The eightieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II has once again sharpened the debate about how and why it began. And, of course, about the role of the Soviet Union in this.
It is generally accepted that World War II began on September 1, 1939, and hardly anyone would agree to consider it the beginning of another date. But for the sake of truth, it is worth deciding when exactly the world war really began, including because the answers to many other questions of its history depend on it. As you know, on September 1, 1939, only the three largest European powers entered the war, but it did not take on a global character. Not only the Soviet Union, but also the United States refrained from participating in the war in Europe. By the way, none of those who criticize the Soviet Union say a single word of reproach to the United States, and after all, their participation in the war, if they had been involved in it back in 1939, given the economic power of the States, would have given a chance to end the war almost instantly. Therefore, strictly speaking,the war finally became world war in December 1941, when it was already fought on the territory of the USSR and the United States and Japan entered it. Moreover, the States are clearly not of their own free will: Germany declared war on them, and Japan attacked them.
And in 1939, one might say, the Franco-British-German conflict began, in which the fate of Poland was decided. And, consequently, the question of the need for the USSR to participate in this conflict must be resolved taking into account other circumstances, which we will consider below.
A story of three betrayals
But if, nevertheless, we remain on the position that these participating countries are already enough to consider the outbreak of the war as a world war, then it began at the time of the signing of the Munich Pact, when the indicated powers and Italy agreed on the partition of Czechoslovakia. What the weapon did not say does not change the essence of the matter. After all, there are wars of the strong against the weak, when the strong do not need to use weapons. Moreover, Czechoslovakia, which had fallen into isolation (our future allies betrayed it), immediately surrendered, although it had serious opportunities for resistance. Its army was considered one of the strongest in Europe, and on the border with Germany, Czechoslovakia had its own "Maginot Line". France actually trampled on the Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance in case of aggression. And Poland took part in the section and, probably,therefore she refused to let the Red Army go to help Czechoslovakia - so as not to interfere.
Let us ask ourselves a question: what should the Soviet leadership think about the reliability and moral foundations of our future allies, who then, as now, claimed the role of the beacons of democracy if they betrayed the only democracy in Eastern Europe? I'm not talking about the Polish leadership, which took advantage of the situation in order to profit from the victim of betrayal. Moreover, we note that Czechoslovakia was betrayed twice: once in September 1938, when the Munich Agreement was concluded and the Sudetenland was torn away from Czechoslovakia, the second time - in March 1939, when Germany occupied the remnants of the Czech Republic and no one in the countries that signed the Munich agreement a finger on a finger did not hit to save her.
Actually, this is exactly what Joseph Stalin spoke about in the report of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to the XVIII Party Congress in March 1939: “It is naive to read morality to people who do not recognize human morality. Politics is politics, as the old hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It should be noted, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-interference may end in a serious failure for them."
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Of course, there will be people who will say that the moral foundations of the Soviet leadership were even worse. And this is also a fact. But this does not justify the betrayal of Czechoslovakia by our future allies.
But this was not the only act of betrayal, including the declared ideals, by our future allies. Just in 1939, the Spanish Civil War ended. The democratic forces of this country suffered a defeat from the fascists Franco, which had two reasons: the help that was rendered to Franco by the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy, ideologically close to him, and the policy of non-intervention carried out by France and Great Britain, which also prevented the Soviet Union from providing assistance to the republicans. But at the head of the Spanish government were liberals and socialists, who had broad connections among Western liberals and socialists, who succeeded each other at the head of the French governments at that time. French Prime Minister and Socialist leader Leon Blum spoke to Ilya Ehrenburg, with whom he was on friendly terms,that "non-intervention is tearing his soul," but did nothing to save Spain. But this betrayal did not help France either. It eventually turned into her defeat in 1940.
Soviet anti-fascist poster.
