in Stalin's death. It was not Beria who dispersed the Stalinist guards and put Vlasik and Poskrebyshev under arrest, namely G. M. Malenkov, but, like a cunning fox, he did it with the hands of L. P. Beria so that the mosquito would not undermine his nose. And as soon as Stalin went to the forefathers, he immediately concocted a case against Beria and got rid of him.
Question. Awful suspicion. Could this be?
Answer: There are more than enough reasons for this, in my opinion. During the interrogation by the chief of the KGB, L. P. Beria, the head of Stalin's personal security, Vlasik, Nikolai Sidorovicha got the impression that Beria thoroughly knew about the purely personal conversations between Vlasik and I. V. Stalin. Which once again gives reason to assume that the services of LP Beria were listening to the office and apartment of the General Secretary …"
It is difficult to say what the "knowledgeable" people are aware of - in the secrets of the atomic nucleus or in breeding aquarium fish, but not in the subject about which they argue. I would like to know why Malenkov dispersed the Stalinist guards and put Vlasik and Poskrebyshev under arrest by the hands of Beria, and not, say, the soloist of the Bolshoi Theater Kozlovsky? At that time they had approximately the same attitude to the corresponding services. And also with what fright Beria's service - the uranium committee - listened to the office and apartment of the General Secretary. What was she hoping to find out there? The secret of the hydrogen bomb? Well, after the words "KGB chief Lavrenty Beria" the book can be closed and never opened again, for this author is the cousin of the historian FG Volkov. Only the second summons the spirits, and the first owns the secrets of moving his characters in timeotherwise how did Beria manage to become the chief of the special service, created almost a year after his death? Yes, a mysterious, extremely mysterious character …
BERIA Lavrenty Pavlovich was born in the village of Merheuli, Sukhum district, Kutaisi province (later the region of the Abkhaz ASSR), into a poor peasant family on March 17 (29), 1899. In 1915 he entered the Baku Secondary Mechanical and Technical Construction School, in the autumn of the same year he began to participate in the work of an illegal Marxist circle, was its treasurer and in March 1917 joined the RSDLP (b). In May 1919 he graduated from college, receiving a diploma of a technician-builder-architect. In 1919-1920, he headed the illegal Bolshevik organization of technicians in Baku. At the same time, on the instructions of Anastas Mikoyan, who led the Bolshevik underground in the city, he became an agent of the Organization for Combating Counterrevolution (counterintelligence) under the State Defense Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan (this is the job for the Musavat counterintelligence,which they blame him all the time).
From October 1920 to 1922 he studied at the Baku Polytechnic Institute, from October 1920 he began work in the Cheka and by May 1921 became the head of the secret-operational unit and deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Cheka. Then he worked in the Cheka, and later in the GPU of Georgia until December 1931. For this work, he was twice awarded the Order of the Battle Red Banner, which was then simply not given. In December 1931, he transferred to party work, soon becoming the first secretary of the Zakraikom. It makes a great contribution to the development of industry and agriculture in the Caucasus.
In 1938, Beria was transferred to Moscow, and on August 22 he became the first deputy people's commissar of internal affairs, and in November - the people's commissar. With his arrival in the organs of repression, the repression practically ceased, a review of the cases of Yezhov's times and the release of prisoners began. In 1939, Beria became a candidate member of the Central Committee's Politburo, and soon a member of the Politburo. In addition, in 1941 he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee. In April 1941, he was entrusted with overseeing the people's commissariats for the timber industry, non-ferrous metallurgy, coal and oil industries, and during the war, the State Defense Committee entrusted him with control over such important defense industries as the people's commissariat for mortar weapons, the production of aircraft and engines, the production of ammunition, the tank industry.(For his achievements in the production of ammunition he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.) But the most important area that Beria oversaw was work on the Soviet atomic bomb. In December 1945, he leaves his job in the authorities and deals only with industrial affairs.
That is, by the beginning of 1953, Beria had not worked in the special services for seven (!) Years. Moreover, the fact that in difficult cases Ignatiev contacted not Beria, but another deputy of the Council of Ministers, Malenkov, proves that he did not supervise the organs, that is, he had nothing to do with them at all. Malenkov supervised them from the Council of Ministers, and Khrushchev from the Party Central Committee. Yes, yes, Khrushchev, we must ask him for all these matters! And all the equivocations about Beria's participation in the arrest of Vlasik, or in the "doctors' case", or in general in any activity of the special services are simply lies. So Abakumov or Ignatiev, who replaced him, was allowed there!
