At the 25th Anniversary Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, which opens on Friday, it will be a question of changing the world system. What awaits the world order in the near future and how will Russia's relations with Europe, the United States and China develop? Rossiyskaya Gazeta talks about this with the Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and World Politics at the Higher School of Economics Sergei Karaganov and Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Fedor Lukyanov.
Nuclear weapons save the world
Fedor Lukyanov: Changes in the world inevitably lead not to some kind of temporary fluctuation, but to a fundamental shift in the geopolitical system. For many years it was generally accepted that the changes taking place in the world are a regular correction, after which everything will level out. Nobody talks about it now. It turned out that the number of changes turned into quality. The visual embodiment of this "quality" was probably US President Donald Trump, a man who, according to all forecasts, should not have become an American leader, but has become. Naturally, this is not the reason for what is happening, this is the product. Trump's election demonstrated the rejection by the population of the leading Western countries of the policies that were carried out before.
But maybe this is still only a temporary correction of the world order?
Sergei Karaganov: No, this is a global breakdown of the system, and at the same time a breakdown of the old unipolar world, which was established in the first fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Until now, we have all lived in a world in which we looked at ourselves and the world order largely through the eyes of the West and through the prism of theories generated by the West, including those explaining international relations. These theories don't work anymore.
And now we need to develop our own theoretical mechanism to explain this new world. We do not say yet what this new world will be like, although I do not believe that it is unpredictable. I am convinced that it is predictable. All the talk about the collapse of the liberal order looks ridiculous: the old order was not so liberal and free. It is not excluded that the next order will in fact be much freer.
When discussing system change, we will also touch on the new role of nuclear weapons. Until now, according to the theories that existed in the West and which we accepted, it was believed that nuclear weapons are an absolute evil, which means that they must be limited and eliminated. We will propose a different approach: nuclear weapons are, of course, evil if used. But at the same time, it saves the world. And the main task of humanity is not the elimination of nuclear weapons, but the strengthening of nuclear and other types of deterrence in order to prevent a world war.
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Fyodor Lukyanov: The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy is, one might say, the result of the previous change of the system, when there was a radical breakdown of the order that had existed at the very least for several decades. We remember well how it ended for our country. And on these, one might say, ruins, it was necessary to restore everything, including the intellectual discussion about the new system, in order to understand who we are, who they are and who is who in the world. 25 years ago, Sergei Karaganov and a group of like-minded people created the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.
Sergei Karaganov: We tried to prevent the country's crazy run to the West, to correct Russian policy. We were probably more focused on the domestic Russian agenda, that is, on adjusting Russian foreign policy from within. There were other functions of the Council, which now, thank God, are not so relevant, for example, the integration of the military and security officials, who were then under a terrible blow, into the new Russia. Then we set a completely obvious task - to create a connection between the elites that were destroyed.
Fyodor Lukyanov: With regard to ties between the elites, of course, now the situation is completely different, not post-revolutionary. But the problem remains, because after the events in Ukraine, society and its intellectual part are strongly polarized. Now, it is not a consensus that is beginning to grope, but a baseline towards which both the reasonable part of those who are considered to be liberals and the reasonable part of those who are called conservatives or statists are inclined. I hope this dialogue will be strengthened.
Does Europe have to pay
Sergei Karaganov: Once upon a time the members of the Council were called liberal imperialists. It was the mid-90s. I must say that then it was a dirty word, but we were proud of it. Now Russia is faced with the task of turning to the East and transforming itself into a great Eurasian power. It is necessary to integrate this direction with the European direction, which is fundamental for Russia, from a cultural point of view, because the majority of the Russian elite has traditionally been fixated on Europe for 300 years. And this provincialized Russia, we viewed ourselves as a "non-European", aspired to it and were ready to pay for membership in this "club". The heaviest payment was made by Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
But now we are beginning to feel like a full-fledged Eurasian power. How to move on? One of the options is some kind of detachment from Europe so that we understand ourselves. Another option is to transform Russia into the center of Eurasia. At the same time, it is perfectly clear that we will need to discuss the question of how, at some next stage, to establish new relations with Europe, from the position of new confidence, new strength.
But today one gets the impression that it is not we who are moving away from Europe, but Europe is moving away from us, deliberately demonizing Russia
Fyodor Lukyanov: Over the past 25 years, Russian thought, in an accelerated and slightly caricatured form, has traveled the path that Russian thinkers traveled throughout the 19th century. And we in Russia came to very clear conclusions: Europe is a very important partner, but we are not part of it and the entrance ticket to this “club” is not for sale.
