These words, according to the chronicle, said Yermak Timofeevich, addressing his associates during the Siberian campaign before the decisive battle with Kuchum. The shrewd and brave chieftain was not mistaken. The descendants to this day show a keen interest in that ancient time when the Russian people crushed one of the daughter states of the Golden Horde - the Siberian Khanate. It threatened Russia from the east and impeded the development of the Trans-Ural territories. The domination of the Siberian Khanate, backward in socio-economic and cultural relations, doomed the population of this region to age-old stagnation. As part of Russia, the Siberian peoples received the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the material and spiritual culture of the great Russian people, they fought with him against their oppression: It is characteristic that the Khanty, Mansi and other peoples subject to Kuchum quite easily left their khan,went over to Yermak's side and took an oath of allegiance to Russia. The feat of Yermak and his comrades was etched in the people's memory.
Historians carefully study every news of the sources about Yermak's campaigns. Such news has survived to insulting little. And how many contradictions, riddles, omissions there are in them. It is not surprising, therefore, that in historical writings one can find the most different, sometimes mutually exclusive points of view on the circumstances of Yermak's campaign. But what scientists are unanimous about is the recognition of the outstanding significance of the acts of * Ermakov Cossacks "for the fate of Siberia and all of Russia. It was after Yermak's campaign that the rapid advance of the Russians "meeting the sun" began. This is evidenced by the dates of the founding of the cities of Siberia: Tobolsk (1587), Tomsk (1604), Kuznetsk fortress (1618), Krasnoyarsk (1628), Yakutsk (1632). In 1639-1640, the Russians reached the shores of the Pacific Ocean. Let us recall the words of A. I. Herzen, who wrote:“A handful of Cossacks and several hundred homeless peasants crossed the oceans of ice and snow on their own fear, and wherever tired heaps settled, life boiled in the frozen steppes, forgotten by nature, the fields were covered with corn fields and herds, and this is from Perm to the Pacific Ocean”.
As if summing up the results of the first century of the development of Siberia by the Russians, the Tobolsk scientist-nugget Semyon Ulyanovich Remezov said about his native Siberian land: “In glorious Siberia, the air above us is cheerful and healthy … the land is grain-growing, vegetables and cattle”.
But back to those who were among the first, to Ermak and his associates.
The name of Yermak, fanned by legends, still evokes various interpretations. Be that as it may, in the era of the "Siberian take" (as the chronicles sometimes call the campaign of the Cossacks against the kingdom of Kuchum), the nickname "Ermak" was not uncommon. And what is very interesting, Ermaks were not only among the Russian people, but also among the peoples of the Volga region. The most complete explanation of the word "Ermak", which goes back to ancient sources, can be found in an essay called "The Tale of the Siberian Land". There are two interpretations: a tripod for hanging the boiler, as well as a hand mill for grinding grain.
The same source concludes a very important evidence of the origin of Ermak and his homeland. With reference to his own handwritten "news" written by Yermak, it is said that the ataman's grandfather was a townsman in the city of Suzdal, apparently a poor man, as it is mentioned that he "lived in privation." From "bread poverty" Afanasy Grigorievich Alenin (that is the name of Ermak's grandfather) moved to Vladimir, where he "raised two sons of Rodion and Timofey." While driving, Alenin got involved with robbers in the Murom forests, was caught, put in prison, from where he fled with his wife and children to Yuryevets Povolsky (Povolzhsky), where he died.
Driven by need, the sons of Alenin moved in search of food to the Urals, to the estates of the Stroganovs, to Chusovaya. Here Timothy had three sons, the youngest was called Vasily. “And this Vasiley,” is told further, “was strong and eloquent and sharp, walked with the Stroganovs on plows in work on the Kama and Volga rivers, and from that work he took courage. Y, having picked up a small squad for himself, went from work to robbery and from them calling himself ataman, was nicknamed Ermak. This version provided well-known grounds for the conclusion about the Ural homeland of Ermak.