And one more touch to the portrait of our future allies - the Evian Conference, convened in 1938 in this French city at the initiative of the President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt to discuss the possibility of providing asylum to refugees from the Third Reich, the vast majority of whom were Jews. The result of the conference was the actual refusal of its participants, representing 33 countries of Europe and Latin America, including the United States, Great Britain and France, to accept these refugees, many of whom were forced to return to their homeland in order to subsequently become victims of the Holocaust. Isn't this a betrayal, and not only of the unfortunate Jews, but also of those ideals that our future allies allegedly guided in their policies?
But all this was preceded by the so-called Pact of Four - an international treaty signed by representatives of Italy, Great Britain, Germany and France on July 15, 1933. That is, just a few months after Hitler came to power, exactly when the Soviet Union began to curtail cooperation with Germany, which was widely practiced during the Weimar Republic. Therefore, when someone writes that the Union was training pilots for Hitler, it is at best out of ignorance. The USSR prepared them for the Weimar Republic, which at that time was the most democratic country in Europe, when no one thought that Hitler would come to power. And they began to curtail cooperation precisely because in the USSR they understood what Nazism was. It is no coincidence that the slogan of the German Communist Party in the last elections to the Reichstag before the Nazis came to power was "Hitler is war." The Germans did not listen to this, but our future allies did not listen either.
After the signing of the Munich Agreement. From left to right: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini.
The main enemy
Moreover, literally until the very moment of the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, fascism, especially German, was viewed in the Soviet Union and throughout the communist movement as the main and most dangerous enemy, while the Soviet leadership did not forget to accuse other political forces of imperialism. In 1935, in a conversation with Romain Rolland, Stalin, answering a question asked to himself, on whose side the Soviet Union will be in the event of a conflict between fascist and bourgeois-democratic states, says: “Naturally, on the side of the bourgeois-democratic governments … Intervening in this way, we seem to be throwing on the scales of the struggle between fascism and anti-fascism, between aggression and non-aggression - an additional weight that outweighs the scales in favor of anti-fascism and non-aggression. " And in the same year 1935,speaking at the VII Congress of the Comintern, Georgy Dimitrov said: "… Fascism in power is an open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist elements of finance capital … Fascism in foreign policy is chauvinism in its crudest form, cultivating zoological hatred against other peoples" … And at the same congress, finally (albeit belated) rejection of the absolutely insane assessment by the Comintern, and hence by the Soviet leadership, of Social Democracy as social fascism took place and the slogan of a united front was put forward, which led to the formation (unfortunately, also belated) governments of the Popular Front with the participation of communists, social democrats and left liberals in Spain and France."… Fascism in power is an open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist elements of finance capital … Fascism in foreign policy is chauvinism in its crudest form, cultivating zoological hatred against other peoples." And at the same congress, finally (albeit belatedly) rejection of the unconditionally insane assessment by the Comintern, and hence by the Soviet leadership, of Social Democracy as social fascism occurred, and the slogan of a united front was put forward, which led to the formation (unfortunately, also belated) governments of the Popular Front with the participation of communists, social democrats and left liberals in Spain and France."… Fascism in power is an open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist elements of finance capital … Fascism in foreign policy is chauvinism in its crudest form, cultivating zoological hatred against other peoples." And at the same congress, finally (albeit belatedly) rejection of the unconditionally insane assessment by the Comintern, and hence by the Soviet leadership, of Social Democracy as social fascism occurred, and the slogan of a united front was put forward, which led to the formation (unfortunately, also belated) governments of the Popular Front with the participation of communists, social democrats and left liberals in Spain and France.cultivating zoological hatred against other peoples”. And at the same congress, finally (albeit belatedly) rejection of the unconditionally insane assessment by the Comintern, and hence by the Soviet leadership, of Social Democracy as social fascism occurred, and the slogan of a united front was put forward, which led to the formation (unfortunately, also belated) governments of the Popular Front with the participation of communists, social democrats and left liberals in Spain and France.cultivating zoological hatred against other peoples”. And at the same congress, finally (albeit belated) rejection of the absolutely insane assessment by the Comintern, and hence by the Soviet leadership, of Social Democracy as Social Fascism occurred, and the slogan of a united front was put forward, which led to the formation (unfortunately, also belated) governments of the Popular Front with the participation of communists, social democrats and left liberals in Spain and France. Social Democrats and Left Liberals in Spain and France. Social Democrats and Left Liberals in Spain and France.
