On April 16, 1945, the last, decisive military operation of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War began. The ultimate goal is Berlin. It turned into a race of fronts, illuminated by the searchlights of Georgy Zhukov.
When did the war end?
The operation to capture Berlin could have been launched by the Red Army in early February 1945, at least so the Allies believed. Western experts believe that the Kremlin has postponed the offensive on Berlin in order to drag out hostilities. Many Soviet commanders also spoke about the possibility of the Berlin operation in February 1945. Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov writes:
“As for the risk, in a war you often have to take it. But in this case, the risk was well founded."
The Soviet leadership deliberately delayed the offensive on Berlin. There were objective reasons for this. The situation of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts after the Vistula-Oder operation was complicated by the lack of ammunition and fuel. The artillery and aviation of both fronts was so weakened that the troops were unable to advance. After postponing the Berlin operation, the headquarters concentrated the main efforts of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts on defeating the enemy's East Pomeranian and Silesian groupings. At the same time, it was planned to carry out the necessary regrouping of troops and restore the supremacy of Soviet aviation in the air. It took two months.
Trap for Stalin
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At the end of March, Joseph Stalin decided to accelerate the offensive on Berlin. What prompted him to force events? There were growing fears in the Soviet leadership that the Western powers were ready to start separate negotiations with Germany and end the war "politically". Rumors reached Moscow that Heinrich Himmler was seeking to establish contacts with representatives of the Allies through the vice-president of the Red Cross, Folke Bernadotte, and SS Oberstgruppenführer Karl Wolf began negotiations in Switzerland with Allen Dulles on a possible partial surrender of German troops in Italy.
Stalin was even more alarmed by the message from the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Western powers, Dwight Eisenhower, on March 28, 1945, that he was not going to take Berlin. Earlier, Eisenhower never informed Moscow about his strategic plans, but here he went into the open. Stalin, expecting a possible betrayal on the part of the Western powers, indicated in his reply that the areas of Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden and Vienna-Linz-Regensburg should become the junction of the Western and Soviet troops. Berlin, according to Stalin, has lost its former strategic importance. He assured Eisenhower that the Kremlin was sending secondary forces to the Berlin sector. The second half of May was called the potential date for the start of the main attack of the Soviet troops to the Western powers.
Whoever came first, to Berlin
According to Stalin's estimates, the Berlin operation should have begun no later than April 16 and completed within 12-15 days. The question of who should capture the Hitlerite capital remained open: Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and the 1st Belorussian Front or Ivan Stepanovich Konev and the 1st Ukrainian Front.
“Whoever breaks through first, let him take Berlin,” Stalin declared to his generals. The third commander of the Soviet armed forces - Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky and his 2nd Belorussian Front were to advance north of Berlin, reach the sea coast and defeat the enemy grouping there. Rokossovsky, like the rest of the officers of his regiment, was annoyed that he would not be able to take part in the capture of Berlin. But there were objective reasons for this, their front was not ready for an offensive operation.
Zhukov's optical "miracle weapon"
The operation began at five o'clock in the morning (three o'clock in the morning Berlin time) with artillery preparation. Twenty minutes later, the searchlights were turned on, and the infantry, supported by tanks and self-propelled guns, rose to the attack. With their powerful light, more than 100 anti-aircraft searchlights were supposed to blind the enemy and provide a night attack until dawn. But in practice they have had the opposite effect. Colonel-General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov later recalled that it was impossible to observe the battlefield from his observation post.
The reason was unfavorable foggy weather and a cloud of smoke and dust formed after the artillery barrage, which even the light of searchlights could not penetrate. Some of them were faulty, the rest were turned on and off. This was extremely disturbing for the Soviet soldiers. Many of them stopped at the first natural obstacle, waiting for dawn to cross a stream or channel. "Inventions" by Georgy Zhukov, previously successfully used in the defense of Moscow, under Berlin, instead of benefit brought only harm.
Commander's "oversight"
The commander of the 1st Byelorussian Army, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, believed that during the first days of the operation he did not make a single mistake. The only oversight, in his opinion, consisted in underestimating the complex nature of the terrain in the Seelow Heights, where the main defensive forces and equipment of the enemy were located. The battles for these heights cost Zhukov one or two days of battle. These heights slowed down the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front, increasing Konev's chances of being the first to enter Berlin. But, as Zhukov assumed, the Seelow Heights were soon taken by the morning of April 18, and it became possible to use all the tank formations of the 1st Belorussian formation on a wide front. The way to Berlin was opened, and a week later Soviet soldiers stormed the capital of the Third Reich.