Discussions on the role of cavalry during the war are ongoing. Allegedly, our cavalry with sabers flew barely at German tanks, and Soviet marshals before the war overestimated its importance.
In the historical discussion about the reassessment of military strategy at the beginning of the war in the 90s, one could often hear the opinion that the opinion of the so-called “horsemen” prevailed before the war: Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shchadenko. They allegedly advocated that the number of cavalry units be increased. Efim Shchadenko, in particular, said: “The war of engines, mechanization, aviation and chemistry were invented by military experts. While the main thing is a horse. The cavalry will play a decisive role in the future war."
Such quotes, taken out of context, those who like to grumble about "swords against tanks" like to cite as proof of the shortsightedness of the Soviet military command at the beginning of the war, however, if you look at the facts and documents, the picture appears quite different. The number of directorates of cavalry corps before the war decreased to 5, cavalry divisions - to 18 (4 of them were stationed in the Far East), mountain cavalry divisions - to 5 and Cossack (territorial) cavalry divisions - to 2. After all reductions, the Red cavalry met the war in composed of 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions.
The total staff strength of the cavalry division was 8,968 people and 7,625 horses, the cavalry regiment, respectively, 1,428 people and 1506 horses. Thus, the opinion that Stalin, Voroshilov and Budyonny wanted to win the war "on top" is a banal myth.
The cavalry corps of the Red Army turned out to be the most stable formations of the Red Army in 1941. They managed to survive in the endless retreats and encirclements of the first year of the war. The cavalry was, in the first place, the only means that made it possible to carry out deep envelopes and detours, as well as to carry out effective raids behind enemy lines. At the beginning of the war, in 1941-1942, cavalrymen played an important role in defensive and offensive operations, essentially taking on the role of motorized infantry of the Red Army, since at that time the number and combat readiness of these formations in the Red Army were insignificant.
During the years of the notorious perestroika, one can recall how its "foremen" hysterically branded the "hardened cavalrymen" who interfered with the creation of a mighty tank Red Army. And, they say, this is only why the Red Army suffered severe defeats at the beginning of the war.
But then time passed, the archives were opened and amazing things began. Suddenly it turned out that very often it was the cavalry formations of the Red Army who fought much more successfully against German tank and motorized formations than tankers. And their counterattacks put the Germans in a critical position. And it turned out that the tankers, acting precisely in conjunction with the cavalry, achieved much greater success than acting independently.
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The theory of the combat use of cavalry in the USSR was studied by people who looked at things quite soberly. For example, Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, a former cavalryman of the tsarist army, who became chief of the General Staff in the USSR. It was he who wrote the theory that became the basis for the practice of the combat use of cavalry in the USSR. It was the work "Cavalry (Cavalry Sketches)" in 1923, which became the first large scientific study on cavalry tactics, published after the Civil War. The work of B. M. Shaposhnikova caused a lot of discussion at the meetings of the cavalry commanders and in the press: whether the cavalry retains its former importance in modern conditions or is it just "riding infantry".
Boris Mikhailovich quite intelligibly outlined the role of the cavalry in the new conditions and the measures for its adaptation to these conditions:
“The changes introduced under the influence of modern weapons in the activities and organization of the cavalry are as follows:
In tactics. The modern power of fire made it extremely difficult to conduct equestrian combat with cavalry, reducing it to exceptional and rare cases. A normal type of cavalry battle is a combined battle, and the cavalry should not wait for action exclusively in the equestrian formation, but, starting a rifle battle, must conduct it with full tension, trying to solve the problem if the situation is not conducive to the production of horse attacks. Horse and foot fighting are equivalent methods of cavalry action today.
In strategy. The power, destructiveness and range of modern weapons made the operational work of the cavalry difficult, but did not diminish its importance, and, on the contrary, in it they open up a true field of successful activity for the cavalry as an independent branch of troops. However, the successful operational work of the cavalry will be possible only when the cavalry, in its tactical activity, shows independence in solving tasks in accordance with the modern situation of the battle, without evading decisive actions on foot.
In the organisation. The fight against modern weapons on the battlefield, bringing that in the cavalry closer to infantry operations, requires a change in the organization of the cavalry closer to the infantry, outlining the numerical increase in cavalry formations and the division of the latter for foot combat, similar to that adopted in infantry units. The addition of infantry units to the cavalry, even if they are moving quickly, is a palliative - the cavalry must independently fight the enemy's infantry, gaining success on their own, so as not to limit their operational mobility.