There is another slander about this person. The brothers Zhores and Roy Medvedev in their book "Unknown Stalin" write: "The four party leaders closest to Stalin in 1952 - Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev and Bulganin - did not have any outstanding merits." Brothers-historians are cunning, oh, they are cunning. Indeed, Khrushchev was a purely party figure and did not shine with any outstanding merits, and as head of state he became famous mainly for the fact that he knocked on the UN rostrum with his boot, planted corn and almost started a world nuclear war. Stalin himself said about Malenkov: “This is a clerk. He will write a resolution quickly, not always himself, but he will organize people … He is not capable of any independent thoughts and independent initiative. " Bulganin is a mysterious figure: before the war he was the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,with the beginning of the war, for some reason, he becomes a member of the military council at the front, from 1947 to 1949 he was the minister of the armed forces and deputy chairman of the council, what exactly he did after 1949 is generally incomprehensible. In general, as Mrs. Hudson would say, he looks like a statesman, but does not look like a capable one. However, as for the fourth member of this company, there is one thing that could not have happened in principle. In those years when the US had already adopted a plan for a nuclear attack on the USSR, the country's nuclear program could not be entrusted to a fool or mediocrity. It could be said with confidence that after Hiroshima, nuclear affairs should have been in the hands of the most intelligent of all those who surrounded Stalin, for mediocrity in such a post could cost too much.what exactly he did after 1949 is not clear at all. In general, as Mrs. Hudson would say, he looks like a statesman, but does not look like a capable one. However, as for the fourth member of this company, there is one thing that could not have happened in principle. In those years when the US had already adopted a plan for a nuclear attack on the USSR, the country's nuclear program could not be entrusted to a fool or mediocrity. It could be said with confidence that after Hiroshima, nuclear affairs should have been in the hands of the most intelligent of all those who surrounded Stalin, for mediocrity in such a post could cost too much.what exactly he did after 1949 is not clear at all. In general, as Mrs. Hudson would say, he looks like a statesman, but does not look like a capable one. However, as for the fourth member of this company, there is one thing that could not have happened in principle. In those years when the US had already adopted a plan for a nuclear attack on the USSR, the country's nuclear program could not be entrusted to a fool or mediocrity. It could be said with confidence that after Hiroshima, nuclear affairs should have been in the hands of the most intelligent of all those who surrounded Stalin, for mediocrity in such a post could cost too much.which could not have happened in principle. In those years when the US had already adopted a plan for a nuclear attack on the USSR, the country's nuclear program could not be entrusted to a fool or mediocrity. It could be said with confidence that after Hiroshima, nuclear affairs should have been in the hands of the most intelligent of all those who surrounded Stalin, for mediocrity in such a post could cost too much.which could not have happened in principle. In those years when the US had already adopted a plan for a nuclear attack on the USSR, the country's nuclear program could not be entrusted to a fool or mediocrity. It could be said with confidence that after Hiroshima, nuclear affairs should have ended up in the hands of the most intelligent of all who surrounded Stalin, for mediocrity in such a post could cost too much.
In fact, this was the only person from the comrades-in-arms on whom the leader could rely, because they were pulling in one direction. The Stalin-Beria tandem was invincible. Left alone, Beria had very few chances not only to take power, but even to stay afloat and simply keep his life and the freedom of his loved ones. As it actually happened.
BERIA AS A STATE ACTOR
Stalin was still alive when on March 5, 1953, his former comrades-in-arms began to reorganize state power. The first thing they did, the most important thing for themselves, was to nullify the Stalinist party reforms. Having liquidated the Bureau of the Presidium, they sharply reduced the number of the Presidium of the Central Committee. It included: Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan and of the new members - Saburov and Pervukhin. In fact, it was the former Politburo. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers consisted of five people - Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich, although the latter was a “minister without a portfolio,” a purely nominal figure. Nevertheless, he was present there, signifying that the country intends to follow the Stalinist path after Stalin - the former Stalinist path.