And it must be admitted that the conclusion of the pact after many years of aggressive anti-fascist propaganda waged by the Soviet leadership made a stunning impression on the communist parties of the West and the entire left movement and seriously undermined the Soviet positions, which began to recover only after Germany's attack on the USSR. From the point of view of many of our contemporaries, this may not be so important. But we must remember that, firstly, at that time very many leaders of public opinion, primarily cultural figures, sympathized with communism and such cynicism of Soviet leaders, manifested in the pact, caused them serious psychological trauma, thereby causing damage to the positions of the Soviet Union in public opinion. Moreover, the conclusion of the pact was accompanied by completely inexplicable and completely unnecessary assurances from members of the Soviet leadership of sympathy for the leaders of the Nazi regime. Unfortunately, we must admit that this was very reminiscent of the behavior of the leaders of Western countries during the conclusion of the Munich Treaty, perhaps for the same reasons - fear of war.
After the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union (Molotov Pact - Ribbentrop). From left to right: Ribbentrop, Stalin, Molotov.
Origins
But back to the politics of Western countries. Why did they choose such servile behavior in the face of Nazi Germany and, what can I say, Hitler personally? Although, according to all estimates of the time, not only the combined power of these countries, but even the army of France alone was superior to the forces of Germany. And the possibilities even of Czechoslovakia were very significant. What did the German generals know, who feared this force and were preparing conspiracies against Hitler in anticipation of the impending defeat. The answer is simple: fear of a possible war. Both Great Britain and especially France were deeply wounded by the memories of the past World War I, literally paralyzed by them. It is known that Henri Pétain, when he was tried after the 1941 surrender war, declared at the trial that he did what the French wanted. And the Czechs' refusal to resist was due to the same - the fear of war, which had to be avoided even at the cost of enslavement. It can be said that the main content of the policy of France and Great Britain was "appeasement" of Germany at any cost. This fear of war is understandable, but still it does not justify the behavior of these states.
At the same XVIII Congress, Stalin characterized the policy (note how he called them) "non-aggressive states, primarily England, France, the United States": "… The policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, unleashing a war, and therefore turning it into a world war. The policy of non-interference shows the desire, the desire not to prevent the aggressors from doing their dirty deed, not to prevent, say, Japan from getting involved in the war with China, or even better with the Soviet Union, not to prevent, say, Germany from getting bogged down in European affairs, getting involved in the war with the Soviet Union. Union, let all the participants in the war sink deep into the mud of the war, encourage them in this on the sly, let them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they are sufficiently weak, appear on the stage with fresh forces - to act, of course,in the "interests of peace" and to dictate their conditions to the weakened participants in the war. " That is, France and England were afraid of war; the Soviet leadership was also afraid of war, but also "set up" by future allies.
From the search for an alliance against Germany to a treaty with her
So, the beginning of the trilateral Soviet-Franco-British negotiations in April 1939 on the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty in Moscow was approached with the knowledge of how the Western negotiators betrayed their allies, and with disbelief in the sincerity of their intentions to actually conclude such an agreement, and not roll it up. pushing Germany into war in the east. This distrust was reinforced by the conduct of the French and British negotiators when they refrained from making any clear commitments to the USSR. And this was no coincidence. And it was not a diplomatic game. It is known that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain has repeatedly spoken about his fundamental distrust of the Soviet Union. And although these were not public statements, they were certainly known to the Soviet leadership. The situation was aggravated by the position of Poland, which, on the one hand, refused to allow the introduction of Soviet troops into its territory even if a war broke out, and on the other hand, it tried to negotiate with Germany about a general opposition to the Soviet Union.