For a long time in pre-revolutionary works there was an opinion about the Don origin of Ermak (the village of Kachalinskaya was called). Donets have erected a monument to Ermak in the city of Novocherkassk. But direct data from sources did not support this point of view and increasingly began to be questioned.
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Relatively recently, chronicle texts of Northern Russian origin were discovered, in which Ermak is called a native of Pomorie: in one case, the village of Borok on the Northern Dvina is indicated, in the other - Totemokiy district. And what is noteworthy is that the inhabitants of all these areas have preserved legends that Ermak is their fellow countryman.
In this way, new findings give rise to new challenges. It is necessary to continue the research begun in order to get to the answer to the controversial question about the origin of Ermak Timofeevich.
To this day, in historical science, disputes about the time when Ermak's campaign began, about the role of the government and the Stroganovs in organizing the expedition beyond the Urals, about the stages of advancement to Siberia, and so on do not stop.
Some historians support the position of the so-called Stroganov Chronicle. She assured that Yermak and his squad were invited by the Ural businessmen from the Volga, where he robbed, and for about two years before the start of the Siberian epic he was in the possession of the Stroganovs. On September 1, 1581, a campaign to Siberia began, and less than two months later the capital of Kuchum was taken.
Experts in the history of the Urals will now show you the cave where, according to legend, Yermak's squad spent the night. The memory of the "Ermakov khutors" on the Sylva River has been preserved (it is believed that some Cossacks settled here even before the Siberian campaign). There is a rock on Chusovaya, it is also associated with the name of the chieftain …
How convincing? However … However, puzzling questions arise if you turn to other sources.
The chronicler Savva Esipov was under the Archbishop of Tobolsk. In 1636 he wrote an essay about Yermak's campaign. Outlining all the vicissitudes of the campaign, Esipov did not mention a word about the Stroganovs and their role in organizing the expedition.
S. U. Remezov, already known to us, wrote at the turn of the 17th-18th centuries his work on the “Siberian take *. He was a very knowledgeable author: he grew up in a family of cadre service people of Tobolsk, knew Cossack stories and legends. Moreover, in the work of Remezov, scientists discovered an invaluable source - a short chronicle called Kungurskaya.
Written in a lively, colloquial language, sometimes with rude humor, the Kungur Chronicle tells how Yermak and his Cossack squad fled from the Volga from the persecution of the tsarist authorities. Coming to the Stroganovs, the Cossacks demanded from them the necessary supplies for an expedition to Siberia. The Ural industrialists had to agree, otherwise the Cossacks threatened to deal with them.
It turns out that there was no call of the Cossacks, there was no initiative of the Stroganovs. In the description of the campaign, both the Kungur Chronicle and Remezov say that the path to the capital of the Siberian Khanate was not immediately overcome. The Cossack squad had to spend the winter. And only with the onset of spring did they move further.
By the way, already today, students of Perm University have undertaken an expedition on boats along the route of Yermak's squad. And it turned out that it was impossible to walk the distance to the former capital of Kuchumova in two months. Physically prepared young people - sportsmen - took part in the experiment. And they did not fight with the local population along the way …
So, the role of the Stroganovs (albeit involuntary) in the organization of Yermak's campaign can still be recognized as reliable. But the transience of the first stage of the campaign raises serious doubts.
Folk songs about Yermak also say that Yermak had a winter stay on the way to Siberia.
However, there are historians who defend the version of the Stroganov chronicle about the rapid advance of the Cossacks to the khan's capital. Messages from Esipovsky's work admit the same interpretation. So the dispute on this score is not over yet.
No less controversial is the date of Yermak's speech. If the day of September 1, in fact, is accepted by the majority of scientists, then opinions about the year differ significantly.
What is the reason for this? With contradictory or ambiguous indications of sources.
Esipov indicates 7089 - the beginning of the campaign. Since it is further referred to as the month of October, the year 1580 is obtained. (Remember - the year is September!) The Stroganov chronicler calls the date September 1, 7090. According to our chronology, this is 1581.
Following the work of Remezov, we will get a kind of chronology of the campaign. In this case, the winter of 1579/80 will have to be recognized as its beginning. But here's what is interesting: Remezov more often than other sources mentions the days and months of events in a fairly logical sequence. And he doesn't indicate years! Again, a mystery for researchers.
