When people talk about popular science these days, Stephen Hawking is usually one of the first to be remembered. This fame is justified by the problems raised in his works, as well as by his accessible style of presentation. And in this regard, he, as a rule, does not cause a neutral attitude towards himself: every person interested in modern physics, in one way or another, is familiar with him and has a formed opinion about him. Readers removed from the direct production of science also tend to attribute innovation and daring ideas to Hawking - and in this regard, they, precisely, make a critical mistake. Like no other modern physicist, Hawking tries to think as close as possible to the paradigm of classical rationalism of twentieth-century physics. His ideas, no doubt,reaching a new level of understanding of physical reality at the expense of scientific facts, hypotheses and theories available in modern physics, are a direct continuation of this rationalism. Hawking, like many of his colleagues (Weinberg, Heisenberg, Green, Kaku, etc.), is a supporter of the search for the classical "Holy Grail" of physical sciences - the creation of a unified physical theory, in modern science called M-theory. Hawking's view of M-theory expresses the direct continuity of the physical science of the past. The first stage is the unification of the theories of electricity, magnetism and light by Maxwell and Einstein. The second is the subsequent unification of the electromagnetic force with a unified theory of strong and weak nuclear interactions. The desire to embrace the remaining force - gravity - is, firstly, a prerequisite for the development of M-theory within the framework of existing physical theories,emerging due to the connection and continuity of physical knowledge, secondly, in this search for unification there is no tendency to depart from the dominant paradigm of thinking. Recent experimental confirmation of the existence of gravitational waves has brought the dream of combining four interactions one step closer, and perhaps soon we will see the first models in which all interactions are combined.
A conventionally “non-canonical” approach to the foundations of physics, both philosophical and ontological, can be observed, for example, in the ideas of I. Prigogine and I. Stengers, who wrote about Hawking himself: “the classical TVS (Theory of Everything in the World), as he wrote Stephen Hawking, claims to comprehend the purposes of God, i.e. to reach a fundamental level of description from which all phenomena (at least in principle) could be deduced in a deterministic way. We are talking about a completely different form of unification. A FA that would include chaos at the deepest level of physics would not lead to a reductionist, timeless description. Higher levels would be allowed by fundamental levels, but would not follow from them”(Prigogine, Stengers 1999, p. 258).
The controversial and controversial synergistic approach to the interpretation of physical reality looks much more innovative than Hawking's views, which, rather, convey to the general public the results of the development of physical theories over the past 100 years without gaps in the historical and paradigmatic continuity between them. Hawking also discusses the most common theory not as a science fiction writer or innovator, but rather as a rationalist scientist, from the standpoint of scientific skepticism: “1. A complete unified theory does exist, and we will discover it someday if we try. 2. There is no final theory of the Universe, but there is simply an endless sequence of theories that give an increasingly accurate description of the Universe. 3. There is no theory of the universe:events cannot be predicted beyond a certain limit and occur in an arbitrary and random manner”(Hawking 2014, p. 206).
The first statement obviously reflects the aspirations of physical rationalism in its most classical form. The second statement is an attempt to observe the "golden mean" between rationalism and relativism: it does not matter at the moment whether M-theory exists or not, the main thing is only the continuous dialectical formation of knowledge as a process and scientific knowledge as a result, from a given stage of development to an unknown future, which just to be achieved. The third statement deserves closer attention, since it takes into account the phenomena of the microworld, which, as before, cannot be fully encompassed by the existing tools of cognition (although their very understanding remains rationalistic, even though the very concept of rationality has undergone significant changes, having lost the connotations implicit in the 1899 Manifesto).
This means that if for the creation of M-theory it will be really necessary, for example, the simultaneous knowledge of the trajectory and momentum of a particular particle at a particular moment in time (which, proceeding from the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which has not yet been refuted, is impossible), and the tools of human cognition will still not cope with this task - it will be possible to forget about M-theory for technical reasons, and not in connection with the infinity of consistent theories of explaining the surrounding reality or revised and corrected cosmological models (the question of finiteness / infinity itself will become impossible in principle, as impossible any further advancement of research in this area).