Chamberlain wrote in his diaries about the position of the Polish Foreign Minister: “Beck really wanted not to be associated with Russia, not only because the Poles do not like Russians, but also because of the influence on the opinion and policy of Germany. He thought that such an association could still be avoided. I confess that I very much agree with him (!), Because I consider Russia a very unreliable friend, possessing a huge irritating force for others."
All this is well known, but critics of the Soviet-German pact of 1939 for some reason forget about it.
So, the Soviet leadership faced a dilemma. Or continue negotiations with France and Great Britain with unknown results, and in case of non-conclusion of the treaty and the beginning of the inevitable war, face a possible blow from Germany without anyone's support. And there was no confidence that the allies would fulfill their obligations to Poland, as the history of Czechoslovakia showed. Another possibility is to conclude an agreement with Germany and deliberately postpone entry into the war, for which the Union was not ready, and, moreover, taking advantage of the situation, move the border from the centers of the Soviet Union to the west by several hundred kilometers. The Soviet leadership chose the second option, hoping, almost certainly, including the fact that if the allies nevertheless fulfill their obligations to Poland,the war will take on a protracted nature, like the First World War, when trench warfare on the western front lasted all four years of the war. That is, the Soviet leadership tried to play the same game in which it suspected our future allies. Indeed, no one could have imagined the defeat of France in 1940, when the supposedly strongest army in Europe collapsed within a month under the blows of the Germans and France preferred the shame of surrender to resistance.the army of Europe disintegrated within a month under the blows of the Germans and France preferred the shame of surrender to the resistance.the army of Europe disintegrated within a month under the blows of the Germans and France preferred the shame of surrender to the resistance.
Street fighting in Warsaw, 1939.
A devastation that no one expected
So, the agreement with Germany was concluded, Germany attacked Poland. And it turned out that after this attack, the behavior of the allies, who, although they declared war on Germany, made practically no serious attempts to somehow indicate their desire to intervene in the course of the war, confirmed the suspicions of the Soviet leadership that Poland's allies had decided to betray Poland, as they betrayed Czechoslovakia. And, as one might assume, they expected that Hitler would continue to move east. A "strange war" began, which lasted until the very defeat of Poland. The Polish press, which at the beginning of the war enthusiastically welcomed the declaration of war on Germany by its allies, by the end of the campaign was full of acrimonious caricatures of their behavior.
And the "strange war" continued for some time, until Germany decided to end it and began an offensive on France on May 10, 1940, which ended with the defeat of the latter and the signing of the surrender on June 22. Stalin's calculation for a protracted war in the west did not come true, and this can be considered his main miscalculation. But this was a miscalculation, first of all, by France itself. And who in the world even foresaw such an ending? And Germany added to the capabilities of its industry the capabilities of the French, Polish and Czech.
Blitzkrieg
Let's run a little ahead. Discussing our defeats in 1941, critics of the Soviet military leadership for some reason do not think about a certain similarity between the defeats of the French and Soviet troops at the initial stage of the war, which became both final for France and their reasons. But there was only one reason - the invention by the German military and personally by Guderian of the so-called blitzkrieg, the tactics of using high-speed tanks in cooperation with motorized infantry and aviation. The famous Russian historian Sergei Nefedov describes this military invention as follows: “Guderian's main idea was to create motorized corps: in them, fast tanks were accompanied by equally fast infantry - motorized infantry, moving in armored personnel carriers or cars. A huge role in the blitzkrieg was assigned to the interaction of tanks and aircraft;attack aircraft had to constantly accompany the convoy of tanks and clear the way for it. The Blitzkrieg assumed that tank columns would suddenly collapse into narrow areas of the enemy defenses, break them open and enter the operational space. They move swiftly along the roads behind enemy lines and close their pincers in the depths of enemy territory. Panzer divisions are followed like thread by needle by motorized divisions in automobiles; “Panzergrenadiers” of these divisions create the initial encirclement front. For the “panzergrenadiers” the main thing is to withstand the approach of the infantry divisions. The infantrymen who arrived in time are replacing the motorized corps, which rush into the interior of the country, where the main enemy forces are no longer there and only a few reserves can resist them. The encircled main forces at this time are fighting in agony: they are running out of ammunition, fuel,food, communications are broken, the enemy soldiers are in panic - and after a while they are forced to surrender. By the way, the panic that Nefedov writes about, and the demoralization caused by it, is one of the reasons for the mass capture of Soviet soldiers at this stage of the war.
