And I remember how as a child I was allowed to play with a pack of just such pieces of paper. The attitude towards them was seemingly as "not needed", but either out of habit, or because of some kind of hope, they were still cherished and were not considered particularly "toys." Now I understand why it happened this way. Reading …
For decades, the compulsory purchase by citizens of the Party Bureau of TB of the plant, PO Box 329 was the USSR of government bonds, helped to replenish the budget and reduce the unsatisfied effective demand. But by 1956, the state's debt to the population reached such proportions that it became very, very difficult to service it, and the presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, in fact, decided to declare a default on domestic obligations in August 1957. And the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs summed up the operation against the largest bondholders.
That's what turned out …
This debt should also be canceled
The payment of an unspoken, but high and obligatory tax, which began in the late 1920s - the subscription to regular issues of government bonds - became a common part of life for Soviet people in the post-war period. Every citizen of the country, excluding children, was usually obliged to purchase bonds in an amount equal to one monthly salary per year. There were also exceptions, when those in greatest need were reduced to half their monthly wages. But sometimes individual workers and employees were voluntarily signed for two monthly salaries a year. Collective farmers were approached somewhat differently. They were forced to pay twice - first individually for each, and then they also took money from the collective farm as a whole, without issuing any bonds. They did the same with the production cooperatives,which at that time had not yet begun to liquidate.
At the same time, the authorities tried to observe at least external decency. So, in 1947, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) suppressed the initiative of the party leaders of the Kirov region, who decided to improve the beating of money for loans from the peasants. There, in several districts, even before the official announcement of the next subscription, collective farmers were organized to go to the markets to sell products from their farmsteads. Moreover, with each group of peasants an authorized representative went to whom they gave the proceeds for safekeeping until the start of the subscription to the loan. The organizing bureau of the Central Committee, in a special decree, informed the regional and regional committees that such a practice “discredited Soviet loans,” but did not punish anyone.
As soon as Khrushchev realized that the cost of servicing the domestic national debt would soon exceed the proceeds from loans, he invited workers to show consciousness and forgive the debts to the state.
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A little later, the party and the government decided to alleviate the situation of the workers and were allowed to give money for bonds in installments - 7-8% of wages per month. Which, however, once again emphasized that state loans are nothing more than an additional tax, which the state still promised to return to citizens someday.
But in 1956, the state's debt to the population exceeded 259.6 billion rubles. And against the background of the struggle against the personality cult of Stalin, the people began to violently resent the presence in the country of this remnant of the Stalin era. Moreover, pressure from the administration and party organizations caused a stream of letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU. From the factory, PO Box 329 wrote:
“The party bureau of the TB plant at PO Box 329 violated the principle of voluntariness when signing up for a loan. One communist was reprimanded with entry into a personal file, 2 with 12-14 years of party experience were transferred to candidates. I ask you earnestly to explain to me the correctness of my understanding of the principle of voluntariness and whether there can be any decisions of individual Party organizations on the above."
“Yesterday, May 18, by the decision of the party bureau, and then by the decision of the party meeting, I was transferred from the members of the CPSU to the candidates: the reason for this was that I signed up for a loan for a smaller amount than I was offered, namely, I signed up for 1,500 rubles … instead of the proposed 2200, with a salary of 1400 rubles. (not counting premiums).
At the party bureau, as well as at the party meeting, I explained my marital status, but it was useless. I earnestly ask you to assist me, and if I am wrong, then explain what exactly."
In addition, up to 17 billion rubles were spent on servicing the domestic public debt. per year, and, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Finance, the growth of these costs in the foreseeable future should have been equal to the amount of funds collected from the population. The problem demanded an immediate solution, and "dear Nikita Sergeevich" personally found a way out.
On March 19, 1957, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, he announced his decision: “What if we tell the people: let them give up loans in favor of the state? We announce that we will stop issuing loans.” Khrushchev told his comrades about the scheme he had invented, thanks to which the plunder of the people would take place on the initiative of the people themselves. He proposed holding meetings at large Moscow enterprises - Hammer and Sickle, Red Proletarian, the Likhachev plant, where the workers should accept an appeal to the country to refuse to pay off loans. Then the initiative was to be supported in other cities. At the meetings, as the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee believed, it was necessary to adopt resolutions "not to pay on bonds, but let them remain in the hands of the holders as a sign of their contribution to the common cause of building socialism."
The drawing of prizes on bonds made such a meager number of citizens happy that the rest reasonably considered themselves victims of a drawing by the state.
