What is knowledge? For thousands of years, philosophers have defined it as "justified true belief." But Edmund Gettier demonstrated, using a thought experiment with short stories, that this intuitive definition of knowledge is wrong. We figure out what is wrong with our confidence in our innocence.
In the 1960s, the American philosopher Edmund Gettier developed a thought experiment that later became known as the Gettier problem. He showed that something is wrong in our understanding of knowledge. And 50 years later, philosophers are still debating this issue. Jennifer Neigal, a student of the mind at the University of Toronto, notes the following:
What is knowledge? For thousands of years, thinkers have defined it as "justified true belief." The reasoning seemed to be proven: simply being convinced of what later turns out to be true is not necessarily knowledge. If your friend says that she knows what you ate last night (let's say it's vegetarian pizza) and if she's right, that doesn't mean she knew it. It was just a lucky guess - just a correct belief. Your friend may know, but if she named vegetarian food because she saw you eating it, then that's part of the rationale. In this case, your friend will have good reason to believe that you ate her.
The reason Gettier's problem is known is that the philosopher, using short stories, showed that the intuitive definition of knowledge was wrong. His 1963 work, "Is Knowledge True and Informed," resembles a student assignment. It is presented in just three pages. But that was all Gettier needed to revolutionize his field, epistemology and the study of the theory of knowledge.
The "problem" in Gettier's problem appears in small, unassuming sketches. He had his own stories, philosophers have since offered their own versions and interpretations. One of which - the version of Scott Sturgeon from the University of Birmingham - is presented below.
Doesn't it seem strange that you know that there are two Newcastles in the refrigerator? Of course, you are sure they are there. But the only reason for you to be sure is that the robbers clearly think otherwise. Although you believe the two bottles are there because you put them there. You're right, your beer is in the fridge and you have good reason to believe it will be there on your return. But doesn't it seem too fortunate your true and well-founded belief that two Newcastles await you? Could the pursuit of true and valid faith be knowledge?
Consider another example given by the philosopher John Turry.
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And again there was an element of luck. Does Mary know that her husband is sitting in the living room? She believes so, with evidence that she is right. And it's still the same temptation as in the case of Newcastle, just to say no. Turri says:
Therefore, the question arises: if knowledge is not faith that has a basis, then what? Reflecting in this vein, several years after the 50th anniversary of the publication of the Gettier riddle, a group of philosophers and psychologists come to the conclusion that it is foolish to try to answer this question, and it has always been so. Allan Nazlett, a philosopher at the University of New Mexico, says:
But Duncan Pritchard, a philosopher at the University of Edinburgh, disagrees. “This is not a lost cause at all,” he says. "In fact, it is a lively and obstinate task."
Inspired by the Gettier problem, Pritchard presented his own definition of knowledge. In a 2012 article, he explains why you don't know there is beer in the fridge, even if your belief is valid and true - something that the traditional definition of “grounded true faith” has failed.
The trick, according to Pritchard, is to be the first to notice two different "possessions of intuition" about knowledge, which seem to be two "images" of the same intuition, but are not. These are “intuition versus luck” (your true faith, which Pritchart calls “cognitive success,” cannot be luck if viewed as knowledge) and “ability to intuition” (your true faith must be, in some sense, a product of your cognitive ability) …
(It is worth noting that some question whether it is useful to explore intuition, as Pritchard does. Nagel noted in a 2013 article in The Contemporary Contradictions of Experimental Philosophy: “Epistemological intuition is not infallible, but today it looks quite reliable. in order to continue to fulfill its traditional function of providing us with valuable evidence of the nature of knowledge. )
Pritchard writes:
But, in his opinion, to think so is a mistake. Consider another Gettier example of a guy named Tump to see why.
Pace formed his beliefs about room temperature based on thermometer readings. His beliefs, formulated in this way, are very reliable, since any belief that has such grounds will be correct. Moreover, he has no reason to believe that something is wrong with the thermometer. But the thermometer is actually broken and fluctuates randomly within a given range. Temp doesn't know that there is an agent hidden in the room who controls the thermometer, his job is to ensure that every time Temp turns to the thermometer, the "readings" on it correspond to the temperature in the room.
Temp's opinion, which has reason to be true, regarding the current temperature, was unsuccessful. He knows the truth, but only because someone is deliberately showing him the correct temperature whenever he looks at the thermometer. As Pritchard says:
In other words, he says, "While Pace's cognitive success is not the result of his cognitive ability, it is not just a matter of luck."
Therefore, Pritchard concludes that the way to gain knowledge is for your respective cognitive abilities to create an opinion that is not only true but also safe. By "safe" Pritchard means an opinion that cannot be easily refuted. Temp's beliefs, for example, are safe - there is a person hiding, thereby ensuring that Temp will believe the temperature every time the thermometer is checked. (If you are thinking to yourself, “But the person who is hiding might decide to show Temp the wrong temperature,” just imagine that this is not just a person, but a hidden machine, programmed so that the thermometer always shows the correct temperature.) But your belief is in there is beer in the fridge and Mary's belief that her husband is sitting in the living room is not safe,because the burglar could easily replace the beer, and Mary's husband could easily end up in another room.
To make it easier to imagine, Pritchard invites us to think about cognitive success as a reasoned belief in something, in the same way that we think about success in, say, archery. Knowledge is an achievement, just like hitting the bull's-eye is an achievement in itself: you did it, it wasn't just luck. Here's what Pritchard says:
In other words, success is not an achievement until you have achieved it yourself. The same goes for true belief - it is not knowledge unless you are responsible for right understanding. (This does not mean that you have to learn everything yourself firsthand; otherwise, the theory will exclude the possibility of obtaining knowledge from books, for example).
You will be interested to know what Gettier thought about this. It turns out that it's not so much to have an opinion, but sometimes it is not enough to share it.
In fact, he never published any other work other than "Is Knowledge True and Informed Opinion?" He turns 90 in October. To the question "Why not?" he replied, "I have nothing more to say."