Moreover, already in the course of the hostilities, it became clear that the one who starts first obviously wins. Therefore, the "strange war" was just a gift for the German generals. Note that there was a man in France who understood this - General De Gaulle, but no one listened to him. And the blitzkrieg ends only when it encounters obstacles in the form of pre-created defensive structures (which, however, can be bypassed, as happened with the Maginot Line), natural conditions, in case of difficulties with logistics and losses, which are inevitable in any case. It was the combination of the last three factors that took place on the approaches to Moscow. But this is by the way. After all, in two years we are waiting for the eightieth anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and another intensification of discussions about its course and the reasons for our defeats at the first stage.
There is a point of view that the USSR, using the pretext, had to start a war with Germany itself and thus get the advantages of a first strike. But, firstly, the supporters of this position, most of those who criticize the Soviet leadership for the pact, probably in the event of a first strike from the USSR, would be among the first to accuse the Soviet leadership of unleashing a war, simply because any step he takes is critically evaluated by these people; secondly, as we have already said, the Soviet leadership hoped that Germany would get bogged down in France and, based on these assumptions, there was no point in starting a war.
It is also known that Stalin liked to refer to the example of Bismarck, who warned the future leaders of Germany against a war on two fronts and against a war with Russia. Before the war, Bismarck's book "Thoughts and Memories" was published in three volumes, including these warnings, edited by the famous Soviet historian-Germanist Arkady Yerusalimsky and with his introductory article. In the text and in the margins of the manuscript of this article, which Molotov had instructed Yerusalimsky to write personally, Stalin made numerous remarks and corrections, with which Yerusalimsky was introduced by summoning him to the Central Committee. It seems that Stalin also relied on Hitler's common sense. And in this he was just as wrong as our future allies.
Surrendering French soldiers.
"Partition" of Poland
Critics of Soviet policy during this period especially emphasize the so-called partition of Poland, which is seen as complicity in the aggression of Germany against this country, and as a result of a secret conspiracy between Germany and the USSR. Let us leave aside the accusations of collusion - such agreements are only secret.
Let's try to answer two questions. First, could war have been avoided if the Soviet Union had not concluded a treaty with Germany? And secondly, did he have any other way out, regardless of the circumstances of the start of the war, except to occupy part of Poland?
Answering the first question, let us note that many believe that Hitler was afraid of a war on two fronts, and if the USSR had concluded an alliance with Western countries, he would not have dared to attack Poland. But he himself had already driven himself into a corner with his demands to Poland to include Danzig in Germany and liquidate the "Polish corridor"; deviation from these requirements, firstly, was not in the style of the Fuehrer, and secondly, it would mean for him a complete loss of face, because this was one of his main promises when he came to power. Therefore, Hitler would hardly have backed down. Moreover, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, despite the fact that Poland refused to let Soviet troops into its territory, was simply impossible. It seems that the Soviet leadership proceeded precisely from this perspective.
And we must not forget that in the book Mein Kampf (1925–1926) Hitler proclaimed the conquest of lands in eastern Europe in order to expand the living space for the Germans as his main goal, and this could only be achieved by starting with Poland.
When answering the second question, one must understand the dilemma that faced the Soviet leadership: to allow the occupation of all of Poland by German troops or to occupy part of Polish territory in one way or another, meaning the need to move the new border with Germany several hundred kilometers away from the centers of the Soviet Union. And if you still go for the occupation of a part of Poland, then, given the inevitability of German aggression against this country, is it not better to come to an agreement with Germany? It sounds extremely cynical. But let us be shown the idealists among the leaders of the European countries of that time.
