In the late 70s. BC e. the internal situation in Italy was extremely tense. The unsuccessful attempt by Lepidus to overthrow the rule of the Sullans further exacerbated the contradictions. The most revolutionary element at that time was the slaves. In those days, as the Italic grassroots democracy, which had experienced a series of severe defeats in previous years, was already significantly weakened, the numerous slaves of Italy had not yet emerged independently. Individual outbreaks were of a local nature and were quickly suppressed.
On the other hand, during the 80s BC. e. slaves were systematically involved in the actions of the Italian democracy, in particular, in the uprising of the Italics and in the Marian movement. This served as a wonderful school of political education for them: the slaves saw that in the end they were only an instrument in the hands of certain factions of the ruling class. The class consciousness of the Italic slaves grew. The most developed and brave of them came to the idea that only on their own they could achieve liberation. Such was the setting and preconditions for the largest uprising of ancient slaves that history knows.
Sources on the history of the Spartak movement are extremely scarce. These are several pages in Appian's Civil Wars and Crassus's Plutarch biography. The main source - The History of Sallust - is almost entirely lost. Other sources (periochus of the 95-97th books of Livy, Flor, Orosius, Valley Paterculus, etc.) are very short or do not have an independent meaning. Therefore, the history of the uprising of Spartacus can be restored only in the most general terms, and we cannot answer many basic questions.
In particular, we hardly know the biography of Spartacus. We know that he came from Thrace. From the cursory indications of Appian and Florus, it can be concluded that Spartacus had previously served in the Roman auxiliary troops and was sold into slavery for desertion. Thanks to his physical strength, he fell into gladiators. The sources emphasize the education, intelligence and humanity of Spartacus.
The beginning of the uprising of Spartacus
In 73 BC. e. we find him in Capua, in one of the gladiatorial schools. At the beginning of the summer, about 200 gladiators conspired that, apparently, was revealed. But 60-70 people managed to escape from the school and, armed with anything, fled from the city. At their head were Spartacus and the Gauls Crixus and Enomai. On the way, the fugitives seized a transport with gladiatorial weapons. They left for Vesuvius and began to raid the area from there.
Spartak's detachment grew rapidly at the expense of escaped slaves and farm laborers from neighboring estates. An important propaganda role was played by the fact that Spartak divided the spoils equally among all.
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At first, the Roman authorities did not attach much importance to this incident, since such cases often occurred in Italy. A small detachment sent from Capua was defeated. Finally, a real weapon was in the hands of the slaves, for which they enthusiastically changed the hated weapons of the gladiators.
In Rome, they began to worry. A detachment of 3,000 men was sent against Spartacus under the command of the propraetor Guy Clodius. Not wanting to waste his energy on the storming of Vesuvius, Clodius camped at the foot of the mountain in the place where the only convenient descent from the top was located. But Spartacus outwitted the Romans. From the vines of wild grapes, the rebellious slaves weaved ropes, with the help of which they descended the steep slopes of the mountain and suddenly attacked Clodius. The Romans fled, and their camp fell to the slaves.
This was the first major victory of Spartacus, which was soon followed by others. In the autumn, the praetor Publius Varinius was sent to Campania with two legions. His troops were not first-class. Spartacus alternately defeated both Varinius's legates, and then himself, while even capturing the praetor's lictors and his horse.
These events proved to be a defining moment in the course of the Spartacus uprising. It now covered almost the entire south of the peninsula: Campania, Lucania and, possibly, Apulia. Many cities were captured and devastated. Sallust talks about the mass extermination of slave owners and the inevitable atrocities committed by slaves who escaped to freedom. Spartacus tried to prevent these unnecessary excesses, which only demoralized the slaves. He devoted all his energy to organizing the army and creating discipline in it.
Spartacus's army now numbered about 70,000 people. Slaves were hastily making weapons. Created cavalry.
The question arose, what to do next? We can say with complete categoricality that during this period Spartacus had a certain plan: to collect as many slaves as possible and bring them out of Italy through the Eastern Alps. Probably, Spartacus understood the complexity of the armed struggle with Rome and settled on the most realistic of all possible options. Once outside Italy, the slaves thereby became free and could return to their native places. We have no grounds to assume that Spartak had some calculations for the further development of the struggle behind this plan.
