Public perception of history is an understandable sequence of notable events that have been fixed in the minds of people since school. In this sense, the history of space exploration of the USSR is a satellite, Gagarin's flight and a series of different automatic space stations, which merge into one epic, the most striking chapters of which are photos of the far side of the Moon, lunar rovers and landing on Venus. We propose to go beyond this perception and look at well-known events from the inside, through the eyes of Soviet engineers, who exactly 60 years ago created the first communication line in the history of mankind with spacecraft flying to the Moon. The archive document “Draft design of the system for radio monitoring of the orbit of the object“E-1”is published for the first time, provided to us by the Russian Space Systems Holding (RCS).
Several generations of employees of the enterprise, which was formerly called NII-885, left marks on its first pages, demanding not to destroy the original and keep it for history. And now the time for this document has come.
"E-1" is the index assigned by the Special Design Bureau No. 1 (OKB-1) to the stations that were supposed to be the first to go to the Moon. Sergey Korolev proposed the lunar exploration program in 1957 shortly after the launch of the first satellite. Events then developed very rapidly: less than a year after Sputnik-1, the USSR had already made the first attempt to launch the apparatus to the Moon.
From the government decree on the creation of a lunar station and a three-stage rocket 8K72 based on the R-7 rocket to the first attempt to launch the E-1, only six months passed. Scientists and engineers worked in a state of constant time pressure.
The size and shape of the E-1 series vehicles were similar to those of the first Earth satellite. Their task was simply to "get" to the moon, and on the way to collect information about radioactivity, magnetic fields and the gas component of interplanetary matter. This posed several very complex tasks at once, the main of which was the creation of a space rocket and the development of its control over huge distances. Their solution was supposed to give Soviet scientists the necessary experience for further study of the planets of the solar system. The enthusiasm was tremendous, but from a technical point of view in the late 1950s, this task seemed almost fantastic:
"Determination of the parameters of the rocket movement and the transmission of information from it to the Earth must be carried out at distances two orders of magnitude greater than the distances for which similar systems have been developed so far in jet technology and in other related areas."
Don't miss the moment
Promotional video:
The key and one of the most difficult technical tasks of this mission was the timely shutdown of the engines. The choice of the correct torque depended on the accuracy of the speed determination. An error in its determination by only one meter per second deflected the trajectory by 250 kilometers. It was necessary to launch the rocket at a well-defined time, very precisely control its trajectory and speed, and give the command to turn off the engines at the right time.
Here is how Boris Chertok describes it in his book "Rockets and People":
“Possible errors of the autonomous system for turning off the second stage engines - from the integrator of longitudinal accelerations - exceeded the permissible ones. Therefore, from the very beginning, it was decided to use the radio control system to turn off the engine by measuring the speed and coordinates."
Truncated reflector of the Crimean expedition of FIAN.
The extreme complexity of solving this problem is stated in the Draft Design of the E-1 Object Orbit Radio Monitoring System:
"Such a complex problem can be solved in a relatively short time only in combination with a radio control system, which should ensure at the end of the active section of the trajectory, the measurement of six motion parameters with accuracy sufficient to solve the problem - hitting the moon."
According to the engineers, it was impossible to maintain the accuracy of determining the parameters of the movement, which were originally intended, but it should have been enough accuracy to hit the moon. In addition, the air-to-ground radio link was supposed to transmit signals from the RTS-12A telemetry systems (on the active part of the trajectory) and RTS-12B (on the passive part of the trajectory) installed on board the E-1.
Link to the unknown
The difficulty in creating a radio link, which is directly in the document called by its developers "the weakest link" E-1 ", consisted in the error in signal transmission through the Earth's atmosphere, which influenced the determination of the coordinates and speed of the object. This problem is still relevant, especially for satellite navigation systems, and at the end of the 1950s, its solution was just getting started.
The model of the automatic interplanetary station "Luna-3", launched on October 4, 1959 and for the first time transmitted to the Earth an image of the far side of the Moon.
But things got worse as they approached the moon. If the effects of the influence of the earth's atmosphere and magnetic field on radio waves were at least known, then no one knew what to expect from the moon:
"When the object" E-1 "passes in the area of immediate proximity to the Moon, additional errors may occur in radio measurements of its coordinates and velocity due to the Moon's ionosphere, the existence of which should be assumed."
The first convincing evidence of the existence of the ionosphere around the Moon was provided in the 1970s by the Soviet spacecraft Luna 19 and Luna 22.
The composition of the lunar soil was known very approximately:
“When calculating the values of the reflection coefficient and gain in the direction of the sounding radio transmitter due to the irregularities of the lunar surface, it is necessary to know the chemical composition and structure of the lunar surface. In the literature, the most common opinion is that the lunar surface is solid volcanic rocks, similar in composition to the earth's, which are covered with a layer of dust about several millimeters thick. An experimental test of such a structure was carried out under terrestrial conditions."
