Plan "Barbarossa" for a long time will attract the attention of researchers, who will find in it a lot of details that will help to draw important (even for the present) conclusions. The role of neophytes, such as A. Hitler was, in the system of government is still waiting for its researchers.
So, the signing of the "Barbarossa" plan by the Fuhrer (1940-18-12) marked the beginning of the second period of preparation for the war against the USSR, which took on a broader scope. Now it included the detailed development of plans for all branches of the armed forces, plans for the concentration and deployment of military units, preparation of the theater of operations and troops for the offensive.
It is important to note that the Barbarossa plan is not only Hitler's directive No. 21, which sets out the main political and strategic goals of the war against the USSR. The Barbarossa plan incorporated a whole set of additional directives and orders of the OKW General Staff (German OKW - Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) and the OKH General Staff (Wehrmacht Ground Forces, German OKH - Oberkommando des Heeres) for planning and practical preparation of an attack on the Soviet Union. The most important of these documents were: directives on troop concentration and disinformation; Instruction on Special Areas to Directive No. 21 (Plan Barbarossa); guidance on the use of Barbarossa propaganda; directive to the commander-in-chief of the occupying forces in Norway on his tasks in accordance with the Barbarossa plan.
An important planning document was the "Directive for the Concentration of Troops" issued on January 31, 1941 by the main command of the ground forces and sent to all commanders of army groups, tank groups and commanders of armies. It determined the general goals of the war, the tasks of the army groups and the field armies and tank groups that were part of them, established dividing lines between them, provided for the methods of interaction of the ground forces with the air and naval forces, determined the general principles of cooperation with the Romanian and Finnish troops … The directive had 12 appendices containing the distribution of forces, a plan for the transfer of troops, a map of the unloading areas, a schedule for the transfer of forces from the deployment areas and their unloading to the initial areas, data on the position of Soviet troops, maps with objects for aviation flights,communications and supply orders.
The headquarters of the main command of the German ground forces especially strictly warned about secrecy and the strictest secrecy of all measures related to preparation for an attack on the USSR.
The directive indicated the need to limit the number of officers involved in the development of plans, and they should be aware only enough to be able to solve the specific task assigned to them. The circle of fully informed persons was limited to the commanders of army groups, commanders of armies and corps, their chiefs of staff, chief quartermasters and first officers of the general staff.
Two days after the signing of the Directive for the Concentration of Troops, on February 3, 1941, in Berchtesgaden (the seat of the Führer's Berghof), Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, heard a detailed report from Brauchitsch and Paulus (Chief of Staff Halder was on vacation).
In general, approving the operational plan developed by the General Staff, the Fuehrer said: "When Operation Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath and will not make any comments."
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Jodl summed up Hitler's “instructions” for the “final version” as follows: “The coming campaign is more than just an armed conflict; it is a clash of two different ideologies. In view of the scale of the territory involved in this war, it will not end simply with the defeat of the enemy's armed forces. The entire territory must be divided into separate states, each with its own government, with which we can then make peace. Forming these governments requires a lot of political skill and should be based on well thought out principles.”
“Any large-scale revolution entails events that cannot simply be erased from memory in the future. Today the socialist idea in Russia can no longer be destroyed. From the point of view of internal conditions, the formation of new states and governments must inevitably proceed from this principle. The Bolshevik-Jewish intelligentsia must be destroyed, since to this day it is the "oppressor" of the people. The former bourgeois and aristocratic intelligentsia, the one that is still alive among the emigrants, should not appear on the stage either. The Russian people would reject her, and she is mostly anti-Germany. This is especially true for the former Baltic states.
Further, we must, under all circumstances, prevent the possibility of the emergence of a nationalist Russia in the place of a Bolshevik Russia, since history shows that it will also become anti-German again.
Our goal is to build, as soon as possible and using a minimum of military force, socialist states that will depend on us. This task is so difficult that it cannot be entrusted to the army."
The main strategic plan of the Barbarossa plan, as you know, boiled down to the following: with a sudden powerful blow to destroy the Soviet troops located in the west of the USSR, followed by a deep advance of German tank units to prevent the retreat of the Red Army troops inland.
The ultimate goal of the operation, as stated in the directive, is to create a shield dividing the Asian and European parts of Russia on the main Volga-Arkhangelsk line. In this case, the objects of the last industrial region that will remain at the disposal of the Russians, the Urals, can be destroyed by the Luftwaffe if necessary.