Sergey Karaganov: This is the first. And secondly, we have now come to the conclusion that in principle there is no need to buy anything. For the first time in Russian history, it became obvious that we do not have to join this "club" called Europe. The "club" has become a little different, and a significant part of the Russian elite, and society now absolutely does not want to join it, since we have got rid of the feeling of inferiority.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Getting rid of, let's just say, let's not get ahead of events.
Sergei Karaganov: Getting rid of this is not easy, and I call it the emancipation of Russia.
How can we build relations with this club?
Sergey Karaganov: Make friends. But we will be doing this in the coming years. Russia's turn to the East, which began in the late 2000s, has largely taken place, at least in the minds of the elite. And the next stage, probably at a new stage, will be the return of Europe. But, most likely, from a common Eurasian position, including from the position of the new Russian power and some self-confidence. Well, at the same time we will see what happens in Europe, because for a very long time a significant part of our Russian elite did not want to understand this. Simply because they loved Europe.
What, from your point of view, awaits Europe today? Will it stay the same? How long will Russophobic sentiments remain in it, turning into paranoia in relation to Russia and everything Russian?
Sergey Karaganov: This inner paranoia exists. It is associated with the deepest moral, political and economic crisis in Europe itself. This is the internal paranoia of Europe, with the temporary, I hope, desire of a significant part of the European elites to contain the collapse of the European project by creating a common enemy. The 90 percent sanctions against Russia are an inward-looking action to contain the sprawling European Union. In this sense, Europe's line is not anti-Russian. This is an intra-European policy.
Fyodor Lukyanov: In the years of our recent history, we are running from one extreme to another. For some reason, either we expect from Europe and from ourselves in Europe hugs and complete merging in ecstasy, and when this does not happen, we are indignant and say that we are not Europeans at all! This, in my opinion, is evidence of uncertainty.
But the theory of international relations teaches us that there is no such thing as friendship, brotherhood. There are interests, objective laws in the interaction of states and groups of states. And they are unemotional. Of course, factors related to personalities and historical experience are overlapping. But in general, the one who is more cool-headed and not charged to see personal insult everywhere wins. The sooner we understand this, the easier it will be. And with Europe as well. Because the problem of Russia's relations with Europe is the problem of unrequited love, which for some reason we are constantly trying to revive.
Sergei Karaganov: Our European friends hoped that they would be able to abandon such concepts as the sphere of interests, the sphere of control, but they did not succeed. This worldview is bursting at the seams. And we in Russia just need to calmly observe the processes in Europe. And to implement the policy of national interests already with the understanding that in the modern world it is senseless and harmful to pursue a policy against everyone.
Slavic brotherhood or national interests
Sergei Karaganov: I am not sure that the Slavic brotherhood, despite the fact that I support Slavic culture and its unity, is a viable path for the politics of great Russia.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Many are now beginning to believe that European integration in the form it was in the second half of the 20th century or at the beginning of the 21st century is ending or has already ended. The world has already set a precedent for the contraction rather than expansion of the Union with the beginning of Britain's exit from the EU. This means that the conditional periphery of the European Union - Eastern or Central Europe, and first of all the Balkans, where there were especially many passions for "little brothers", seem to hang in the air. To be honest, I don't really believe in Europe of many speeds. Although the authors of this theory beautifully describe how it will be, but as soon as someone from the European countries is officially told that they are “second class”, a united Europe ceases to be united. Still, European integration had a very powerful ideological charge. The mythology of equalitywhere the smallest and largest country in Europe were equal in rights. As soon as they give up this in Europe, everything will start to creep apart. And here, in my opinion, Russia may have a very dangerous temptation to help "brothers" who always rush to us for help in difficult cases. Or, which is also quite dangerous, in a sense to take revenge in order to prove that what happened to Eastern Europe at the end of the 20th century after the collapse of the USSR was a random phenomenon, not a natural one. In my opinion, if we try to engage in such revanchism in Eastern Europe, it will not lead to anything good. And most importantly, it will lead Russia away from the main task that we talked about. Russia may have a very dangerous temptation to help "brothers" who always rush to us for help in difficult cases. Or, which is also quite dangerous, in a sense to take revenge in order to prove that what happened to Eastern Europe at the end of the 20th century after the collapse of the USSR was a random phenomenon, not natural. In my opinion, if we try to engage in such revanchism in Eastern Europe, it will not lead to anything good. And most importantly, it will lead Russia away from the main task that we talked about. Russia may have a very dangerous temptation to help "brothers" who always rush to us for help in difficult cases. Or, which is also quite dangerous, in a sense to take revenge in order to prove that what happened to Eastern Europe at the end of the 20th century after the collapse of the USSR was a random phenomenon, not natural. In my opinion, if we try to engage in such revanchism in Eastern Europe, it will not lead to anything good. And most importantly, it will lead Russia away from the main task that we talked about.if we try to engage in such revanchism in Eastern Europe, it will not lead to anything good. And most importantly, it will lead Russia away from the main task that we talked about.if we try to engage in such revanchism in Eastern Europe, it will not lead to anything good. And most importantly, it will lead Russia away from the main task that we talked about.