Only Kaganovich cautiously expressed his doubts: "There is a minus - the loan itself - the state loan, guaranteed." But he immediately made a reservation that the majority of the people would support this proposal. The cunning Mikoyan, who knew the real state of affairs with the budget better than others, said that the loan should be replaced by a lottery. The remaining members of the Central Committee Presidium supported Khrushchev's proposal unconditionally. The details were assigned to the Ministry of Finance, whose head Arseny Zverev submitted a detailed plan of default to the Central Committee just six days later.
The Minister of Finance proposed, in a Bolshevik manner, once and for all to annul all the debts of the state to the people:
“The population will suffer losses from the termination of payments on loans and their cancellation. However, these losses will be compensated by measures to systematically improve the material and cultural standard of living of the population."
Collective farms and consumer cooperation were given special care of the minister:
“The total amount of the state debt - 2.4 billion rubles - is the debt to collective farms and cooperative organizations, which acquired loans mainly during the war years. This debt should also be canceled. In addition, as a loan, the state budget in different years received free funds from the funds of the fishing cooperatives. In total, such funds are on the balance sheet of the state debt of 3.2 billion rubles and funds transferred by state insurance bodies, as economic organizations - 3.8 billion rubles. It is also advisable to write off these amounts from the balance of the state debt”.
However, according to the Ministry of Finance, the catch was that the annual plan had already been drawn up. And it provided for income from a new loan in the amount of 19.2 billion rubles. The cost of servicing the state debt in 1957 was 11.7 billion. So a hole of 7.5 billion was formed in the budget. And it was proposed to close it by issuing a lottery.
The funniest thing in Zverev's plan was that it was proposed to distribute lottery tickets, like government loans, on a voluntary-compulsory basis. The country's chief financier made a calculation and submitted preliminary figures for approval by the Central Committee:
“To replenish the revenues of the state budget and prevent an even greater gap in the balance of monetary incomes and expenditures of the population, it is necessary to issue in the second quarter of 1957 a monetary lottery in the amount of 9 billion rubles, bearing in mind that 20 percent of this amount will be paid to the population in in the form of cash and goods prizes.
The plan for the placement of lottery tickets is meant to be set among workers, employees and military personnel in the amount of 7,500 million rubles, and among peasants - 1,500 million rubles. In relation to the monthly wage fund, the planned amount of ticket placement among workers, employees and military personnel will be 13 percent, and the average amount of ticket placement in the countryside will be 76 rubles per farm. Last year, the subscription of workers, employees and military personnel to a loan issued in 1956 accounted for 76.6 percent of their monthly wages fund, and the subscription of peasants to a loan was 214 rubles on average per farm."
But, as usual, the realities of the socialist economy stood in the way of the Ministry of Finance's grandiose plans. The Soviet industry was unable to produce 600 super-planned Volgas, 2,100 Moskvichs, 9,000 motorcycles, tens of thousands of bicycles, radios, refrigerators and washing machines for the lottery. It turned out that a new loan subscription could not be avoided.
Buyers of bonds disguise themselves as beggars
Not everything went well with the initiative from below, although millions of Soviet workers could support Khrushchev's idea. As the government and the Central Committee, first the NKVD, and then the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have repeatedly reported, a huge number of workers have not had any bonds for a long time. According to police, illegal buying and selling of these Soviet securities was carried out in almost every market in the country. Disadvantaged people, who had nothing left but state-imposed bonds, brought them to merchants and received 5-7 rubles without any problems. for a hundred-ruble bond. Where speculators were kinder or the population was not so poor, 8-10 rubles were given for a hundred-ruble bond. Moreover, the merchants themselves did not remain at a loss.
They served only as intermediaries and themselves resold bonds to reputable buyers who operated in large cities, but sometimes traveled to the outback or sent reliable assistants to purchase bonds. They bought hundred-ruble securities already at 13-15 rubles, and also did not incur losses. The big dealers of the shadow market paid off each other with bonds as money, in the absence of anything better in many cases, they kept their savings in them. But, most importantly, the bonds were winning, and therefore the purchased securities brought income. And what is even more pleasant, having received a large prize, one could officially and legally buy something expensive - a car or a summer house. And then spend money widely, saying that these are the remainders of the winnings.
Even during the war and after its end, the militia authorities many times urged subordinates to seriously engage in bond traders. After all, buying up anything at a reduced price for the purpose of resale is speculation, for which the guilty person must be punished. However, for a long time only small buyers fell into the hands of the police. But in 1954, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs issued an orientation that summarized the entire experience of fighting bond resellers:
“To avoid exposure, bond buyers are taking various tricks and precautions. Small buyers disguise themselves by selling old things in the markets. Having noticed the persons selling bonds, they, as a rule, do not buy bonds from them directly on the market, but take them away from the market to convenient places and make deals there.
The transfer of the purchased bonds to wholesale buyers is carried out even more secretly, in predetermined places: in parks, back alleys, entrances of houses, etc. At the same time, they try not to disclose their home addresses and authentic data about themselves, call each other by nicknames.