Polish poster "England - this is your handiwork."
As Churchill wrote, “In favor of the Soviets, it must be said that it was vital for the Soviet Union to push as far west as possible the starting positions of the German armies so that the Russians had time and could muster forces from all parts of their colossal empire. In the minds of the Russians, with a red-hot iron, the catastrophes suffered by their armies in 1914, when they rushed to the offensive against the Germans, were still imprinted with a red-hot iron. And now their borders were much farther east than during the first war. They needed to occupy the Baltic states and most of Poland by force or deception before they were attacked. If their policy was coldly calculating, it was also at that moment highly realistic."
Did the Soviet leadership harbor illusions about Hitler's ultimate goals? Of course not. This is evidenced by the continued intensive preparations for the war.
Parade of German troops in occupied Paris.
Consequences of the pact
Critics of the pact include among its negative consequences the Soviet Union's supply of large quantities of raw materials to Germany, which allowed Germany to mitigate the consequences of the blockade that the United States and Great Britain tried to impose on it. But much less attention is paid to what supplies the USSR received from Germany. And they were extremely important for strengthening the defense capability of the USSR. Why Hitler agreed to this is a separate question. Most likely, he proceeded from the fact that the Union is so weak that nothing will help him.
In particular, the USSR received from Germany hundreds of types of the latest models of military equipment and industrial products. For example, samples of the latest aircraft and a variety of aviation equipment. The unfinished cruiser "Luttsov" and equipment for the navy were received. Samples of artillery and tank weapons. Equipment for the oil refining industry, nickel, lead, copper smelting, chemical, cement, steel wire plants. And much more*. Could the USSR have neglected these opportunities?
But most importantly, the pact provided the Soviet Union with two additional years of relative calm and the advancement of its borders to the west, which played a significant role in 1941 near Moscow, oddly enough for someone it sounds. Thus, the famous Anglo-American historian Adam Tuz in his already classic work “The Price of Destruction. The creation and destruction of the Nazi economy recognizes that to a large extent the defeat of the German troops near Moscow was, among other reasons, a consequence of the difficulties of logistics between the advancing army and the main supply depots located in Poland, and 200-300 kilometers added to this shoulder in as a result of the pact, played an important role in this.
And the occupation of the Baltic States made it possible to avoid the immediate capture of Leningrad, from which to the Estonian border several tens of kilometers. Probably, not everyone in the Baltics enjoyed it, but the USSR had little choice: either to allow the capture of the Baltics by the Germans, or to occupy it themselves. Moreover, before the eyes of the Soviet leadership there was an example of the same Belgium, which the Germans occupied, regardless of its neutrality.
Of course, it sounds cynical that a great power, in the name of its own security, neglects the interests of small countries. But this is the cynicism of history. And isn't it not only in those difficult times, but even in all the post-war decades, we do not constantly observe the same attitude of one well-known power in relation to other countries, which, as they believe, are in the sphere of their interests, even if they are on the other side? the globe?
And the seizure of Leningrad was fraught with cutting off the connection between the centers of the USSR and the most important northern ports: Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, through which the lion's share of aid from our allies came.
When the Germans nevertheless closed the blockade ring around Leningrad, they were no longer up to it. They were forced to abandon all reserves at Moscow.
Concluding this essay, we can say: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which, by the way, is officially called the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, is not something to be particularly proud of. But there is no need to be ashamed of it: it was an ordinary agreement in the style of Realpolitik, which was inherent in all states of that time. All future opponents of Germany were afraid of war, everyone thought how to avoid it even at the expense of others, and, as we have shown, they were ready to betray even their closest allies, and everyone underestimated Hitler's adventurism, which Realpolitik just did not suit. But the pact helped the Soviet Union, and therefore, it was beneficial to our country. And this is the main thing in his assessment.
Author: Alexander Mechanic
