Why did the Crimean Khanate help Moscow to free itself from the Horde yoke, and then from the main ally turned into the worst enemy of our country? What was the price for Russia to be adjacent to it? Why did the Russian and Polish-Lithuanian states organize the "Crimean auction"? Alexander Vinogradov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told us about the difficult and dramatic history of Russian-Crimean relations.
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Can we say that the Crimean Khanate was a robber and predatory state that existed by robbing neighbors?
Vinogradov: You can, but be careful. Of all the fragments of the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khanate occupied a unique position. The fertile lands of the southern coast of the Crimean peninsula and the most convenient ports were under the rule of the Ottoman Turks. In the steppe and arid regions of the Crimea, it was difficult to engage in agriculture, although as early as the 16th century, Khan Sahib-Girey tried to teach his subjects to do this.
Crimean Tatar horseman
But the southern part of the Wild Field was also under the control of the Crimean khans, where numerous Nogai-Mangyts roamed, who broke away from the Great Horde. Sometimes they are called Mansurs, since they were ruled by the descendants of Mansur, one of the sons of the famous Horde temnik Edigei. It was they who ensured the military might of the Crimean Khanate, since they constituted a significant part of its troops during the campaigns of conquest. And if in the Crimea itself, the Tatars, with difficulty, but gradually switched to agriculture, then the nogai-mangyts existed exclusively through raids. Therefore, the economic conditions in the Northern Black Sea region and the constant threat of starvation forced the subjects of the Crimean khans to constant attacks on their neighbors. But it is necessary to distinguish between "independent attacks" of the subjects of the major khans and campaigns led directly by the khan or his sons. These raids could pursue two goals: robbery and seizure of war booty, or the presentation of political demands.
Requirements of what?
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Requirements for regular ambassadorial gifts. In the Russian state, they were called "commemorations", and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (mainly the territory of modern Belarus and Ukraine - approx. "Lenta.ru") - "mentions" (later in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth they were called "treasury"). Thus, the Crimean Khanate emphasized its geopolitical ambitions. If the Grand Dukes of Moscow (Kalitichi) and the Grand Dukes of Lithuania (Gediminovichi) considered themselves the heirs of the Grand Dukes of Kiev and claimed all the lands of the Old Russian state, the Crimean khans perceived themselves as the heirs of the khans of the Golden Horde. Therefore, for the time being, they tried to subjugate all the territories that were previously part of it.
Is it true that after the "Standing on the Ugra" and the end of the Horde yoke in 1480, the Moscow state and the Crimean Khanate were allies?
Yes, and at first this union was very beneficial for Moscow. The largest fragment of the Golden Horde was the Big Horde, located in the lower reaches of the Volga. On its territory were the ruins of Sarai, the former capital of the Golden Horde, so its khans demanded submission from both Crimea and Moscow. During the famous "Standing on the Ugra" in 1480, the Crimean Tatars hit the rear of the Khan of the Great Horde Akhmat, which greatly helped Ivan III. Until the collapse of the Great Horde in 1502 and the flight of Akhmat for the Dnieper, the strategic alliance between Moscow and Bakhchisarai was strong, since it allowed them to oppose the coalition of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Great Horde together. Thanks to the alliance with the Crimea, during the wars of 1487-1494 and 1500-1503, the Russian state conquered about a third of its territories from Lithuania, including the cities of Mtsensk, Bryansk, Chernigov and Putivl.
Lithuanian Tatars
That is, the union of the Great Horde and Lithuania was the main incentive for the union of Moscow and Crimea?
Of course, after the collapse of the Great Horde, contradictions arose between the Russian state and the Crimean Khanate. First, Crimea wanted to take over the Astrakhan Khanate, which categorically did not suit Moscow. Secondly, in response to this, Crimea refused to help the Russian state in its border wars with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which added tension in Russian-Crimean relations. Thirdly, Bakhchisarai and Moscow finally fell out over disputes over control of the Kazan Khanate. As a result, the confrontation grew - its apotheosis was the notorious Crimean-Kazan campaign against Moscow in 1521.
Slavic slave trade of Crimea
This is when Vasily III almost agreed to sign an enslaving letter with the obligation to pay an annual tribute, as in the days of the Golden Horde?
