Is it correct to call the Caspian Sea?
It is known that the sea is part of the World Ocean. From this geographically correct point of view, the Caspian Sea cannot be considered a sea, for it is separated from the ocean by huge tracts of land. The shortest distance from the Caspian to the Black Sea, the closest of the seas included in the World Ocean system, is 500 kilometers. Therefore, it would be more correct to speak of the Caspian as a lake. This largest lake in the world is often referred to simply as the Caspian or the sea-lake.
The Caspian has a number of signs of the sea: its water is salty (however, there are other salt lakes), the area is not much inferior to the area of such seas as the Black, Baltic, Red, North and even exceeds the area of the Azov and some others (however, the Canadian Lake Superior also has a huge area, like the three seas of Azov). Fierce storm winds and huge waves are frequent in the Caspian (and this is not uncommon on Lake Baikal).
So the Caspian Sea is a lake after all? So it is written in Wikipedia. And the Great Soviet Encyclopedia answers that no one has yet been able to give an exact definition of this issue - "There is no generally accepted classification."
Do you know why this is very important and fundamental? And here's why …
The lake belongs to inland waters - sovereign territories of coastal states, to which the international regime does not apply (the principle of UN non-interference in the internal affairs of states). But the sea area is divided differently, and the rights of coastal states are completely different here.
In terms of its geographical position, the Caspian itself, in contrast to the surrounding land territories, for many centuries has not been the object of any targeted attention from the coastal states. Only at the beginning of the 19th century. The first treaties were concluded between Russia and Persia: Gulistan (1813) 4 and Turkmanchay (1828), summing up the results of the Russian-Persian war, as a result of which Russia annexed a number of Transcaucasian territories and received the exclusive right to keep a military fleet in the Caspian sea. Russian and Persian merchants were allowed to trade freely on the territory of both states and use the Caspian for the transport of goods. The Turkmanchay Treaty confirmed all these provisions and became the basis for maintaining international relations between the parties until 1917.
Promotional video:
After the October Revolution of 1917, in a note from the new government of Russia that came to power on January 14, 1918, it renounced its exclusive military presence in the Caspian Sea. The treaty between the RSFSR and Persia of February 26, 1921 declared invalid all agreements concluded before him by the tsarist government. The Caspian Sea became a reservoir of common use for the parties: both states were granted equal rights of free navigation, except for cases when the crews of Iranian ships could include citizens of third countries using the service for unfriendly purposes (Article 7). The 1921 treaty did not provide for the maritime boundary between the parties.
In August 1935, the following treaty was signed, the parties to which were new subjects of international law - the Soviet Union and Iran, which came under the new name. The parties confirmed the provisions of the 1921 treaty, but introduced into the agreement a new concept for the Caspian - a 10-mile fishing zone, which limited the spatial limits of this fishery for its participants. This was done in order to control and preserve the living resources of the reservoir.
In the context of the outbreak of World War II, unleashed by Germany, an urgent need arose to conclude a new agreement on trade and navigation in the Caspian Sea between the USSR and Iran. The reason for this was the concern of the Soviet side, caused by Germany's interest in intensifying its trade relations with Iran and the danger of using the Caspian Sea as one of the stages of the transit route. The treaty between the USSR and Iran, signed in 1940, 10 protected the Caspian Sea from such a prospect: it repeated the main provisions of the previous agreements, which provided for the stay in its waters of the vessels of only these two Caspian states. It also included a rate of perpetuity.
The collapse of the Soviet Union radically changed the regional situation in the former Soviet space, in particular in the Caspian region. Among the large number of new problems, the problem of the Caspian Sea has arisen. Instead of two states - the USSR and Iran, which previously bilaterally solved all emerging issues of maritime navigation, fishing and the use of other living and nonliving resources, now there are five of them. Of the former, only Iran remained, the place of the USSR as succession was taken by Russia, the other three are new states: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan. They had access to the Caspian before, but only as republics of the USSR, and not as independent states. Now, having become independent and sovereign,they got the opportunity, on equal terms with Russia and Iran, to participate in the discussion and decision-making in considering all the above issues. This was reflected in the attitude of these states to the Caspian Sea, since all five states that had access to it showed the same interest in using its living and nonliving resources. And this is logical, and most importantly, justified: the Caspian Sea is rich in natural resources, both fish stocks and black gold - oil and blue fuel - gas. Exploration and production of the last two resources have long been the subject of the most heated and protracted negotiations. But not only them.and most importantly, it is justified: the Caspian Sea is rich in natural resources, both fish stocks and black gold - oil and blue fuel - gas. Exploration and production of the last two resources have long been the subject of the most heated and protracted negotiations. But not only them.and most importantly, it is justified: the Caspian Sea is rich in natural resources, both fish stocks and black gold - oil and blue fuel - gas. Exploration and production of the last two resources have long been the subject of the most heated and protracted negotiations. But not only them.