Sergei Karaganov: The future of Russia is definitely not in European squabbles, which will only grow. If Europe follows the path of two speeds, that is, a center stands out, which will be real Europe, and everything else is set aside, then the European Union will collapse. But if Europe does not have two speeds, if a hard center is not allocated, then the European Union will also fall apart. Therefore, our forecast for the European Union is, unfortunately, disappointing. But, unfortunately, Europe, which is returning to its history, that is, to a Europe consisting of nation states, the struggle of great powers with each other, is Europe of the past world. And God forbid her past to be repeated in the future. We must remember that all the most monstrous religious wars, two world wars, two anti-human civilizations, the most anti-human ideologies were born in Europe.
EU leaders blame the possible collapse of Europe on the new US President Donald Trump.
Sergei Karaganov: Objective circumstances are destroying Europe, as well as the mistakes that were committed by the European Union. Of these main objective circumstances, from my point of view, the most important is that the European Union has followed the path of so-called liberal democracy. And, accordingly, integration. And it turned out that Russia was on the right side of history, and our neighbors in the European Union were on the wrong side. Despite fierce criticism, Russia is now gaining a lot.
Russia and the United States are doomed to enmity
Fedor Lukyanov: What does it mean, doomed or not doomed to be enemies? Once we wanted to become best friends with America, which is impossible. Now we say that we are doomed to be enemies. Why enemies? Observing the development of Soviet-American, and then Russian-American relations since the 1950s, I see one hundred percent repeatability. The same trajectory all the time. Which suggests that it is not about political systems or the personalities of leaders, although they can somehow influence the situation. The point is in some systemic things.
In my opinion, what Trump is doing will not affect US-Russian relations per se, they are, unfortunately, or fortunately, very stable. This will affect the world. Here is the change of the system. And this will result in some other quality of relations between Russia and the United States, but not directly, but as the next step.
Sergei Karaganov: Relations between Russia and the United States have been abnormal over the past four years. The enmity was high, there was no dialogue at all. And now we are returning to more or less normal relations. There will be rivalry, mistrust, but it looks like there is some dialogue and cooperation. America needs to understand that Russia is a secondary problem for it. And for Russia, which we do not fully understand, it should be admitted that America is a secondary problem for us. We are probably more interested in what is happening in Eurasia.
I hope that the situation will one day lead to the fact that the three remaining capable powers - Russia, the United States and China - will begin a systematic conversation to solve three or four major global problems and settle relations with each other.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Why is the change of the world system important in relation to our relations with the United States? Today the problem is not that the United States somehow treats us badly or well. The problem is that Washington holds the "keys" to virtually everything in the world. But as a result of the outlined changes in the world, these "keys" will disperse among a wider circle of "key holders" from among the world powers.
Sergey Karaganov: I don't quite agree. Our latest research, including the American policy of sanctions, has shown that Washington does not have "keys" either. They bluff a lot when they say they can impose a policy of sanctions. There are many ways to get around them. But Russia's national policy in this situation is to create an international system in which the United States will have less opportunity to impose anything.
America in recent years has played a destructive role for the so-called globalization and the so-called world economic order. Because it was losing, trying to use interdependence unilaterally, destroying what had been created in previous decades. In our economic strategy, together with other countries, we need to create parallel and complementary systems that would deprive Washington of its ability to have a destructive impact on the world economy. If we finally have a second SWIFT, if we have many operating systems, if we have the ability to work in many currencies, then this will become possible.
Should Russia be afraid of a possible arms race with the West? And the Cold War that accompanies this race?
Sergei Karaganov: The Soviet Union took part in the arms race, on which it spent almost a quarter of the gross national product. Now we are spending 5 or 6 percent of the budget … I am convinced that we should not participate in the arms race, in the military sphere there are many effective asymmetric responses.
Fyodor Lukyanov: I hope that the lessons of history are still being learned. Not to mention the fact that now is a completely different world. "Cold War" as a state of mind, we can still talk about it. But the "cold war" as a definite structure of the international system is unique.
Sergei Karaganov: In Europe, there was and is still in a dying state an attempt to restore the bilateral confrontation of the Cold War. We played along a little with this, acting within the framework of the old interaction system. We even still play along. For example, why did Russia recognize NATO as a legitimate partner in a situation when the alliance committed several obvious acts of aggression? Military dialogue - for God's sake, but no more. Why has Russia been clinging to the OSCE for many years, when it has already become clear that the Western partners are against the creation of a common European security system? Now we see a paradigm shift in Europe, a vacuum is forming there, but this vacuum seems to me creative, because in 5-6 years it will need to be filled, and the old systems that served and reproduced the Cold War need to be gradually pushed aside.
