The tragedy that took place on December 7, 1941 at the Pearl Harbor military base in Hawaii, marked the entry of Japan into World War II.
That afternoon, Japanese aircraft bombed the main forces of the US Pacific Fleet, which was based at Pearl Harbor. And on December 8, America and Great Britain officially declared war on Japan. But historians to this day do not cease to argue about whether the leadership of the Soviet Union knew about the impending attack, and if so, why did not they warn the Americans about it …
1941, December 7 - at about 8 am a group of Japanese bombers and torpedo bombers unleashed a surprise attack on the American naval base Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. A second attack followed at 9 o'clock. Then 5 battleships were sunk, three more ships of the same class were seriously damaged, three destroyers and three cruisers were disabled, more than 300 aircraft based in Pearl Harbor were destroyed or disabled.
And, of course, it wasn't just technology that suffered that day. The Americans lost about 2,400 people at Pearl Harbor. And this despite the fact that the Japanese side lost only 29 aircraft and several submarines. The day after the incident - December 8 - the United States and England announced their entry into the war against Japan. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on America.
Actually, up to this point, US President Roosevelt tried to limit himself to supplying weapons to the Soviet Union. He clearly did not plan a large-scale participation in World War II. The attack on Pearl Harbor came as a complete surprise to Roosevelt. After all, before that, for several months he tried to delay the inevitable war with Japan through diplomatic negotiations.
After the declaration of war, the American president, in accordance with the current law, assumed the duties of the commander-in-chief in wartime and contributed to strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition. Roosevelt attached particular importance to the creation of the UN, the Declaration on their creation was signed in Washington on January 1, 1942. But on the issue of opening the Second Front, the American president for a long time took a wait and see attitude. He took the decision only after the impressive victories of the Soviet Union at Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, when it became clear: the USSR has every chance of victory and it is better to establish active cooperation with it …
It is clear that such a delay in an extremely important issue for the USSR at that time could not but irritate Stalin and his entourage. But, as it turned out, the Americans also had something to be offended … In any case, in the midst of the Cold War, in 1951, the Committee to Investigate the Anti-American Activities of the US House of Representatives said: the Soviet Union knew about the planned Japanese attack on Pearl -Harbor, however, withheld this information and the date of the raid.
The "hearing on the American aspects of the Sorge espionage case" was devoted to clarifying this issue. In their course, the experts carefully sifted through mountains of documents, listened to testimonies from different people and put forward different versions.
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Of particular interest was the testimony of Major General Charles Willoughby, who during the Second World War served as the head of intelligence of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the southwest direction of the Pacific Theater of War Douglas MacArthur.
For several years, Willoughby has been collecting materials about the activities of one of the most famous intelligence agents in history - Richard Sorge, who went down in history under the pseudonym Ramsay. According to the opinion that existed at that time, Sorge informed the Soviet government in advance that the Japanese were going to strike in the direction of the southern seas, and therefore it was possible to send part of the troops stationed in Siberia to the western front.
In addition, Sorge allegedly indicated that the Japanese military would make the first attack on the Hawaiian Islands, and even named the time for which this action was scheduled. Was this so, and why - in the case of an affirmative answer to this question - Stalin withheld such important information for the United States and the participants in the hearing had to find out.
Willoughby, for example, believed that Ramsay's group had information about the Japanese plans. But when asked whether Sorge knew about the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, he could not immediately answer. Only the next day did he admit that he had once again thoroughly reviewed all the documents at his disposal and could say with confidence that the intelligence officer did not specify a specific date. Thus, it turned out that Sorge did not give any information about the attack on Pearl Harbor; the only thing he did was report the direction of the possible strike.
But, according to Willoughby, that was very important. After all, not even the dates were of particular value, but the instructions in which direction the Japanese troops would move in 1941 - south (against Great Britain and America) or north (against the USSR). This information was of great interest to all powers that might have been targeted by Japan.
Willoughby was actually right: it was thanks to the information received from Sorge that the Soviet Union was able to significantly strengthen its forces in the western direction. Sorge's ciphers sent to Moscow were of great importance both politically, economically and militarily. They reported that the Japanese in 1941 would move their troops to the south, so that their attacks on the USSR during this period could not be feared. Moreover, the documents indicate that Sorge's group received this information back in September-October 1940.
At the same time, Willoughby stressed that the Americans themselves, despite all their indignation at Stalin's "non-partner" behavior, had reason to fear an attack by the Japanese. At the same time, military experts assumed: the first blow would be struck on the Philippine Islands, which at that time were a de facto American colony. This means that information about the intended direction of the strike was not unknown to America. Thus, it is not possible to accuse the USSR government of concealing the most important information and of complicity in the defeat of the US Pacific Fleet.