Armed. The modern power of firearms to fight them requires the presence of the same powerful firearms in the cavalry. For this reason, the "armored cavalry" of our day must adopt rifles with a bayonet, similar to infantry ones, a revolver, hand grenades and automatic rifles; to increase the number of machine guns in both divisional and regimental teams, to strengthen artillery, both in number and in caliber, by introducing a howitzer and anti-aircraft guns; reinforce yourself by adding auto-armored means with cannons and machine guns, light vehicles with the same means of fire, tanks and the assistance of the fire of air squadrons."
Note that the opinion expressed in hot pursuit after the Civil War (1923) was in no way influenced by the euphoria from the use of cavalry in 1918–1920. The missions and scope of cavalry are clearly delineated and defined.
Here is September 1941. The 24th Motorized Army Corps of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group broke through to the rear of the Soviet Southwestern Front. "Fast Heinz", unlike Kleist and Manstein, did not get in the teeth in June near Brody and Rovno or in July near Soltsy. And so the Hitlerite general felt very comfortable. And followed with the headquarters of his tank group on the heels of the 24th Motorized Corps. And suddenly, on September 17-21, in the Romn region, this German corps received a furious blow. Guderian himself admitted in his memoirs that he experienced very unpleasant sensations when the cavalrymen almost broke through to his command post. This counterattack was delivered by the 2nd Cavalry Corps of General Belov, together with
1st Guards Rifle Division (formerly 100th Rifle) and 1st Armored Brigade. And he gave a cruel bashing to the Germans.
And after that Guderian continued to get it. On September 30, at Shtepovka, Belov's 2nd Cavalry Corps, together with the 1st Guards Moscow Proletarian Motorized Rifle and the same 1st Tank Brigade, inflicted severe damage on the 25th Motorized Division of the 2nd Panzer Army (this is how Guderian's tank group became known). As a result, this division, instead of participating in the offensive on Moscow, was forced to lick its wounds for several days. But Guderian's troubles did not end there again.
Thus, the cavalry, before the appearance of motorized units and formations in the Red Army, was the only maneuverable means of the operational level. In the second half of the war, from 1943, when the mechanization of the Red Army improved and the mechanisms of tank armies were fine-tuned, the cavalry began to play an important role in solving special tasks during offensive operations. In the second half of the war, the Red cavalry made a breakthrough deep into the enemy's defenses and formed the outer front of the encirclement. In the case when the offensive was on highways of acceptable quality, the cavalry could not keep up with the motorized formations, but during raids on dirt roads and off-road the cavalry did not lag behind the motorized infantry.
The advantages of cavalry include its independence from fuel. Its breakthroughs to great depths allowed the Red Army to save infantry and tank forces, providing a high rate of advance for armies and fronts. The number of cavalry and tank units in the Red Army was practically the same. There were 6 tank armies in 1945, and seven cavalry corps. Most of both of them bore the rank of guards by the end of the war. Figuratively speaking, the tank armies were the sword of the Red Army, and the red cavalry was a sharp and long sword. They were used in the Great Patriotic War and loved by the red commanders in the Civil carts. Ivan Yakushin, lieutenant, commander of the anti-tank platoon of the 24th Guards Cavalry Regiment of the 5th Guards Cavalry Division, recalled: “The cars were also used only as a means of transportation. During horse attacks, they really turned around and, like in the Civil War, were scalded, but this was not common. And as the battle began, the machine gun was removed from the carriage, the horse breeders took the horses away, the carriage also left, but the machine gun remained.
Cavalry Cossack units distinguished themselves in the war. The Kushchevskaya attack in early August 1942 became famous, when the Cossack divisions were able to delay the German offensive in the Caucasus. The Cossacks then decided to fight to the death. Standing up in a forest plantation near the village of Kushchevskaya, they were ready for an attack and were waiting for an order. When the order was given, the Cossacks went on the attack. The Cossacks walked a third of the way to the German positions at a pace, in silence, only the steppe air hissed from the flapping of the checkers. Then they switched to a trot, when the Germans became visible to the naked eye, they started the horses at a gallop. It was a real psychic attack.
The Germans were taken aback. They had heard a lot about the Cossacks before, but near Kushchevskaya they saw them in all their glory. Here are just two opinions about the Cossacks. One - an Italian officer, the second - a German soldier, for whom the battle at Kushchevskaya was the last. “Some Cossacks stood before us. They are devils, not soldiers. And their horses are steel. We can't get out of here alive. " “The mere memory of the Cossack attack horrifies me and makes me tremble. I have nightmares at night. Cossacks are a whirlwind that sweeps away all obstacles and barriers in its path. We are afraid of the Cossacks as the retribution of the Almighty."