Some are inclined to attribute a philosophical subtext to such a comprehensive position, speaking of the philosophical views of Hawking. Rather, it is a kind of "romance", since the physicist himself does not particularly favor modern philosophy, although he has an established opinion about it (since, calling L. Wittgenstein "the greatest philosopher of the 20th century" (Hawking 2014; Hawking, Mlodinov 2013), he definitely has an idea of both him and other philosophers - in short, one cannot say that he attacks philosophy "blindly"). He pays a certain tribute to the “subdivision” of philosophers of science, but only “for attempts” (Hawking 2014) to understand science, and not for its very real understanding, while recognizing, however, the validity of philosophy in the ethical, political and social spheres. In addition, there is also a well-known call for a "single search"wandering from book to book and from lecture to lecture: “If we create a complete theory, over time, in its very foundations, it will become understandable to everyone, not just a few specialists. Then we can all take part in a discussion about why the universe exists. If we find the answer, it will be an absolute triumph of the human mind”(Ibid, p. 495).
So, the inclusion of philosophers in the discussion of questions of M-theory, according to Hawking, is not only permissible, but also desirable. In addition, not liking modern philosophers, Hawking, like any scientist, had certain methodological principles that guided him, and from all approaches to the perception of reality and its study, he chose one approach, and did not use them situationally and intuitively. He called his point of view "model-dependent realism." And our goal is the historical and philosophical representation of model-dependent realism as an epistemological practice and its reflection.
To do this, first it is worth returning to two preliminary points - skepticism in relation to philosophers and a view of the fate of M-theory. The critical perception of modern philosophy by a physicist undoubtedly has adequate prerequisites - this is a problem that permeates all modern philosophy as a whole - the lack of agreement between philosophers in the field of epistemology, the problem of constructing a logically consistent and effective criterion for the verification and demarcation of knowledge, discussions between realism and anti-realism, the problem of reference, controversies in the field of philosophy of mind, and so on. It is the questions of the philosophy of science that are of interest to representatives of other sciences in philosophy in the first place. It can be stated that at this stage in the development of epistemology,we continue in fact to be between two poles - the position of a unifying formal-logical approach to the creation of a unified criterion for the verification of scientific knowledge (which takes place, first of all, in analytical philosophy) and the provisions of modern epistemological relativism. In view of the dialectical essence, the internally contradictory unity of the phenomenon of science and the production of scientific knowledge, the formal-logical verification criteria formed by positivism - from K. Popper to I. Lakatos and Saul Kripke [1] - deprive science of the right to exceptions, to "special cases", capable of destroying the established scientific paradigm with one confirmed discovery that does not fit into the framework of dominant scientific thinking.in analytical philosophy) and the provisions of modern epistemological relativism. In view of the dialectical essence, the internally contradictory unity of the phenomenon of science and the production of scientific knowledge, the formal-logical verification criteria formed by positivism - from K. Popper to I. Lakatos and Saul Kripke [1] - deprive science of the right to exceptions, to "special cases", capable of destroying the established scientific paradigm with one confirmed discovery that does not fit into the framework of dominant scientific thinking.in analytical philosophy) and the provisions of modern epistemological relativism. In view of the dialectical essence, the internally contradictory unity of the phenomenon of science and the production of scientific knowledge, the formal-logical verification criteria formed by positivism - from K. Popper to I. Lakatos and Saul Kripke [1] - deprive science of the right to exceptions, to "special cases", capable of destroying the established scientific paradigm with one confirmed discovery that does not fit into the framework of dominant scientific thinking.capable of destroying the established scientific paradigm with one confirmed discovery that does not fit into the framework of dominant scientific thinking.capable of destroying the established scientific paradigm with one confirmed discovery that does not fit into the framework of dominant scientific thinking.
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At the same time, focusing on "special cases" and "the right to one's own vision of reality" makes impossible the very concept of "objectivity" of scientific truths. And in this case, we have to either sacrifice science or discard relativism. According to the sociologist of science B. Latour in his work Science in Action, we can remain relativists only when we are in the “scientific kitchen,” that is, in the process of creating a theory, when pluralism of opinions is not only possible, but also justified (Latour 2006). When the main verifier of scientific knowledge, Nature, comes into its own, and when we present to the scientific community and the whole world the result of our scientific activity, we either return to realism, or our theory loses its grounds to be called scientific, in the case of philosophy, most often it turns into empty sophistry …
In addition, Hawking also accuses some of the modern rationalist philosophers of being banal: “Many of them are failed physicists who found it too difficult to develop new theories, and instead they write about the philosophy of physics. They continue to argue about scientific theories of the turn of the century and do not touch the cutting edge of modern physics”(Hawking 2014, p. 258). And if the lack of knowledge in some schools of philosophy of science (which is primarily referred to by Hawking) is expressed primarily in their banality regarding scientific facts, then Bricmont and Sokal in the book "Intellectual Tricks" put another rebuke to postmodernism, the most pronounced " the representative "of relativism in epistemology - the abuse of the terms of the special sciences, their vulgarization, and often - their misunderstanding.