However, what has been said does not exhaust the divergence of sources about the beginning of the expedition of Yermak.
So far we have been talking about the written annals. But there are also government documents from that time, mentioning Ermak. Will they help sort out these disputes?
Let's take the most famous document in science, the "disgraced" letter of Ivan the Terrible Stroganov. It was compiled in Moscow on November 16, 1582. The letter uses information received from the governor of Perm, Velikaya Pelepelitsyn. The voivode complained to the tsar that the Stroganovs had hired the Cossack robbers led by Ermak and sent them on a campaign to Siberia "September in 1 day" Unfortunately, on the same day the prince, Kuchum's henchman, made a devastating raid on the Ural settlements. Pelepelitsyn accused the Stroganovs and Ermak of "not helping Perm in any way." Tsar's disgrace fell on the heads of the Stroganovs for this. It was ordered to return Ermak from the campaign.
The diploma at first glance confirms the Stroganov interpretation of the beginning of the expedition. She is on their initiative. And the date … And this is where new difficulties arise.
132 If we assume that Ermak moved out of the Stroganov possessions on September 1, 1581, then why was the tsar's charter more than a year late with the conviction of the Stroganovs and the chieftain? Why was the voivode in no hurry to inform about the enemy's raid in time?
Or maybe the campaign began not in 1581, but in 1582? And the letter was an operational response to the news of the attack from across the Urals? The "unsubscribe" of the voivode could reach Moscow in a month and a half.
So what is it? Is it relief to breathe a sigh and say that the matter is now cleared up?
No, the researchers were not satisfied with this answer.
First, we do not know the official data when the capital of the Siberian Khanate was taken. But the annals, with all the discrepancies in the years, unanimously call October 26. Taking September 1, 1582 as the date of Yermak's speech, we are again faced with the problem of the transience of the campaign, which already raises serious doubts.
Secondly, some scholars do not trust Pelepelitsyn's denunciation, considering it the fruit of serious friction between the voivode and the Stroganovs. To spite his ill-wills more strongly, Pelepelitsyn decided to denigrate them in the eyes of the government.
Thirdly, the foray of the Pelym prince into the Urals is dated in a number of chronicles to 1581.
Fourth, there is one unique piece of news going back to Ermak's associate Gavrila Ivanov. This Cossack in 1623 said that his Siberian service lasted 42 years. In other words, G. Ivanov considered the year 1581 to be its beginning.
Finally, a detachment led by Prince Volkhovsky was sent from Moscow to help Ermak in the second half of 1583. By that time, Ermak managed to send an embassy to Ivan the Terrible with the news of the capture of the capital of Kuchum and other victories. It is hard to believe that the Cossacks were able to notify Moscow so quickly - in the winter of 1582/83, and from there they equipped and sent Volkhovsky's expedition.
Further searches of official sources gave some results, but did not remove disputes and doubts.
The Livonian War was still going on. And one of the documents of the Polish military leader Pan Stravinsky (a letter to the king from the city of Mogilev besieged by the Russian army) turned out to be extremely interesting and rather unexpected for researchers of our topic. This letter, which was printed long ago, was ignored for a long time: Mogilev is too far from the Urals. And what does Ermak have to do with it? However, the acquaintance with the letter gave a surprise: it named among the commanders of the Russian troops … "Ermak Timofeevich, Cossack chieftain"! Stravinsky's letter dated back to the end of June 1581.
So where was Yermak actually then: in the Urals, preparing for a campaign, or near Mogilev? It turns out some kind of "split personality" of the ataman.
Most scientists did not find it possible to recognize the ataman from the letter of the Mogilev commandant Yermak, who made the famous trip to Siberia. At the same time, they were guided, in particular, by the fact that the tsar's "disgraced" letter by the Stroganovs denounces Ermak and his fellow "thieves", sees no merits for them before the state! Moscow should have known who was fighting in the west of the country.
So, two Yermaks?