In fact, Vasily III signed this charter, although it was not about tribute, but about "commemoration", but in fact it was a recognition of Moscow's dependence on the Crimean Khanate. Then the Ryazan governor Ivan Vasilyevich Khabar managed by cunning to seize this letter and destroy it, which gave Vasily III a reason to refuse to execute it.
Is it true that when leaving Moscow, the Crimean Tatars captured the baggage train with the boyar's wives and children, after which the women were taken prisoner, and the babies were thrown in the forest?
I've heard about this story. The women were eventually bought out, but I have not seen any documentary evidence about babies.
Tell us about the consequences of the Crimean Tatar raids on Russia. Is it true that in just one campaign the Tatars took several hundred thousand Russian people into Crimean captivity?
I think that these numbers are greatly exaggerated. Although, of course, the scale of the disaster for the Russian state was impressive, it is impossible to calculate them. But let's not forget that the Crimean raids on the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were no less catastrophic.
Why did the Crimean Tatars take prisoners: for further resale or for ransom?
And for that, and for another. For noble captives, the Tatars preferred to receive a ransom. But here a lot of difficulties arose, since the khan had his own full and could not lay claim to the slaves captured by his murzas and beys. Therefore, Moscow and Lithuania had to negotiate a ransom not only with the khan, but also with other high-born representatives of the Crimean nobility. Subsequently, the khans transferred the process of redemption of slaves to a centralized channel, transferring control over it to the Karaites.
Tatar cavalry
Who is the Karaites?
This is a special ethnic group that professes Judaism.
That is, the khans gave the Crimean slave trade at the mercy of local Jews?
There is still controversy about the origin of the Karaites, but I am not inclined to identify them with Jews. The Karaites controlled not only the ransom of noble prisoners, but also the resale of the rest of the slaves to the Ottoman Turks. Most of the Slavic slaves were sent by the Crimean Tatars as rowers to the galleys of the Turkish fleet. These slaves were in the most distressing situation and, as a rule, did not live long. Other captives who remained in Crimea worked on the land, in households, or as interpreters.
How did Russia resist the aggression of the Crimean Khanate after the catastrophe of 1521?
After a successful campaign against Moscow in 1521, two years later, the Crimean Tatars conquered Astrakhan. This event became the peak of the power of the Crimean Khanate, which now controlled the crossing of the Volga and all trade in its lower reaches. However, the expansion of the Crimea upset the balance of power in the region. Feeling a threat for themselves, the Murza of the Nogai Horde, with the tacit support of the Russian state, united and invaded Crimea, exposing it to terrible ruin. After that, a period of prolonged instability began on the peninsula, when the Ottoman Empire, whose vassal was the Crimea, changed the khans there according to its own understanding. Conspiracies and murders of khans by their rivals from the Girey family or by representatives of the Crimean Tatar aristocracy were commonplace. These troubles weakened the Crimean Khanate and created conditions for interference in its internal affairs by not only the Ottoman Empire, but also the Russian and Polish-Lithuanian states.
Crimean auction
The 19th century historian Sergei Soloviev wrote about the "Crimean auction", when the Grand Duchy of Moscow and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania alternately set the Crimean Tatars against each other. And the khans in Bakhchisarai gladly took money from both those and others, and then devastated the lands of both states and took away into captivity a huge full.
And so it was. Moscow diplomats in Crimea constantly confronted the Polish-Lithuanian ambassadors. Crimean Tatars negotiated with both. The price of the question was the number of "commemorations" and "mentions" sent from Moscow and Vilna. And when the khan took sides, he sent the other embassy to prison in Chufut-Kale.
A classic example of the "Crimean auction" is the diplomatic duel during the Livonian War between the Moscow ambassador Afanasy Fedorovich Nagy and his Lithuanian counterpart Alexander Fedorovich Vladyka. As you know, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania together with Poland at that time were at war with the Russian state, and therefore both ambassadors competed before the Crimean Khan, who would offer him more "commemoration" and "commemoration".
Both Lithuania and Moscow sent their best ambassadors to Crimea. It will not be an exaggeration to say that it was in the Crimean direction that Russian diplomacy was formed and strengthened.
Was Crimea a priority of Russian foreign policy?
Of course, it was from there that the main threat to our country emanated for a long time. Lithuania (and then Rzeczpospolita) was another priority of Moscow's foreign policy, but Crimea was certainly just as important and more dangerous. In general, he was a link in relations between Russia and all of its neighbors: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Kazan Khanate and the Nogai Horde. It so happened that Crimea was constantly at the center of all the geopolitical interests of Moscow.