In general, the information provided by Willoughby is corroborated by other documents known to military historians. For example, in Japan, at one time, materials of the investigation and trial of members of the Sorge group were published. There is also no mention of preparations for an attack on Pearl Harbor. This question was raised only once, during the interrogation of Zorge's assistant, Hotsumi Ozaki, held on June 8, 1943. Ozaki then said: "If we talk about the beginning of the war, the attack on Hawaii was a complete surprise for us."
By the way, in the published cipher codes of Sorge for 1941, there is also no indication of the preparation of an attack on Pearl Harbor. According to these documents, until June 1941, all the efforts of the group of the famous intelligence officer were concentrated on disclosing plans for a German attack on the USSR. And only after June 22, Sorge switched to clarifying the military intentions of Japan.
His group managed to obtain information about two top secret meetings with the participation of the emperor, at which the issue of the entry of the Land of the Rising Sun into World War II was decided. They took place on July 2 and September 6, 1941, respectively. At the first meeting, its participants decided to simultaneously prepare for a speech on two fronts - in the north and in the south. But Germany was advancing in a northern direction, so that the main efforts could be concentrated in the direction of the southern seas. So at the second meeting, the Japanese elite decided to enter the war against Great Britain and the United States.
Throughout the Japanese-American talks that took place in Washington since the summer of 1941, Sorge and his group closely followed the development of events. In a cipher program dated October 3, 1941, the observations were summed up and stated: "If America does not come to a real compromise by mid-October, Japan will first oppose Tai, then move troops to Singapore, Malaya and Sumatra." Incidentally, this was the last encrypted message sent to Sorge in Moscow …
In September - early October 1941, the Japanese military really completed the development of plans for a southward attack. According to them, the main blow was to be inflicted on the English citadel in the Pacific Ocean - Singapore. In addition, the troops were tasked with seizing the colonial possessions of France, England and Holland in Asia, as well as the Philippines.
But then what does Pearl Harbor have to do with it, you ask. As it turned out, the idea of attacking this base came to the head of the commander of the Japanese Navy, Admiral Isorok Yamamoto, only in August 1941. He proposed to duplicate the action of the Japanese army in the south, striking the base where the main forces of the American fleet were located in the Pacific Ocean. Yamamoto's idea was eagerly accepted. On its basis, a top-secret operation of the attack on Pearl Harbor was developed, which was to be carried out by a special squadron. It consisted of six aircraft carriers with about 400 combat aircraft on board. The operation was codenamed "Operation Z".
Judging by the surviving reports of Sorge, he actually foresaw the direction of Japanese aggression. But Sorge failed to uncover plans for an attack on Pnrl Harbor. This, incidentally, is confirmed by the Japanese researcher Hisaya Shirai. He wrote that the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was developed in the highest naval circles in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy.
“Sorge's group simply could not get to him,” summed up Shirai. In addition, by the time the final decision was made on the attack on the base, the members of the Sorge group had already been arrested, which means they could not share information with anyone (even if we assume that they actually had it).
Nevertheless, Sorge, perfectly aware of the danger the Americans might be exposed to, made an attempt to inform the American public about the plans of the Japanese known to him. And he did it with the help of the American journalist Joseph Newman, the Tokyo correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune.
Japanese researcher Saburo Ito, who for some time worked as a correspondent for the Asahi newspaper, became interested in the fate of Newman and found out that he had arrived in Japan in 1937. The American's correspondent office was located in the building of the Domei Tsushin telegraph agency, in the same place where he was bureau of the French agency "Havas". One of the most valuable agents of Richard's group, Sorge Branko Vukelich, worked under the cover of the latter for a long time. It was he who, in 1941, suggested to his boss to use the American journalist in order to acquaint the American public with the aggressive plans of the Japanese and Germans.
When Vukelich was arrested and he began to testify, he admitted that he had personally been working with Newman since the spring of 1941. This was done in agreement with Sorge himself. Vukelich and Newman discussed US-Japanese relations, looking for ways to make US policy more favorable to the USSR. The agent argued to the journalist that German policy would sooner or later lead to Japan entering the war as the fifth column of Germany. In this case, the Japanese strike will be directed against England and America. Vukelich insisted that Newman use the information he received and write a number of relevant articles for his newspaper. In the end, the journalist agreed.
Vukelich received confidential information about the plans of Japan and Germany, about the state of Japanese-American negotiations from Sorge, after which he supplied Newman with the necessary data. He immediately processed the received material and wrote materials on its basis, which he sent to the editorial office. The New York Herald Tribune has published at least three such articles. The first was the article “Tokyo Expects Hitler to Move on Russia,” published on May 31, 1941, that is, three weeks before the start of the war. Perhaps it is worth citing an excerpt from this material, because it speaks for itself …
“The information received by reliable sources in Tokyo testifies, from their point of view, that tensions between the USSR and Germany have reached almost an explosion point in the past few weeks and are not subsiding due to the expected decision of Fuehrer Adolf Hitler to move against the USSR. These sources believe that the only possible time for Germany to attack the USSR is the period between the completion of grain sowing in Ukraine and the ripening of the crop. They also add that if the attack does not occur at the end of June, it will be postponed until next year.
