Feeding from the spot
In ancient Russia, according to the rules of the "Russian Truth" of Prince Yaroslav the Wise, the official was kept by ordinary people. A tax collector - a virnik, who came to a settlement for taxes, had to feed "how much he could eat" or pay him money.
The state apparatus grew, officials multiplied, but the treasury did not give them money for the maintenance - the officials themselves agreed. This was one of the reasons for the low degree of centralization of power and the unsatisfactory control over parochialism from Moscow.
Ivan the Terrible, carrying out his famous reforms, faced the problems of rejection of his actions (as they say now) in the regions and undertook to eradicate the problem. During the Zemsky reform, in 1555-1556, feeding was canceled and severe punishment was introduced to officials for bribes - up to quartering.
Anarchy is the mother of order.
The principle of "additional"
The bureaucratic apparatus always strives to increase, and the state, faced with ever-increasing spending on service people, is trying to limit this growth.
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The reform of Peter the Great, paradoxically (reshaping the state apparatus in a Western manner) did not lead to a reduction in the total number of officials. On the contrary, during the transformations, their number increased from 4.6 thousand to 7.4 thousand.
Only Emperor Paul I managed to achieve a real reduction of bureaucrats. In 1796 he inherited from Catherine II a bureaucratic apparatus reaching 20-30 thousand people. By the end of his reign, there were just over 13 thousand of them. All further attempts to diminish the staff led only to its increase.
The only exception to the rule: "any reduction leads to an increase in the number", were the reforms of NS Khrushchev. He managed to achieve a very significant reduction in both departments and bureaucrats sitting in them.
The army of officials demanded huge amounts of money for maintenance, which, as a rule, were not in the treasury. Therefore, the lower ranks received very little and were forced to either earn extra money or take bribes. For a long time, the bosses looked through their fingers at such "extras", which formed a stable tradition of officials to independently compensate for their underpayment - bribery.
You to me - I to you.
On the fine line of balance
Who are the officials? They are guides from power to population and back. The great misfortune of Russia is that about the second function of officials - to bring the ideas and aspirations of the population to the higher authorities, they constantly try to forget or get away from it.
The entire history of the formation of the bureaucratic apparatus, its content and settings, tells about the attempts of the rulers (in any form of the system) to find a fine line of balance between the dependence of officials on the authorities (loyalty) and the attachment (attitude) to the population (the so-called quality of services).
In Ancient Russia, officials were elected (princes, local governors, foremen, and so on) and the people themselves fed. At the same time, the chosen men also kept the answer in front of the people and depended on it.
Ivan the Terrible, wishing to increase the controllability of the bureaucratic apparatus, began to introduce state content and abolish parochialism, and hence the attachment to the population. In the future, the tsarist government continued to strengthen the "vertical of power", at the same time alienating officials from the people.
And in this sense, the principle of “donation” (compensation for a small salary with bribes) can be regarded as some kind of alternative form of population management. After all, if the instruction (from the authorities) says “no”, then with the help of the “gratitude” of the applicant (from the population) it can often be circumvented.
In the Soviet period, a party line was added to the bureaucratic vertical, which, together with the principle of “dobra”, seriously strengthened the attachment to the population. Something similar was tried to portray already in our time - "United Russia", then ONF, all these are unsuccessful projects of strengthening the alternative management structure of officials to varying degrees.
It turns out frankly weak. Our bureaucrats know exactly the recipe for success: as long as you are completely loyal to the authorities, you are there. And nothing will move them from their familiar point: stupidity, outright rudeness with people, personal incompetence, inconsistency with the tasks of the position held - everything is like water off a duck's back … until you are "in the cage".
The vertical of the management structure.
Unfortunately, at present, no one is involved in the development and expansion of the system of elective offices. We see and hear the result (thanks to the Internet!) Almost on a daily basis.
The open contempt and rudeness of officials towards the population (for which they have nothing to do), the need for V. Putin to govern the country "in manual mode" (which does not change much), appointment to positions not for professional qualities, but for the degree of loyalty to the ruling clan - all this is the reverse side of strengthening the "vertical of power".
Need to do something? Maybe there is a need to reform the management system? Has anyone bothered with this at all? And in response, silence….