In addition to the 1521 campaign, there was an equally disastrous raid by the Crimean Tatars to Moscow in 1571. What was the reason for his success?
Everything was very simple - there were many traitors who willingly showed the Crimean Tatars the fords across the Oka.
Tatar cavalry crossing the ford across the river
What for?
The well-known Malyuta Skuratov was studying this issue. He found out that the mass betrayal of the nobles was a reaction to the oprichnina terror in the Russian state. Based on the conclusions of his investigation, Ivan the Terrible dismissed the oprichnina army, which successfully robbed its compatriots, but turned out to be completely powerless in front of an external enemy. This is a well-known story, in 2004 the Rodina magazine published an article about this by the Petersburg historian Alexander Filyushkin "Your guilty slave: the crime and repentance of Kudeyar Tishenkov." The scale of betrayal in the Russian army was then catastrophic.
Battle of Molody
Perhaps Ivan the Terrible drew the right conclusions from the catastrophe of 1571, if the next year Russian troops completely defeated the Crimean Tatars and Turks in the Battle of Molody?
This battle, I consider one of the turning points in Russian history. Unfortunately, very few people here remember him. After the devastation of Moscow, Ivan the Terrible was forced to promise Khan Devlet-Giray to give Astrakhan. However, a few months later, he actually disavowed this obligation. Devlet-Girey flew into a rage, and it became clear that a new Crimean campaign against Russia was inevitable.
This time the Russians prepared well for the raid and took into account the mistakes of the past year. Ivan the Terrible made a deceptive maneuver, pretending to be going on a campaign against the Swedes. At the same time, the main forces of the Russian troops secretly dispersed south of Moscow. As a result, the Battle of Molodi ended with the complete defeat of the Turks and Crimean Tatars: several khan's sons and influential Murzas were killed, and the main military leader of Khan Divey was captured.
Participants of the reconstruction of the Molodino battle stage
Who is this?
"Prince of Mangitsky", the head of the Mansurov clan, who headed the ulus of the Nogayev-Mangyts, former subjects of the Great Horde.
What would have happened in the event of a different outcome of this battle?
Nothing good for Russia. Then Ivan the Terrible would have to pay the Crimean Khan huge "commemoration", and in a few years Russia would have to deal with a powerful coalition of the Crimea and the Nogai Horde under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire, which would also seize Astrakhan to control the Volga trade route to Persia. Under such conditions, we would hardly have kept Kazan either. And if we recall that a protracted conflict with the Commonwealth continued on the western borders, then our country would have to wage a war in all directions. Whether she could have survived this is an open question.
Another question about the slave trade. In the Russian-language Wikipedia article about the Crimean Nogai raids on Russia, there is evidence of Duke Antoine de Gramont, who was in the Polish-Tatar army during the campaign of King Jan Casimir to the Left Bank Ukraine in 1663-1664, about the savage treatment of the Crimean Tatars with slaves captured during raids.
This is the middle of the 17th century, when there was a struggle between Russia, Poland and the Crimea for control over Ukrainian lands. It was a time of widespread bitterness and savagery (especially among the Nogai), when the central power of the Crimean khans weakened and at the same time the influence of the Zaporozhye Cossacks increased. Then all the previous traditions of good neighborly relations were completely violated, so there is nothing surprising in the inhuman cruelty of that era.
Icon "Blessed is the army of the Heavenly King", written in memory of the Kazan campaign in 1552
Ukrainian Ruin
It was then, after the annexation of Ukraine, that a turning point came in relations between Russia and the Crimean Khanate, when our country switched from passive defense to an active offensive policy?
No, in fact, our country for the first time launched an offensive in the Crimean direction at the end of the 16th century, during the next dynastic crisis in the Crimean Khanate. At the same time, Russia came to the Caucasus, erecting the first fortified fortresses on the Terek. The apotheosis of this success was the failure of the Crimean campaign against Moscow in 1591, when Khan Gazi-Girey reached the village of Kolomenskoye and Vorobyovy Gory, and then was forced to ingloriously go home and conclude a peace treaty a few years later. During the reign of Boris Godunov, a favorable situation for Russia developed in the southern and eastern directions: our Kazan, our Astrakhan, the Russian people are successfully mastering Siberia, and they managed to reconcile with the Crimea.