Needless to say, a rare coincidence of the name and patronymic of two Cossack leaders who acted simultaneously. If we accept this point of view, of course.
Some historians have suggested that Ermak was still alone. From near Mogilev, the government of Ivan the Terrible sent him with a detachment of Cossacks to the east, on the Siberian campaign. But in a month and a half to walk 2 thousand miles and immediately rush into a difficult expedition? An incredible guess. But this is in the event that you adhere to the date of September 1, 1581 as the beginning of the Siberian campaign.
Therefore, supporters of the "Mogilev Ermak" expressed the idea that the campaign to Siberia began in 1582, when the arrivals stocked up with everything necessary for a long and dangerous service. Then the "disgraced" letter of 1582 can be understood as a reinforcement of this point of view. According to this version, the initiative for the campaign belonged to the government.
The continued search for information about Yermak's campaign in official documents prompted researchers to find new finds. Some of them are associated with archives, while others - with a thorough study of published sources in rare editions that seem far from the Siberian theme.
Among the documents of the Russian embassy service at the end of the 16th century, such documents suddenly appeared that were of great interest to the historians of the Siberian epic of Yermak. Moscow supplied its ambassadors with instructions on what and how to speak at the courts of foreign rulers. An approximate range of questions was determined that could be asked to Russian representatives. The instructions to the ambassadors also provided answers to these questions.
And what happened?
Already in November 1584, an embassy instruction was drawn up, which outlined the history of Russia's relations with the Siberian Khanate. The order asserted that the Siberian khans were always dependent on Russia. But Khan Kuchum violated his citizenship, robbed the Russian tribute collectors. Therefore, Tsar Ivan IV “for this disobedience ordered his Volga and Kazan and Astrakhan Cossacks to attack him from Perm with a firefight. And those Cossacks, having come, took the Siberian kingdom. " And in other orders of the following years, we are talking about the campaign in Siberia "sovereign" Cossacks or "Volga Cossacks" on the tsarist order. There are no names here, everything should testify to the leading role of the state in the annexation of Siberia.
Unfortunately, these documents do not give an answer to the question about the time when Ermak's campaign began. But for scientists who consider state power to be the guiding force of the expedition, the data of diplomatic documents are a strong argument.
But at the beginning of the book we agreed that we would, whenever possible, involve various sources, compare them, and only on this path will seek answers to the questions that arise.
In our case, this is all the more necessary since the discord of the sources encourages the continuation of the search. Let's see what opportunities are still available.
Moscow in early July 1581 was visited by the Nogai Murza Urmag-Met. He said that "beforehand, Ermak drove sixty of my horses off the Volga, and they drove off a thousand horses from the Volga." Murza demanded damages or the extradition of Yermak. As you can see, in the first case, the blame is laid directly on Yermak, in the second - the question of the participation of the chieftain in driving the horses remains open.
To understand the meaning of the murza's complaint, it is important to understand what the words “in advance” and letos meant. " Since the word “letos” meant “last summer,” it could not refer to 1581. After all, July is the height of summer time. Hence, it is logical to assume that the victim of the murza meant the summer of the previous year, 1580. As for the words "ahead of this", they most likely referred to recent events before Urmagmet's arrival in Moscow. Therefore, it was about 1581.
Our task has become even more complicated: two official documents simultaneously mention Ermak near Mogilev and on the Volga.
Once again, our reasoning seemed to be deadlocked. Either there were two Yermaks, or one of the official messages should be rejected. But which one?
True, a kind of "conciliatory" opinion was also expressed. It boiled down to the fact that Yermak went from Mogilev to the Volga, and the accusation of the chieftain of driving the horses "ahead of this" should not necessarily refer to 1581.