But, in our opinion, the problem lies directly in the problem of unifying the truth and erasing the differences between fields of science, ignoring potential new progressive theories and the impossibility of effectively correcting the cemented dogmas of the created unified formal-logical apparatus of a priori predicted truth of scientific theories. On the other hand, they are opposed by the epistemology of "special cases." Postmodernism undoubtedly raised an important problem, pointing out that there are a number of truly scientific theories that do not agree with unified verification, and therefore either a criterion or an understanding of rationality requires restructuring. But, raising this problem, postmodernism does not offer a concrete solution to it, speaking, among other things,a basis for argumentation of subjectivity and justification for the creation of pseudoscientific theories in the modern world (which is obvious if, in particular, one remembers about such a quality of postmodernism as a call for "equal rights" of all discourses - scientific, religious, literary, mythological, etc.) (Lyotard 2013; Lukyanets et al. 2008).
That is why, in our opinion, an adequate verification criterion, first of all, should be fundamentally non-unified (not reducible to a single method for all subsections of scientific knowledge), fundamentally finite (a non-unified area should still have its own limits, which cannot multiply unnecessarily), and the criteria themselves must be fundamentally open (the ability to be revised at any time and, if necessary, discarded [2]). An effective theory of knowledge, in short, should be a movement in the middle, between the abstract-general and the particular-concrete. And the search for such a methodology either did not arouse enthusiasm in the philosophy of science, or led those who were looking for it into a dead end. For example, R. Carnap's lecture course on the philosophy of physics,is indeed close to this kind of model of epistemology, but his programmatic work in this area, on the contrary, tends to a one-sided mathematical formalization of all scientific knowledge (including the areas of the humanities that are not fundamentally formalized in this way). However, we will not get hung up on detailing our understanding of the verification criteria, since it is not our goal to clarify them.
Based on these conclusions, it becomes obvious and justified to pose the question of M-theory by Hawking: "Either A - or B - or C". Speaking in more detail: “Or science will achieve what I myself dream of” (A); "Or it is impossible in principle" (B); "Or it is impossible for us" ©. Thus, such a position protects against attacks from different sides, it is a kind of defensive reaction to possible reproaches and criticism. Prigogine, speaking of Hawking, notices only his thesis (A), omitting theses (B) and ©, but in accordance with a very specific goal. In Time, Chaos, Quantum, they and Stengers recruit Hawking into their own allies, building his idea of M-theory as a counter-position, as opposed to their own views, which themselves are closest to (B) (with a slight correction). Rather, their position sounds like:"Our tools of knowledge can develop to unimaginable proportions, but since the world around us is chaotic and unpredictable, we will never be able to give it an adequate description." In other words, Prigogine and Stengers take a well-defined position in which they use Hawking's opinion in their own context, which often happens within science. On the other hand, if you take Hawking himself, there is a creation of "outposts" and "traps" that make it possible to avoid scientific criticism or soften it. Based on Hawking's defensive reaction, let us take a look at what he himself said about the philosophical concept that is closest to him.in which they use Hawking's opinion in their own context, which often happens within science. On the other hand, if you take Hawking himself, there is a creation of "outposts" and "traps" that make it possible to avoid scientific criticism or soften it. Based on Hawking's defensive reaction, let us take a look at what he himself said about the philosophical concept that is closest to him.in which they use Hawking's opinion in their own context, which often happens within science. On the other hand, if you take Hawking himself, there is a creation of "outposts" and "traps" that make it possible to avoid scientific criticism or soften it. Based on Hawking's defensive reaction, let us take a look at what he himself said about the philosophical concept that is closest to him.
