A military strategy professor at Johns Hopkins University writes about the US-China standoff in the South China Sea. Using examples from the past, the author describes how Xi Jinping can oust the United States from this sea without using military force. He believes that Beijing has every chance of achieving its goal.
The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said: “Winning 100 victories in 100 battles is not the pinnacle of skill. The pinnacle of skill is to bring the enemy into submission without a fight. It seems that his descendants do just that today in the South China Sea with the United States of America.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping implements the classic component of the strategy, overpowering the enemy in a completely unexpected way - with military ceremonies. This "ceremonial strategy" could provide China with a victory that overshadows real-world success.
How it works? Rituals, symbolic military actions and events replace decisions to conduct battles and battles, and as a result, the enemy cedes his power and influence. In other words, the enemy must agree to “submit” without starting a war. How can this be achieved? There are certain parameters.
- The parties to the conflict must be equal in strength opponents who fought with each other in the past. Neither side has any particular desire to fight again.
- The parties to the conflict are trying to prevent military escalation.
- Thus, the parties can agree to unofficial guidelines for military confrontation, which is below the level of a real war.
- The attacker succeeds because he knows that the other side has more motives to avoid fighting. Several factors combine to create a willingness to submit.
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- There are measures to save prestige, masking or making it easier for the enemy to subjugate, and they are proposed by the attacker.
Such ceremonial campaigns can be as important as the wars themselves. Three stories from history show how this is possible.
Great Britain supports the Confederation and destroys the American merchant fleet (1861-1872)
When the United States split apart, Britain backed the Confederate States of America with gold and arms. She built the most modern cruisers, manned the crews with English sea wolves and tore apart Union trade to shreds. To do this, the armored British ships went to Bermuda, where blockade violators and pirates took refuge.
Prime Minister Lord Palmerston's strategy was to prevent America from becoming a rival and equal to Britain. In doing so, he pursued three goals. First, give the CSA the weapons they need to defeat the Union armies and secure their independence. Second, if this goal is not achieved, ensure that the war between the South and the North continues so that the struggle to reunite America will tie the nation hand and foot for years to come. Third, he wanted to destroy the American merchant fleet, which at the time represented the greatest threat to British naval power.
Success would be a powerful blow to the United States, threatening its existence. At the same time, a direct collision could have been avoided. In this case, the second and third goals would be achieved. Why did this strategy work? For Lincoln, a second bitter war was unacceptable, as was the existence of an independent Confederation. Plus, Britain was willing to pay for the damages (although the monetary fine was a trifle compared to the benefits that a strategic victory gave Britain).
Great Britain prevented the Russians from taking Constantinople
In February 1878, Russian armies attacked one of the most valuable cities in history (it is also the capital of the Ottoman Empire). It seemed that nothing could interfere with the plans of the king. And suddenly on Valentine's Day, six battleships emerged from a blizzard and anchored in the Sea of Marmara. Six battleships with obsolete cannons stopped history.
Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's strategy was to prevent Russia from declaring a new Byzantium in the Balkans. The British were furious at the excesses of the Bashi-bazouks (remember the brutal suppression of the April Uprising in Bulgaria), and did not want to fight with Russia, which had become the savior of the Bulgarians. However, the entire British "state within a state" wished Russia defeat, and the Ottomans salvation. Therefore, battleships appeared in the Dardanelles. Why did they succeed? Disraeli understood that the Romanovs would not want to enter another humiliating war with Britain for the sake of triumph in Constantinople. He managed to give the society and the ruling elite what they wanted. And all thanks to a graceful demonstration: an iron fist in a velvet glove. But Disraeli gave Russia a way out that allowed her to save her reputation. It was the Berlin Congress of the Great Powers.
The Third Reich between October 1933 and March 1939 turned the defeated Germany into the ruler of Europe
Adolf Hitler organized and conducted 10 lightning-fast and mostly ceremonial campaigns that changed the balance of power in Europe by mixing various forms of public coercion. Declarative statements, military parades, theatrical diplomatic missions, urgent negotiations. The culmination of all this was invariably a military triumph, as in a victorious war. And not a single shot was fired.
Hitler, with his strategy of ceremonies, achieved more than Bismarck did with bloody wars. Success depended on an assessment of the enemy's reaction. Of the 11 ceremonial campaigns conducted by the Fuehrer, 10 were successful (Mussolini in 1934 opposed the attempt of the Austrian Anschluss, and he succeeded). Hitler dismantled the European security system, restored the power and authority of Germany, and presented the Western allies with the threat of shameful defeat. Why did he do it? Hitler knew that the Allies were not ready to fight in an economic crisis. But he also felt that their societies did not even want to think about another big war. It took the Allies six years to abandon the onerous system of negative perceptions of "war to end all wars" and enter World War II. Hitler in every possible way slowed down this shift in worldview, insisting that every concession is a step towards peace.