Malenkov became the chairman of the Council of Ministers, while remaining one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. Khrushchev also received the post of secretary of the Central Committee. And one of the secretaries was … Ignatiev. For him, the only one of all, this story ended in a clear promotion. However, Malenkov very quickly abandoned his duties as a secretary, yielding the leadership of the party to Khrushchev. Everything seemed to be back to square one - just as there was no XIX Congress …
Yes, but who really influenced the situation? After all, formally, the head of state was generally Voroshilov, who took over as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. It seems that Malenkov had the most significant post, but he is a "clerk," as Stalin called him, and as soon as a sluggish and lack of initiative is in the post of Council of Ministers, then this post itself becomes insignificant. With a light hand I don't know who, probably the same Nikita Sergeevich, they try to assure us that he was close to Beria - but how, in fact, is this known?
Despite the fact that the Presidium of the Central Committee, like the Politburo, seemed to be a collegial body, de facto, according to tradition, it was supposed to be headed by the General Secretary, and in the absence of such, one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee. Khrushchev very quickly became such a head, not very smart, but extremely assertive and active.
Among the figures of the second plan, Beria stood out, taking the post of minister of the newly united ministries of the interior and state security and retaining the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and head of the nuclear committee. Surely this issue was resolved and agreed upon even under Stalin, otherwise on March 5 the minister would simply be reappointed, and that is not a fact, it was not such a day to deal with reorganizations. Why Stalin could have wanted this appointment is also understandable. The situation was too reminiscent of 1938, there were repressions in the country, about which the head of state had more and more doubts, and he needed Beria in order to fulfill the same role that he performed with such brilliance in 1938 - to figure out what was happening in the People's Commissariat and put it in order. Which, by the way, he immediately began to do.
Bulganin became the Minister of Defense, the second power department, and the importance of this appointment should not be underestimated. Now Khrushchev is not the Politburo, but Khrushchev, (since Bulganin was an old friend of his, since the 1930s, when both worked in Moscow), in the event of an unforeseen coincidence of circumstances, he could use the army. Khrushchev's biography is more or less known. But the new Minister of Defense is a very, very little-mentioned figure in our history.
BULGANIN Nikolai Alexandrovich was born in 1895 in Nizhny Novgorod, in a working class family. He graduated from a real school, in 1917 he joined the party. His career is somewhat zigzag. Until 1922 he was a Chekist, then moved to the Supreme Council of National Economy, in 1927 he was appointed director of the Moscow Electric Plant, but in 1931 he leaves this post for the chairmanship of the Moscow Council. Since then, he became friends with Khrushchev, who was then the first secretary of the Moscow regional committee. In July 1937, he became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, in 1938, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and chairman of the board of the State Bank. However, he is not used in the military economy - Bulganin, like Khrushchev, is sent to the front as a member of the military council. He commissioned until 1944, when he became a member of the State Defense Committee in the position of People's Commissar of Defense. From 1947 to 1949 - Minister of the Armed Forces, which, despite the fact that Stalin remained the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and Beria oversaw the most important defense industries, he did not give special powers. In the last years of Stalin's life, he was one of the chairmen of the Council of Ministers. That is, if you look at the development of a career, then he is one of those workers that are “without fish”. But Nikita Sergeevich's friend.
Purely formally (or as they are trying to assure us) two groups confronted each other in the new government: the Malenkov-Beria tandem and the Khrushchev group. But in reality, two forces opposed the new state elite: the Politburo, the "collective mind" of the party apparatus, to which Malenkov belonged, and Beria, who was just as alien to this apparatus as Stalin was to him in the early 1920s. Logically, "industrialists" should have been behind him, but in fact, his team did not have time to take shape, so he was alone. Do not consider Kobulov a serious support in the Ministry of Internal Affairs …
What was Beria as a statesman? Unless, of course, to judge by those things that he really did, and not by those that he did not do, because he "waited".
For example, in less than a month he sorted out the “doctors' case” that was boring. In early April, the investigator Ryumin, who initiated this case, admitted that it had been falsified. The case was closed, moreover, reports about this and about "illegal methods of investigation" were published in the newspapers, about which the Politburo was outraged that Beria de "dishonored the party." The logic is clear - let the garbage in the hut be up to the ceiling, just not to take it out so that no one can see that the hut is dirty! Ignatiev was relieved of his duties as secretary of the Central Committee, and that seemed to be the end of it for him. But only it seems.
What else did Beria do?
