War Of 1812. The Armies Of Russia And France Could Not Fit At The Same Time On The Smolensk Road - Alternative View

War Of 1812. The Armies Of Russia And France Could Not Fit At The Same Time On The Smolensk Road - Alternative View
War Of 1812. The Armies Of Russia And France Could Not Fit At The Same Time On The Smolensk Road - Alternative View

Video: War Of 1812. The Armies Of Russia And France Could Not Fit At The Same Time On The Smolensk Road - Alternative View

Video: War Of 1812. The Armies Of Russia And France Could Not Fit At The Same Time On The Smolensk Road - Alternative View
Video: Наполеон в России. Вторжение 1812 года 2024, September
Anonim

I decided to digress a little from the topic of the death of the Dyatlov group. If anyone is curious, I propose to take a look at my last article on this topic “The mystery of the traces of the Dyatlov group. They didn't go without shoes."

Today I decided to return to the topic of the mythological war of 1812 between Russia and Napoleon. Why do I call it mythological? Because the description of this event is full of obvious myths!

Who first looked at my blog I advise you to read the article “The mythical war of 1812. Was Napoleon in Russia? Part One ", and" The Mythical War of 1812. What were the horses fed with? " to get an understanding of the basis of my conclusions.

In the comments, the sofa strategists, of course, began to correct me that Napoleon went to Moscow, because it was inexpedient to go with the whole army in the direction of St. Petersburg due to the extremely meager surrounding nature and it was difficult to feed the horses and soldiers. But on the way to Moscow, the local peasants were simply heaps of food.

But if Napoleon went to St. Petersburg, where ALL Russian power was at that time and managed to capture it, then the war could have ended there. Then just a victorious march to go to Moscow. If there was a desire. But strategically, Napoleon did not need Moscow at all, its capture did not solve anything, as it was proved later. At least that's what historians teach us. I have no reason to think of Napoleon as mentally retarded. Therefore, he was clearly aware of the whole senselessness of the campaign against Moscow if he wanted to defeat Tsar Alexander the First. And I have serious doubts that his task was to win the war with Alexander the First. But I will not get ahead of myself, I will write about it another time.

Let us return to providing Napoleon's army with food taken from the peasants.

We are convinced that during Napoleon's attack, the peasants actively opposed him in the form of partisan detachments and setting fire to crops in the fields. Naturally, the grass in the meadows should have also burned. I don't think they left hay either. What did Napoleon's food detachments take from the peasants? I repeat, once again that the horse's diet must include oats and carrots. Where did you get it?

Historians are convincing us that partisan detachments of peasants inflicted serious damage on the supply of Napoleon's army, practically cutting off the convoys with provisions and destroying them. And in such conditions of practically hungry existence, Napoleon's army reaches Moscow with a confident march - a throw. Extremely unlike emaciated soldiers riding half-starved horses.

Promotional video:

Let's go back to the composition of Napoleon's army. Let's see how many troops participated in the Battle of Borodino.

Let's take the average value of the French troops equal to 130 thousand soldiers and officers, including about 70 thousand horses in the cavalry and about 20 thousand horses, which dragged the cannons.

From Smolensk they moved along the Old Smolensk road. In fact, there was no other road there. All around the forest. You can't go beyond the roads.

What was the width of the carriageway? Take five meters, I don't think there was an autobahn at that time. How many horses will fit in width? No more than three and that will be enough for them. How much space on the road does a horse take in length? You can safely take a value of at least 4 meters. So that the horse does not rest on the ass in front of him and does not get the tail in the face.

Simple arithmetic begins. If 90 thousand horses are put in three rows, then the length of this column will be equal to 120 kilometers. If in this way we calculate the length of a column of soldiers in the amount of about 50 thousand people, then we can add at least another 20 kilometers. Let's add here the length of more than 10 thousand guns and carts from the convoy.

Even such a cursory and approximate calculation will give a value equal to 300 kilometers. Now let us recall that the Russian army of approximately the same size is retreating along the same road towards Borodino. Perhaps with a smaller baggage. Let's allocate 200 kilometers for it.

We get a distance of 500 kilometers, provided that the vanguard of the French troops rests against the rear of the Russian army in the literal sense.

Today the distance from Smolensk to Borodino is 277 kilometers.

Image
Image

That is, when the vanguard of the Russian army came to Borodino, more than half of Napoleon's army simply physically could not get out on the Smolensk road. There wouldn't be enough space.

Not to mention the fact that, according to any estimate, 300 thousand soldiers and officers of both armies could not fit on the field near Borodino.

And this is one more proof of the clear mythologization of the Great Patriotic War of 1812.

Who needed it? Of course, the Romanov dynasty. It is common for kings to invent great victories that have never happened before. As, for example, the great naval battle of Peter the Great at the mouth of the Neva, which was frankly invented, and rather clumsy.

Was Napoleon in Russia? Perhaps there was, but not in the quality and quantity as we are told. I will also write about this later.

Recommended: