annotation
Not every "literature about Sorge" can be trusted. For when revealing the exploits of the outstanding intelligence officer during the reign of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, a legend was created, or rather a myth that deliberately distorted reality, about the alleged complete disclosure of the plans and plans of Hitler and his generals regarding the defeat of the Soviet Union in lightning war.
***
The tragic date for our people is approaching the attack on the USSR by Hitlerite Germany on June 22, the beginning of a bloody massacre unprecedented in history, which claimed about 27 million Soviet lives.
Knowing that in my scientific and journalistic works, while exploring the pre-war situation in the world, including the Far East, I widely refer to the information that came to Moscow from the resident of the Soviet military intelligence Richard Sorge, my readers have been asking the same question. Namely: “Why, having detailed information about Hitler's plans for our country, Stalin did not use it properly, and the German attack caught him by surprise? After all, if you believe the literature about Sorge, this outstanding intelligence officer informed in advance not only the exact date of the attack, but also the composition of the German group allocated for the war against the USSR, and even the direction of the main attacks? To this can be added the "information" that appeared recently in the TV movie about Sorge aboutthat our intelligence officer in Japan allegedly sent to Moscow from Tokyo … and the very plan of war between Germany and the Soviet Union "Barbarossa".
Getting to the answer to this question that still excites people, I note that one should pay special attention to his first words, namely, "if you believe the literature about Sorge." The fact of the matter is that not all "literature about Sorge" can be trusted. For when revealing the exploits of the outstanding intelligence officer during the reign of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, a legend was created, or rather a myth that deliberately distorted reality, about the alleged complete disclosure of the plans and plans of Hitler and his generals regarding the defeat of the Soviet Union in lightning war. Until the date of the start of the treacherous invasion - Sunday morning June 22, 1941. This was done by the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Khrushchev, who hated J. V. Stalin, to create among the people about the leader of the country during the war years as a gloomy misanthrope who believed in no one and nothing,through the fault of which the Nazi troops, inflicting powerful blows on the ill-prepared and unawares Red Army in the first period of the war, reached the walls of Moscow.
And only in the post-Khrushchev period, Soviet and now Russian researchers, as well as Japanese Zorgevologists, based not on inventions, but on genuine documents, were able to give a real picture of what the Soviet intelligence officer actually managed to find out in Tokyo and transmit to Moscow about the German attack on the USSR … Of course, there were no reports attributed to Sorge about the German attack "at dawn on June 22", of course, and could not have been, because Hitler, for reasons of surprise, would not have reported the date to his ambassador in faraway Tokyo, through which our intelligence officer received important information … However, Sorge's warnings about the imminent treacherous invasion of the Soviet Union by the Wehrmacht were justified and confirmed by other sources. And certainly were taken into account,although they were thoroughly tested for the possibility of enemy disinformation activities.
Promotional video:
One of the editions, which contains genuine encryptions to Sorge about the danger of war, is the 18th volume from the series “Russian Archive”, published in 1997 - “The Great Patriotic War. The Soviet-Japanese War of 1945: the history of the military-political confrontation between the two powers in the 30s - 40s. Documents and materials ". Sorge's messages contained in this collection greatly helped the author of these lines in preparing the monograph "The Japanese Front of Marshal Stalin" (2004), which, among other things, examines the role of Soviet intelligence in defining the Soviet leadership's policy and strategy towards Japan in the first period of World War II …
This year, another collection has appeared in our country, which contains almost all the documentary materials available today concerning the intelligence activities of Richard Sorge in China and Japan. The monograph was compiled by the Russian scientist in Japan, Candidate of Historical Sciences Andrei Fesyun and is entitled "The Case of Sorge". Telegrams and Letters (1930 - 1945) ". For those who study the activities of the Soviet intelligence officer and readers simply interested in his feat, this is an important additional help, which allows not according to rumors and speculations, sometimes malicious, but on genuine original documents to form an idea of the intelligence activities of the great anti-fascist and pay tribute to him. The activity is highly challenging and life-threatening.
So, what did Sorge and his group manage to transfer from Tokyo to the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army about the approaching attack of Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union, and through the General Staff to the country's top leadership, including I. V. Stalin
From the collection we learn that the first serious information on this matter came from Sorge on April 11, 1941. The resident of the Soviet military intelligence Ramsay (Richard Sorge) reported:
Recall that Hitler made the final decision to conduct a war against the USSR by early August 1940. “Russia must be liquidated. The deadline is the spring of 1941,”said the Fuehrer on July 31, 1940 at a meeting of the leadership of the German armed forces. To achieve a surprise attack, a whole program of misinformation was developed, misleading the enemy about Berlin's intentions and the timing of a possible war, which explained the inconsistency of intelligence reports to the Kremlin from various countries, including Japan.
Although the Soviet-Japanese pact of neutrality was signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941, there was no confidence in the Kremlin that the Japanese leadership would abide by it in the event of an attack by its ally Germany on the USSR. On April 16, the head of the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army sets the task for Sorge:
It is quite obvious that the Kremlin had a certain expectation that Tokyo, having a pact of neutrality with the USSR, would, with greater freedom of action, focus its military efforts on ending the war in China and confronting the Anglo-Saxon states. And at least for the first time, it will not allow provocations fraught with a big war on the Soviet-Manchu border.
Regarding the reaction in Tokyo to the conclusion of the pact on neutrality, Sorge reported on April 16:
Let us add that, unlike politicians, Japanese military circles, which had a negative attitude to any agreements with the Soviet Union, did not attach much importance to the neutrality pact. In the "Secret War Diary" of the General Staff of the Army on April 14, the following entry was made: “The significance of this treaty is not to ensure an armed uprising in the south. It is not a treaty and a means to avoid war with the United States. It only gives additional time to make an independent decision to start a war against the Soviets."
Realizing the strategic importance of "switching" Japanese aggression from the north to the south, who had the opportunity to influence Japanese policy and strategy through Ozaki, a member of his reconnaissance group close to the prime minister, Konoe, proposed to "push" the Japanese towards expansion in the south, which objectively made it difficult to simultaneously act in the north, against the USSR. On April 18, 1941, he wrote to the Center:
One can only be perplexed that the Center rejected this proposal of Sorge. By the way, this once again refutes the absurd fabrications spread in the Russian media in the 1990s that the alleged Japanese-American war … was "organized" by Stalin and his special services. The encrypted message to Sorge from Moscow read:
The following important information about the approaching German attack on the USSR Sorge sends to Moscow on May 2, 1941:
As can be seen from this report, the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities against the USSR "after the war with England" was allowed. Was it possible to draw final conclusions on the basis of such mutually exclusive information? Of course not! However, was there any "fault" in this for Sorge? Again, no. As befits a serious intelligence officer, he passed on all the information he obtained, including conflicting information. The conclusions were to be drawn in Moscow.
However, conclusions were extremely difficult to draw. Indeed, intelligence reports, in particular from the Soviet intelligence network in Europe "Red Chapel", contained a number of dates for the upcoming German attack on the USSR: April 15, May 1, May 20, etc. There are many reasons to believe that these dates were launched for the purpose of disinformation by the German special services. It seems that in Berlin they acted according to the famous parable of the shepherd boy who, out of prank, often shouted: "Wolves, wolves!" They hurried to his aid, but there were no wolves. When the wolves really attacked, the adults, thinking that the boy was indulging again, did not run to the rescue.
Subsequent reports from Sorge about the timing of Germany's attack on the USSR were also not clear. It was assumed that the war might not start. Here is a transcript from Tokyo on May 19, 1941:
On the same day, Sorge reports:
On May 30, Sorge transmitted:
Sorge's message about Berlin informing its ambassador to Japan about the time of the attack on the USSR raises certain doubts. Hitler, having strictly forbidden to inform the Japanese of anything about the "Barbarossa" plan, could hardly entrust his diplomats in Tokyo with highly important information without fear of its leakage. Hitler hid the date of the attack on the USSR even from his closest ally, Mussolini. The latter learned about the invasion of German troops into the territory of the USSR only in the morning of June 22, while still in bed.