Despite the clear advantage in weapons, the Germans wavered. The village of Kushchevskaya passed from hand to hand three times. According to the memoirs of the Cossack Mostovoy, German aviation also took part in the battle, but because of the hustle and bustle, in which a fierce hand-to-hand fight was already going on, it turned out to be practically useless - the Luftwaffe did not want to bomb its own. The planes circled over the battlefield at low level flight, obviously wanting to scare the Cossack horses, only this was useless - the Cossack horses were accustomed to the roar of engines.
It is interesting to read the memoirs of the sanitary instructor of the cavalry squadron Zinaida Korzh (based on the book by S. Aleksievich “The war does not have a woman's face”): “After the Kushchevskaya battle - it was the famous horse attack of the Kuban Cossacks - the corps was given the rank of guards. The fight was terrible. And for me and Olya the most terrible, because we were still very afraid. Although I had already fought, I knew what it was, but when the cavalrymen went into an avalanche, the Circassians fluttered, the sabers were taken out, the horses snore, and the horse, when it flies, has such strength; and this whole avalanche went to tanks, to artillery, to the Nazis - it was like in a terrible dream. And there were many fascists, there were more of them, they walked with machine guns, at the ready, walked next to the tanks - and they could not stand it, you know, they could not stand this avalanche. They threw guns and fled."
The cavalry found its use at the end of the war. Konstantin Rokossovsky wrote about the use of the cavalry corps in the East Prussian operation: “Our cavalry corps, NS Oslikovsky, rushing forward, flew into Allenstein (Olsztyn), where several echelons with tanks and artillery had just arrived. With a dashing attack (of course, not in cavalry!), Stunning the enemy with the fire of guns and machine guns, the cavalrymen captured the echelons. It is significant that Rokossovsky emphasizes that the cavalrymen attacked the tanks, dismounted. This was the classic tactic of using cavalry against motorized units. When meeting with tank formations, the horsemen dismounted, and the horses were taken to a safe place by horse breeders attached to each cavalry unit. The red cavalrymen entered the battle with the tanks on foot.
But there are other opinions as well. Let's consider them too
World War II began on September 1, 1939. On the same day, on the western borders of Poland, a battle took place at Kutno, where the Polish lancers ran into German tanks, suffering heavy losses. In the memoirs of the famous German General Guderian "Memories of a Soldier" about this attack there are the following words: "The Polish Pomor Cavalry Brigade, due to ignorance of the design data and methods of action of our tanks, attacked them with cold weapons and suffered terrible losses."
The battle became known due to the following fact: eyewitnesses, looking at the corpses of the killed Poles, for unknown reasons began to declare that the Polish cavalrymen were trying to damage the tanks with their melee weapons. German propaganda began to use this fact, proving the absolute inability of the Poles to distinguish between true and false information. On the other hand, to intimidate the enemy, the Poles came up with a myth that the Poles nevertheless cut at least one tank or armored car with a cold weapon, proving their desperate bravery and desire to defend their homeland from invaders.
The Polish cavalry delayed the German advance for a day, and the troops of the Chersk task force had a chance to withdraw. However, the Germans recovered from such a blow within a few hours. The 18th regiment, by order of General Stanislav Gzhmot-Skotnitsky, was awarded the Order of Virtuti Militari for bravery in battle.
On the same day, German war correspondents and their Italian colleagues examined the battlefield (as well as the corpses of Polish soldiers). The Italian journalist Indro Montanelli set about writing an article about the battle and wrote about the courage and heroism of the Polish soldiers who rushed at the German tanks with sabers and pikes. Although nothing like this actually happened, the fiction began to spread at a rapid rate: in the German magazine Die Wehrmacht on September 13, it was noted that the Polish forces had seriously underestimated the power of the German army; Polish propaganda claimed that German armored vehicles were not armored at all, which is what the Polish troops tried to use. In the postwar years in the USSR, the event was regarded as an example of the stupidity and recklessness of Polish commanders who shed the blood of innocent soldiers and were not at all ready for war.