It turns out solid questions and riddles …
How do you get out of the jungle of conflicting evidence from sources about the beginning of the campaign of Yermak's squad to Siberia? At the current level of knowledge, various answers to this question are permissible. The most common is the point of view that Ermak came to the Stroganovs from the Volga, and his Siberian expedition began on September 1, 1581. However, the controversy is not closed, research is ongoing. And not only on the initial stage of the campaign, but also on other subjects of this wonderful page of Russian history …
LETTER FROM THE PRUT
The Great Northern War was going on. Russia has already achieved a turning point in its struggle with Sweden. The army of Peter I inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy near Poltava. And then at the crossing of the Dnieper, the Swedish regiments that had fled from the battlefield laid down their arms. King Charles XII with a small detachment managed to get to the right bank of the river. His refuge was the city of Bender, which was then in Turkish possessions.
After Poltava, Russia's international prestige increased, and the Northern Alliance was restored against Sweden. The military operations took place far from the Russian borders. In 1710, the Baltic was cleared of Swedish troops. New military operations were being prepared.
However, Russia was constantly concerned about the security of its southern borders. The Crimean Khanate now and then violated the country's borders. The government of Sultan Turkey did not come to terms with the loss of Azov. And although it did not dare to side with Sweden, the anti-Russian foreign policy line was strong in Istanbul. The successes of Russia worried Turkey, and she gave shelter to the enemy of Peter I - the Swedish king. In the environment of the Sultan, there was a fierce struggle between supporters of peaceful relations with Russia and aggressively-minded groups of Turkish feudal lords.
Karl XII added fuel to the fire, urging the Sultan to oppose Peter I. The diplomats of the Western powers in Istanbul also did not sleep, making it clear to the Turkish government that it was necessary to put a limit to the rise of Russia.
As a result, a group hostile to Russia gained the upper hand at the Sultan's court. Turkey began intensive preparations for the war. A huge army was mobilized, the hordes of the Crimean Khan sat on the horse. The powerful war machine of the Ottoman Empire was gaining momentum. Finally, the sultan declared war on Russia and moved his troops north. At the same time, the Krymchaks flooded into the lands of Ukraine, trying to break through to Voronezh and destroy the Russian ships under construction there.
Peter I and Russian Ambassador to Turkey P. A. Tolstoy tried to influence the Turkish government through diplomatic means and prevent the war. However, this was not done.
Then the Russian army, led by Peter I, set out on a long campaign to meet the enemy further from the borders of Russia. Her path led to the banks of the Danube. It was known in Russia that the peoples of Moldova and the Balkan countries, dependent on Turkey, yearn for liberation from the Ottoman yoke. There was a hope for an uprising of these peoples against their oppressors, when the Russian troops would find themselves on the Danube lands. But, as subsequent events showed, the Turkish side managed to prevent this danger. Only a small detachment of Moldavian soldiers, led by the ruler Dmitry Cantemir, joined the army of Peter I when it entered the territory of Moldova in the early summer of 1711.
Going on a campaign, Peter I issued a decree on the establishment of the Senate - a new authority from the confidants. In the absence of the tsar, the Senate was to act as a collective ruler. Now it is difficult to say whether the creation of the Senate and Peter's departure to the theater of military operations was a mere coincidence. Or the tsar was tormented by some unkind foreboding, leaving Moscow and the new city on the Neva dear to his heart.
The summer of 1711 in Moldova turned out to be unusually sultry and arid even for these places. This made it difficult for Peter's troops to advance. In addition, during the campaign, it became clear that the hopes for replenishing food supplies within Moldova did not come true.
In these unfavorable conditions, the army reached the Prut River and then met with the main Turkish forces, reinforced by the troops of the Crimean Khan. The enemy's almost fivefold numerical superiority aggravated the severity of the situation. He allowed the Turkish commanders to surround the Russian regiments on the banks of the Prut.
At a military council in the Russian camp, it was decided to take the battle. Having quickly strengthened their positions, the soldiers of Peter I repulsed the fierce attack of the selected enemy units - the Janissaries, withstood another artillery bombardment. The Janissaries rolled back, suffering heavy losses. The attempt of the Turkish command to send them into battle again met with a decisive refusal. The Sultan's Guard did not want a repetition of the previous bloody bath organized by the troops of Peter.