In addition to the presence of rich mineral resources in the waters of the Caspian Sea, there are about 120 species and subspecies of fish, there is a world gene pool of sturgeon, the catch of which until recently amounted to 90% of their total world catch.
Due to its location, the Caspian has traditionally and for a long time been widely used for shipping, acting as a kind of transport artery between the peoples of the coastal states. Along its shores are located such large seaports as the Russian Astrakhan, the capital of Azerbaijan Baku, the Turkmenbashy, Iranian Anzeli and Kazakhstan's Aktau, between which routes of trade, freight and passenger sea transport have long been laid.
Nevertheless, the main object of attention of the Caspian states is its mineral resources - oil and natural gas, which each of them can claim within the boundaries that must be determined by them collectively on the basis of international law. To do this, they will have to divide between themselves the Caspian Sea and its bottom, in the depths of which its oil and gas are hidden, and develop rules for their extraction with minimal damage to a very fragile environment, primarily the marine environment and its living inhabitants.
The main obstacle in resolving the issue of the start of widespread extraction of the Caspian mineral resources for the Caspian states continues to be its international legal status: should it be considered a sea or a lake? The complexity of the issue lies in the fact that these states themselves must solve it, and there is no agreement in their ranks yet. But at the same time, each of them seeks to start the production of Caspian oil and natural gas as soon as possible and make their sale abroad a permanent source of funds for the formation of their budget.
Therefore, the oil companies of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, without waiting for the end of the settlement of existing differences on the territorial division of the Caspian Sea, have already begun active production of its oil, hoping to stop being dependent on Russia, turn their countries into oil-producing countries and, in this capacity, start building their own long-term trading relations with neighbors.
However, the question of the status of the Caspian Sea remains unresolved. Regardless of whether the Caspian states agree to consider it a "sea" or a "lake", they will have to apply the principles corresponding to the choice made to the territorial division of its water area and the bottom, or develop their own in this case.
Kazakhstan was in favor of recognizing the Caspian by the sea. Such recognition will make it possible to apply the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf to the division of the Caspian Sea. This would allow the coastal states to acquire sovereignty over the subsoil of the territorial sea (Article 2) and exclusive rights to explore and develop resources on the continental shelf (Article 77). But the Caspian cannot be called a sea from the position of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, since this body of water is closed and has no natural connection with the world's oceans.
In this case, the option of joint use of its water area and bottom resources is also excluded.
In the USSR treaties with Iran, the Caspian Sea was considered as a border lake. With the granting of the legal status of a "lake" to the Caspian Sea, it is supposed to be divided into sectors, as it is done in relation to border lakes. But in international law, there is no norm obliging states to do just that: division into sectors is an established practice.
The Russian Foreign Ministry has repeatedly made statements that the Caspian is a lake, and its waters and subsoil are the common property of coastal states. Iran also considers the Caspian Sea as a lake from the position enshrined in treaties with the USSR. The government of the country believes that this status implies the creation of a consortium for the unified management of production and the use of its resources by the Caspian states. Some authors also share this opinion, for example, R. Mammadov believes that with this status, the extraction of hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian by these states should be carried out jointly.
In the literature, there has been a proposal to give the Caspian Sea the status of a lake "sui generis", and in this case we are talking about the special international legal status of such a lake and its special regime. Under the regime, states are supposed to jointly develop their own rules for the use of its resources.
Thus, the recognition of the Caspian by a lake does not require its obligatory division into sectors - each coastal state has its own part. In addition, in international law, there are no norms at all on the division of lakes between states: this is their good will, behind which certain internal interests may be hidden.
At present, all the Caspian states recognize that the modern legal regime was established by the established practice of its use, but now the Caspian is in actual common use of not two, but five states. Back at the meeting of foreign ministers held in Ashgabat on November 12, 1996, the Caspian states confirmed that the status of the Caspian Sea can be changed only with the consent of all five coastal states. Later, this was also confirmed by Russia and Azerbaijan in a joint statement of January 9, 2001 on the principles of cooperation, as well as in the Declaration on Cooperation in the Caspian Sea signed between Kazakhstan and Russia of October 9, 2000.
But in the course of numerous Caspian negotiations, conferences and four summits of the Caspian states (Ashgabat summit on April 23-24, 2002, Tehran summit on October 16, 2007, Baku summit on November 18, 2010 and Astrakhan summit on September 29, 2014), the consent of the Caspian states it was never achieved.