According to George Parade: “Contrary to the German propaganda statement, the Polish cavalry brigades never attacked tanks armed with sabers and pikes, since they had 37mm anti-tank guns (for example, Bofors wz.36, which was called in the UK Ordnance QF 37 mm Mk I), and such guns could penetrate 26 mm armor at a distance of 600 m at an angle of 30 degrees. The cavalry brigades at that time were reorganized and became motorized brigades."
There are those in Russia who believe that it is allegedly sinful to write about the cavalry fighting against tanks like this: “These words [Guderian's] were understood literally and creatively developed in fiction:“The blades of the brave the same armor broke the pikes of the Polish cavalry. All living things perished under the tracks of the tanks …”The cavalrymen began to appear as some kind of violent madmen, rushing in horse ranks at tanks with swords and pikes. The battle of the mythical "zholner" with Guderian's tanks became a symbol of the victory of technology over obsolete weapons and tactics "…
The author from Voennoye Obozreniye seems to be outraged by Guderian's just words. But in fact, this is what the veterans of that Polish attack on tanks said themselves: “We were told that tanks are made of plywood and can be easily cut with a saber … I, jumping to the side of the tank, chopped it down with all my might, thinking that I was chopping plywood. My hand was shattered by the sharp rebound of the saber hilt from the hard armor …
It turns out that Guderian is right, Voennoye Obozreniye is wrong. The Polish lancers really looked like idiots, but only because they were unwittingly deceived by their commanders. The Germans really used plywood tanks, but only as dummies for enemy aircraft.
Even the most stubborn cavalryman of the USSR Budyonny was convinced of the uselessness of cavalry against tanks and cannons in modern conditions. And, nevertheless, Cossack divisions were included in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War.
CATASTROPHE UNDER RYE
The fate of the 46th Cavalry Division of the Red Army is no less sad than the battle of the Poles with tanks. But if the Poles were confused about tanks, then the Red Army seemed to be confused in time, apparently believing that it was still 1920 in the yard. As part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War, cavalrymen of the 46th division fought on September 18, 1941, when they disembarked at the Firovo station. The riders entered the battle without heavy weapons, which were transferred to the headquarters of the 31st Army. On this occasion, the chief of staff of the division, Colonel A. Ya. Soshnikov wrote indignantly: “It was a strange situation that a non-fired division goes to fight without artillery and machine guns. All this caused bewilderment and indignation …"
In defensive battles and in reconnaissance, cavalrymen somehow managed to act more or less quickly and efficiently. But in attacks …
Rzhev … White and at the same time black page of the Second World War and the greatest battle in the history of mankind. During the year of battles for Rzhev (January 1942 - March 1943), up to 10 million (!!!) people participated on both sides, and the Red Army lost 2.5 million soldiers and officers - a terrible tragedy. The success of the battle remained with the Germans. Therefore, they chose to forget Rzhev, and they still do not remember him. The film about Rzhev, shown on NTV, only angered the jingoistic patriots. The soldiers of the Red Army, according to the Germans, were driven to slaughter like cattle (apparently, then the soldiers gave Zhukov the offensive nickname Butcher).
At the beginning of January 1942, the 46th Cavalry Division was deployed northwest of Rzhev, and from January 8, 1942 participated in the offensive during the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation. Then the cavalrymen were thrown into a breakthrough from the encirclement as part of Sokolov's mobile group. On this occasion Horst Grossman writes in his memoirs: “At the same time, 5 Cossack squadrons galloped to the site, trying to break through to the southeast. They were given a worthy welcome. Everyone with a weapon fired, be it an infantryman or an artilleryman. Self-propelled guns and light artillery fired direct fire. By chance, one Ju-88 appeared over the village and, seeing the Russians, launched bombs and airborne weapons. All the Cossacks were destroyed by this concentrated fire."
It is curious how the armchair Soviet historians write about this human tragedy of the cavalry division and how modern scholars rewrite them: “On July 5, 1942, the division received an order to withdraw from the encirclement, apparently, part of its forces withdrew”… “Apparently”! It's just incredible! The division was practically all killed, and the armchair "rats" calmly write "received an order", "apparently"!
On July 7, 1942, the 46th Cavalry Division ceased to exist: everyone who miraculously survived was transferred to the 24th Cavalry Division.
ATTACK UNDER THE STATION OF KUSHCHEVSKAYA
However, the tragedy of some did not become a lesson for others. Early in the morning on August 2, 1942, in the battles for the village of Kushchevskaya (Krasnodar Territory), the cavalry again launched an attack on tanks and cannons with a bare saber. Little is known about this night attack by the Kuban Cossacks on the German position, and the information is extremely contradictory, which is further evidence of its failure.
