After 1225 the crown of Jerusalem did not return to the kingdom. Until 1268, she crowned the head of the Hohenstaufens, kings of Sicily, or, in the case of Frederick II, the emperor. Then, between 1269 and 1286, the Cypriot Lusignans and representatives of the Anjou dynasty, who became the rulers of Sicily and southern Italy, fought for the right to possess it. Neither the Hohenstaufens nor the Angevins lived permanently in the Holy Land. They transferred nominal power to their representatives; in fact, the kingdom was ruled by an oligarchy, among which the masters of the Templars and Hospitallers played the leading role. But sometimes it happened that some Western European monarch went on a crusade and took control of the situation, as Louis IX did in 1248-1254. Such kings were generally treated favorably by the orders. With the exception, however, of Friedrich P.
In 1223 Jean de Brienne, a man already quite old, married his daughter Isabella to the Emperor Frederick P. Isabella died, having had time to give birth to a son, Konrad. Frederick II, who did not feel any respect for his father-in-law, forbade him to return to the Holy Land and appropriated the crown of his infant son. Frederick II's crusade began under unusual circumstances, as the emperor set out on a journey after being excommunicated.
However, this did not bother him. Frederick landed in the Holy Land to begin negotiations with his "friend", the Sultan of Egypt al-Kamil. On February 18, 1229, Frederick II obtained from the Sultan the return of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and the corridor that connected these cities with Acra. Muslims and Christians alike received this agreement badly. Like most of the local barons, led by Jean d'Ibelen, the military orders - which the Pope ordered not to help the emperor, "a traitor and a villain" - reacted sharply to the emperor's idea, since they believed that under the current conditions it would be impossible to defend the Holy City … The Order of the Temple generally had something to reproach Frederick for: the agreement concluded with the Sultan did not provide for the return of the Templars to their former residence in Jerusalem. Therefore, the Templars and Hospitallers were not present at the coronation of Frederick II in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. The English historian Matthew Parisian even mentioned a conspiracy allegedly organized by military orders to kill Frederick: apparently, this is an invention of this devoted supporter of the Hohenstaufens.
However, the policy of both military orders changed, and gradually they found themselves in hostile camps. In 1229, Frederick took possession of the fortress of the Château-Pelerin, which belonged to the Templars. The Knights of the Temple reacted immediately, forcing the emperor to go home. To avenge the insult, he attacked the Templar quarter in Acre. The Hospitallers did not interfere; they even accepted Frederick after his failure. This was the first sign to usher in a rapprochement between the Hospitaller Order and the Emperor.
Returning to the West, Frederick II made peace with the pope. From that moment on, the military orders began to behave with restraint. The Templars showed goodwill by refusing to shelter in one of their homes in the county of Tripoli, the opponent of Frederick II, Balland d'Ibelena (Jean's brother), "since they did not want to look bad in the eyes of the emperor's people." However, the agreement between the pope and the emperor did not last long. The Hospitaller Order went over to the Emperor's side along with the Pisans. The Order of the Temple, along with most of the barons and the cities of Genoa and Venice, remained loyal to the pope. In 1242, the Hospitallers supported the attempt of Frederick's representative, Philangieri, to take possession of Acra, but failed. In response, opponents of the Hospitallers besieged his residence for six months. Even after the death of the emperor, the Hospitallers supported his successors, Konrad, Manfred and Conradin. Should we consider them "Ghibellines", supporters of the emperor, and the Templars - "Guelphs", adherents of the Pope? It is not that simple. In their relations with Frederick II, the military orders were guided by other motives - namely, in the opinion of J. Riley-Smith, foreign policy: the Order of the Temple fought for an alliance with Damascus against Egypt, while the Hospitallers held a different point of view, thereby becoming “objective »Allies of Frederick II. I will return to this question later, considering the totality of the relationship between these two orders.the Order of the Temple fought for an alliance with Damascus against Egypt, while the Hospitallers held a different point of view, thus becoming the "objective" allies of Frederick II. I will return to this question later, considering the totality of the relationship between these two orders.the Order of the Temple fought for an alliance with Damascus against Egypt, while the Hospitallers held a different point of view, thus becoming the "objective" allies of Frederick II. I will return to this question later, considering the totality of the relationship between these two orders.
