1st part: "Soviet industrialization - to the 90th anniversary of the beginning".
Part 2: "On the sources of financing for Soviet industrialization."
3rd part: "Soviet industrialization - how the economic machine worked".
4th part: "Soviet industrialization - some results"
The economic model created during the Soviet industrialization (Stalinist economy) existed until about the mid-50s. XX century. Since the second half of the 1950s. and until the end of 1991, the Stalinist economy began to lose such properties as a planned nature, high centralization of management, the predominance of the physical indicators of the plan over the value ones, the limited nature of commodity-money relations, the dominant position of state ownership, the national character of state ownership, etc.
During the existence of the Stalinist economy in the USSR, a purposeful process of transformation of private and group property into public property was carried out. In the post-Stalin period, a reverse (unreported) process of transformation of public property into group property took place. I will give a conclusion from the article by N. O. Arkhangelskaya, dedicated to the study of changes in industrial relations in the USSR: “If in the period 1930-1950s. the country's economy was a single complex that worked for a common result, then in 1960-1980. this complex ceased to exist, giving way to a mass of separate enterprises and their teams."
Three stages of dismantling the Stalinist economy can be distinguished: 1) N. Khrushchev's experiments; 2) the Kosygin-Lieberman reform and the "stagnation" of the Leonid Brezhnev era; 3) "perestroika" M. Gorbachev.
After Stalin's death, a slow, imperceptible (masked by pseudo-socialist propaganda) transformation of the socialist model of the economy into the model of state capitalism was outlined. This process began under N. S. Khrushchev, continued under L. I. Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin, and ended under M. S. Gorbachev. The reasons for this mutation, associated with the spiritual and moral state of society, as well as political, lie outside the economy.
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Even before the war, Stalin tried to strengthen the political foundation of a new economic model by creating a system of democracy. The contours of this system can be seen in the USSR Constitution of 1936. In it, the main role in governing the country was assigned to the Soviets of People's Deputies; the government was to become an executive, that is, a branch of power subordinate to the Soviets. And the party in general had to refuse direct participation in the management of the state, including the economy. Democracy should have become a guarantee that state ownership of the means of production will be used in the interests of the entire people and work to strengthen the entire country.
Without the creation of a political system of democracy by the people, there was a risk that socialist society would gradually transform into state capitalism. This means that the means of production will formally remain the property of the state, but are used in the interests of not the entire people, but only a narrow group of the state bureaucracy (K. Marx called this model the "Asian mode of production"). At the same time, socialist rhetoric may persist and even intensify. China is a prime example of such state capitalism.
However, Stalin's attempts to create a system of democracy were not crowned with success; the new economic model did not have a strong political foundation even at the time of the leader's death. Stalin repeated many times: "Without theory, we are dead." Social scientists, on the other hand, continued to chew on the dogmas of “historical materialism,” and any fresh ideas were perceived as heresy and were severely punished. Even discussions about the "Asian mode of production" were conducted almost clandestinely. The authorities were afraid of this topic. This is how a dangerous stereotype has developed: state is socialist. This stereotype has not been overcome even today. Nationalization is a necessary but insufficient condition for building a just society and an independent economy in Russia. During the last financial crisis in the United States and Great Britain, the governments of these countries in order to save the sinking banks of Wall Street and the City of London pumped huge amounts of budget funds into them, the banking giants were nationalized quietly, but this was nationalization in the interests of financial capital. After the peak of the financial crisis, the state began to withdraw from the capital of banks.
Setting the strategic goal of creating a political system of government by the people, Stalin also solved such a task as neutralizing the party's overly active role in managing the country's economy. He tried to overcome the existing "dual power", which was expressed in the fact that the economy in the 1920-30s. both the government and the party ruled simultaneously. This dual power disorganized economic life, reduced the rate of industrialization, and eroded the principle of personal responsibility. Stalin succeeded a lot in overcoming the "dual power". The party imperceptibly moved away from solving economic issues, it was assigned a decisive role in only two areas: the formation of ideology and the selection of personnel for socialist construction. However, everything returned to normal under Khrushchev.