It seems that certain moments of preparation for a war with the USSR require comments. Not everything went smoothly in Hitler's plans, even on paper.
1. The term "shield building" has not been deciphered, since it is not clear how many divisions should be left in Russia and what they should do. Only in July 1941 there was an assessment (56 divisions) and a change in the proposed border of the Reich to the Urals, and then to Novosibirsk.
The General Staff was obliged to insist on deciphering the criterion for the end of the operation, since its duration depends on it. And the duration of a strategic operation is the most important criterion by which it is judged whether or not it is worth starting it.
The General Staff saw perfectly well that this was a long war, and the Fuhrer deliberately tried to present it as a fleeting campaign. The question is, why? Answer: so he wanted. At the decisive moment in making decisions, neophytes experience a violation of logic, which is brought up by professionals over a long period of study.
Neophytes do not distinguish between subjective desires and objective consequences. Scientific, in fact, the dispute was ended by order.
2. The General Staff did not have an analysis of the effectiveness of various strategies of "influence" on England. Assessing the strategies, strengths and weaknesses of potential opponents is the duty of the General Staff of all countries of the world.
3. The General Staff did not have a forecast for the development of the strategic aviation of Britain and the United States.
4. The Fuhrer hesitated all the time: is it worth it or not to destroy the colonial system of England, whether or not it is worth landing on the islands, what to do with England in case of victory, whether it is necessary to move healthy men to the continent as slaves … And other nonsense.
5. The General Staff did not understand the strategic role of the naval blockade of England (despite the memoranda of Admiral Doenitz) and did not deploy the submarine fleet in advance. He authorized the construction of very expensive and ineffective battleships. Only after the "experience" of 1939-1940. there was an understanding of the importance of the naval blockade, but only in 1941-1942. the production of submarines began to increase. However, the train left. This was a professional mistake.
6. The Fuhrer did not have a clear distinction between the two wars: the current one with England and the planned one with Russia. Sometimes the war with Russia was presented as an auxiliary operation in the strategic confrontation with England. Sometimes - as the main one, which he had long dreamed of.
7. For Germany, the lesson of the First World War was not to fight on two fronts, and the General Staff immediately realized that there would be a war on two fronts, but (after France) kept silent.
8. Talk that Stalin believed Hitler's letter is nonsense. He didn't trust anyone. Stalin believed only in his own logic. And she prompted him that the Fuehrer did not admit obvious logical mistakes, so Stalin delayed with decisive actions.
Outwardly, it looked like he believed Hitler's letter of May 15, 1941. In fact, this was the last test of the opponent's sanity. Then he already knew how to behave with this adventurer.
9. In strategic games, only the "potential" of the opponents fight, and then a conclusion is made about the expediency of the operation. Hitler did not know how to operate with the concepts of "the potential of the enemy" and "the potential of the Reich." To do this, you need to understand the long tables and graphs of forecasts for population size, industry capabilities and the combat effectiveness of weapons. Only professionals can do this “horsey” and tedious job. The Fuhrer needed argumentation, and the public (generals) were presented with the underestimated capabilities of the industry of the USSR and the Red Army. In addition, thanks to the British agent Canaris, he did not know about the existence of the Katyusha, Il-2 and T-34. It was a puncture of the Fuhrer as an integrator of all factors (he appropriated this function to himself during the reforms of 1937-38) and a triumph of British intelligence.
10. In the Barbarossa plan, there is no forecast of the resources remaining in the “defeated” Russia. This is a professional mistake by the General Staff. There is no (officially recorded) forecast of the behavior of the Russian leadership. This is a professional mistake of the political leadership in the person of Hitler.
11. The Barbarossa plan does not forecast the reaction of the rest of the world (Canada, Australia and the United States) to a new war. There is no assessment of their resource capacity for assistance. There is no assessment of their army, navy and strategic bombers, the capabilities of which were already known.
It was only said "The world will hold its breath …". Not to understand that England will make every effort to attract the United States to its side is a professional mistake of the political leadership in the person of the Fuhrer and the General Staff.