Divided over the support of Frederick II, the Templars and Hospitallers were temporarily reconciled thanks to the French king Louis IX. The relationship with him was at the same time cordial and uneasy. Louis IX possessed the mentality of a Western crusader and was distrustful of the Puleins, and the orders sometimes took positions very close to their views. The military orders easily recognized the authority of the King of France. In Cyprus, Louis IX discussed with the Masters of the Temple and Hospital a further plan of action. They invited him to play on the internal contradictions of the Muslim world. Louis IX flatly refused: he will not negotiate with infidels! He then asked the orders to sever all relations with them as well. It was about generally recognized, long-standing and well-established contacts, and subsequently they will continue. Still the orders obeyed - though,in general, they were not going to give up their usual diplomacy.
Louis IX was defeated and taken prisoner, he had to pay a ransom for freedom, then he spent four years in Acre. He was forced to reconcile and enter into negotiations with the infidels. However, his lack of desire prevented him from capitalizing on the feud between Damascus and Egypt. He did not show any military or political initiative and left the Holy Land, having previously concluded a truce that ensured a favorable status quo for Muslims. It was in this context that the rift between the king and the Templars occurred, which Jean de Joinville recounts:
Brother Hugh de Jouy, Marshal of the Order of the Temple, was sent by the Master of the Order to the Sultan of Damascus to negotiate a large plot of land belonging to the Order, half of which was claimed by the Sultan. The terms were accepted but postponed pending the king's approval. Brother Hugo brought with him the Emir of the Sultan of Damascus and the text of the treaty …
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The King rebuked the Master of the Order of the Temple for starting negotiations without his knowledge. He demanded an answer. In the presence of the whole army …
the Master of the Order of the Temple, along with the entire community, walked through the camp without pants. The king ordered the master and the Sultan's messenger to be seated in front of him and said loudly: "Master, tell the Sultan's ambassador that he forced you to conclude a treaty with him without telling me, and therefore you are taking away all your promises." The master took the treaty and handed it over to the emir, adding: "I am giving you the treaty, which I drew up poorly, and it depresses me."
The Templars, on their knees, were to bring public repentance, and the king demanded that Hugo de Jouy be expelled from the Holy Land. Hugo de Jouy was promoted to the post of Master of Catalonia, but Renaud de Vichier remained in his post of Master of the Order. This incident does not at all indicate any deep hostility that Louis IX may have harbored towards the Order of the Temple; proof of this is the fact that at the time of the king's return from the crusade, his fleet was commanded by a Templar. However, this event clearly indicates the existence of contradictions between royal power - episodic or distant (in the case of Louis IX, we are dealing with de facto power) - and influential groups, well-organized and independent, pursuing their own diplomatic and military policies.
In 1268 the Hohenstaufens finally left the historical scene. Conradin, defeated in the battle of Tagliacozzo by the brother of Louis IX, Charles of Anjou, was executed: the Kingdom of Jerusalem lost its king. It was supposed to either unite the kingdom with Cyprus, or invite Charles of Anjou to the throne. The plans for calling the Cypriot sovereign to the throne raised a rather delicate issue: the fact is that there were two branches of the Cypriot dynasty - one was represented by Hugo of Cyprus, the other - Maria, the wife of the prince of Antioch. The Hospitallers favored the former, and the Templars favored the latter. Hugo prevailed and in 1269 received the crown of the Jerusalem kings. But in 1277 the king left Acre, irritated by the behavior of the military orders, especially the Order of the Temple. He wrote to the pope that he could no longer rule "the country because of the orders of the Temple and Hospital."
