Beginning: "Politics and the results of the reign of the liar. Foreign policy and the strange Northern War."
The Battle of Narva, despite future victories, can rightfully be called the Narva Battle of the Russian troops. It was very characteristic of the entire subsequent course of the Northern War. Therefore, he needs to be given a more detailed examination, since it reveals both the ongoing policy of the liar, his external dependence, and his personal character. This shows the strength, might and deceit, against which the “old enemies and new allies” of Russia pushed in one person.
According to the agreement with Augustus II, the liar declared war on Sweden immediately after the conclusion of the Constantinople Peace Treaty with the Ottoman Empire - on August 19 (30), 1700 and set out on a campaign to Ingermanlandia (now Estonia) [hereinafter materials from Wikipedia are used].
The Russian army at that time had a large number (up to 200,000 soldiers). However, according to historians, the Russian army during this period lacked discipline, training and material support. The Russian army was modernized along the Western lines with the help of Western experts and officers. By 1700, only two regiments, formed on the basis of amusing troops - Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky (each of about 3,500 officers and soldiers), were completely organized according to the Western model.
The liar planned to bring to Narva over 40,000 regular infantrymen, divided into three "generals" (divisions): under the command of generals A. I. Repnin, A. A. Veide and A. M. including five thousandth cavalry under the command of BP Sheremetev, and 10,000 Little Russian Cossacks under the command of I. Obidovsky - over 60,000 soldiers in total.
The Swedish army at the turn of the 18th century, in contrast to the Russian army, was a well-organized semi-professional structure formed at the beginning of the 17th century by the Swedish king Gustav Adolf. The principles of the organization of the Swedish army were preserved with minor changes until the reign of Charles XII. In the Swedish army, the cavalry was formed on a voluntary contract basis - the estate sending an equestrian soldier to the army received monetary compensation in the form of tax benefits. In the Swedish infantry, a compulsory recruitment of soldiers was made - each territorial entity had to send a certain number of soldiers, and in addition, any man who did not have a livelihood and did not stain himself with breaking the law was sent to military service. All soldiers and their families were provided with public housing and salaries [Alf Åberg The Swedish Army, from Lützen to Narva // Michael Roberts Sweden's Age of Greatness 1632-1718. - New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973, pp. 265-287.].
The Swedish army was well disciplined, which organically flowed from the Lutheran ideology that dominated the Swedish Empire. The Lutheran Church supported the military actions and conquests of Sweden in the 17th century, proclaiming the successes of the Swedish military campaigns "by the will of God." They went to war under slogans that later, almost 240 years later, became Nazi: the Swedish nation is "above all" and they are administering "God's judgment." Hitler and his ideology in Europe had distant predecessors.
By the beginning of hostilities near Narva, according to various estimates, from 34 to 40 thousand people of the Russian army were concentrated. The Narva fortress was defended by the Swedish garrison, which consisted of 1,300 foot and 200 horse soldiers, as well as 400 militias.
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On October 20 (31), 1700, the Russian army began regular shelling of the fortress. The charges lasted only two weeks, and the effectiveness of the fire was minimal. The siege of Narva was personally commanded by the liar himself.
At the time of the Russian attack on Ingermanland and Estonia, the Swedish troops in the region were few. Apart from the garrison defending Narva, the entire Swedish military presence in those places did not exceed 8,000 soldiers.
At the same time, Augustus II lifted the siege of Riga and retreated. It is very likely that this happened on the initiative of Patkul, who commanded this siege. He really did not want the Russians to fight on their own without his control and leadership, and he needed a future defeat for his approval. This allowed Charles XII to send additional forces of about 10,000 soldiers to Estland and Ingermanland, who landed in Reval and Pernov.
The liar, after this news, on September 26 (October 7) sent a cavalry detachment of Boris Sheremetev along the Revel road going from Narva to the west. The distance from Narva to Revel (present-day Tallinn) was about 200 versts. According to various estimates, the size of Sheremetev's detachment ranged from 5,000 to 6,000 cavalrymen. Learning in advance about the approach of the Swedes, Sheremetev decided to retreat 36 miles back to the Purts fortress and disperse his squadron across several villages in the swampy area east of Purts to guard all roads leading to Narva.