But in the Russian camp there was no time for fun. Having bravely withstood the first battles, the soldiers were exhausted by the heat, lack of food and water. There was nothing to feed the horses. Ammunition was depleted. The enemy had more than threefold superiority in artillery. The shelling of Russian positions practically deprived Peter's troops of access to drinking water. It became obvious that the army could not withstand a long blockade. A critical situation has arisen.
One by one, Peter held military councils, discussed ways out of a desperate situation. The idea of surrender, surrender was rejected from the very beginning. In an extreme case, the option of breaking the blockade was envisaged with an attempt to withdraw troops up the Prut. But does this promise salvation when there are numerous enemies around, abundantly provided with food and ammunition? How can such a fight end?
Then Peter I decided to enter into peace negotiations with the Turkish commander in chief. He, of course, knew about the plight of the Russian army. But he also knew something else - the Russians would fight desperately and there was no need to expect an easy victory. The lessons of the previous days were eloquent enough.
What could Peter count on when starting negotiations? As is clear from his instructions to the assistant to the Chancellor P. P. Shafirov and Major General M. B. Sheremetev, the son of Field Marshal B. P. Sheremetev, sent to the Turkish camp, the Russian side was ready to agree to any conditions, concessions to the conquered territories, except captivity ("Shklafstvo", that is, slavery, in the words of Peter I). It was necessary to listen to the demands of the Turkish side …
One can imagine the mood and feelings of Peter and his troops these days. The future of not only the tsar himself and the army, but also the course of the Northern War and Russia's international position depended on the outcome of the negotiations. Later, Peter will say that he has never been in such a desperate situation.
Here we come to one mysterious document that is associated in historical research with the Prut campaign of Peter I.
This is a letter from Peter I to the Senate on July 10, 1711. Let us cite it in full, as it is printed in the edition of "Letters and Papers of Emperor Peter the Great":
“I hereby inform you that I, with all my army, without fault or error on our part, but solely only on the basis of false news received, am fourfold by the strongest Turkish force so surrounded that all paths to obtaining food have been cut off, and that I, without God's special help, I can not foresee anything else, except for a complete defeat, or that I will fall into Turkish captivity. If this latter happens, then you must not regard me as your king and sovereign and do not fulfill anything that I, at least by my own handwritten command, required of you, until I myself appear among you in my person. But if I perish and you receive the correct news of my death, then choose among you one who is worthy as my heir.
As you can see, the letter was drawn up at the most critical moment of the Prut campaign. It reflects the turmoil in Peter's soul and, at the same time, his concern for the fate of the state in the worst possible outcome. In a sense, the document can be regarded as the testament of Peter.
As if simple and understandable. You can only explain some parts of the letter and put an end to it.
However, in reality, everything is much more complicated. First, to this day, among the papers of Peter I, written by him or on his behalf, this document has not been found.
Secondly, the letter from the banks of the Prut was first printed in German in 1785. It was published by the scientist Yakov Shtein, who for many years collected materials about Peter I and his time. Whether Shtelin had a text in Russian and where he went is unknown.
The next year the letter was printed in Russian translation and later was reproduced several times in various publications.
After the first publication of the letter for almost 75 years, scholars have expressed no doubt that it actually existed. But then historians sort of caught themselves. If there is no original, then is it not a forgery put into circulation? For the first time such doubts were expressed by the historian N. G. Ustryalov in 1859. He was opposed by the famous SM Soloviev (1820-1879), who included the document in his multivolume essay "History of Russia from Ancient Times". However, Ustryalov also gained supporters. F. A. Witberg insisted on the forgery of the letter in 1875. The historian E. A. Belov entered into polemics with him, considering the arguments of the critics unfounded. Some scholars have taken a hesitant stance or avoided a sensitive issue.
Almost a hundred years have passed since the work of Vitberg and Belov. The Soviet historian E. P. Podyapolskaya, preparing a letter for a new edition, considered this controversial and very important historically issue.
The researcher first of all paid attention to the language and syllable of the letter. Those who doubted the authenticity of the document emphasized that there were obvious discrepancies with the era of Peter I. At the same time, it was not taken into account that the translation from German did not provide sufficient grounds for judging the language and style of Peter.