However, Mary of Antioch sold her rights to the throne to Charles of Anjou. The Order of the Temple supported him in the strongest possible way. Guillaume de Beauje, who became the master of the order in 1273, had family ties with the Angevin dynasty, and in 1271-1273. was the preceptor of the province of Apulia. In the Holy Land, he acted as a devoted champion of the interests of the Angevin house. Under Guillaume's leadership, the Order of the Temple resisted any attempts to interfere from Cyprus. Acre spoke in favor of Charles, Tire and Beirut - in favor of the king of Cyprus. Becoming more and more meaningless, the title of King of Jerusalem still consoled the vanity of the Western dynasties: the Catalan Ramon Muntaner enviously emphasizes that Charles of Anjou called himself "the governor of the entire overseas land, and the supreme ruler of all Christians living overseas, and the orders of the Temple, Hospital and Germans." …In addition, Charles of Anjou cherished an ambitious dream of international politics throughout the Mediterranean region, relying on southern Italy, Morea and the Kingdom of Jerusalem.
Military orders put their power at the service of kings, for whom the Holy Land was only one of the many arenas of their activities (Louis IX was an exception). But all his efforts were in vain: kings came and went, and they stayed. True, even if they wanted, the orders would still not be able to stay away from the large-scale eastern maneuvers of Frederick II or Charles of Anjou. In the same way, they could not stay away from the intrigues of the Syrian-Palestinian nobility or the Italian colonies.
In a whirlpool of intrigue
Of the many examples we know of, two particularly clearly demonstrate how military orders, at first drawn into other people's strife, turned out to be participants in real private wars.
Major Italian port cities continued to feud in the East - especially Genoa and Venice, which fought each other everywhere, both on land and at sea. In Acre, each of them owned a quarter, colony or trading post, which enjoyed wide autonomy in relation to the political and religious authorities of the kingdom. These quarters, located near the port, were adjacent to the possessions of the military orders.
One fine day, around 1250, the conflict between Genoa and Venice broke out in the Holy Land: the reason for it was the house of the monastery of St. Sava, which belonged to the abbot and located on a hill within the Genoese quarter. This height was of strategic interest as it controlled the way to the port from the Venetian quarter. The Genoese intended to buy this house from the abbot. The Venetians decided to discourage them with all available means. Initially, the Genoese had the advantage, but in 1256 the Venetians launched a vigorous counteroffensive. They made an alliance with Pisa and gathered a large fleet, which attacked the port of Acre and the Genoese quarter, causing considerable damage to it. The situation took a new turn, as as a result of intrigues and alliances, two camps were formed: on the one hand, Venice, part of the local nobility and the bailiffs of the kingdom by Jean d'Ibelen,some brotherhoods of Latin merchants of Acre, as well as merchants from Marseille and Provence; in addition, the Venetians were supported by the prince of Antioch. At the other extreme, Genoa was supported by the Genoese Embriachi family, who owned the Señoria Jebaila, Senor Thira, Philippe de Montfort, the main representative of the Hohenstaufens in the East, Catalans and merchant brotherhoods of Acre, which included Syrian Christians from the local population. These two camps became parties at the moment when the queen of Cyprus arrived in the Holy Land with the aim of achieving regency over the kingdom. Venice and its allies supported her, while Genoa, on the contrary, defended the interests of Konradin, the young heir to the Hohenstaufens. Against the background of the struggle between Venice and Genoa, the enmity between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines flared up again.the Venetians were supported by the prince of Antioch. At the other extreme, Genoa was supported by the Genoese Embriachi family, who owned the Señoria Jebaila, Senor Thira, Philippe de Montfort, the main representative of the Hohenstaufens in the East, Catalans and merchant brotherhoods of Acre, which included Syrian Christians from the local population. These two camps became parties at the moment when the queen of Cyprus arrived in the Holy Land with the aim of achieving regency over the kingdom. Venice and its allies supported her, while Genoa, on the contrary, defended the interests of Konradin, the young heir to the Hohenstaufens. Against the background of the struggle between Venice and Genoa, the enmity between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines flared up again.the Venetians were supported by the prince of Antioch. At the other extreme, Genoa was supported by the Genoese Embriachi family, who owned the lord Jebaila, the lord of Thira, Philippe de Montfort, the main representative of the Hohenstaufens in the East, the Catalans and merchant brotherhoods of Acre, which included Syrian Christians from the local population. These two