Lavrenty Pavlovich did not speed up the development of events. I considered something else more important for myself in May-June. Something that should have made him completely invulnerable. Put in an exceptional position. To predetermine his indisputable sole leadership, recognized by all, and, consequently, the right to determine foreign and domestic policy. He focused all his attention on creating the country's nuclear missile shield. On what happened at two top-secret training grounds …"
What happened at these test sites? One was testing a new air defense missile, the other was preparing tests of a hydrogen bomb. Considering that the United States, one after another, adopted more and more new plans for a nuclear attack on the USSR, and now not only a "retaliatory strike", but also preventive ones, he considered that this was more important than sitting in Moscow and carving up seats and spheres of influence … However, he did all this, of course, not for nothing and not for the good of the state, but solely to acquire sole leadership.
This is the key to resolving all international issues that should have made Molotov, an outspoken hardliner, an unconditional ally of Beria. To turn Bulganin, who was becoming the most formidable defense minister in the world, into an obedient satellite of Lavrenty Pavlovich. To win over to your side two out of five members of the narrow leadership who did not pretend to be a leader …
What a nightmare! What a villain! What a person does not go to in the struggle for power - even to honestly fulfill his official duties! There is no excuse for him either before the court of history, or before the party court! “Alexey Ivanovich Adzhubey in his book opened the edge of the veil of secrecy over the motives of the preemptive strike
49 Zhukov Y. Secrets of the Kremlin. Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov M., 1998. S. 632 100 Ibid. P.633.
Khrushchev. It turns out that Beria came up with a clever move with amnesty after Stalin's death. It concerned large groups of prisoners. Beria was worried that he no longer had the power to automatically extend the terms of imprisonment for those who were sent to the camps during the years of mass repressions and left their own. They returned to their homes and demanded the restoration of justice. And it was extremely necessary for Beria to send the unwanted back into exile, to detain those who remained there. It was then that they began to release criminals and repeat offenders. They immediately took up the old. Dissatisfaction and instability could give Beria a chance to return to the old methods " ".
The horror of the Beria amnesty is most convincingly depicted in the famous film "Cold Summer of 53". True, it is not entirely clear under which category of those released these criminal hari fit - not otherwise, these are pregnant women disguised as raiders. Adjubey is lying just like his father-in-law. At the suggestion of Beria, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, amnesties were granted: convicted for a term of up to 5 years, as well as for some official, economic, military crimes, women with children under 10 years old, pregnant women, minors, elderly and seriously ill prisoners. And where in these categories is the place for repeat offenders?
Beria did a lot of bad things. He stood up for a united Germany, which would be grateful to the USSR for this, and not for a divided, striving for unification and hating the force that divided it. He insisted that office work in the national republics should be conducted not in Russian, but in the local language and that local personnel should work there, not sent from Moscow, and much, much more.
In general, he showed himself to be a serious and reasonable statesman, and it is completely incomprehensible what the Politburo could have against him. Beria was absolutely not dangerous, he stopped repression, he had no intention of fighting for power, which even Khrushchev recognized, and he could not fight for it, because he had no allies in the party elite, and one was not a warrior in the field. The vaunted apparatus of the MGB - the Ministry of Internal Affairs, after seven years of domination by Abakumov, Ignatiev and Kruglov, had to be reassembled piece by piece. He could not commit anything seditious and did not want anything seditious.
So what is Beria's mystery? Why was he killed, and most importantly, why is he so hated by those on whose submission this man was declared a fiend of hell - namely, Khrushchev's Politburo? Let's say his hands are stained with blood - that's a lie, but let's say! But after all, the same Khrushchev has blood on his elbows, but this does not annoy anyone. Let's say he was a pathological womanizer, raped high school girls in a perverted form - this is also a lie, but let's say! But after all, the rehabilitated “victim of Stalinism” Abel Yenukidze raped 10-12 year old girls, and no one is hysterical about this. Let's say he wanted to seize the sole power in the country - this is also a lie, but let's say that too! But the other comrades-in-arms ate each other like rats locked in the basement, and everyone takes it for granted, no one takes offense at anyone. Why exactly Beria is presented in the guise of a villain of all times and peoples? For what?
The answer is somewhat paradoxical: precisely because there was nothing to accuse him of. I really needed it, but it turned out to be nothing! No real serious crimes were found behind him, and it was necessary to explain why he was suddenly dealt with. And there was only one way for this - to shout so loudly and for a long time about his pathological villainy, so that everyone would hear, remember and ultimately believe. This is not the guard Khrustalev, who can simply be removed, this face is noticeable, justifications are needed here.