Fyodor Lukyanov: The Cold War was at the time of the triumph of symmetry. The world has now entered an era of asymmetry in every sense. Some countries, which in general cannot and should not play a significant role in world politics in any way, are suddenly beginning to do this, like, for example, Qatar.
Suddenly it turned out that with significant financial resources, a tiny country can dictate quite a lot of things in a certain area. So to get involved in an arms race, that is, in a race for symmetry, in my opinion, is contrary to the logic of the times.
Sergei Karaganov: We still call on our partners at the highest level to equal cooperation and interaction. But why do we need equal rights? We need a mutually beneficial - yes, exactly, a partnership that is beneficial to us in the first place. Moreover, I find it humiliating to seek equitable cooperation from countries whose policies cause me sarcastic contempt.
What to offer us to China
Sergei Karaganov: Russia's turn to the East is proceeding at a tremendous speed. We turn not because we wanted to be loved there, but because there are profitable markets. This is the first thing. Second, we have amazing relations with most of the countries of the East. They are semi-allied with China, but we have now come to the conclusion that we have good relations with almost all the states surrounding China. This is called a friendly hug of the environment. This is the correct policy. In South Asia, in the Pacific Ocean, where old contradictions appear and new ones grow, a demand is being formed for a relatively powerful external player. We will answer this request. We are even going too slowly where we should have gone 20 years ago. But the main thing is that the turn to the East took place in the brains of the Russian ruling elite: from a provincial European it turned into a Eurasian one,Eurasian, looking at the world from a completely different point of view. This is a major achievement.
We propose the creation of a greater Eurasia in which, thanks to a network of ties and balances, China will be a leading power, but not a hegemon. If this does not happen, then in 10-15 years a significant part of Asia may unite against China.
What can we offer China?
Sergey Karaganov: We offer China, like China to us, a tight strategic alliance. This is the first thing. Second: safe ways of transporting goods and raw materials, which is very important. And thirdly, we are the main providers of security in the region. In order to play the role of a security provider, you need to have many years of international experience. We have it, China does not.
Will the Big Three appear?
Fedor Lukyanov: The world has changed dramatically over the past 10 years. Could it have been imagined 20 years ago that a super-loyal NATO member like Turkey would pursue a policy as if NATO did not exist at all? Another example is Japan. It is inextricably linked to the United States for a variety of reasons. But this does not prevent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe from either convincing the United States of the importance of relations with Russia to Japan, or simply ignoring American objections: as we know, former US President Barack Obama has repeatedly urged Abe not to go to Russia and not to invite Vladimir Putin to Japan. … But Abe responded by saying that this is Japan's national interest, and the Americans were forced to put up with it.
Sergei Karaganov: The world will change also because the United States does not want to pay more for protection to weaker states, receiving only moral benefits from this. Trump put it simply: money for a barrel or less patronage. The deal between America and Europe, and to a large extent between the United States and Japan, was in a very simple formula: Americans pay for the security of these countries, while maintaining confrontation so that these countries feel in danger. And for this they get loyalty. But now the old schemes cannot be restored. America will leave Europe anyway. This departure will take place, because the world for which the old system of relations was created no longer exists.
At the beginning of our conversation, you said that, despite the breakdown of the old system, the new world looks predictable. But is it possible, in principle, to talk about predictability in the presence of a "powder keg of the world" - the Middle East?
Fyodor Lukyanov: Predictability lies in the understanding that the "powder keg" will inevitably explode at some point.
Sergei Karaganov: Ten years ago it was clear that confrontation with the West would grow. And then the Russian leadership made a decision on a program for Russia's rearmament. If it had not been, a great war would have taken place now. It is also necessary to act in the Middle East, understanding the objective circumstances prevailing there, which can lead to an explosion. But, perhaps, the great powers - the United States, China, Russia, involving other regional players, will agree on how to behave in this region. Maybe this will be the basis for talking about the Big Three so that local explosions do not lead to what is called the Third World War.
If we compete there, then this absolutely unpromising strategy for all may lead to the fact that the cumulative effect of regional explosions will lead to a monstrous explosion for all.
Fyodor Lukyanov has been the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine since its foundation in 2002. Chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy of Russia since 2012. Research Professor at the Higher School of Economics. Scientific Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Graduate of the Faculty of Philology of Moscow State University, since 1990 - international journalist.
Sergey Karaganov is an international scholar, honorary chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, chairman of the editorial board of the Russia in Global Affairs magazine. Dean of the Faculty of World Politics and Economics, National Research University Higher School of Economics.