The Roman government, in the end, realized the extent of the danger and moved the troops of both consuls of 72 BC against the slaves. BC - Lucius Gellius and Gnaeus Cornelius Lentula. It was at this critical moment that discord began among the rebels. They led to the fact that most of the slaves (about 20,000 people) under the command of Crixus separated from the main forces and began to act independently. Gellius' assistant, the praetor Quintus Arrius, attacked the detached troops and defeated them near Mount Gargana in Apulia. Crixus was killed in the process.
On what basis did the disagreements arise? Some sources (Sallust, Livy, Plutarch) say that the troops of Crixus consisted of Gauls and Germans. If so, then it is possible to assume that the differences were due to the heterogeneous tribal composition of the rebels. But this is only one side of the matter. A more significant role was played by programmatic and tactical differences. Crixus and his comrades were supporters of more aggressive offensive operations and, probably, did not want to leave Italy. Sallust remarks in one of the fragments: “And the slaves, who were arguing over the plan for further action, were close to internecine war. Crixus and the Gauls and Germans of the same tribe with him wanted to meet (the Romans) and join the battle with them."
Perhaps Crixus was also supported by that free poor who joined the uprising and who had no point in leaving Italy.
The split and defeat of Crixus temporarily weakened the forces of Spartacus's rebellion, but not to such an extent as to change the intended plan. Skillfully maneuvering in the Apennines, Spartacus inflicted a series of defeats on Lentulus, Hellius and Arrius, escaped the encirclement that the Romans were preparing for him, and moved north.
Spartacus's forces increased as he succeeded. According to Appian, his army reached 120,000. Moving north, Spartacus reached the town of Mutina, under which he defeated the troops of the proconsul Gaius Cassius Longinus, the governor of Cisalpine Gaul.
Now the way to the Alps was open, and Spartacus's plan seemed to be close to implementation. And at that moment he turns back south. Why? We cannot find a completely accurate answer to this question in the sources, although the general picture is completely clear. After the brilliant victories of Spartacus, the mood in his troops improved so much that there could be no question of leaving Italy at that time. The slaves demanded from their leader to lead them to Rome, and Spartacus was forced to obey. It can hardly be allowed that, with his intelligence and composure, he let himself be carried away by the general mood and changed his basic plan of leaving Italy. But at that moment he lost control of his undisciplined army.
But Spartak still did not go to Rome. He understood the impossibility of capturing the city, which at one time neither Hannibal Barca nor the Samnites could take. In addition, the Roman government in the fall of 72 BC. e. mobilized all available forces to fight. The Senate ordered the consuls to cease hostilities against Spartacus. Praetor 72 BC was appointed commander-in-chief with the rank of proconsul. e. M. Licinius Crassus. He was given a large army of 8 legions, though far from first-class. The soldiers were already demoralized in advance by the panic that the unheard-of successes of the Spartacus uprising were driving the Romans.
Crassus, apparently, wanted to surround the slaves on the border of Picena. His legate Mummy, sent bypassing with two legions, attacked the army of slaves against the orders of Crassus and was defeated. Many of the soldiers threw down their weapons and fled. This allowed Spartak to break through to the south.
Crassus decided to restore discipline in his troops with severe measures. In relation to those who escaped, he applied decimation, an ancient punishment that had not been applied for a long time in the Roman army: one in ten was executed.
Spartacus, meanwhile, went through Lucania to Bruttius. For some time he stayed in the city of Furia and its environs. Many merchants came here to the slaves, buying up the loot from them. Spartak forbade his people to take gold and silver from buyers. Slaves had to exchange their spoils only for iron and copper, which they needed to make weapons.
Crassus followed Spartacus's army. The latter had a new plan: to transfer part of his troops to Sicily and "resume the war of the Sicilian slaves, which had only recently been extinguished and required a little combustible material to break out again." He conspired with the pirates, who promised to deliver vehicles to him. But the pirates deceived him, probably bribed by the governor of Sicily, Verres. In addition, the coast of the island was heavily guarded. Attempts to cross the strait on rafts made of logs and barrels failed.