And by the way, why did it work so easily? After all, if Beria, an experienced security officer, got involved in a power struggle, he had to understand who he was dealing with, and had to be on his guard. One of the researchers of his life, Aleksey Toptygin, writes: “If we take the unit of measurement of intuition, it should be called“beria”. And they took him with his bare hands. How did he go wrong? And here, too, a somewhat paradoxical answer suggests itself: and therefore they took that he was not going to fight with anyone - there is some telepathic evidence that he "wanted", but there is not a single evidence that in the direction of this "desire" he did at least step. Already on March 9, in his speech at the mourning ceremony, he spoke about the "steel unity of the leadership" and did nothing to undermine this unity. Beria was in the mood for a normal job, and even before his death, probablydid not have time to understand, but what did he do wrong?
BEST PUNCH - BACKSTICK
Yuri Mukhin in his excellent book "The Murder of Stalin and Beria" on many pages, in detail and convincingly, comparing information and testimony of witnesses, proves that no one arrested Beria, that he was simply killed during his arrest, and even names the alleged perpetrators of this crime, because murder without trial is a crime. The "Beria case", as well as his alleged presence at the trial, was staged. None of those who can be trusted as witnesses have seen him alive after June 26. Moreover, neither me, nor my acquaintances, historians, journalists, politicians have ever had a chance to communicate with a person who saw the notorious "Beria case", or even hear about someone who saw this case, so it is unclear whether it exists in nature. In general, I refer everyone to Mukhin's book. At least he convinced me.
However, Mukhin was not the first to express this version. The first was Beria's son Sergo, who told his mother on June 26, before they were all arrested, that they would never see their father again. By the way, many years later, when he got this opportunity, he began to take an interest in the circumstances of his father's death. “I met with N. Mikhailov, who was an official member of the court,” he says in an interview with the Moscow newspaper Vecherniy Klub. - I knew Nikolai Alexandrovich well from the Central Committee of the Komsomol. He told me: “I will not deceive you, I have not seen your father at the trial: the person who demonstrated the doll (as he said) is not your father. As far as we know, he was killed that day. How it happened, I do not know. " Another member of the court, N. Shvernik, told me the same thing."
The next, at least according to Avtorkhanov, who collected all the gossip of European boulevards, this version was voiced … by Khrushchev himself. “Khrushchev told his foreign interlocutors, especially the communists, how Beria was arrested and killed. The direct physical killers of Beria in Khrushchev's different versions of the story are different persons, but the plot of the story remains the same … "(The following is a story about the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, about the trap set up by Beria, about his arrest - this plot is quite well known. - E. P.). “Now,” said Khrushchev, “we are faced with a difficult, equally unpleasant dilemma: keep Beria in custody and conduct a normal investigation, or shoot him right there and then issue a death sentence in court. It was dangerous to make the first decision, because the entire Chekist apparatus and Chekist troops stood behind Beria,and he could easily be released. We had no legal grounds to make a second decision and immediately shoot Beria (and what, could there be a legal basis for shooting without trial and investigation in peacetime? - E. P.) After a comprehensive discussion of the minuses and pluses of both options, we came to the conclusion: Beria must be shot immediately, because no one will rebel because of the dead Beria. " The executor of this sentence (in the next room) in the stories of Khrushchev is once General Moskalenko, another time Mikoyan, and the third time even Khrushchev himself. Khrushchev added emphatically: "Our further investigation into Beria's case fully confirmed that we correctly shot him."can there be a legal basis for execution without trial and investigation in peacetime? - EP) After a comprehensive discussion of the minuses and pluses of both options, we came to the conclusion: Beria should be shot immediately, because no one will rebel because of the dead Beria. " The executor of this sentence (in the next room) in the stories of Khrushchev is once General Moskalenko, another time Mikoyan, and the third time even Khrushchev himself. Khrushchev added emphatically: "Our further investigation into Beria's case fully confirmed that we correctly shot him."can there be a legal basis for execution without trial and investigation in peacetime? - EP) After a comprehensive discussion of the minuses and pluses of both options, we came to the conclusion: Beria should be shot immediately, because no one will rebel because of the dead Beria. " The executor of this sentence (in the next room) in Khrushchev's stories is once General Moskalenko, another time Mikoyan, and the third time even Khrushchev himself. Khrushchev added emphatically: "Our further investigation of Beria's case fully confirmed that we correctly shot him."The executor of this sentence (in the next room) in the stories of Khrushchev is once General Moskalenko, another time Mikoyan, and the third time even Khrushchev himself. Khrushchev added emphatically: "Our further investigation into Beria's case fully confirmed that we correctly shot him."The executor of this sentence (in the next room) in Khrushchev's stories is once General Moskalenko, another time Mikoyan, and the third time even Khrushchev himself. Khrushchev added emphatically: "Our further investigation into Beria's case fully confirmed that we correctly shot him."