Of course, the most important thing is the content of the letter. Comparison with other sources allowed us to come to the following conclusions.
The letter mentions “false news that caused disaster for the Russian army. What is meant by this? It turns out there was such a sad fact. One of the foreign officers gave Peter false information about the enemy's movement. Later, in the "History of the War of the Sweys" (Peter directed its preparation, he partially wrote and edited the texts) we will find the following words: "This report was false." Finally, the news about the supplies of provisions for the army of Peter in Moldova was not confirmed.
The fourfold superiority of the Turkish forces can be judged by the ratio of the number of opposing troops on the Prut. Official Russian documents list 38 thousand in the army of Peter and 119 thousand Turks (in addition, 70 thousand Crimean Tatars). The letter does not conclude a major departure from these testimonies.
Peter points out that "all ways to get food are cut off." This is consistent with the following passage in the History of the War of the Swedes:
"In all this march from the Prut … our bread had nothing …"
The alarming note of the letter about a possible defeat finds its confirmation in the same “History”. It also sounds in the notes of contemporaries - participants in the Prut campaign.
Peter's fears ("I will fall into Turkish captivity") were quite real. Voluntary surrender, as we have already said, was not part of the king's plans, but he could be captured during the battle.
Perhaps the greatest doubts among historians were caused by the phrase of the letter about the choice of the "most worthy" to the royal throne in the event of the death of Peter. Ustryalov, for example, believed that Peter could not entrust the Senate with the decision of the issue of succession to the throne, since the composition of this body was far from aristocratic. None of the senators were related to Peter. In addition, Peter had a son, Alexei. In 1711, their relationship had not yet deteriorated to such an extent as later, when Peter most decisively refused to inherit the throne from his son.
However, these remarks are far from indisputable. Peter perceived the Senate in his absence as a "collective king." In the decree on March 2, 1711, he wrote: * … everyone … let the decrees be obedient as to ourselves. " A few days later, in a letter to AD Menshikov, the tsar emphasized: "We have determined the ruling Senate, to which we have given all full power."
And the second doubt is answered. The fact is that in the marriage contract between Tsarevich Alexei and Princess Charlotte, Peter crossed out the words about the subsequent "statehood" of his son and his wife. Back in 1704, the tsar warned Alexei that he would deprive him of his succession to the throne if he was not his faithful assistant. Moreover, Peter in this case did not want to consider Alexei as his son.
So, we can admit that the content of the letter of Peter I from the banks of the Prut does not contradict the data of other sources, corresponds to the then historical situation.
Answers to other questions related to this document are offered.
For example, about why the letter of Peter we are considering was not found in the archives. They searched for a long time and diligently. Let's not anticipate events - maybe someone will be lucky enough to come across a letter during new searches. It is possible that our secret source will suddenly "emerge" into the light where it is not expected to be discovered. Since the first publication was in German, it is possible that the document is in foreign archives.
If we are confronted with the need to make assumptions, then we cannot fail to say that the original letter could have been destroyed on purpose. The Prut epic ended more or less happily for the Russian side. The Turks signed the peace. Peter, in good health, returned with his army to his homeland. Let us think, to whom could the desperate letter of the tsar serve in glory?
A bitter reminder of the past dramatic days, when the monarch did not know about his tomorrow's fate - why is it? So Peter and his entourage were unlikely to want to keep such a testimony …
Scientists are not inclined now to share the opinion about the forgery of Peter's letter, although the version of the later forgery continues to exist.
Some of the circumstances reported by K. Shtelin when publishing this source, however, look incongruous. Thus, the letter is allegedly addressed to the Senate in St. Petersburg. But in 1711 the Senate was still in Moscow. The royal message reached its destination, as Shtelin claimed, after 9 days. And this is more than strange. Such a short delivery time is not possible.
However, it is not difficult to be convinced that the question of the timing and ways of delivery of the letter is a special one. His decision in no way affects the very essence of the matter.
It is hoped that the mysterious story of Peter's letter of July 10 (old style) 1711 will still be the subject of new research.