Suppression of the uprising of Spartacus
While Spartacus tried in vain to penetrate Sicily, Crassus approached from the north. He decided to take advantage of the nature of the area and lock up the army of slaves on the southern tip of the peninsula. For this, he built "from sea to sea" a fortified line 300 stadia long (about 55 km), consisting of a deep and wide ditch and rampart. The first attempt to break through ended in failure. But then on one stormy and snowy night (winter 72/71 BC) Spartacus managed to force the fortified line with a skillful maneuver. He again found himself in Lucania.
Crassus despaired of coping with the uprising on his own and demanded help. The Senate sent an order to Gnaeus Pompey, who had done away with the Sertorians, to hasten his return to Italy. Another order was sent to Marcus Licinius Lucullus in Macedonia to land at Brundisium. Around Spartak, the ring of government troops began to narrow. And again, at this crucial moment, as a year and a half ago, divisions intensified among the slaves. Again, the Gauls and Germans separated from the main forces, led by their leaders Cast and Hannik. Those who separated were soon defeated by Crassus.
If at the beginning of the uprising of Spartacus, the death of Krix's detachment did not have a big impact on further events, now the situation was different. The main reserves of slaves who could join the movement were exhausted, and the uprising was coming to an end. Under these conditions, the death of several tens of thousands of soldiers could play a fatal role.
Spartacus rushed to Brundisium. Did he want to cross to the Balkan Peninsula in this way and carry out his old plan? He could hardly seriously hope for it. If he could not find the means to cross the narrow Strait of Messana, then what hopes could he have for crossing the Adriatic Sea? And yet Spartacus wanted to try, contrary to the arguments of reason. After all, other ways were still closed to him. But when he approached Brundisium, he learned that Lucullus was already there. Then Spartacus turned back and went to meet Crassus.
In the spring of 71 BC. e. the last battle took place in Puglia. 60,000 slaves fell under the leadership of Spartacus. The body of Spartacus could not be found. The Romans lost only 1,000 people. 6,000 captive slaves were crucified on crosses along the road from Capua to Rome. But for a long time in the south, individual groups hiding in the mountains continued to fight against the Roman troops. Some of the slaves fled to the pirates. A large detachment of 5,000 men managed to break through to the north. There they were met by Pompey and destroyed every one.
Spartak was a talented organizer and a major commander. From the rebellious slaves, he organized an exemplary army for that time, whose strength grew continuously in the process of struggle. The uprising of Spartacus differs from other uprisings of slaves not only in its organization, but also in the exceptional mobilization of all possibilities. The army of slaves included all types of troops of that time: heavy and light infantry and cavalry. The armament of slaves was slightly inferior to the armament of the Roman legionaries.
An army of slaves was trained to fight. Spartacus tried not to restore civilians against the rebels. Everything necessary for the army, taken from the population, was paid for. This policy provided Spartacus with a more or less reliable rear. The slave army's strategy was bold and determined. The slaves acted, as a rule, offensively, without losing the initiative from their hands, beat the enemy in parts, concentrating in each case superior forces against him. Each combat enterprise was carefully prepared. Spartak always tried to hit the enemy unexpectedly. Technically, the insurgents were also offensive. Particularly of great interest is their breakthrough of the fortified enemy line.
Thus ended the uprising of Spartacus, which shook Italy for 18 months. Despite its enormous scale, it was suppressed, like all previous slave uprisings. The reasons for his defeat lie both in the area of objective-historical and in the area of subjective-class aspects.
In the uprising of Spartacus, in addition to its "local-historical" meaning and significance, there is also something else - something enduring, universal and - let this word not frighten us - world-historical. It consists, in our opinion, in the fact that in this great movement there are oppressed and disenfranchised - albeit spontaneously, albeit without a “program,” even if not against slavery as such! - rose to fight for conquest, for achieving the simplest and greatest universal human ideal of all time - for freedom. It is in this young, naive, spontaneous, frantic impulse to freedom - the eternal and enduring significance of the uprising of Spartacus, the secret of the grateful memory of his descendants up to our days"
S. Kovalev