The active return of the party nomenklatura to the leadership of the economy began with the defeat in 1957 of the "anti-party" group. And it included figures who at that time were already more economic than party leaders - G. Malenkov, L. Kaganovich, M. Saburov, G. Pervukhin, V. Molotov. In the second round of the "purge", such talented business leaders as Finance Minister A. Zverev, Chairman of the Board of the USSR State Bank A. Korovushkin and many others were removed from their posts. However, the "cleansing" of economic leaders began not even in 1957, but even earlier. We are talking about L. Beria, who was arrested and executed in 1953. I don’t presume to evaluate him as a politician and party leader, but as an economic leader he made an invaluable contribution to the creation of the Stalinist economy.
It was not even dual power that returned to the economy, but multiple power. Under Stalin, the sectoral principle of economic management was dominant. The overwhelming majority of ministries were sectoral. After Stalin's death, the strict vertical of centralized economic management began to erode. In 1957, Khrushchev began a reform of the management of the national economy. Its essence consisted in a sharp strengthening of the territorial principle of management. Councils of the national economy (economic councils) were created in the so-called economic administrative regions (105 in total). At the same time, a large number of branch union ministries were liquidated. In the early 1960s. economic councils were created in the union republics, in 1962 the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR (VSNKh) was established. The reform continued until Khrushchev's removal in October 1964.
The vertical of state management of the economy also began to weaken as a result of a reduction in the set of planned indicators that are obligatory for ministries, central administrations, production associations and enterprises. The number of indicators of the national economic plan under Stalin was constantly increasing. In 1940 it was 4744, and in 1953 it reached 9490, that is, it doubled. And then the number of indicators began to decline continuously: 6308 in 1954, 3390 in 1957, 1780 in 1958. By the way, the “anti-party group” opposed this weakening of central planning; there was no serious scientific and ideological justification behind the reduction in the number of indicators.
As you know, the model of the Stalinist economy did not allow any commodity-money relations in the group of industries "A". But N. S. Khrushchev violated this taboo. Under Stalin, tractors and agricultural machinery came from mechanical engineering not to collective farms, but to state machine-technical stations (MTS). The collective farms were only users of this equipment on the basis of contracts with the MTS. At the insistence of Khrushchev, the distribution of agricultural machinery in the MTS ceased in 1957, and in 1958 the MTS themselves were disbanded, the machinery was transferred to the balances of collective farms. By a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of September 22, 1957, all implements and means of agricultural production are included in the system of commodity-money relations. As Stalin had foreseen, there was a strong dispersion of the means of production in agriculture, technology began to be used without a full load,the necessary repairs were not made, the equipment began to quickly retire from service. This, in turn, caused the need to dramatically increase the production of such equipment. Solid losses began. It is no longer necessary to say that far from all collective farms were able to buy out agricultural machinery from the MTS and then buy agricultural machinery from manufacturers.
Khrushchev's voluntaristic decision to liquidate the artels (producing significant volumes of some consumer goods and services) led to the fact that part of the artels turned into shadow workers. It was under Khrushchev that "guilds" (shadow production) and "hucksters" (shadow trade) appeared, and underground capital arose. Shadow companies turned out to be in demand, because as a result of economic "experiments" in trade, there were shortages of consumer goods. The number of such "adjustments" that destroyed the model of the Stalinist economy under Khrushchev is measured in dozens.
The mechanism of the Stalinist economy was undermined during the economic reform of A. Kosygin - E. Lieberman (1965-1969). The official start to the reform was given by the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of October 4, 1965 "On improving planning and strengthening economic stimulation of industrial production." Much has been written about this reform, I will briefly note four fundamental points.
First, this reform has finally made a turn towards cost indicators, and the number of physical indicators, even in comparison with Khrushchev's times, has sharply decreased. This created the opportunity for enterprises to achieve the implementation of plans in ways that did not increase, but, on the contrary, reduced the integral result of economic activity throughout the country. The orientation towards gross value indicators contributed to the winding up of the shaft by enterprises, which finally destroyed the cost-control mechanism of the Stalinist economy.