What are the parameters of Xi Jinping, with the help of which he intends to reach the pinnacle of skill and defeat the United States in the South China Sea? Let's get a look.
- The United States and China are equal in strength, and since 1950 they have fought each other twice. Moreover, the strategic position of the United States is weakening, as was the case of Britain during the Palmerston era. In 1861, the United States was as strong as China is today, and had fought Britain twice before.
- The United States and China have interconnected economies - like America and Britain in 1861. Both countries fear that disputes between them could escalate into disastrous war.
- During the rivalry for the South China Sea, neither side has irrevocably violated the rules of the game - yet.
- From 2009 to 2017, the US tried to appease China. Today, covid-19 threatens to paralyze American society, as it did with Britain and France in 1933-1939.
“China can offer the US options to save its reputation and prestige, and it also has many opportunities to bribe neighboring countries if tensions with America escalate.
Do Xi Jinping's goals in the South China Sea match the parameters of the ceremonial campaign? He definitely wants to turn this sea into a Chinese lake, as the US did with the Caribbean in the 1890s. He wants to bribe and threaten to force neighboring states to recognize the dominion of China at sea and the primacy of the Chinese in their "near abroad". Ultimately, Xi seeks to undermine the US-led coalition that is holding back China's hold on the East Asian seas. Finally, he wants to change the Anglo-American global maritime order by weakening the norms and institutions of international law.
China is capable of achieving the first and second goals, and possibly the third, for which it will have to take great risks. China can achieve the latter goal only in the unlikely event that the United States begins a worldwide retreat. Once again, history provides us with important clues about the balance of power and the course of the game.
By not opposing China's aggressive construction of artificial islands from the outset, the United States under President Obama has effectively recognized the legitimacy of Xi's venture. Moreover, the United States did not dispute the militarization of these islands. Now China has moved to the second stage, and now its navy and coast guard are seeking to consolidate Beijing's sovereignty over the entire South China Sea. Ceremonial demonstrations of Chinese authority over this sea could lead to violence and crisis.
But China can offer economic compromises (essentially bribery) in exchange for "formal" recognition of Chinese sovereignty. If the United States cannot defend the claims of Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam without the risk of unleashing a war, then these countries will have only one choice: to accept the Chinese compensation. Of course, American warships may come to the region. But the confrontation can only continue to the point when the situation starts to spiral out of control. Will the Americans agree to the daily use of force at sea?
The US-led coalition is entering a period of enormous risks. If we cannot fully represent and protect our allies' interests, they may decide it is better to make peace with China on its terms. This means that American destroyers can cruise as much as they like in these waters, pompously demonstrating their resistance to Chinese aggression. And the bitter truth will be that everyone else will have to notify the Chinese coast guard that ship X will sail such and such a course on such and such a day, and obtain all the necessary permits for such a passage. And how, in such a situation, can we convince Japan, South Korea and especially Taiwan that the US is, of course, there for them?
In truth, we are already running out of options in confronting Xi Jinping. The conduct of operations to ensure freedom of navigation and little military aid to the states of the region is a weak ceremonial response to China, and our navies do not have the powerful trump cards that Disraeli had. The basis of the Chinese claim is practical occupation. The sudden seizure and seizure of territories grows into lasting sovereignty.
We can always leave and let our allies take care of themselves in their own region. But if we want to maintain our strategic positions there, we have the opportunity to do so. However, at the very beginning, we did not use the opportunity to oppose Xi and rally international institutions to fight the Chinese strategy, and therefore now we have only limited opportunities, and we can only use them at great risk to ourselves. What are these opportunities?
“We can accept, prepare for, the violent clashes at sea that arise during a crisis, and prepare friends and allies to act as a united front when the time comes.
“We can strengthen the naval power of the Philippines and Vietnam with great efforts and significant investments.
“We can work directly with Taiwan at the peak of our technology to prevent China from slowly encircling the island and intimidating it.
“We can, together with Japan and South Korea, invest and significantly strengthen the defense of the islands, making our contribution to their sovereignty.
History shows that the current position of the United States is most similar to that of Britain and France in the late 1930s. We lost the beginning of the battle, but our nation is better prepared today to confront China as a strategic threat. If we demonstrate a more aggressive ceremonial reaction through military force, Xi will realize that he misjudged us. Not with us, but he has more reason to avoid battles.
Michael Vlahos is a writer and author of Fighting Identity. Sacred War and World Change (Fighting Identity: Sacred War and World Change). He teaches martial arts and strategy at Johns Hopkins University and the Naval War College