However, at the beginning of the 17th century, all these successes were completely erased by the outbreak of the Troubles. The new Tsar, False Dmitry I, was going on a campaign against the Crimea, which completely buried all the achievements of Godunov's policy. The real prospect of a military alliance between Moscow and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth loomed before Crimea, which was a real nightmare for the khanate. But, as you know, soon False Dmitry I was killed in the Kremlin and the campaign did not take place.
And when the Troubles began, did the Crimean Tatars take advantage of it?
Of course, and there were two options from the category "both worse". Either they were officially invited by Tsar Vasily Shuisky to fight the Zaporozhye Cossacks (the main striking force of the Polish-Lithuanian intervention), or they came themselves.
Why did the Crimean Tatars during the Troubles willingly fight on the side of Moscow?
The Crimean Khanate sought to maintain an advantageous balance of power in the region, therefore, during the eternal confrontation between Moscow and the Polish-Lithuanian state, it sought to prevent the rise of both sides. If at the beginning of the 17th century it supported Russia, then in the middle of the century it returned to a coalition with the Commonwealth. Thus, the Crimeans sought to weaken both countries.
Successfully?
And how. The Ukrainian Ruin (the period of turmoil, civil war and foreign interventions in the history of Ukraine in 1657-1687 - approx. "Lenta.ru") of the second half of the 17th century for the Crimean Khanate was the last surge of its activity. Do not forget that before turning to Moscow for help, the Zaporozhye Cossacks tried to flirt with the Crimean Tatars. And later, when, during the general chaos in Ukraine, various hetmans turned to the Crimeans for help, the finest hour came for the Bakhchisarai khans. The famous campaigns of Mehmed-Girey IV and Islam-Girey IV became the last great pages of the history of the Crimean Khanate.
And when did it decline?
The decline began in the era of the "Holy League", when the Commonwealth and Russia joined it and concluded the "Eternal Peace" in 1686. After that, the Crimean Khanate rotted for another 100 years - until the final annexation to Russia in 1783.
Crimean price
Was the "commemoration" sent to Bakhchisarai up to 1700 a tribute from Moscow to the Crimean Khanate?
Not. These were voluntary ambassadorial gifts that were not mandatory. But the Crimean khans, who considered themselves heirs of the Golden Horde, perceived them precisely as a tribute. If you like, it can be compared to a payoff from racketeers.
So it wasn't a form of addiction?
No, not a single Crimean-Moscow treaty contained obligations to pay "commemoration". Their frequency and size were determined by personal agreements between the Crimean khans and the Moscow sovereigns. The obligation to pay "mentions" was in the agreements between the Crimea and the Polish-Lithuanian state, with one exception - there was prescribed the mediation of the Ottoman Empire in case of conflict situations. But Russian diplomacy, for reasons of principle, could not allow Istanbul to interfere in its relations with the Crimean Khanate.
Is it true that the need to counter the Crimean threat contributed to the development of the steppe territories south of the Oka, which now constitute the Black Earth Region of Russia?
Undoubtedly. The cities of Oryol, Saratov, Tsaritsyn, Voronezh, Belgorod were built as advanced Russian fortresses in the steppe on the path of the nomadic hordes. Russian colonization of the forest-steppe zone was largely due to the military threat from the Crimean Khanate.
Is it possible to say that the Crimean Khanate was a dangerous and unpredictable neighbor for Russia?
Sure. It was possible for a long time and successfully to negotiate with the Crimean Khan, and then he could suddenly suddenly attack Russia and, after robberies and robberies, take with him a huge full. Huge funds were spent on the ransom of slaves; for this, in 1551, special taxes and ("polonyachya money") were introduced in Russia, which was collected from the taxing estates until 1679.
Is it possible to calculate the material damage to the Russian state from the Crimean Tatar raids?
I don't think it's ever possible to do that. To say that the ransom of prisoners, "commemoration", payment of "request money", the arrangement of an extensive defensive line in the steppe regions with their subsequent colonization and direct losses from devastation during raids were too expensive for Russia is to say nothing. One thing is clear - the damage from such a neighborhood was colossal and constantly diverted financial and human resources so necessary for the internal development of our country.
Interviewed by Andrey Mozzhukhin