camps became parties at the moment when the queen of Cyprus arrived in the Holy Land with the aim of achieving regency over the kingdom. Venice and its allies supported her, while Genoa, on the contrary, defended the interests of Konradin, the young heir to the Hohenstaufens. Against the background of the struggle between Venice and Genoa, the enmity between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines flared up again.the main representative of the Hohenstaufens in the East, the Catalans and the merchant brotherhoods of Acre, which included Syrian Christians from the local population. These two camps became parties at the moment when the queen of Cyprus arrived in the Holy Land with the aim of achieving regency over the kingdom. Venice and its allies supported her, while Genoa, on the contrary, defended the interests of Konradin, the young heir to the Hohenstaufens. Against the background of the struggle between Venice and Genoa, the enmity between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines flared up again.the main representative of the Hohenstaufens in the East, the Catalans and the merchant brotherhoods of Acre, which included Syrian Christians from the local population. These two camps became parties at the moment when the queen of Cyprus arrived in the Holy Land with the aim of achieving regency over the kingdom. Venice and its allies supported her, while Genoa, on the contrary, defended the interests of Konradin, the young heir to the Hohenstaufens. Against the background of the struggle between Venice and Genoa, the enmity between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines flared up again.young heir to the Hohenstaufens. Against the background of the struggle between Venice and Genoa, the enmity between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines flared up again.young heir to the Hohenstaufens. Against the background of the struggle between Venice and Genoa, the enmity between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines flared up again.
At first, the military orders were wary; then they got involved in the battle and, of course, on the side of the rival camps. According to Gerard de Montreal - usually the well-informed author of the chronicle, which is usually called the Chronicle of the Tyrian Templar - the Templar and Hospitaller orders initially tried to play the role of intermediaries, and then were forced to separate the opposing sides. They did not succeed. It was then that the Hospitallers spoke in favor of Genoa, and, as Gerard tells us …
the Venetians and Pisans were advised to meet with the Master of the Order of the Temple, Tom's brother Berard, who was about to move to the house of the Knights of St. Lazarus, to stay away from the battles that had begun and the shooting stone throwers, because the house of the Temple was located near the house of the Pisans.
Was Gerard de Montreal biased? Was he embellishing the position of the Templars?
The Templars very quickly forgot about their restraint, and the order sided with Venice. In the spring of 1258, Genoa planned to deliver a decisive blow: its fleet was to blockade the port, while its ally Philippe de Montfort was going to break into the city with the help of the Hospitallers. However, the Venetian fleet of Lorenzo Tiepolo attacked the ships of the Genoese, and in order to prevent the invasion of Montfort from land, Venice and Pisa turned to the Order of the Temple for help:
The master promised to give them brothers and other people, on foot and on horseback, who would guard their streets and houses while the battle was going on at sea. And they did everything as he said … The brothers mounted their horses, and the Turcopolas, and others, and with the banner raised, set off to guard two streets of the Pisans and Venetians.
The victory of the Venetians was complete. A little later, the Genoese took revenge, but in Constantinople.
Needless to say, the "war of St. Sava" caused tangible tension in relations between the orders, which nevertheless did not reach the point of mutual extermination, as Matthew of Paris mistakenly claims.
In 1276, the Order of the Temple became involved in another intrigue - the conflict between the lord Jebaila and his brother. Senor Jebaila came to Acre to become a fellow of the Order of the Temple and to enlist his help. Returning to Jebail, he took possession of his brother's lands and attacked the Count of Tripoli, Bohemond VII, who supported the opposing side: while Señor Jebail was assisted by thirty Templars. The count did not remain in debt and ordered “to demolish the house of the Temple in Tripoli … Learning about this, the Master of the Temple equipped galleys and other ships and set off for Jebail, leading a large detachment of brothers with him; He went to Jabaila to Tripoli and kept it under siege for many days … . The Templars captured several fortresses and defeated the count twice before being defeated in turn at Sidon. To reconcile the three protagonists of this civil strife, in which the legitimate authority has suffered,the power of the Count of Tripoli, reduced to the role of an extra, required the intervention of the Hospitallers, who always supported the family of the lords of Jebail.