In the orientation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, cases of the most sophisticated disguise of buyers were also cited:
“There are cases when bond buyers disguise themselves as beggars. OBKHS of the Police Department of the Sverdlovsk Region as a result of the implementation of the agent case "Millionaire" was exposed in the mountains. Nizhny Tagil Kravtsov, who, entering the market to buy bonds, dressed like a beggar. On the market, he had his proxies who bought bonds for him … A search at Kravtsov found and seized 1,314,000 rubles in bonds and 133,000 rubles in savings books”.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs explained where and how reputable speculators keep their securities:
“Large buyers store bonds in most cases in secret places: under the floor, between attic floors, walled up in walls, in garbage, buried in the ground (in iron boxes or glass jars), etc., and hide them in more than one, but in many places."
The arrested buyer Kedrov, as stated in the orientation, kept the bonds buried in the ground in eight caches in the forest park. In this regard, the police bosses obliged subordinates to constantly work with the employees of the savings banks that paid out the winnings, and to ensure that they immediately inform the operatives about the appearance of winning bonds with traces of decay, damage and other signs of secret storage. And besides, to recruit caught small buyers in order to go out to wholesalers with their help.
It must be admitted that the tactics chosen soon yielded significant results. From all over the country, the Interior Ministry began to receive reports of arrests of major bond buyers. They confiscated bonds for a rather large amount from each of them - from 300 thousand rubles. up to 9-10 million
In 1956, when the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU became concerned with the problem of bonds, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on the results of the operation to seize large speculators:
“In 1955-1956, the police for these crimes brought to criminal responsibility 250 people. State bonds worth 99 million rubles, 3 million 400 thousand rubles of cash and more than 5 million rubles of various values were seized from the criminals.
The amount, of course, was impressive, but with such a speed the police could reduce the state's debt to the population for more than a dozen years. So this operation did not affect either the decision to default or the willingness of citizens to voluntarily agree to it.
Have not heard a single vote against
The Minister of Finance of the USSR Zverev offered to turn Soviet securities into worthless pieces of paper without any compensation.
Contrary to the expectations of the Central Committee, the workers were in no hurry to forgive the debt to the state. And, apparently, having felt the mood of the workers, none of the leaders of the party and government went to the largest Moscow factories. So the very first secretary of the Central Committee had to get down to business.
Khrushchev began his campaign in the Gorky region with speeches at factories and in front of collective farm activists. The transcript of one such meeting said:
“We in the Central Committee of the party and in the government have discussed more than once the question of how we could terminate the subscription to the loan. Of course, a person who does not quite understand the affairs of the state will say: well, do not issue a loan or make a subscription. That's all. (Laughter.) This is actually not an easy question. For two years, in 1953 and 1954, we issued a loan half as much as usual, but nothing came of it. In 1955, we were again forced to issue a loan in the amount of 32 billion rubles, and in 1956 the subscription was over 34 billion. This year we are thinking about how to cut the amount of the new loan by half, but nothing comes of it …
We now have to pay off loans in winnings and repayments every year, large sums. This year we will have to pay about 16 billion, next year - 18 billion, and in 1967 we would have to pay 25 billion rubles, that is, almost as much as it was planned to subscribe for a loan this year. It turns out a vicious circle. It turns out that the state puts money from loans in one pocket, and gives out the same amount of money from the other pocket to pay for winnings on loans. How to be?"
Then Khrushchev began to lie with his usual selflessness: “We have not made a decision yet, we wanted to consult with workers, collective farmers, office workers and the intelligentsia. And if they support our event, then an appropriate resolution can be adopted."
And then "dear Nikita Sergeevich" began to lure people in with a mythical benefit:
“The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government would consider it possible to do so. Beginning in 1958, stop issuing loans, except for 3%, freely circulating loans. This year, to issue a loan not for 26 billion, as was planned earlier, but for 12 billion rubles.
Now what is the best way to place a loan? Here you have to think too. There is such a proposal that people who earn up to 500 rubles a month do not subscribe to this loan, but who receive more than 500 rubles would subscribe to a loan, but no more than a two-week earnings.
We think that it will be beneficial both for the state and for the people. It is beneficial for the people because our socialist state will grow stronger, in the prosperity of which every Soviet person is interested. In addition, every worker will receive a purely material benefit. (Applause.)
But we cannot carry out this measure, we cannot stop issuing loans, unless we simultaneously stop paying out winnings and repayments on previously issued loans. Therefore, we would suggest postponing the loan repayment for 20-25 years. If you think this is correct, I encourage you to support. (Stormy applause.)
And in 20-25 years, bond payments will begin, of course, not immediately, because it is impossible to pay 260 billion rubles at once, and in parts - about 13 million rubles annually.