Cooperation at the bilateral and trilateral levels is still more productive. Back in May 2003, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the junction point of the delimitation lines of adjacent sections of the Caspian Sea bottom, which was based on previous bilateral agreements. In this situation, Russia, by its participation in these agreements, seemed to confirm that the agreements between the USSR and Iran are outdated and do not correspond to the existing realities.
In the Agreement of July 6, 1998 between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on the delimitation of the bottom of the northern part of the Caspian Sea in order to exercise sovereign rights to subsoil use, it was announced that the seafloor was delimited between adjacent and opposing sides along a modified median line based on the principle of justice and agreement of the parties. The states have sovereign rights to the bottom of the plot, but at the same time their common use of the water surface is preserved.
Iran perceived this agreement as a separate one and in violation of the previous Treaties with the USSR in 1921 and 1940. However, it should be noted that in the preamble to the 1998 agreement, to which Russia and Kazakhstan were parties, the agreement was viewed as a temporary measure pending the signing of the convention by all the Caspian states.
Later, on July 19 of the same year, Iran and Russia made a joint statement in which they proposed three possible scenarios for the delimitation of the Caspian. First, the sea should be shared on the basis of the condominium principle. The second scenario boils down to dividing the water area, waters, bottom and subsoil into national sectors. The third scenario, which is a compromise between the first and second options, assumes that only the bottom is divided between the coastal states, and the water surface is considered common and open to all coastal countries.
The existing options for the delimitation of the Caspian, including those mentioned above, are possible only if there is a good political will of the parties. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have clearly expressed their position from the very beginning of the multilateral consultation process. Azerbaijan considers the Caspian Sea to be a lake and, therefore, it should be divided. Kazakhstan proposes to consider the Caspian an enclosed sea, referring to the 1982 UN Convention (Articles 122, 123), and, accordingly, advocates its division in the spirit of the Convention. Turkmenistan has long supported the idea of joint management and use of the Caspian, but foreign companies already developing resources off the coast of Turkmenistan influenced the policy of its president, who began to object to the establishment of a condominium regime, supporting the position of dividing the sea.
Azerbaijan was the first of the Caspian states to start using the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian under the new conditions. After the conclusion of the "Deal of the Century" in September 1994, Baku expressed a desire to declare the adjacent sector an integral part of its territory. This provision was also enshrined in the Constitution of Azerbaijan, adopted in order to exercise sovereign rights to subsoil use, Moscow, July 6, 1998 at a referendum on November 12, 1995 (Article 11). But such a radical position from the very beginning did not correspond to the interests of all other coastal states, especially Russia, which expresses fears that this will open access to the Caspian Sea to countries in other regions. Azerbaijan agreed to a compromise. In the Agreement between the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan on the delimitation of adjacent sections of the Caspian Sea, 2002, the provision was fixed,in which the section of the bottom was carried out using the median line, and the water area of the reservoir remained in joint use.
Unlike Azerbaijan, which has expressed a desire to completely divide the Caspian Sea, Iran offers to leave its subsoil and water in joint use, but does not object to the option of dividing the Caspian into 5 equal parts. Accordingly, each member of the Caspian Five would be allocated 20 percent of the total area of the reservoir.
Russia's point of view was changing. For a long time Moscow insisted on the establishment of a condominium, but wishing to build a long-term policy with neighbors who did not find it profitable to consider the Caspian as the property of the five coastal states, changed its position. This then pushed the states to begin a new stage of negotiations, upon completion of which in 1998 the above Agreement was signed, where Russia declared that it was “ripe” for the division of the Caspian. Its main principle was the position “common water - we divide the bottom”.
Taking into account the fact that some of the Caspian states, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia, have reached agreements on the conditional delimitation of spaces in the Caspian, we can conclude that they are actually satisfied with the already established regime with the division of its bottom along the modified median line and the joint use of the surface reservoir for shipping and fishing.
However, the lack of complete clarity and unity in the position of all coastal countries prevents the Caspian states themselves from developing oil production. And oil is of key importance to them. There are no unambiguous data regarding their reserves in the Caspian Sea. According to the US Energy Information Agency in 2003, the Caspian was ranked second in oil reserves and third in gas reserves. The data of the Russian side are different: they speak of artificial overstatement by Western experts of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea. The discrepancies in assessments are due to the political and economic interests of regional and external players. The factor of data distortion was the geopolitical significance of the region, with which the foreign policy plans of the USA and the EU are connected. Zbigniew Brzezinski back in 1997 expressed the opinion that this region is the "Eurasian Balkans".