Although Sorge's message about the likelihood of a German offensive "in the second half of June" was correct, could the Kremlin fully rely on the opinion of the German ambassador to Tokyo? Moreover, not long before that, on May 19, Sorge conveyed that "this year the danger may pass."
The fact that Ambassador Otto drew information about the war of Germany against the USSR not from official sources from Berlin, but from the Germans who visited Tokyo, is evidenced by the encryption from Sorge on June 1, 1941. The message text read:
It hardly needs explaining that Moscow could not rely on the information of a German lieutenant colonel, especially a military diplomat associated with intelligence, and in a third-rate country, and not with the development of operational and strategic plans. Nevertheless, the information attracted the attention of the Center. Sorge was asked for clarification, namely, he was to be informed:
A Soviet intelligence resident telegraphed June 15, 1941 to the Center:
The most definite was the information that Sorge sent to Moscow two days before the attack, on June 20. He reported:
The importance of this message cannot be underestimated, but the date of the attack, as it is mistakenly believed, was not named. It should be borne in mind that other information came from Tokyo as well. So, for example, Soviet intelligence intercepted a telegram from the military attaché of the French Embassy (Vichy) in Japan, who reported:
Here the term is indicated, but it is immediately admitted that it can be "either an attack on England or an attack on Russia."
The famous Soviet historian Professor Vilnis Sipols, who carefully studied the various information received in Moscow on the eve of the war, comes to the conclusion: “Even by mid-June 1941 in the USSR, as in other countries, there was no accurate and sufficiently complete information about Germany's intentions. Until June 21, reports were coming in that gave grounds for hopes that the attack could still be prevented. The question arises: did not the disinformation that came to Moscow look much more weighty, more convincing than the partly correct, but incomplete, most often fragmentary and contradictory information that was collected by our bodies that obtained information about the German plans?"
However, although the exact date of the attack was not known, even on the basis of the available information, the Kremlin should have brought the troops to full combat readiness before it was done. Moreover, as an active participant in the war, General of the Army Valentin Varennikov, rightly pointed out, Stalin had warned a month before the war: "We may be subjected to a surprise attack." So the questions remain …
An interesting version of events was given by the German historian F. Fabry, who, referring to the well-known TASS report of June 13, 1941, writes: “Soviet historiography during the“de-Stalinization”subjected Stalin to sharp criticism because of this message: she saw in him evidence of credulity and the naivety of Stalin, who allegedly seriously counted on the fact that with this proof of his goodwill, to keep Hitler from hasty measures. But if you study this document in detail, you will see completely different calculations. After all, the Kremlin openly let Hitler understand that he had information about the deployment of German troops, that he had taken countermeasures, but that, if Germany wishes, he will agree to start negotiations, which, naturally, would have the sole purpose of gaining time. " That Stalin was by no means naive was evidenced by his enemies. For example. Goebbels wrote in his diary: "Stalin is a realist to the core."
But back to Sorge and his exploit of a scout. As you know, after the German invasion, information about the position of Germany's ally - militaristic Japan - became critically important for the Kremlin.
After confirming the authenticity of Sorge's messages about the approaching German attack in Moscow, confidence in his resident in Japan increased. Already on June 26, he sends a radio message:
Although through the efforts of journalists and publicists who were trying to please Khrushchev, the main merit of Sorge was precisely the warnings about the impending treacherous attack by Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union, in reality his main feat was the timely opening of Japanese strategic plans and informing the Kremlin about the postponement of the Japanese attack on the USSR from summer-autumn 1941 for the spring of next year. This, as you know, allowed the Soviet high command to free part of the grouping in the Far East and Siberia to participate in the battle of Moscow, and then in the counteroffensive. But more on that next time.
Anatoly Koshkin