The most accurate introduction to Hawking's approach is to pose the problem in the form in which we can find it even in G. V. Leibniz: “Often, scientists either invented something that did not exist, or went too far in the conclusions from some observations; at the same time, it should be appreciated that they made noteworthy guesses, which were justified at least in some cases, and established some subordinate propositions, based on which one can gradually advance in the study of causes”(Leibniz 1982, p. 354). So, there are many opinions of scientists, among which there are both right and wrong. Based on this obvious thesis (a kind of analytical truth for epistemology), Hawking builds his approach, which he calls model-dependent realism. This approach is based on the fact that “our brain interprets signals,coming from the senses, and creates a model of the world. When such a model successfully explains events, we tend to attribute to it, as well as to its constituent elements and concepts, the property of reality, or absolute truth. But one and the same physical phenomenon can be modeled in different ways, using different fundamental ideas and concepts”(Hawking, Mlodinov 2013, p. 12). And if two physical theories reliably predict or describe the same events, it will be impossible to say that one of them is more real and "more objective" than the other. In this case, the criterion of use will be the most convenient one of the theories. But one and the same physical phenomenon can be modeled in different ways, using different fundamental ideas and concepts”(Hawking, Mlodinov 2013, p. 12). And if two physical theories reliably predict or describe the same events, it will be impossible to say that one of them is more real and "more objective" than the other. In this case, the criterion of use will be the most convenient one of the theories. But one and the same physical phenomenon can be modeled in different ways, using different fundamental ideas and concepts”(Hawking, Mlodinov 2013, p. 12). And if two physical theories reliably predict or describe the same events, it will be impossible to say that one of them is more real and "more objective" than the other. In this case, the criterion of use will be the most convenient one of the theories.
So, we are dealing with the following position: a theory of physics or a picture of the world is a model, always connected in a certain way with observations. Observations are transformed into scientific facts, and facts, through interpretation, are synthesized and transformed into scientific theories, concepts of reality and worldviews. “According to model-dependent realism, it makes no sense to ask whether the model of the world is real or not; one thing is important: does it correspond to observations” (Ibid.: 52-53) But observations are not a direct way of constructing pictures of the world - between them and observations (if we consider the latter as directly determined recorded results, bare data) there are also scientific facts, the production of which directly affects the truth / falsity of the theory. The subjective component of scientific fact is a place as a possibility of error and disagreement,and a source of heuristic potential in the production of scientific knowledge. B. Latour gives a rather detailed definition of a fact in the context of the sociology of science: “Fact is what begins to form in the course of disagreements as a result of collective actions, provided that later texts operating with it contain not only criticism and various distortions, but also confirmation "(Latour 2013, p. 77). For example, Blondlot "opens" N-rays due to an error in the settings and installation of equipment in his own laboratory. Disagreements in the scientific community and the need for re-experiment have pointed to this error, demonstrating to the scientific community the virtual absence of N-rays in nature.which begins to form in the course of disagreements as a result of collective action, provided that the later texts operating with it contain not only criticism and various distortions, but also confirmation”(Latour 2013, p. 77). For example, Blondlot "opens" N-rays due to an error in the settings and installation of equipment in his own laboratory. Disagreements in the scientific community and the need for re-experiment have pointed to this error, demonstrating to the scientific community the virtual absence of N-rays in nature.which begins to form in the course of disagreements as a result of collective action, provided that the later texts operating with it contain not only criticism and various distortions, but also confirmation”(Latour 2013, p. 77). For example, Blondlot "opens" N-rays due to an error in the settings and installation of equipment in his own laboratory. Disagreements in the scientific community and the need for re-experiment have pointed to this error, demonstrating to the scientific community the virtual absence of N-rays in nature. Blondlot "opens" N-rays due to an error in the settings and installation of equipment in his own laboratory. Disagreements in the scientific community and the need for repeated experiments pointed to this error, demonstrating to the scientific community the virtual absence of N-rays in nature. Blondlot "opens" N-rays due to an error in the settings and installation of equipment in his own laboratory. Disagreements in the scientific community and the need for repeated experiments pointed to this error, demonstrating to the scientific community the virtual absence of N-rays in nature.
When the problems of the subjective side of the fact are overcome, the moment comes to construct a scientific theory from the obtained facts. Provided that scientific facts correctly interpret observations from objective reality, a theory or a holistic picture of the world is built on their basis, which, accordingly, does not contradict reality in the same way. And this raises the question raised earlier regarding such theories with equal explanatory value - which one will be more effective? At the descriptive level, the most simple and "elegant" theory is chosen. So, when building a quantum model in the theory of relativity, there was a choice: a simpler (Euclidean) geometry, but much more complex physical and mathematical calculations than when using a more complex (non-Euclidean) geometry. The theory "generally accepted" by the scientific community was chosen based on the criterion of the relative simplicity of physical calculations, as a result of which the simplicity of geometric calculations had to be sacrificed, which does not negate the fact of the possibility of using another theoretical model. But at the level of practical use of the theory, a number of other factors also play a role: the maximum result, minimum costs or the possibility of application in general (based on the fact that some theories are practically inapplicable, existing only as an opportunity), not to mention scientific fashion or ideological paradigms, negative influence which, as before, can take place in modern science. But at the level of practical use of the theory, a number of other factors also play a role: the maximum result, minimum costs or the possibility of application in general (based on the fact that some theories are practically inapplicable, existing only as an opportunity), not to mention scientific fashion or ideological paradigms, negative influence which, as before, can take place in modern science. But at the level of practical use of the theory, a number of other factors also play a role: the maximum result, minimum costs or the possibility of application in general (based on the fact that some theories are practically inapplicable, existing only as an opportunity), not to mention the scientific fashion or ideological paradigms, negative influence which, as before, can take place in modern science.