12. In the Barbarossa plan, there is no reasoned forecast of material and human losses in Germany. There is no forecast of the impact of strategic aviation on the industry for the production of weapons and ammunition and a decrease in the number of industry specialists. Goering (probably thanks to Canaris) did not know about the plans to form giant bombers in England and the United States and did not launch into mass production the practically finished Wasserfall anti-aircraft missile. This is a serious professional mistake by the General Staff.
10. The "Barbarossa" plan does not stipulate combat interaction with Japan and the proportion of the division of Siberia. The division was fluently agreed upon in July 1941. Consequence - Japan (through a false demonstration, without formally violating the peace treaty) did not slow down the reserve of the Far Eastern troops of the USSR, which was used near Moscow. This is also a professional mistake by the General Staff.
11. The nonlinear law of the decrease in the combat effectiveness of troops as the distance from the main supply bases, off-road and deepening into forests, and the decrease in air support are not taken into account. Hence the overestimation of offensive capabilities and an error in assessing the required amount of resources. There was no corresponding replenishment of the Central Group of Forces, which (even before the counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow) suffered heavy losses. This is a gross professional mistake of the General Staff, which at the beginning of 1942 led to the first hysteria of the Fuhrer. (Neophytes really do not like it when reality does not correspond to their plans.)
12. The General Staff did not pay attention to the recollections of Caulaincourt (General Napoleon): the capture of Moscow did not solve anything. The General Staff did not understand the strategic role of the southern (Kiev) direction for the capture of Stalingrad and Baku. This could well have been done in 1941, which would have led to the cessation of fuel supply to the central part of Russia and, in the future, to the blockage of communications with the Urals. The Soviet General Staff understood this and back in 1940 created a powerful Kiev grouping, which was destroyed by the Germans (with a loss of the pace of the offensive and increased losses of troops and equipment of the Central Group of Forces), but only in order to go to Moscow again. The importance of the southern direction was understood by the Fuhrer only in the summer of 1942. This is a professional mistake of the General Staff.
It is quite possible to put an end to this and summarize
The main conclusion: the decision to start any strategic operation is made only after assessing all the factors and consequences. There was no full-fledged analysis in the General Staff (even “for myself”).
From a military point of view, the "Barbarossa" plan is a plan of an (large and not fully calculated) army operation with ideological, police and economic "bells and whistles". This is an improvisation by a neophyte.
Even before 1939, the Fuehrer violated the general subordination of the high command and the procedure for drawing up strategic plans by the General Staff. Thus, the General Staff (sharing the ideology and strategic goals of the Fuhrer) was deprived of the accumulated culture of strategic planning for centuries. And in 1939, when planning a French company, Hitler showed haste and imprudence, which was countered by the General Staff. The date of occurrence was postponed 26 times. Only in 1940 was the optimal plan developed. A quick victory over France with very small losses (which is a consequence of scientific and technological progress) led to a colossal increase in the Fuhrer's authority among the people, but he did not understand that this was not his merit.
After victories in 1940 (naturally) the problem arose of maintaining (or demobilizing) a large number of combat-ready divisions (about 150), which each month required a huge amount of resources for maintenance. The obvious (for a neophyte) solution to the problem was to put them into action as soon as possible. Therefore, for the Fuehrer, the lack of analysis of all aspects of the new war, all international agreements and diplomatic considerations lost their meaning. He habitually made an elementary substitution of concepts and performed at the General Staff as in a Bavarian pub. Demagogic definitions like "Russia is a colossus with feet of clay", "England's last hope", "Russia is our Africa", "clash of ideologies", "war is inevitable" were used as decisive arguments.
The generals of the General Staff understood all this perfectly, but remained silent. The second time, the General Staff was unable to stop and correct the (obviously adventurous) plan of the Fuhrer. Moloch of war and mass consciousness have a terrible inertia of their own.
A belated attempt to surgically correct the situation in 1944 failed. By the way, many of the Fuhrer's associates, including Goering, were against the war: they were not ready yet. But they remained within the general discipline. The most literate generals from the General Staff were removed back in 1937-1938. Competent generals with their own opinion were removed from the army at the end of 1941. Generals - interpreters and good tactics remained. The result is known.
PS The publication used materials from the book of V. I. Dashicheva “Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. Historical sketches. Documents and materials. Volume I. Preparation and deployment of Nazi aggression in Europe in 1933-1941. " M.: publishing house "Science", 1973.
Author: Valery Antipov