Secondly, the transition from social forms of income distribution (public consumption funds, lower prices in retail trade) to private-group forms began. Tying workers' cash incomes to the profit of the enterprise imperceptibly led to the fact that the principle of the organic combination of personal and public interests no longer worked. Previously, the criterion for the efficiency of the economy was the integral result (profitability) at the level of the entire national economy, now the main criterion has become the profitability (profitability) of an individual enterprise. This could not but weaken the country. Note that in the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of October 4, 1965, the reduction of the cost of production as a planned indicator of the enterprise's activity was no longer mentioned. Although the “distortions” that have arisen in the activities of enterprises turned out tothat then the cost indicators had to be restored.
Third, departmentalism was one of the manifestations of private-group interests. It has always existed (even in the Stalinist economy), but as a result of the reform of 1965-1969. she acquired hypertrophied forms. The liberation of industries from many natural planned indicators created ample opportunities for ministries to "optimize" their activities. Various funds of ministries and departments appeared, the replenishment of which depended on the financial results of the activities of branch enterprises and the breakdown power of the heads of departments (adjusting plans, knocking out financial and material resources in the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Finance, the State Committee for Supply, etc.). An unreported competition arose between ministries and departments for the division of the “common pie”. Here is what M. Antonov writes about the sharply increased departmental system:“… State ownership of the means of production, which was at the disposal of business executives, was not something uniform. It was divided between the monopolies - ministries and departments, and within each of these divisions - between enterprises and organizations. Each department vigilantly watched so that its interests, as a rule, did not coincide with the interests of related departments were not infringed. As a result, the implementation of any decisions that were optimal from a national point of view ran up against the resistance of the departments, which often led to enormous unnecessary costs "(Mikhail Antonov. Capitalism will never happen in Russia! - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005, p. 174).and within each of these divisions - between enterprises and organizations. Each department vigilantly observed that its interests, which, as a rule, did not coincide with the interests of related departments were not infringed upon. As a result, the implementation of any decisions that were optimal from a national point of view ran up against the resistance of departments, which often led to enormous unnecessary costs "(Mikhail Antonov. Capitalism in Russia will never happen! - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005, p. 174).and within each of these divisions - between enterprises and organizations. Each department vigilantly watched so that its interests, as a rule, did not coincide with the interests of related departments were not infringed. As a result, the implementation of any decisions that were optimal from a national point of view ran up against the resistance of departments, which often led to enormous unnecessary costs "(Mikhail Antonov. Capitalism in Russia will never happen! - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005, p. 174).- M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005, p. 174).- M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005, p. 174).
Fourthly, the introduction of payments for funds for enterprises strengthened the opposition between society and production collectives. Planning-profitable enterprises had to pay to the budget for fixed and standardized working capital. A strange situation arose in which funds were alienated from state-owned enterprises, the latter becoming nothing more than users of funds. The actual owner of the funds was the bureaucratic state apparatus. This is how the outlines of state capitalism took shape.
The spirit of consumerism that reigned in Russia began to be cultivated by the Kosygin-Lieberman reform. A dependent mood, a desire to live at the expense of others, appeared. These were not yet obvious relations of exploitation of one person by another, but already an unconscious desire for such exploitation. The official statistics convincingly testifies to the pursuit of profit by enterprises (hence, to the maximum share of the "public pie"): from 1960 to 1980, the profit of state enterprises in the USSR increased 4.6 times, and labor productivity, according to official data, in industry - only 2.6 times, in agriculture and construction even less.
Special attention should be paid to the reaction to the reform abroad. The West took it with enthusiasm, the foreign media of that time praised the changes that began in the USSR. And this happened at the height of the Cold War. Will our geopolitical adversaries praise us if we gain strength? No! We were praised for voluntarily weakening ourselves.
The final destruction of the remnants of the Stalinist economy took place during the reign of M. Gorbachev. At this time, the ideological foundation of the total privatization of the 1990s was laid, a boom in the establishment of private commercial banks began, small and medium-sized private enterprises appeared, the advantages of the "market economy" were promoted in every possible way, and the Stalinist model was indiscriminately denounced (it was given the derogatory name "administrative-command system "). If Khrushchev's experiments and the Kosygin-Lieberman reform contributed to the transformation of the Stalinist economic model into state capitalism, then Gorbachev's reforms paved the way for private property capitalism.
Author: VALENTIN KATASONOV