On the evening of October 26 (November 6), the forward detachments of the Swedes attacked Russian soldiers stationed in the village of Variel. Russian soldiers settled in the village houses, without putting up sentries, and turned out to be easy prey for the small Swedish detachment. The Swedes suddenly entered the village, set it on fire and were able to interrupt the Russians, taken by surprise, one by one.
Sheremetev, in turn, immediately sent to their aid a large detachment, consisting of 21 cavalry squadrons, which managed to surround the Swedes at Variele. The Swedes, with battle and losses, emerged from the encirclement, but two Swedish officers were captured by Russian. These two officers, following the instructions of Charles XII, gave false information about the size of the Swedish army advancing on Narva, citing many times overstated figures of 30,000 and 50,000 Swedish soldiers. Therefore, despite the success achieved, Sheremetev decided not to gain a foothold in Purtsa, but on the contrary, to retreat another 33 versts back to Narva.
On the evening of November 10 (21), news spread in the Russian camp about the betrayal of the captain of the bombardier company of the Preobrazhensky regiment, Yakov Gummert (an Estonian by birth), who fled to Narva. He enjoyed the special confidence of the liar and was able to convey to the enemy all information about the state and location of the Russian army. After that, the false Peter ordered all the officers of the Swedish nation to be expelled from Narva and assigned to other regiments [P. O. Bobrovsky. History of the Preobrazhensky Life Guards Regiment. Volume 2. - SPb. 1904. Later Gummert wrote to the false Peter from Narva. One of his letters to his wife, who remained in Moscow, was intercepted by the Swedes, after which Gummert was tried and hanged in Narva.].
Gummert's betrayal undermined the confidence of the Russians in foreign officers. It must be said that only foreign officers were in command of the recruited army. They did not know the Russian language, and the soldiers, most of them completely untrained, simply did not understand them. These officers did not know the Russian mentality, did not realize the hatred of the Russians for all foreigners, for their behavior. Once the soldiers publicly stabbed an officer with bayonets and, probably, this was not one case. Therefore, before the first battle, foreign commanders of Russian troops feared their soldiers more than the enemy, with whom they had to fight.
Having learned about the approach of the Swedes to Narva, the liar on November 18 (29), accompanied by Field Marshal F. A. Golovin and Lieutenant A. D. Menshikov, leaves for Novgorod, leaving the command, despite his protest, to Field Marshal Duke de Croix, explaining his departure by the need to organize appropriate reinforcements. There are different opinions of historians about this: some talk about his cowardice, others about his foresight and desire to save the situation of the Russian troops. In Novgorod at that time there were about 10,000 Russian soldiers and another 11,000 Ukrainian Cossacks.
On the night of November 30, 1700, the army of Charles XII, observing complete silence, marched to the Russian positions. His entire army was only 8 430 people, with the opposition of almost 40 thousand Russians. At 10 o'clock in the morning the Russians saw the Swedish troops, who "at the sound of trumpets and timpani, offered a battle with two cannon shots." The Duke de Croix urgently called a council of war. At the council, Sheremetev, pointing out the stretching of the army's positions, suggested leaving part of the troops to blockade the city, and bringing the rest of the army to the field and fighting. This proposal was rejected by the Duke, who declared that the army could not resist the Swedes in the field. The council decided to stay put, which transferred the military initiative into the hands of the Swedish king.
The battle began at 2 pm. Due to heavy snowfall (visibility no more than 20 steps) and the wind in the face of the Russians, the Swedes managed to carry out a surprise attack, coming close to their positions. The first blow was delivered with two deep wedges. Russian troops stood in one line with a length of almost 6 kilometers and, despite the multiple advantage, the defense line was very weak. Half an hour later, the breakthrough was in three places. Swedish grenadiers threw fascines into the ditches and climbed the rampart. Thanks to their speed, pressure and coordination, the Swedes broke into the Russian camp. Panic began in the Russian regiments. Sheremetev's cavalry (at least 4,000 or 5,000) fled and tried to wade across the Narova River. Sheremetev himself escaped, but about 1,000 people drowned in the river. The panic was intensified by the shouts of "Germans are traitors!"as a result, the soldiers rushed to beat the foreign officers. The infantry tried to retreat along the pontoon bridge near Kampergolm Island, but the bridge could not withstand a large crowd of people and collapsed, people began to drown. All this was a precursor to a future defeat.