Contact
To carry out the E-1 mission, it was necessary to maintain radio communication with the apparatus at a distance of hundreds of thousands of kilometers. This required powerful terrestrial transmitting and receiving antennas with an effective area of at least 400 square meters. There were no antennas specially created for such purposes, let alone communication systems, at that time, and Soviet scientists improvised. To begin with, I had to admit that the equipment that I would like to have to complete the task does not and will not be:
“Such an effective area is possessed by a parabolic reflector with a diameter of at least 30 meters. Currently, we do not have operating antennas with such parameters. It is also impossible to develop and manufacture such antennas and especially rotary devices in azimuth and elevation for them within the timeframes provided for the E-1 facility. In this regard, it is necessary to find a compromise technical solution. Currently, the domestic industry does not produce rotary devices that allow the rotation of 12 by 12 antennas in azimuth and elevation. Therefore, with a limited time frame for the development and manufacture of terrestrial antennas, it is advisable to use rotary devices from captured "Big Würzburg" or SCR-627 radar stations ".
Parabolic reflector with a diameter of 7.5 meters from the captured "Greater Würzburg" radar.
"Big Würzburg" - fighter aircraft guidance stations, which, along with a complete set of design documentation, were taken out by Soviet specialists from Germany. The American radar SCR-627 with a capacity of 225 kilowatts was supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease during the Great Patriotic War. Both of these antennas required significant improvements.
At the same time, a very important issue for the northern country was being solved with the placement of a new complex. It was necessary to choose the point with the maximum elevation of the object "E-1" above the horizon. The southern part of the European territory of the USSR was suitable for this requirement. The Crimean expedition of FIAN in the city of Simeiz was chosen. There were already two reflectors with an effective area of 70 and 120 square meters, respectively, and there was a parabolic reflector from the captured Big Würzburg radar, on the rotating device of which it was possible to put a new antenna (the antenna installed on it with a diameter of 7 meters was deemed insufficient):
Installation diagrams of the ground station for receiving and transmitting information to "E-1".
“The real possibility of using ready-made radio astronomy antenna devices of the Physical Institute of the Academy of Sciences in the area of the city of Simeiz (Crimea) with some alterations makes it possible to place a measuring point there. In this case, radio means will monitor three sections of the passive part of the trajectory: the beginning - according to the radio control system, the middle - 12 + 200 thousand kilometers and the end - 320 + 400 thousand kilometers according to the measurements of the radio monitoring system. The equipment for measuring range, speed and telemetry, antennas for which are created on the basis of rotary devices such as "Big Würzburg" and SCR-627, will be located on Mount Koshka."
The receiving part of the ground equipment was supposed to be mounted permanently, and the transmitting part was to be placed on the chassis of a ZIL-151 car.
Installation diagrams of the ground station for receiving and transmitting information to "E-1". The receiving and recording part of the ground equipment was mounted permanently, and the transmitting devices - on the chassis of a ZIL-151 car.
So in the USSR, the first communication point in the history of mankind appeared with an interplanetary space station, which was the main one until the creation of a new space communication center near Evpatoria. In Simeiz, they learned about the fall of the first man-made apparatus on the moon and received the first photo of the far side of the moon.
Reach the Moon The first "lunarists", as their creators called "E-1", did not even have names, only an index. Only two of the seven vehicles have been awarded a place in history, those that managed to reach the Moon. Luna 1 (the fourth attempt to launch E-1) took place 6,000 kilometers from the Moon. When issuing the command to cut off the engine of the third stage (block "E"), which was issued from the Earth, the time of signal passage from the command post to the station was not taken into account.
Rotating device of the "627" type with a 10x6 meter in-phase belt installed on it.
Nevertheless, it was a great success for the USSR, which was celebrated all over the world, but the creators of the radio line were unhappy: the radio control did not work perfectly and did not hit the moon. What happened was perfectly described by Boris Chertok:
“But the radio team was late! Then, of course, they figured out that the ground radio control stations - RUPs - were to blame. The third stage, together with the lunar container and the pennant, did not hit the Moon, the miss was 6000 kilometers - about one and a half times the diameter of the Moon. The rocket entered its independent orbit around the Sun, became a satellite, becoming the world's first artificial planet of the solar system. The January launch was a very good rehearsal and training session for all of us. The work of the third stage was fully tested for the first time. It turned out to be very useful to check the radio communication system, receive the telemetry of the container, process the results of the operational determination of its coordinates, establish the interaction of the complex of measuring instruments, the orbit control service and computing centers. All onboard equipment worked well."
Truncated parabolic reflector of the FIAN Crimean expedition.
The data transmitted from the device made it possible to establish the absence of a magnetic field on the Moon, the radiation level was measured, and the parameters of the solar wind were investigated. The on-board radio complex transmitted signals to Earth up to a distance of more than 500 thousand kilometers and fell silent only when the batteries were completely empty: 62 hours after the launch, despite the fact that they were designed for only 40 hours.
However, this was not a complete success. The leadership of the USSR demanded that the first, before the Americans, get to the surface of the moon. This was achieved at the most suitable political moment for this - during Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959.
However, this coincidence was rather an accident. In total, during the year before this, the USSR launched six stations towards the moon. In four cases, accidents occurred in the first five minutes of the launch vehicle flight.
The device "Luna-2".
Another launch did not take place due to the removal of a faulty launch vehicle from the launch pad. But in September, the start was successful and at exactly the appointed time (only 1 second later than planned). All systems worked perfectly and at 00:02:24 on September 14, all signals at the station in Simeiz and at the telemetry stations of Baikonur were abruptly cut off - Luna-2 crashed into the Earth's satellite.
* * *
We invite you to flip through the electronic version of the document and feel the spirit of Soviet engineers of the middle of the last century, who, having much less resources and capabilities than their American counterparts, were able to win the first part of the lunar race.
Author: Vladimir Koryagin
