The challenge posed by the idea of multiple universes to the concept of an omniscient and omnipotent God often lies in refining our assumptions. If the number of universes is infinite, we no longer need to guess why the ideal conditions for life have formed in our universe. However, some of the multiple universe theories pose more complex questions. The theory of parallel worlds by quantum physicist Hugh Everett III and the modal realism of cosmologist Max Tegmark suggest the existence of worlds that would not be tolerated by a good, intelligent God. These theories are very different from each other, but they all speak of the existence of worlds full of horror and pain.
Of course, many thinkers have argued that there is too much pain and suffering in our own world to consider it a creation of God. But just as many disagreed, giving very thoughtful explanations of why God could have created a world like ours. For example, the fact that without understanding the difficulties, dangers and mistakes, there is no forgiveness, courage and determination. The most impressive human achievement requires the existence of such obstacles.
However, many monstrous phenomena have no obvious benefits. And Everett's theory of parallel worlds and Tegmark's modal realism suggest the existence of a great many terrifying universes, consisting entirely of misfortunes of this kind. Someone like me who continues to cling to the traditional concept of God as a loving creator will inevitably find something like this shocking and wonder how tangible the evidence for these theories is.
The idea of the existence of multiple worlds is based on one of the problems of quantum mechanics. The Schrödinger equation, a fundamental law of quantum theory, describes the changing states of particles. However, some of the states he predicts are a combination - "overlapping" - seemingly incongruous states, for example, a coin falling both tails and heads. We are left to wonder why we did not have a chance to observe a combination of incongruous states, confining ourselves to a coin falling either tails or heads. Some theorists believe there are other factors besides the Schrödinger equation. They introduce a process called "wave function collapse" that leads to a specific outcome - a coin falling heads or tails.
However, in the 1950s, Everett offered a bold alternative explanation. His theory is not based on collapse, but instead assumes the simultaneous existence of all the constituents of these "superimposed" states in identically real but separate worlds. There are exact copies of the same universe, in some of which the coin lands heads and in others tails. This applies to any physical condition - not just the outcome of a coin toss. There are universes in which you manage to catch up with the train and get to work on time, as well as universes in which you are late, and so on. These small differences create multiple overlapping universes, branching out of a single primordial state.
The classic version of quantum theory suggests that there is little likelihood that things will go really bad in the future. She also suggests that at any point in our past, things could have gone much worse than they actually did. Since many worlds theory assumes that all of these probabilities were realized, it predicts the existence of branching universes in which things went as badly as you can imagine.
For example, whenever there is an arbitrarily small probability of a catastrophe that would make humanity suffer, but would leave him with crumbs of health necessary for further reproduction, a branch of the probability tree also appears, in which this deplorable state of affairs becomes a reality for one generation after another. … From this, it seems, follows the conclusion about the existence of worlds in which the appearance of the human race leads to an incredible tragedy.
A believing adherent of the Everett theory may hope that the Lord will prune the tree, leaving only those branches in which good triumphs over evil. However, as noted by Jason Turner, a philosopher at the University of Arizona, such a cropping would disprove the Schrödinger equation. If the Lord prevents the worst universes from emerging in the tree of worlds, deterministic law cannot accurately describe the development of a multiple universe. Not all of the superimposed states predicted by him are realized, but only those that the Lord deemed acceptable.
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Even if the pruning thesis turns out to be refuted, there is still another reason to believe that the theory of multiple worlds does not contradict belief in God. Everett's multiple universe represents only a fairly expanded carnal world, similar to our own, and if we knew with certainty that we are in such a multiple world, it would not be too different from knowing that there are many other inhabited planets, some of which would embody the worst features of our own and others are the best. Thus, even the worst corners of the Everett multiple universe are only unusually nasty versions of Earth. If the afterlife explains the purpose of our seemingly meaningless suffering, it explains the seemingly meaningless suffering in the worst of Everett's worlds in the same way, we should admit,that every soul from every branch will be in the next world.
The believer will also feel more at ease with the thought that the theory of multiple worlds is still far from generally accepted in the scientific community. Although loved by Oxford philosophers and widespread among a growing number of theoretical physicists, this theory remains highly controversial, and experts still pore over the fundamental problems associated with it.