What was this investigation and what was it? What was Beria accused of? He was tried under Articles 58 (espionage, issuing military or state secrets, going over to the side of the enemy), (committing terrorist acts), (participating in an organization), (active struggle against the working class under the tsarist regime or among counter-revolutionary governments) and for the rape of a colossal the number of women that most of all savor in this matter. The list of charges itself shows that the case was molded according to recipes from 1937. This topic is also discussed in detail, on many pages by Mukhin, and I again refer all those interested in details to him. But even without that it is clear that since Beria was killed, then it was necessary to somehow justify this, and the investigative and judicial system (not only ours, but any) can, with a certain order, justify anything. Especially if the arrested person is no longer alive and he does not care at all what will be the basis of the already executed sentence.
But we will look in vain in these paragraphs for an answer to the most important question.
So why did everyone kill Lavrentius Beria?
One thing is clear: if the party elite went to murder, somehow this person was very dangerous to her. And not with terrible plans to throw her off her old throne - Beria made it clear that he was not going to do this. Of course, he was potentially dangerous - but they don't kill us for that. At least that's not how they kill, openly and frankly. The normal Soviet move in the struggle for power was worked out as early as 1937 - to move, remove, and then arrest and falsify the case as usual. By the way, this openness and frankness also contains a mystery - you could have waited and removed it quietly and unnoticed. It seems that the killers were in a great hurry …
Khrushchev, in his revelations to foreign interlocutors, is in some way disingenuous. He presents the decision on the immediate execution of Beria as a collegial verdict of all members of the Politburo. "After a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of both options, we came to the conclusion: Beria must be shot immediately" … "We!" So now we will believe that nine people, middle-aged, indecisive and rather cowardly, will stamp such a decision - to shoot one of the first persons of the state without trial or investigation. Never in their life will these people, who have been working without a murmur under a strong leader, take on such a responsibility! They will drown the issue in discussions, and in the end, even if there are grounds, everything will end in deportation somewhere in Baku or Tyumen to the post of plant director - let him seize power there, if he can.
And so it was, and there is convincing evidence of that. Secretary of the Central Committee Malenkov in the process of preparing the meeting of the Presidium wrote a draft of his work. This draft has been published and it is very clear from it what was to be discussed at this meeting. To prevent the possibility of abuse of power, Beria was supposed to be deprived of the post of Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, possibly, if the discussion goes on the right track, to release him from the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, appointing him as the Minister of the Oil Industry as a last resort. And that's all. There was no question of any arrest, let alone any execution without trial. And it is difficult even to imagine, with all the tension of imagination, what could happen for the Presidium, contrary to the prepared scenario, to make such a decision impromptu. It couldn't be. And if it could not, then it was not. And the fact that this was not the case, that this issue was not considered at all at the Presidium, is evidenced by the fact that the draft was found in Malenkov's archive - otherwise it would have been handed over to formalize the decision and then destroyed.
So there was no "we". Beria was first killed, and then the Presidium was confronted with a fact, and he had to get out, covering up the killers. But who exactly?
And here it is very easy to guess. First, it is easy to calculate the number of the second - the artist. The fact is that - and no one denies this - that day the army was widely involved in the events. In the incident with Beria, as Khrushchev himself admits, the commander of the air defense of the Moscow Military District, Colonel-General Moskalenko and the chief of staff of the Air Force, Major-General Batitsky, were directly involved, and Marshal Zhukov himself seems to be willing. But, more importantly, for some reason, apparently, to stage the fight against the "parts of Beria", troops were brought into the capital. And then a very important name comes up - a person who could ensure contact with the military and the army's participation in the events - Defense Minister Bulganin.
It is not difficult to calculate the number one. Who poured dirt on Beria most of all, completely losing his composure and presenting him at the same time as a devil? Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. By the way, not only Bulganin, but also Moskalenko and Batitsky were people from his team.
Bulganin and Khrushchev - somewhere we have already met this combination. Where? Yes, at Stalin's dacha, that fateful Sunday, March 1, 1953.
Read the continuation here.