As for the German circles in Tokyo, they say that Russia can be defeated within two months. The objectives of the German attack on the Soviet Union, according to these sources, are as follows: a) to eliminate the danger posed by the only huge land army on the European continent, before starting a new campaign in the west in connection with the expected entry of the United States into the war; to make possible the subsequent demobilization of the several million released German soldiers, whom the industry desperately needs; b) purchase Ukrainian grain without paying their cost; c) to receive labor from Ukraine to ensure the fulfillment of new tasks in the West."
It would seem that such an article should have made the impression of an exploding bomb and could not go unnoticed. But, oddly enough, it passed … The fact is that the "New York Herald Tribune" did not appreciate the material provided by Newman and therefore placed it not as an editorial, but only on page 21 at the end of the newspaper. And Americans are used to paying attention to information only from the front pages …
1941, July 1 - Newman's new article was published, entitled "Japan Still Targets the South Sea Region." It said that Japan's main interest is not Vladivostok, but the southern seas. The journalist, who received the next portion of information from Vukelich, indicated that Japan plans to create a Great East Asian sphere of mutual prosperity. It was to include French Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, and Dutch East India.
1941, September 7 - Newman's new material came out on the pages of the New York Herald Tribune. It was called "Tokyo prepares for war, while courting the United States." The article said that the Japanese government is secretly continuing to actively prepare for military action in the event of the failure of negotiations in Washington.
These materials put Newman in the spotlight of the Japanese secret police. 1941, October 15 - when Hotsumi Ozaki had already been arrested and the arrests of Sorge, Vukelich and Clausen were being prepared, a warrant was issued for the arrest of an American journalist. But he escaped a sad fate, albeit by pure chance - it was just on that day that Newman managed to leave Japan, having sailed from Yokohama "on vacation in Hawaii."
Speaking about Newman's activities, Saburo Ito points out: this man, who introduced the Americans to the classified information he received, warned his compatriots about the threat posed by the Japanese side, in fact did a huge service to historical science. In particular, he helped to identify the historical significance of the work of the Sorge group, about which experts have been arguing for so many decades.
It would seem that in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor it is time to put an end to it and pass a verdict: Sorge and his group could not convey information about Japan's plans regarding this unfortunate base and the time of the attack, because the intelligence officers themselves did not have this information. This means that the United States cannot have any claims to the Soviet Union in this matter. Moreover, Sorge made every effort to make American citizens aware of the growing Japanese threat. But, despite the documents available at the moment, some historians cannot calm down in any way. They are trying to prove that Sorge and his team did know about the attack on Pearl Harbor.
So, V. Berezhkov, who worked in 1941 in the apparatus of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov, personally dealt with Sorge's encryption programs. By the way, he mentions this in the book How I Became Stalin's Translator. According to Berezhkov, in one of the encryption programs, Sorge indicated that the blow, most likely, would be inflicted on American military bases in the Hawaiian Islands. But Stalin did not convey this message to the American president. Why he did this remains unclear. Maybe, due to his pathological suspicion, he simply did not believe his best agent. Or perhaps Stalin had other reasons, unknown to us, to do just that. At least we can only guess about them …
Considering where Berezhkov worked and what information he had access to, it's hard not to believe him. But where, then, did this mysterious encryption go? Why was it not found by any of the researchers? Journalist L. Mlechin in his book “History of Foreign Intelligence. Careers and Fates”expresses the following version: A. Vyshinsky simply forbade diplomats to mention the name of Sorge. The order allegedly came from Stalin himself and was given after the legendary agent was arrested as a result of the betrayal of one of the informers working for Soviet intelligence. In 1944, on November 7, he was executed.
Subsequently, it turned out that Stalin could have saved Richard Sorge by exchanging him for a Japanese officer. But Stalin, having received such an offer, quickly washed his hands, saying that he did not understand at all who he was talking about. Apparently, the talented intelligence officer became unnecessary to the Soviet government, and he was simply handed over to the Japanese authorities. So the question about Sorge, his work and fate was no longer raised.
The archives were diligently cleaned up, destroying all documents related to the activities of the amazing agent. Maybe it was in reality precisely the message about the impending Japanese attack on American military bases? If this is so, and Stalin did not consider it necessary to convey a warning to Sorge to the US President, then after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the leader took care that information about his awareness did not surface.
No, of course, this is a very interesting version. But there is no evidence of it, at least for now. And until that time, until the documents supporting it are found, it is still worth relying on the available evidence and expert opinions based on them.
V. Sklyarenko, I. Rudycheva