Although Everett's theory of multiple universes implies the existence of worlds that are difficult to reconcile with belief in an all-good God, Tegmark's multiverse includes the worst possible worlds. His theory, outlined in his 2014 book Our Mathematical Universe, is based not on quantum mechanics, but on modal realism, a doctrine proposed by the philosopher David Lewis that any path that could being - every consistent, complete version of the history of the universe - is as real as our own universe.
Most philosophers talk about possible worlds as an abstraction, like numbers, that are beyond time and space, as if they are fundamentally different from the real world, carnal and woven from good old matter. Tegmark agrees that possible worlds are abstractions like numbers. However, he denies that this makes them less real than the physical world. He considers our universe to be fundamentally a mathematical structure. Every physicist will agree that there is a set of mathematical entities, the relationship between which exactly reflects the distribution of the fields and particles that make up the physical world. But Tegmark believes that our universe is identical to these mathematical entities.
If our world is a purely mathematical structure, all other worlds available to our imagination are just as real, and their existence is an inevitable product of slightly different mathematical structures. For every possible way that mathematical models can fill the spacetime universe with matter, there is one such world.
Among these possible ways of distributing matter will inevitably come across those that lead to the emergence of cruel universes full of meaningless suffering - universes like the worst branches of the Everett tree of worlds, and an infinite number of equally frightening realities. However, there will also be more terrifying worlds. Unlike Everett's worlds, the fruits of physical theory, Tegmark's worlds are born from the slightest probability, which he determines through a mathematical sequence.
According to Tegmark, any story about a living thing that can be expressed through a mathematical model based on physical facts actually happens. This means that even if some of Tegmark's worlds have existed long enough to allow an afterlife for their inhabitants, the existence of mathematical structures of all shapes and sizes implies the existence of small worlds as well. Accordingly, infinitely many of these worlds will not last long enough for their inhabitants to find life after death.
Thus, the challenge posed to the believer by Everett's theory of multiple universes pales in comparison to Tegmark's theory. Everett's theory does not imply the Lord's inaction in the face of human suffering, just as it does not imply that the Lord will not reward the martyrs beyond the grave. It implies only the existence of lives worse than our own, while Tegmark's theory assumes the existence of worlds whose inhabitants not only suffer, but also die completely, deprived of posthumous existence.
Worse, the fact that terrifying worlds are the product of pure mathematics makes their existence obligatory, which means that the Lord is powerless to change them! The conclusions from this are offensive to the pious ear: the all-good Lord, who loves his creations, but forced to watch the insatiable sufferings of their infinite multitude, is an exceptionally tragic deity.
However, the believer still has cause for hope.
Unlike Everett's theory of multiple worlds, based on experimental theories of physics that are difficult to dismiss, Tegmark's theory is based on fragile philosophical assumptions. Take, for example, his claim that the physical world is a purely mathematical structure; why would we agree? Physicists often use mathematical structures as models for how the physical world might work, but they do not equate mathematical models with the world itself. The reason Tegmark decided to do this is because he believed that physics should be cleared of anything other than mathematical formulations. Other concepts besides mathematical, he called "anthropocentric burden", which must be got rid of in order to achieve objectivity. But why is it all of a sudden mathematical formulations - the only way to describe things objectively, as they are in themselves? As far as I can tell, he does not substantiate this assumption. And a theory based on such a thesis contrary to our intuition is not enough to shake faith in the all-good Lord.
Apart from the challenge posed by the existence of monstrous worlds in the multiple universes of Everett and Tegmark, the idea that we live in a multiverse does not necessarily contradict belief in God. Any believer should seriously consider the likelihood of the existence of other universes, if only on the basis that God could wish to do more good. Indeed, from an infinitely intelligent, creative and powerful Being follows creation on the scale of worlds - seething with action, minimalistic or full of intelligent life like our own. The theories of physicists such as Alan Guth or Andrei Linde, whose multiverse is an infinitely expanding space that spawns child universes, or Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok,multiverse which are endless cyclical universes, dotted with big bangs and big compressions - quite compatible with the religious worldview.
It may turn out that our world is one of the many universes that God considered worthy of creation. And thanks to the thought of the existence of a multiverse consisting of universes torn apart in time and space, it is easier to believe that our world - our universe - is part of a much larger one, in which good outweighs evil, and which was created by an absolutely good deity.
Dean Zimmerman