The problem of the equivalence of the use of some scientific theories was raised by R. Carnap in his lectures on the philosophy of science (Carnap 2008). His basic example was the assertion that each person, for example, is free to use his own scale for measuring length based on his own steps. And within the established scale, his observations will always be correct and consistent. The problem lies directly in the complexity of the intersubjective use of such a scale and the need to translate it into equivalent units that are understandable to others. But is this evidence that model-dependent realism is a kind of positivism? At first glance, it seems that way, but if you look at the example of its application in the three destinies of M-theory in a single presentation, this view turns out to be erroneous. In logical positivism (and any other), truth is always fixed. The positivist approach excludes the possibility of accepting the "objectivity" of mutually contradictory and mutually exclusive judgments. Model-dependent realism as an approach has more immunity to dialectical contradictions and in this is closer to pragmatism in the epistemology of Paul Kurtz or John Dewey.
Based on Hawking's view of the fate of M-theory, it can be argued that model-dependent realism considers three mutually contradictory scientific theories as objective, since each of them corresponds to observations and our knowledge of objective reality. Based on this, we can be free to believe in the one that seems to us the most probable, but this probability is purely subjective until new scientific facts are obtained that can tip the scales in favor of any of the theories. Within the framework of the coexistence of theories that equally adequately represent physical reality, in each of them, it is possible for research and even research programs to move in different directions. It looks more clearly as follows: if theories A and B equally adequately describe physical reality,but they differ from each other in certain parameters, in theory A, due to ongoing research, they may come to conclusion X1, and within the framework of theory B - to conclusion X2. The further difference in theories will be aggravated by the fact that X1 may be fruitful and provide an opportunity to advance in understanding physical reality, while X2 will be unable to give such a new explanation. In this case, theory B will either adapt to the conclusion X1 of theory A, or it will simply be recognized as a counterproductive artifact that has the right to exist only in the history of science. We can find such an understanding of the theory of knowledge in the methodology of research programs of one of the most famous Imre Lakatos. Nevertheless, in model-dependent realism, Lakatos's conclusions are drawn primarily to the history of science, and not to possible predictions of the future. Besides,the methodology of research programs hardly takes into account theories that have long remained and will remain without any factual refutation or confirmation. First of all, this concerns just theoretical physics, for which the logical-methodological programs of post-positivism are unable to make any productive predictions or provide an epistemic strengthening of one of the many theories or weaken the arguments of other theories: all discussions take place either within the framework of science itself, or in the framework of operating with data from related sciences (such as experimental physics), which, so far, have not brought the desired result in discussions around fundamental issues, such as the question of the origin of the Universe.which have remained and will remain for a long time without any actual refutation or confirmation. First of all, this concerns just theoretical physics, for which the logical-methodological programs of post-positivism are unable to make any productive predictions or provide an epistemic strengthening of one of the many theories or weaken the arguments of other theories: all discussions take place either within the framework of science itself, or in the framework of operating with data from related sciences (such as experimental physics), which, so far, have not brought the desired result in discussions around fundamental issues, such as the question of the origin of the Universe.which have remained and will remain for a long time without any actual refutation or confirmation. First of all, this concerns just theoretical physics, for which the logical-methodological programs of post-positivism are unable to make any productive predictions or provide an epistemic strengthening of one of the many theories or weaken the arguments of other theories: all discussions take place either within the framework of science itself, or in the framework of operating with data from related sciences (such as experimental physics), which, so far, have not brought the desired result in discussions around fundamental issues, such as the question of the origin of the Universe.for which the logical-methodological programs of post-positivism are unable to make any productive predictions or provide an epistemic strengthening of one of the many theories or weaken the arguments of other theories: all discussions take place either within the framework of science itself, or within the framework of operating with data from related sciences (such as experimental physics), which, so far, have not brought the desired result in discussions around fundamental issues, such as the question of the origin of the universe.for which the logical-methodological programs of post-positivism are unable to make any productive predictions or provide an epistemic strengthening of one of the many theories or weaken the arguments of other theories: all discussions take place either within the framework of science itself, or within the framework of operating with data from related sciences (such as experimental physics), which, so far, have not brought the desired result in discussions around fundamental issues, such as the question of the origin of the universe.did not bring the desired result in discussions around fundamental issues, such as the question of the origin of the universe.did not bring the desired result in discussions around fundamental issues, such as the question of the origin of the universe.