So, on August 2, 1942, the Cossacks of the 13th Kuban Division in equestrian ranks attacked German troops near the village of Kushchevskaya. The battle lasted three to four hours.
According to the story of a veteran of the Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps E. I. Mostovoy, after artillery preparation, the cavalry deployed into a lava one and a half to two kilometers wide. The German troops opened fire with a delay, after which they put into operation aviation, but with little effect. The Cossacks swiftly cut into the German forces allegedly for several kilometers, knocked out several tanks, but suffering losses, they quickly retreated.
Trumpeter of the 4th Guards Cossack Cavalry Corps I. Ya. Boyko reported that there was no artillery preparation: the Cossack squadrons, using high vegetation, secretly took their starting position for an attack on the night of August 1 to 2, and in the morning they suddenly attacked the enemy and burst into the village. But the Germans quickly drove them out of there.
According to the memoirs of E. S. Ponikarovsky, two regiments of Cossacks, with the support of tanks, knocked out German troops from positions near the village, after which a protracted battle began in Kushchevskaya itself, and the village passed from hand to hand three times … Somehow, all the memories of the veterans are very selective, vague and do not give us a clear answer - how did it end? And what did it cost?
Marshal A. A. Grechko wrote in his memoirs about the cavalry attack, it seems, more distinctly:
“On the night of August 1, the division carried out a raid on the village, but it was unsuccessful, since the 216th rifle division did not participate in the battle. The next night, after air training, the Cossacks undertook a new raid with the forces of the 15th and 13th cavalry divisions and one tank brigade. Fierce battles ensued for the village. Three times Kushchevskaya passed from hand to hand. This time, the 216th division did not support the Cossacks either. As a result, the cavalry corps withdrew to its original positions. In these night attacks on Kushchevskaya, the Cossacks of the 13th Cavalry Division killed more than 1,000 Hitlerites and took about 300 prisoners."
This means that more stubborn battles with the Germans near Kushchevskaya began only with the support of a tank brigade and aviation. Well, what were the losses? And if Grechko indicates up to 1,000 killed Nazis, for some reason he forgets about more than 2,000 killed Cossacks, although other Soviet sources called a much smaller figure of German losses and more real - 400 soldiers. More accurate losses in the killed Cossacks of the 17th Cavalry Corps amounted to 2,163 people. And the village was never released.
There was no victory, the losses were great … The British called the cavalry attack of six hundred light cavalry on the Cossack artillery during the Crimean War (1855) almost a tragedy as much more favorable for themselves. But the British cavalry at least captured the Russian battery. Almost half of the 600 cavalry were killed and wounded. This alone forced the British to accuse their commanders of tyranny and incompetence, as well as to make the phrase "attack of light cavalry" a catch phrase denoting a Pyrrhic victory.
Well, Soviet historians were silent about the losses and failure of the attack near Kushchevskaya, they say, they scared the Germans - and that's good. Killed 2163 people? Well, even more died near Rzhev! Alas. The USSR never knew how to protect people and did not want to. Spawn …
Brave ITALIANS
But oddly enough, there were also positive examples of the use of cavalry during the war. Alas, not with us.
Stalingrad front. The morning of August 24, 1942 was clear and warm. A private of the 812th Siberian Rifle Regiment was sitting in need of sunflowers near the Izbushensky farm. Suddenly he heard the clatter of hooves, and a few seconds later he saw riders in white gloves, in round helmets that were clearly not German and red scarves around their necks, who shouted at him: "Komarade!" In response, the Red Army soldier fired from a three-line. This is how the next battle of the Great Patriotic War began with the participation of cavalry.
Vladimir Afanasyev, a leading researcher at the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, says about the mysterious horsemen: “This was the vanguard of the Italian cavalry regiment“Savoy”. On August 20, 1942, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive at the junction of the Italian 8th and German 6th armies along the right bank of the Don River. The Italian command decided to throw the most mobile fresh connection into the breach.”
In August 1942, the Savoy regiment had 700 sabers. He was armed with Carcano carbines of the 1938 model and captured PPSh submachine guns.
The previous evening, the regiment commander, Alessandro Bettoni Cazzaggio, ordered to dig in for the night. While the privates were digging, following another old tradition, the officers sat down to supper using the regimental silver. Meanwhile, two battalions of the 812th Siberian Rifle Regiment of Commander Serafim Merkulov secretly dug in a wide lowland about 700-800 meters north of the Italians camp. The proximity of the two military camps played a fatal role in the battle near the Izbushkinsky farm.