General overview of relations between military orders
Traditionally, historiography opposes them to each other and reproduces the cliche that was spread with the light hand of Matthew of Paris: the rivalry of the orders was the cause of all the disasters and the final death of the Latin states. Of modern general research, only one chapter is devoted to this issue in the history of the Hospitallers, written by J. Riley-Smith. However, in my opinion, some of the interpretations of this author should be taken with caution.
First of all, Riley-Smith quite justifiably notes that cooperation between orders was the rule, and quarrels were the exception: by the way, we know about strife from agreements designed to end them. Consider the agreement of 1262, in which the two orders pledged to settle all their property disputes throughout the Latin East. Organizationally, there were provisions that favored cooperation between the Templars and the Hospitallers. Thus, both the Templars and Hospitallers were forbidden to accept brothers who had fled or expelled from another order. The Charter of the Order of the Temple prescribed that when the brothers are in their "house … no one should enter there without permission, either from the laity, or even from the clergy, unless they live near the hospitalier's house." Likewise, in battle, the Templar, cut off from his party and left alone,not being able to stand under the banner of his order, he had to "go to the first banner of the Hospital or Christians, if they are nearby."
In practice, a common calling forced the orders to work together. They gave all their aspirations, discipline and professionalism to the crusading cause. They knew how to forget about their disputes in front of the enemy. During the Third Crusade, they worked well in the military field, although politically they were divided by differences. They alternately moved in the vanguard and rearguard of the column under the leadership of King Richard. In nine cases out of ten, sources of that time speak about them in general - whether it is about praise or censure.
However, as the examples in the preceding chapters show, sometimes the orders found themselves in a state of dramatic conflict. J. Riley-Smith offers two explanations for this: the two orders differently adhered to different concepts of royal power in the Holy Land and, moreover, did not pursue a common foreign policy.
Can it be argued that the Hospitallers were royalists, and the Templars were supporters of the barons? This assumption needs clarification. Is it fair, speaking of Antioch, to consider the Hospitallers royalists only because they supported (together with the Franco-Armenian barons) Raimund Rupen, and the Templars - the baronial party, since they invited Bohemond of Tripoli to the throne? Are you talking about the Antioch-Cilicia alliance against the Antioch-Tripoli alliance? Is it royalism to remain faithful to the Hohenstaufens, although, apart from Frederick II in 1228-1229, none of them appeared in their kingdom? From this point of view, the Order of the Temple, which later supported Charles of Anjou, was also royalist. No, the orders of the Knights Templar and the Hospitaller did not argue over royal power, but over specific personalities. Maybe,The Hospitallers were more concerned with the legitimacy of the ruler: Raimund Rupen and Conradin were the legitimate sovereigns, while the Templars were less concerned about the legal side of the matter. But in no case can we consider the Templars as allies of the "feudal lords", and the Hospitallers as supporters of strong royal power.
As for the differences in the field of foreign policy, although they were completely real, they were significant only in a certain period of time. The Templars and Hospitallers were united by the fact that they were realistic and took into account the balance of power. But they evaluated this ratio differently. They demonstrated this repeatedly, dissuading the crusaders from one or another military action. However, it would be too schematic to oppose the pro-Damascus policy of the Templars and the pro-Egyptian policy of the Hospitallers: in 1217 and 1248. both orders unanimously chose Egypt as the target of the crusaders. In 1305, the Grand Master of the Hospitallers again advised an attack on Egypt. But between 1239 and 1254. the question of alliances divorced the two orders to different camps. The term of the contract concluded by Frederick II for ten years came to an end in 1239. Under the leadership of Thibault of Navarre, a new crusade was organized: to what point was it to be directed? Damascus and Egypt at that time competed with each other, it was necessary to choose an enemy and an ally. Thibault never made his choice and decided to first attack Egypt, and then Damascus. Of course, he did not heed the advice of the Latins of the East and the orders. The result was an inglorious defeat at Gaza, the responsibility for which - naturally - was assigned to the military orders, although they had absolutely nothing to do with it. The result was an inglorious defeat at Gaza, the responsibility for which - naturally - was assigned to the military orders, although they had absolutely nothing to do with it. The result was an inglorious defeat at Gaza, the responsibility for which - naturally - was assigned to the military orders, although they had absolutely nothing to do with it.
