Two and a half centuries ago, Jean-Jacques Rousseau invited the readers of his book On the Social Contract to consider “people as they are, and laws as they can be” [Rousseau 1984] (Russian translation quoted from: [Russo 1969: 151]). The proposal has not lost its relevance. We know that good governance is impossible without understanding how people will respond to the laws, economic incentives, information, or moral calls that make up the governance system. And the reaction depends on the desires, goals, habits, beliefs and moral qualities that determine and limit the actions of people. But what does it mean to understand “people as they are,” as Rousseau wrote?
An economic man emerges - Homo economicus. It is common among economists, lawyers, and politicians who have been impressed by the ideas of economists and lawyers that when thinking about the design of a policy or system of laws, as if we were thinking about organizing firms or other private organizations, it is necessary to assume that people - citizens, employees, business partners, potential criminals - pursue only their own interests and are immoral. In part for this reason, material incentives are now being used to motivate students to study, teachers to teach better, to lose weight and quit smoking, to call to vote in elections, and to move from plastic bags to reusable bags.for the formation of trusting responsibility in financial management and fundamental research. All of these activities, in the absence of economic incentives, can be motivated by internal, ethical or other non-economic reasons.
Given the popularity among legislators, economists, and politicians of claims that people are immoral and self-interested, it might seem odd that no one really believes this claim. In fact, it is accepted for reasons of prudence, not realism. Even Hume (see end of epigraph 1 to this book) warns the reader that the statement is false.
I hope to convince you that choosing Homo economicus as your model for the behavior of a citizen, employee, student, or borrower is hardly reasonable for two reasons when drafting laws, choosing a policy, or starting a business organization. First, the political course that follows from this paradigm itself brings the situation of universal immoral selfishness closer to the truth: people often take their interests into account more strongly when material incentives are present than when material incentives are absent. Second, fines, awards, and other material incentives don't always work well. As well as these incentives may well dampen the greed of crooks (as Hume put it), incentives alone cannot lay the foundation for good governance.
If I'm right, then the erosion of ethical and other social motivations vital to good governance may be an unpredictable cultural consequence of the policies favored by economists, including more granular and better defined property rights, the promotion of market competition, and greater use of monetary incentives to change behavior. people.
I will show that these and other policies touted as necessary for a functioning market economy can also develop people's self-interest and undermine the means by which a society maintains a sustainable civic culture of cooperating and generous citizens. These policies can even undermine social norms that are vital to the operation of the markets themselves. The cultural victims of this crowding out are the daily virtues of truthfully disclosing one's assets and liabilities when receiving a loan, keeping one's word and working hard even when no one is watching. Markets and other economic institutions do not work well where these and other norms are absent or undermined. More than evera highly productive knowledge economy requires a cultural foundation in the form of these and other social norms. Among them, the confidence that a handshake is a handshake; when in doubt, mutual distrust will lead to loss of benefits for all parties to the transaction.
The paradoxical idea that policies that economists regard as “improving” markets can make markets worse work is not only true for markets. The civic virtues of people and their inner desire to adhere to social norms can be wasted as a result of such political measures, and are likely to be irretrievably wasted, and in the future the space for better policy measures will be much narrower. Although some economists imagine how in the distant past Homo economicus invented markets, in reality it could be quite the opposite: the pursuit of immoral self-interest may be a consequence of living in a society that economists idealize.
The problem faced by a politician or legislator is as follows: incentives and restrictions are necessary in any governance system. But when the system is built on the assumption that “people as they are” are similar to Homo economicus, incentives can backfire, forcing people to pursue self-interest that these incentives were originally trying to contain for the common good. It wouldn't be a problem if Homo economicus were a good description of "people as they are." In this case, there would be nothing to supplant. But over the past two decades, behavioral experiments have provided strong evidence that ethical and altruistic motives are prevalent in all human societies. Experiments show that these motives are sometimes supplanted by political measures and incentives that appeal to material interest. Here's one example. In Haifa, in a kindergarten, a fine was introduced for those parents who took their children very late. This did not work: after the imposition of the fine, the proportion of late parents doubled [Gneezy, Rustichini 2000]. After 12 weeks, the fine was canceled, but the proportion of late parents did not drop to the previous level. (Their tardiness compared with the control group, in which the penalty was not imposed, is shown in Figure 1.)
The imposition of fines produced the opposite of what was expected, which leads us to speculate that there is some negative synergy between economic incentives and moral behavior. Introducing a price for being late, as if it were selling late, undermined parents' ethical obligation not to impose unnecessary trouble on teachers and made parents think that being late was another commodity they could buy.
I have no doubt that if the fine were large enough, the parents would react differently. But the introduction of a price for everything that is possible is not a very good idea, even if it is realizable and the right prices could be found (and we will see that all this is very large if).
You can show children money or discuss coins with them (rather than other, non-monetary objects), as was done in a recent experiment, and then children will behave less prosocial and less help others in their daily activities [Gasiorowska, Zaleskiewicz, Wygrab 2012].
In another study, children under two years old willingly and without any reward helped an adult reach an object thrown far away. But after they were awarded a toy for helping an adult, the share of helping children dropped by 40%. Felix Warneken and Michael Tomasello, authors of the study, conclude: “Children have a natural tendency to help, but external rewards can undermine this tendency, so socialization practices should build on these tendencies and work in union, rather than in conflict with the natural tendency of children to act altruistically. "[Warneken, Tomasello 2008: 1787]. This advice can be useful not only for parents, but also for politicians.
Bowles Samuel is Professor, Head of the Behavioral Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute.
S. Bowles, The Problem with Homo economicus. Fragment of the book "The Moral Economy" ("Moral Economy")
Translation from English by Daniil Shestakov