On both sides of the Atlantic, Britain's decision to leave the European Union has caused panicky hand-wringing and gnashing of teeth among the foreign policy elite, who believe that Brexit marks the end of post-war liberal internationalism. Of course, internal local forces in Europe and the United States (a populist response to the elite-driven globalization process) threaten the maintenance of liberal internationalism, which, however, weakened for much deeper reasons.
Experts call the liberal international order, in fact, Pax Americana, created after 1945 and based on the dominant position of the United States. In 1945 (the first episode of the United States' unipolar advantage in the world), the United States produced half of the world's industrial production, controlled two-thirds of the world's gold and foreign exchange reserves, and possessed a huge military potential. The United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. It was this dizzying combination of military, financial and economic capabilities that made it possible to create security and economic institutions - the UN, NATO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Association, which formed the basis of the post-war order (and still maintain it) and allowed to restore the economies of Western Europe and Japan,and also helped stabilize and restore peace in Europe and East Asia.
As researchers of world politics emphasize, after World War II, the United States occupied a dominant position, in other words, performed the function of hegemony. Even during the Cold War, US dominance was not seriously threatened. With the lack of economic and technological capabilities to close the gap with the United States, the Soviet Union acted more like a Potemkin superpower than a real one. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991 led to an unprecedented geopolitical rise in the United States, sowing in some heads a hasty thought ("end of history") that liberal internationalism has become an integral part of international politics.
Now we understand that this was an illusion. Liberal internationalism is collapsing due to global redistribution of power, as is the foundation of American power, the foundation of Pax Americana. In fact, America's relative potential has been declining since the 1960s. The significance of this process was not clear because in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s America's advantage was diminishing at the expense of allies in Europe and Japan (although in the 1980s, Japan's economic growth triggered - a false - alarm that Tokyo will shift the United States to the position of the world leader). The abrupt disintegration of the USSR also made it impossible to notice the macro-historical forces that were destroying the foundations of American domination.
Some analysts, David Calleo, Robert Gilpin and Paul Kennedy as the most prominent representatives, have really understood the nature of the geo-economic changes taking place. Kennedy's bestseller, 1987's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, sparked controversy about the relative loss of US influence. Kennedy made two key statements. First, since the beginning of the existence of the modern international system (1500), all superpowers have had a similar life cycle: they emerged, rose, reached the apogee of their power, and then experienced a relative decline. Secondly, in this regard, not a single superpower (even the most powerful) could maintain its leading position forever. Kennedy's thought that the U. S. has no immunity in this rise and fall,caused a furor among the American foreign policy establishment. The controversy over the collapse of the United States, provoked by Kennedy, was abruptly interrupted as soon as the USSR (the US geopolitical rival) collapsed, as well as after the collapse of the Japanese economy (the US economic rival).
The most powerful challenge, Pax Americana, was already being prepared in the 1980s. with the beginning of China's economic recovery. Deng Xiaoping initiated radical reforms that led to the rapid transformation of China into a center of economic influence. China has begun to develop at a breathtaking pace. Since 2010, it has overtaken the United States as the leader in global trade and industrial production. In 2014, according to the IMF and the World Bank, China overtook the United States to become the world's largest economy (measured in purchasing power parity). Meanwhile, America is preoccupied with addressing its domestic problems, including an aging population, stagnant productivity and polarization in politics.
The US expects a fiscal crisis in early 2020 and beyond. Long-term forecasts suggest that America's GDP will grow by only 2% per year. China's GDP has already surpassed that of the United States, measured by purchasing power parity, and it is only a matter of time before China overtakes the United States in GDP at market exchange rates.
Of course, China is facing economic obstacles now and will face constraints such as an aging population and environmental degradation. In many ways, China's economy lags behind America in the quality of economic and technological power. However, this gap is getting smaller. China's economic growth is changing the geopolitical balance of China and America. This is why liberal internationalism is under threat. China (and other nations) are rising, and America's relative power is falling. This is part of a broader picture: the axis of global power is shifting from the Euro-Atlantic to Asia, this process of power shifting under the influence of powerful, objective forces of historical change.
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English scientist E. H. EH Carr examined the dynamics leading to the decline of US-led liberal internationalism. In his classic study of international relations in the interwar period, The Twenty Years Crisis, Carr demonstrated that the geopolitical crisis of the 1930s. was caused by the growing gap between the international order established by the Treaty of Versailles after World War I and the changes taking place in the real balance of power in Europe. He made two key geopolitical statements. First, the international order reflects the balance of power that existed when it was established and the interests of the dominant states that created it. Second, international order is never maintained after significant changes have occurred in the balance of power that existed when it was established. Carr warned that emerging nations and recessionary advocates of the status quo are pitted against each other. The states that have established the dominant international order love the status quo because it gives them privileges. Developing countries, however, are not connected with the existing order and are seeking to redefine it in order to acquire prestige, status and geopolitical conditions corresponding to their growing power.
The most forward-thinking defenders of liberal internationalism (such as John Ikenberry) acknowledge that the era of American leadership is coming to an end. However, they point to two reasons why the United States may maintain some sort of zombie hegemony in which the rules, norms and institutions of Pax Americana can survive in the face of the collapse of American power. First, they argue that the international order is "based on rules" that benefit all states that act on these principles. One key point is not taken into account here: in international politics, who rules dictates the rules. Of course, the benefits of the post-war international order spread everywhere. However, the United States had the greatest benefit, which was Washington's goal in developing the post-war system.
Second, it is argued that China will not threaten or overturn the liberal international order because, geopolitically and economically, it arose within that system. China did rise under the Pax Americana, but it did not become a superpower to maintain that order. China's growing power will do what developing countries always do: reform the international order in accordance with its own interests, norms and values, and not with the interests of the United States. If Carr was alive to this day, he would not be surprised that China is challenging Pax Americana in East Asia to pursue its interests in regional leadership. Likewise, in Eastern Europe, Carr would understand why Moscow is trying to assert its influence in regions that (back in tsarist times) were part of the Russian sphere of influence. He would understandwhy China and other developing countries are trying to reshape international institutions and rules, correlating them with the realities of developing countries and constructing an alternative international order that exists in parallel with Pax Americana. The US will have to adapt to the reality that the balance of power that has supported liberal internationalism has fallen. If the US does not succeed, and they insist on preserving the fading post-war status quo, they risk the possibility of an accelerated economic recession at home, and the emergence of serious conflicts abroad. The US will have to adapt to the reality that the balance of power that has supported liberal internationalism has fallen. If the US does not succeed, and they insist on preserving the fading post-war status quo, they risk the possibility of an accelerated economic recession at home, and the emergence of serious conflicts abroad. The US will have to adapt to the reality that the balance of power that has supported liberal internationalism has fallen. If the US does not succeed, and they insist on preserving the fading post-war status quo, they risk the possibility of an accelerated economic recession at home, and the emergence of serious conflicts abroad.