A new understanding of the content of a 14-month positional battle in the central sector of the Soviet-German front is presented as a strategy of tying up large German forces with the threat of intercepting communications and forcing them to bear heavy losses in counterattacks in order to prevent these threats.
Battle of 1941
The battle that lasted for 14 months on the central sector of the Soviet front around the Rzhev salient and its base is an almost unknown page of the war. Moreover, the books and articles that have appeared at the present time represent the events in this sector as a failure of the Soviet military strategy. In 14 months, four operations took place: two Rzhev-Vyazemsky and two Rzhev-Sychevsky. At the same time, no special advancement of the Soviet troops was observed. Rzhev was not taken, the Germans themselves left it in early March 1943. A large number of prisoners were not taken. Just a few months of fighting without tangible results.
The author Isaev calls this a positional crisis. The number of machine guns and anti-tank weapons on the defending side became so large that the offensive efforts of the infantry supported by tanks were useless.
The author Beshanov simply calls the book "The year 1942 is an academic year." They did not know how to fight. And we learned little by little. Paying a huge price in lives for science.
An almost encyclopedic example of battles for the village of Polunino in the north-west of the Rzhev salient, nevertheless, casts doubt on at least the hopelessness of the positional crisis. Yes, indeed, for weeks the troops suffered unbearable losses in frontal attacks on this fortified point. Then the divisional commander personally probed the swamp and found it dry. He led two regiments across the swamp to the flank and took the village in two hours of battle. This was in August 1942, and in November of the same year, during Operation Mars, two regiments of Kryukov's cavalry corps imperceptibly seep through the front. The Germans opened fire only on the third regiment. In December, a brigade of Katukov's tank corps crosses the front line at night and, wearing armor, takes out the cavalrymen of the regiment, which was carrying out a month-long raid along the enemy's rear on the Rzhev salient. This is in a zone that had a depth of fortifications up to 80-100 km! There could not be a deep positional crisis in the forest zone of the Soviet-German front. The front was fairly transparent. Except, of course, some specially fortified places.
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Learned to fight? - Maybe … But there is another problem. Against the allegedly "ignorant" of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, the enemy had to hold the Army Group Center, which constituted 41% of the enemy forces on the Eastern Front. At the same time, up to half of the German tank divisions were located in the area of the Rzhev salient and its base. And in August 1942, the best division of the Wehrmacht, the motorized infantry division "Great Germany" ("Grossdeutschland"), had to be transferred here. For comparison, it can be pointed out that the Germans had only one tank division for the entire Army Group North.
The most powerful system of long-term fortifications with pillboxes, bunkers, armored caps, with captured Soviet tanks dug into the ground as stationary firing points, did not allow anything to be released for the effectively advancing southern steppe grouping. Moreover, troops were being taken from the south to help the "Center" group. Exactly what should have allowed keeping the front with small forces, and the rest with maximum efficiency in maneuvering directions was for some reason used by a huge group. It doesn't fit with the training battles of an illiterate army … It doesn't fit in any way. We need to figure it out. The question, as it turned out, is not easy and extremely interesting.
Stormtroopers in the battle 1941 - 1942
At the end of World War I, the positional front in the West encountered an unusual phenomenon. The Germans began to advance in a completely different way than they had before. Not in waves of rifle lines, but in assault groups. A group of well-trained soldiers, with a well-developed signal system for communication and control, moves across the battlefield using the folds of the terrain. Short dashes, with targeted fire from the available attacking weapons (light machine guns and mortars). With the transmission of signals to the rear in order for the artillery to suppress the identified dangerous firing points with its fire.
The attacking assault battalions of the Germans on the battlefield suffered less losses than the defending side. For the Germans who lost the First World War, the word "stormtrooper" became synonymous with victorious tactics, synonymous with revenge. The word "stormtrooper" is used by the Germans in the rhetoric of political parties. CC is also an abbreviation containing Sturm. In short: the technology of victory in a field battle by the Germans was worked out in the fields of France, mastered and not forgotten. On the contrary, Germany almost prayed for this technology.