If the Hospital and the Temple
And the knight brothers set an example
Going to help our people.
Our valiant cavalry
I would not have been captured …
So wrote Philip de Nanteuil, who was captured by Egyptian. Once again, the antagonism between the "Pulen" and the crusaders played a role: the wisdom of the orders was considered a weakness.
The Templars fought for an alliance with Damascus, and the Hospitallers with Cairo. And the point is not in the traditional alliance with Damascus, which has long lost its power, not in private interests, because the possessions of the orders were everywhere. And as always, the Order of the Temple, striving for an alliance with Damascus, went over to the side of most of the barons of the Holy Land, while the Hospitallers, who chose an alliance with Egypt, automatically joined the camp of Frederick P. First, the Order of the Temple prevailed: Damascus returned Safed and Beaufort to him … The Gentlemen's taliers made a return move and turned to Cairo. The generous promises paid off with interest, and in addition to the castles of Safed and Beaufort, which Egypt yielded all the more easily because they were not under his control, the Franks again received Ascalon and achieved the release of the Christians who were captured at Gaza. Philip Novarsky describes the course of events as follows:
This truce (with Damascus) was sought and concluded by the will of the Order of the Temple, without the consent of the hospitable Order of St. John. Therefore, it happened that the Hospitallers began again to strive for the Sultan of Babylon (Cairo) to conclude a truce with the Christian side. And the king of Navarre and many pilgrims vouched that they would no longer keep the oath they had given to the Sultan of Damascus.
The Order of the Hospitallers used this success in the interests of their propaganda: on a crowded street in Acre, near the order's residence, they placed a huge tombstone dedicated to their brother Pierre de Vielebrid, who died in 1242. The inscription on the slab said “that at this time the Count of Montfort, along with other French barons, was freed from his Egyptian captivity, and Richard, Earl of Cornwall, rebuilt the castle of Ascalon” (Richard took over from Thibault of Navarre).
In 1243, the Hospitallers and the imperial governor Filangieri made an unsuccessful attempt to establish control over Acra, which echoed with the death knell of their foreign policy. The following year, the Order of the Temple signed a real peace treaty with Damascus, and the Hospitallers had to come to terms. However, the Egyptian army, in alliance with the formidable tribe of Khorezmians, inflicted a terrible defeat on the Latins at Forbia (October 17, 1244), which would have become the second Khattin if it had not been for a split in the Muslim world.
The last attempts to establish allied relations with Damascus, all the same with the filing of the Order of the Temple, occurred during the crusade of Saint Louis. But the energetic Mamluk Sultan Baybars, who united the Muslim world, removed the problem. From now on, the current politics ceased to be a stumbling block between the Templars and the Hospitallers.
Finally, both orders were able to significantly limit the possibility of conflict: as a result, they retained a minimum of solidarity with each other. True, at the beginning of the XIV century. they again, in hostile camps, took part in the strife for the Cypriot kingdom. However, the Grand Master of the Order of the Hospitallers displayed remarkable restraint during the arrest of the Templars in 1307. Of course, he did nothing to help them, but there was not a single Hospitaller among the accusers of the Order of the Temple.
However, this did not solve anything: the "creators of public opinion" in Western Europe were more attracted by the differences of the orders than by their solidarity.
Nikolay Syromyatnikov