The commander-in-chief, the Duke de Croix and a number of other foreign officers (General L. N. Allart, Saxon envoy Langen, Colonel of the Preobrazhensky regiment Bloomberg), fleeing from beating by their own soldiers, surrendered to the Swedes.
At the same time, on the right flank, the Preobrazhensky, Semyonovsky and Lefortovo regiments with soldiers from the division of A. M. Golovin who joined them, fenced off with carts and slingshots, put up fierce resistance to the Swedish troops. On the left flank, General Weide's division also repulsed all attacks from the Swedes, and General K. G. Renschild's Swedish column was upset by the fire of the Russian guards. King Charles XII himself appeared on the battlefield, but even his presence, which strengthened the fighting spirit of the soldiers, could not help the Swedes. The Swedish Major General Johan Ribbing was killed in the battle, Generals K. G. Renschild and G. Yu. Maydel were wounded, and two horses were killed under King Charles XII. The battle ended at nightfall.
The night led to an aggravation of the disorder, both in the Russian and in the Swedish troops. Part of the Swedish infantry, breaking into the Russian camp, looted the train and got drunk. In the darkness, two Swedish battalions mistook each other for Russians and engaged in battle. The Russian troops, despite the fact that some of the troops maintained order, suffered from a lack of leadership. There was no connection between the right and left flanks of the Russians.
Charles XII awaited the next morning with great fear, as he was afraid that the Russians would see the small number of his troops at dawn and crush him. But, not without surprise, I saw that Russian envoys were coming to him. The remaining generals - Prince Yakov Dolgorukov, Avtonom Golovin, Ivan Buturlin and General Feldzheikhmeister Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky decided to start negotiations on surrender. General Weide had to do the same. Prince Dolgorukov agreed on the free passage of troops to the right bank with weapons and banners, but without artillery and convoy. Weide's division capitulated only on the morning of December 2, after the second order of Prince Dolgorukov, on conditions of free passage without weapons and banners. Throughout the night from December 1 to December 2, Swedish sappers, together with the Russians, set up crossings. On the morning of December 2, Russian troops left the Swedish bank of the Narova.
As booty, the Swedes received 20,000 muskets and the royal treasury of 32,000 rubles, as well as 210 banners. The Swedes lost 677 people killed and about 1250 were injured. The losses of the Russian army amounted to about 7 thousand people killed, drowned and wounded, including deserters and those killed from hunger and cold (probably, these are incomplete losses) wounded (Great Soviet Encyclopedia ed. 1974 says about the Swedish losses of 3,000 soldiers and Russians up to 8,000) …
After the passage of the main part of the Preobrazhensky and other regiments, the Swedes pounced on the remaining disarmed part of the Russians and took them prisoner. In violation of the terms of surrender, the Swedes remained in captivity 700 people, of which 10 generals, 10 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 7 majors, 14 captains, 7 lieutenants, 4 warrant officers, 4 sergeants, 9 fireworks and a bombardier, etc. And this was only the beginning all the deceit and deceit, not only of the Swedes, but also of all the new allies of the liar.
The Russian army suffered a heavy defeat: a significant amount of artillery was lost, heavy casualties were suffered, and the command staff suffered greatly. In Europe, the Russian army was no longer perceived as a serious force for several years, and Charles XII received the glory of a great commander. On the other hand, this tactical victory sowed the seed of Sweden's future defeat - Charles XII believed that he had defeated the Russians for a long time and greatly underestimated them right up to Poltava.
Symbolically, the Battle of Narva corresponded to the sacrifice of Russian soldiers to future European wars. Europe, as reported by Russian ambassadors from its capitals after these events, only made fun of the absurd weakness and stupidity of the Russian army.
The defeat at Narva greatly worsened both the military and foreign policy position of Russia. False Peter repeatedly tried, through the mediation of Austrian and French diplomats, to make peace with Charles XII. But these attempts remained unanswered, probably, they either did not reach the addressee, or were in the most unacceptable and distorted form. The "allies" did not allow the liar to escape from the captivity of obligations and did not want to lose such a gratuitous and profitable vassal like Russia.
In August 1704, after a 4-month siege, Narva was taken by assault in just one day with official losses of 350 people. killed and 1340 wounded (according to other sources, only 3,000 people), but despite this victory, Russian troubles were just beginning.