By the beginning of World War II, the idea of attack aircraft was developed and brought to a level much higher than the battalion. Whole divisions turned into attack aircraft. Because next to the infantry, tanks and armored personnel carriers went on the attack, with which there was a connection, which could indicate the unsuccessfully revived machine gun of the defenders. If the enemy was strong enough, then his positions could be bombed by the summoned and guided by radio aircraft, or artillery, the fire of which is corrected directly from the battlefield, could be destroyed. The 100% literacy of the Wehrmacht, its saturation with communications, engineering means - definitely made the German soldier stronger than his enemy. His personal courage and personal skills were multiplied many times over by means of communication, fire adjustment, reconnaissance, and a well-oiled system of interaction between weapons.
The Red Army had nothing of the kind. First of all, the problem was the means of communication. The problem was the lack of literacy of soldiers and officers. The experience of competent warfare, attacks by assault groups - in the First World War also appeared in the Russian army. But it did not become the norm. On this experience, neither the regular officer, let alone the soldier, was brought up. A stormtrooper is first of all an educated soldier who thinks. In principle, you cannot collect many such soldiers. Even if they are all with higher education degrees. But in the presence of normal means of communication, you can give the function of thinking to those who can think. To the commander. And he will quickly and efficiently connect the mortarmen, the artillerymen, the tank crew (or a whole tank unit), then the aviation. On time and to the point.
The Germans had such an opportunity at the beginning of the war. On the Soviet side, these possibilities were very limited. That is why the Soviet defense so easily cut through in 1941. The wonders of bravery of the soldiers of unknown garrisons of pillboxes and companies that occupied key high-rises were nothing against the assault tactics of the enemy. Well, the enemy's wild consumption of ammunition against any sign of movement and resistance broke through everything. The war of the 20th century largely erased the strength of the army in a tough defense from the merits of the army. Hard defenses cannot be overcome. What for? It is simply destroyed by artillery fire and bombs. If someone needs to break through an arbitrarily strong defensive zone, he drives up a large amount of artillery, aviation, a large number of shells and bombs. And he simply erases from the face of the earth what hinders him. The rest is handled by highly skilled stormtrooper soldiers. Losses of the defending side in relation to the advancing side 10: 1. And this is not the limit.
Heroism is useful only in the sense that 5-10% of the soldiers who survived the shelling and bombing still fired and inflicted damage on the enemy. And not just running or, stunned, depressed, surrendered. We gave up. But not all of them. Many still fought even in this hopeless atmosphere. For 6 months of 1941, only the German ground forces used up more ammunition than was produced by the entire German industry for the whole of 1941. The expenditure of ammunition by the ground forces for every three months of the 1941 campaign exceeded the production of ammunition by Germany mobilized in 1942 over a period of 4 months. What fell in 1941 on those regiments and divisions that tried to stop the enemy has no analogues in world practice. For some reason, historians do not speak about this. Either they don't understand, or …
The main thing from what has been said is that the Soviet Union would not have had enough blood to resist the Wehrmacht. Competent troops, equipped with communications, with a well-developed system of interaction between weapons, are always stronger than a simple armed mass with any number of aircraft flying in the wrong direction, with any number of non-radio-equipped tanks that don't know how the situation has changed.
To the greatest extent, the superiority of the maneuverable army, which has perfectly adjusted interaction between the arms of the army, was reflected in the forest-steppe zone. Wide spaces for maneuver, defender positions at a glance. Bombies, overtake, cut off, shoot, take demoralized soldiers prisoner. Something had to be opposed to this. Otherwise, there would simply not be enough Russian blood.
Shaposhnikov's winter offensive
In the history of the Great Patriotic War, the offensive of the Red Army and the Battle of Moscow in 1941 looks like some kind of poor relative. We pulled up our reserves, just barely held back the Germans, and immediately went on the offensive. And they won. Generally speaking, nonsense. But this is exactly how historians interpret the Moscow battle of 1941. No tactical or strategic findings. No tricky or unexpected solutions. They just went on the offensive. Without superiority in strength, in technology. When there is a shortage of ammunition. Could this be? Or were there any strategic findings?