Of course, it should be noted that the state will not charge interest for these years. In a word, to freeze the loans held by the population. I must say that in this case, the state, without distributing the loan among the population, would receive a loan for 20 years, because the funds that would have to be repaid on loans would remain at the disposal of our state, and this is a lot of money.
We in the Central Committee of the party and the government consulted where to direct this money. It is necessary to direct them to meet the needs of the people, to increase the amount of appropriations for housing construction, for the construction of schools, hospitals, maternity hospitals, nurseries, kindergartens and other needs, that is, for what is associated with improving the life and life of Soviet people. (Applause.) We raised these questions with the workers of the Krasnoye Sormovo plant and did not hear a single voice against it. And there were 20 thousand workers, and the proposal met with full support. (Applause.) Then there was a meeting at an automobile plant. There were about 60 thousand people present, and they approved the event of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government on the loan. Now you, the participants of the meeting of agricultural workers of the Gorky, Arzamas, Kirov regions,Chuvash, Mari and Mordovian autonomous republics, you warmly support these events. (Prolonged applause.)”.
Now it only remained to show the fig to the West. They don't know how to get out of financial problems so cleverly there:
“Comrades! The capitalist, this huckster who will slaughter his own father for half a percent, if it is profitable for him, will never understand the soul of our Soviet man. He will never believe that you volunteer for this. He will read it in the newspapers and say: the workers and peasants were intimidated, so they agreed.
The capitalist does not understand the new man, the Soviet man, who was born and brought up in our conditions, when a man does not live in order to accumulate and rob another. Our person works, participates in labor, he receives for his work in accordance with the contribution he makes to the common cause. But this is today's payment. At the same time, he looks forward to the future, works for the future. And this is not a distant future, but tomorrow - a communist society. (Applause.).
Purchase of goods has increased sharply
The illusion of mass support was created by the entire propaganda apparatus of the country. The newspapers began to print letters from workers and even housewives, warmly approving the decision of the party and government not to repay debts to the population:
“In the newspaper I read the speech of Comrade NS Khrushchev, in which he talks about loans, and I fully agree with his proposal. I especially liked the idea that bond payments should be postponed and that money should be used to improve the everyday needs of workers. Take our family: we have bonds worth 12,740 rubles. In 1956 we received about three thousand rubles in winnings and redemptions. With this money, they bought a TV, a washing machine and a vacuum cleaner. This, of course, is not bad for one family. But it would be much better if a mechanized laundry was built with the money paid on winnings; a good house management club, etc. And how many new residential buildings, kindergartens, hospitals will be built with funds that will remain at the disposal of the state! Each family will also receive a purely material benefit,since he will really feel a monthly increase first from a decrease in loan deductions, and from next year - from a complete cessation of them. In short, the party and the government have proposed a good, useful deed. Housewives will probably agree with me.
MP Guseva, housewife.
But in reality, what happened most of all was the Minister of Finance Zverev - panic began. Disciplinedly subscribing to the last compulsory loan in mid-May 1957, the people ran to the savings banks to withdraw money. People didn’t believe that the party and government would be satisfied with a bond freeze. The USSR Ministry of Trade reported:
“In a number of cities (Kursk, Smolensk, Ryazan, Yerevan, Odessa, Tashkent, Samarkand, Kokand, Margelan, Bukhara, Vilnius, Kirov, Kostroma, Tbilisi), on the basis of false rumors about the alleged impending monetary reform, in May of this. the purchase of goods in stores increased sharply.
Various jewelry was bought, mainly of gold, watches, wall clocks, crystal, fur products, expensive silk and woolen fabrics, suits, coats, radios, bicycles, furniture, etc. half the time.
Since May 14, demand for goods has sharply increased in some cities of Uzbekistan, especially in Tashkent, Samarkand, Kokand, Margelan and Bukhara. Cake revenue in Tashkent increased by about three times.
Such an outbreak occurred in mid-May in Vilnius. If the Vilnius department store on ordinary days sold goods worth 580 thousand rubles, then on May 14 its turnover amounted to 2.2 million rubles. One jewelry store sold goods worth 200 thousand rubles on May 12, with a regular daily sale of 20 thousand rubles.
Promtorg and a department store in Kostroma on May 5 sold goods for 1,640 thousand rubles, on May 7 for 1,870 thousand rubles, while usually their revenue was about 600 thousand rubles."
Citizens also did not believe that the state would ever pay out at least something on bonds, and there were many families in the country where children were allowed to play with beautiful pieces of paper. And in 1974 it was announced that the state would pay off the old bonds, and they began to forget about the default in 1957. But the crises did not stop there.
Author: Evgeny Zhirnov