Remove helicopters and landing craft and screw on the sonars! Despite criticism of the LCS project, the Americans continue to order littoral - or coastal - warships for their fleet. What is wrong with these ships and what they can fit in - now we will tell you.
Child of Strange Times
The roots of the LCS program (Littoral Combat Ship - "coastal combat ship") go back to the distant 90s. By that time, the US Navy had no standing adversaries in the world's oceans, and the role of naval forces had shifted from gaining dominance at sea to supporting land and "police" operations. But the ocean-going fleet was not very adapted to this task. Large and expensive ships and submarines were perfect for actions against their Soviet counterparts, but they did not really succeed in fighting coastal mines, anti-ship missiles from a canister of explosives and suicide bombers on boats. And in the role of support for ground forces, there was little benefit from them.
One of the many "arsenal ships" projects.
It became clear that a new ship was needed. At first, the sailors played a little with the idea of an arsenal ship - an unmanned stealth barge with a strategic stock of cruise missiles. Deciding that this was too radical, they started the DD-21 program - a promising destroyer of the 21st century. It inherited much from the arsenal ships and was also intended primarily for coastal operations. It was planned to build at least 27 such pennants to gradually replace the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. But, having calculated the cost of the project, the politicians rested their horns and said: no, there is not so much money and there will not be. In 2001, work on the DD-21 was abandoned in favor of two new programs - the DD (X) missile destroyer (better known to everyone as the Zumvolt class) and the littoral ship LCS.
Destroyer DD-21, a transitional link from the "arsenal ship" to the "Zumvolt".
The main requirement for LCS was cheapness. This was followed by a whole bunch of desires: so that the ship could fight submarines, work as a minesweeper, be effective in the fight against small surface targets and be able to reconnoitre the coast and land amphibious groups. Previously, all these tasks were performed by different units of the fleet: frigates, minesweepers, patrol gunboats and high-speed transports. And now he had to make one ship, at the same time cheap - and small so that he could walk close to the coast. The designers were faced with a difficult task.
Promotional video:
Design development of various LCS projects.
In 2004, Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics presented their projects. Both firms have found one solution to meet the demands of the military - modularity. That is, depending on the tasks ahead, the ships will have to remove unnecessary devices and install the required ones.
For example, if mines are to be encountered, the LCS will be equipped with a set of sonars, anti-mine floating and flying drones, and a laser demining system. Ground troop support? For 120 hours, the same LCS will receive a pair of attack helicopters, marine cockpits and a set of landing gear.
In total, four interchangeable modules were developed: anti-submarine, anti-mine, to support ground operations and to support special operations.
Freedom class LCS (photo: Devin Bowser / US Navy).
The American fleet could not choose between the presented projects. The more classic version from Lockheed Martin was cheaper and slightly simpler, but the trimaran from General Dynamics was faster and slightly better suited for offshore operations. As a result, a very unusual decision was made - to build a pair of ships of each type and in practice decide which is better.
In 2008, the first two pennants were launched - LCS-1 "Freedom" from Lockheed Martin and LCS-2 "Independence" from General Dynamics.
Independence class LCS (photo: Keith DeVinney / US Navy).
A ship without a future
Even during their construction, the LCS program was overtaken by serious problems. She did not fit into the budget - the cost of ships grew almost every day. Reducing the requirements and simplifying the design of future modules did not help. So combat units lost ten knots of speed and almost all (and so poor) anti-aircraft capabilities. In addition, coastal ships did not fit into the already existing concept of naval forces. They were not adapted to interact with the main stars of the American fleet - aircraft carriers - or with their retinue.
Despite intense criticism and rising prices, in 2010, Americans ordered 52 LCSs - 26 from Lockheed Martin and 26 from General Dynamics. This decision was explained by the desire to speed up the renewal of the fleet and the support of the industry. By that time, the price tag from the initial 220 million dollars per unit had already reached 600, and this is not taking into account the price of the modules.
One of the proposed options for strengthening LCS - the installation of the Norwegian-American anti-ship missiles Naval Strike Missil on them (photo: Kongdberg).
As construction unfolded, the controversy surrounding the LCS grew steadily. By that time, the Chinese fleet had already gained strength and had become, if not yet a threat, then already a challenge for the Americans. There was simply no room for the LCS in a possible "big" conflict. In addition, there were serious problems with bringing the modules to mind. Half of the advanced technologies just didn't work, and some didn't work as they should. Questions also arose about the replaceability of modules. In addition to the fact that the replacement turned out to be significantly more time-consuming than initially planned, there were also problems with the training of the crews. The sailors could not equally well possess four different weapons systems at once, which forced either to have an "excess" crew on the LCS, or, when replacing modules, change part of the crew - causing discord in the existing team. As a result, by our time, only the anti-submarine module was more or less brought to mind. The rest are only partially combat-ready.
Lockheed Martin FFG (X) - one of the projects for replacing LCS.
In 2015, the LCS program was reduced to 40 ships and began work on the promising frigate FFG (X) - which is a development of the LCS ideas, but at the same time adapted for the "big" war in the ocean.
The question arises - what to do with the already ordered 40 units of the fleet, of which 15 have been adopted? It's just a pity to write off and saw down completely new ships. And recently, more and more in the press and at conferences the idea of abandoning the modularity of the ship is being discussed. The only completed module - anti-submarine, is the only one suitable for a large ocean war. Refusal to work on the rest of the options will save money, and the US fleet will immediately receive 40 good anti-submarine ships.
The appearance in the ocean of 40 fast and stealthy submarine hunters can become a serious threat to both ours and the Chinese submarine. Whether the Americans will do this or whether the LCS will remain a large-scale but unsuccessful experiment is not yet clear.
Yuri Kuzhelev