Shortly after the soldier's sunflowers fired, Soviet mortar and machine gun fire rained down on the Italian positions. Almost immediately, the deputy commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Giuseppe Cacchandra, was wounded in the leg, another bullet pierced the regiment commander's coat. The Italians were seized with confusion, but only for a few minutes.
Afanasyev further says: “Colonel Bettoni Cazzaggio, whom his colleagues until that moment considered an aristocrat to the bone, discovered a deep knowledge of folklore and attacked the standard bearer with abuse. Lieutenant Emanuele Dzhentzardi unfurled the banner in the wind, and hundreds of people shouted in unison, “Sav-howl! Sav-howl! " - it was the battle cry of the regiment."
The cavalry was instantly supported by artillery. Three Italian cavalry squadrons lined up in front of their trenches in full view of the advancing Red Army fighters and moved at a trot and then at a gallop. The cavalrymen rushed towards the enemy with bared blades, despite the numerical superiority and strong enemy mortar fire.
Afanasyev believes that the uniqueness of this battle lies in the fact that since the First World War cavalry attacked on foot. So they took care of themselves and the horses. And then - checkers bald and at a gallop! The unexpected attack and the absence of the supposed panic among the Italians forced Merkulov to make a not the best decision - two battalions of the Red Army went on the attack prematurely. And because of this, the machine gunners were forced to stop shelling the Italians.
“The Italian cavalry attacked swiftly. A detachment under the command of Major Leeth, including the chief sergeant-major and all the staff of the regiment headquarters, galloped with sabers bald, encouraging their units. Having run into the enemy, they chopped down those who were still resisting and forced the enemy to flee and lay down their arms,”says a leading employee of the Central Armed Forces Museum.
Thanks to the support of its regimental guns and a machine-gun squadron, the Savoy Cavalry regiment completely destroyed two Red Army battalions, and in the next attack scattered the third. The results of this battle are known, unfortunately, only from Italian data. As always, they were silent about failures in the USSR, and they were silent in Russia. The Italians lost only 40 people, 79 were injured. They also lost about a hundred horses, but at the same time the losses of the Red Army soldiers in the killed amounted to more than 150 people and up to 900 people - prisoners. In addition, the Italians captured about forty machine guns, 4 regimental guns and 10 mortars.
Afanasyev sums up: “The tragic truth in this case is that Merkulov and the regiment officers acted, in general, correctly and tactically competently. The attack was undertaken in full accordance with the regulations and tactics of the actions of the Soviet infantry units of that time … Another thing is that all Soviet tactics of that time were not suitable for modern wars. An infantryman with a rifle against a cavalryman was as helpless as in the First World War, as in the Crimean War. That is why in 1943 the Red Army ceased to exist, the concept of the Soviet Army was introduced instead, as well as the uniform was changed - they introduced shoulder straps, other buttonholes, new ranks, abolished commissars, changed tactics, introduced new weapons, and discarded the difficult-to-use disk PPShs.
In the fall of 1942, the 8th Italian Army also ceased to exist. Its units suffered heavy losses. The Savoy regiment participated mainly in defensive battles, and in September 1943 its remnants returned to their homeland. As for the regiment commander, Alessandro Cazzaggio, he became one of the leaders of the anti-fascist resistance in Italy.
A month after the offensive defeat from the Italians, Major General Merkulov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and awarded the Order of Lenin and a medal Golden Star. Everyone quickly chose to forget about the unpleasant fight with Cazzaggio.
Already in the First World War, it became clear that the cavalry and its role are a thing of the past in the history of wars. However, the Second World War showed that battles with the participation of cavalrymen still take place. Indeed, the cavalry could be used to a limited extent, but point-wise, in certain sectors of the front, against poorly armed infantry for an unexpected breakthrough, as the Italian cavalry "Savoie" did. Well, what the Poles were doing with their cavalry in 1939 and the Soviet commanders in 1942 cannot be called anything other than a massacre. And if the Poles, even because of a banal delusion, sent their uhlans under the tracks of tanks, then there is no way to justify the red divisional commanders. The cavalry of the Red Army could only fight against the Red Army itself, against forces devoid of tanks and machine guns. Cavalry was nothing but cannon fodder against the highly motorized and armed Wehrmacht army.