In a similar way, for example, the big bang theory (in several of its variations) and the theory of the emergence of the Universe through "entropy" (exit from the eternal and timeless state of equilibrium, which led to the existence of inhomogeneous forms of matter with different properties) coexist. Proceeding from the fact that both theories are based on facts, which are based on the same data of observation of reality, known to science at the moment, neither theory gets a significant advantage over the other, at least neither of them reaches the possibility finally and irrevocably refute her opponent. But if you take the approaches of the authors of the theory themselves, you can see a very strict difference. The Prigogine-Stengers model of the universe unambiguously denies Hawking's position, whileas model-dependent realism, in fact, recognizes the right to exist for both theories until one of them shows greater efficiency. Disagreement exists within the framework of a scientific dispute, but at the level of methodology and approach to the perception of reality, both physical theories are correct, since they agree with the totality of available data on physical reality. Thus, the criterion for the verification of scientific knowledge and its demarcation from pseudoscientific knowledge is observed by pointing to the main criterion - the criterion of the correlation of theory with the world. And this same verification does not deprive any of the theories that are equally “correct” at the moment. Such an approach is not relativistic, but at the same time it is also not unifying, as a consequence, giving science an adequate right to pluralism that does not fall into subjectivity. This is a pragmatic approachbacked up by critical thinking.
If theory A is more convenient than theory B, but a certain scientist sees in theory B a great potential for scientific progress and uses it in his scientific work, there is no formal right to claim that he is a pseudoscientist (if the theory agrees with observations). The view on the three outcomes for M-theory that we mentioned earlier is built in the same way - due to the fact that each of the possibilities is consistent with the existing observations at the moment, all three views take place and none of them can be called inadequate before until new observations arise. The same holds true for highly abstract studies such as the controversy over superstring theory. In the original interpretation,physicists were forced to increase the number of measurements from four to ten - in these conditions the mathematical apparatus began to work flawlessly, successfully explaining the Standard Model in cosmophysics. Later, a new mathematical apparatus appeared in string theory, in which there are eleven dimensions (in fact, this very interpretation of string theory, which also explains the Standard Model, was called M-theory, the "holy grail" of modern physics). Unfortunately, even the upcoming experiments at the Large Hadron Collider will only be able to indirectly confirm any of the mathematical interpretations of string theory. Until the direct confirmation of this or that version, in theoretical physics several models will have to compete,each of which, within the boundaries of science itself, will be seen as potentially successful in explaining the structure of physical reality.
Sometimes, for more productive conclusions within the framework of the philosophy of science, those who deal with this issue should pay attention not only to scientific theories and speak for scientists about what methods they use (or should use), based only on the considerations of philosophers. The dispute about special areas of human knowledge among scientists who are not full-fledged specialists in these areas can lead the search for truth into a dead corner. Sometimes, you should also listen to what the scientists themselves have to say about their own method. It was interesting to hear Stephen Hawking's own opinion on his own methodological principles and approaches. Model-dependent realism demonstrates an adequate approach to the methodology of cognition and the analysis of scientific judgments within the framework of the physical sciences, since it proceeds from the positions of scientific rationalism,while remaining in balance between the extreme form of unification of scientific knowledge and epistemological relativism. In addition, model-dependent realism confers immunity on scientific claims by consistently including relatively conflicting claims if each is proven based on the same scientific evidence (which, in turn, is reliable scientific observation). Thus, it can be argued that model-dependent realism is a kind of Hegelian “A is not-A” as applied to natural science as a theoretically and practically correct thesis. Based on the dialectical nature of scientific knowledge, its internal contradictions, a more detailed consideration of this approach and its development can be fruitful both for the philosophy of natural science and for the philosophy of science in general.
Mstislav Kazakov
Notes:
[1] - See, for example, his Essay on the Theory of Truth.
[2] - We were inspired by the concept of “micro-revolutions” existing in epistemology.
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