The chief of the German General Staff, Halder, mentions in his diaries several times: "ski battalions". Let me remind you of an unusual episode in 1941. On November 17, signed by Stalin and Shaposhnikov, the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the need to destroy villages in the strip 40-60 km from the front line and 20 km from the roads along which the Germans move.
Scorched earth tactics? Very similar. Only now the Germans are looking at Moscow through binoculars, and at the future starting positions for the offensive against the still-unformed Klin-Solnechnogorsk grouping of Germans (Klin is occupied by the Germans on November 23), the 1st Shock Army with 11 ski battalions is already located.
On December 5, the 1st Shock Army goes over to the offensive. And on December 7, ski battalions that have passed 50-70 km through the forests practically block all forest roads to the front, attacking warehouses and headquarters. On December 9, the German front crumbles. The Germans begin to retreat in the direction of Klin. In the future, the retreat turns into flight.
On December 17, the troops of the southern flank of the Moscow region began to move. On December 18, a mobile group of skiers and cavalrymen of Belov was introduced into the gap in the front in the Tarusa area, who bypassing settlements without coming into contact with the enemy, already on the 20th end up on the outskirts of Kaluga, and on December 21 street battles began in the city, far rear for the Germans. On December 20, Halder notes in his diary that the Russians are in Lgov. Guderian has no choice but to give the order to retreat.
The most interesting thing is that on the front itself, the Red Army in the first days of the offensive unsuccessfully tries to break through the defenses. The machine guns of the Germans make them lie down in the snow. No progress. But behind enemy lines, there is already a nightmare and panic. The supply of troops disappears, management is disorganized. The very interaction of units on the front line, with reserves, with aviation, with mobile troops, is breaking down. Communication cannot replace intercepted roads, bombed and blown up warehouses and airfields, headquarters that have disappeared or are fighting off attacks. And the front, saturated with artillery and tanks, finally does not hold out and runs, throwing tanks and artillery.
What does the burnt villages have to do with it? In the 80s, on a trip from a research institute to a collective farm in the Baryatinsky district of the Kaluga region, I heard the story of an old-timer. As a boy, he remained in a German-occupied village. The Germans installed machine guns in the attics of the houses. The Red Army soldiers went out of the forest onto the field - they mowed 500 people per minute.
In the Moscow region, settlements - villages of yards for 20-40, - are typical. And there are many of them. Around each village is a kilometer and a half of fields and meadows. Agricultural zone. Two or three kilometers later, another village. And exactly the same picture. In the middle there are several houses, around a field. The forest is difficult to pass. Spruce forests with dried branches almost from ground level, ravines. Willy-nilly, you have to jump out into open spaces. Under machine guns in the attics of houses.
In the Order of the Headquarters of 11/17/41 there is a remarkable phrase: every three days to report which and where villages have been destroyed. Not the total (which is negligible), but exactly where. If we recall that the Headquarters is planning an offensive with a preliminary deep raid of ski battalions, everything falls into its rightful place. No village - no strong point controlling the surrounding fields with machine guns. The Germans have not even tried to adapt to life in snow-covered dugouts and trenches. They lived in villages. There is no village, no enemy in control of the treeless area around it. The headquarters can calculate the corridors for deep and quick penetration (without collision with the enemy) of ski battalions 40-60 kilometers behind the front. Destruction of communication and control points, warehouses, airfields.
This is how the victory in the battle for Moscow was made in 1941. The infantry divisions themselves cannot do anything. The Red Army counts every shell (the evacuated industry is still in its infancy), and the Germans have a dense fire from all types of weapons. But the ski battalions are forcing the Germans to fold the front - cutting off communications.
And this is no coincidence. Ski battalions are being prepared long before the Moscow offensive. On the Internet, I came across a recollection of a resident of Perm, who was sent to the ski battalion on September 15, 1941 on a Komsomol ticket. Ski battalions are formed from athletes, from Siberian hunters, from sailors of the Pacific Fleet. Subdivisions of special purpose. Which can live in the field for days in winter. They have a sufficient supply of ammunition and food, have communications. Well, just people, selected for special moral qualities. You can rely on. The best, selected. And their actions are foreseen for several months - even in summer and early autumn.
It's not about the cold weather, which was too unusual for the Germans. The point is in the creative processing of the negative experience of the Red Army by the Headquarters in the Finnish campaign of 1939-40. Finnish ski groups cut the forest communications of the advancing Red Army. And the Soviet units that broke through were dying of hunger and cold in deserted, deprived of food settlements. War is a complex economic system. The army must be fed, it must be provided with fuel and ammunition. Those who have lost their supplies will not last long.
The enemy was strong in its organization, in its material and technical support. But this support had to be delivered to the front, and the very organization of the enemy troops was in direct proportion to the precise work of the rear support services. Warehouses for ammunition, foodstuffs, fuels and lubricants, unloading railway stations, repair bases, automobile parts and subdivisions, horse-drawn transport.
And this was exactly what was used in the counteroffensive of the Moscow Battle of 1941. The front units of the Germans were deprived of rear support. And that was the end of their organization and their material and technical superiority. Several months before the offensive, the Achilles heel of the German troops was calculated. And here is December 1941, the battle was shot at this Achilles' heel. From this moment, the Germans have a fad - the fear of breaking communications. And the Soviet command makes full use of it. But not the rupture of communications itself, but the fear of it.
Trishkin caftan of Army Group "Center"
After the offensive near Moscow, an interesting geographic situation developed. Behind the back of the Red Army there are quite habitable Moscow and Kaluga regions, cut through by several railway highways and many country roads, a powerful Moscow railway junction. Behind the Germans is a huge array of dense Vyazma forests, through which rare railway lines pass: Smolensk-Vyazma, Vyazma-Sychovka-Rzhev, Vyazma-Sukhinichi, Vyazma-Bryansk. A couple of highways: Varshavskoe and Minskoe highways … And that's it! Is that rare country roads. Do you know what forest country roads are in Russia?
Please note that the supply of the 3rd tank and 9th combined-arms German armies passes along the railway, literally sandwiched between the Kalinin Front hanging from the north and a large enclave of Soviet troops east of Smolensk and south-west of Vyazma. In this enclave there are several thousand cavalrymen of Belov's cavalry corps and several thousand infantrymen of Efremov's 33rd army. On this territory, Soviet power operates, conscription into the army is carried out, a search and collection of artillery pieces, mortars and ammunition for them, abandoned in October 1941 by the troops of the Reserve Front, is organized. The found long-range gun fires at the Vyazma railway station.
But the main thing is that for over 100 kilometers these troops are in close proximity to the Smolensk-Vyazma railway. And between this enclave and the main forces of the front runs the Vyazma-Bryansk railway and the Varshavskoe highway. One well-organized strike, and the enclave joins the front. Especially large forces cannot be guided through forests, but small ones are enough. Two or three infantry divisions and several cavalry regiments. And it is no longer clear how to deal with them.
From February to April 1942, the Germans, step by step, squeeze the Soviet troops from the railways. They are building barriers, laying minefields. In May-June, an offensive against the enclave begins. But it also only partially solves the issue of road safety. The front disappears, but the soldiers are scattered into the partisan detachments hidden in the dense forests. And they continue to threaten communications. At the same time, they have reliable radio communication with Moscow, their actions are coordinated and directed by the Soviet high command.
And the enemy can maneuver his forces, supply his troops only along these roads and along the country roads, limp after each rain. Hitler's installation to stop the Soviet offensive drove huge masses of troops into this wooded and swampy area. But these troops themselves became dependent on supply and maneuver for rare communications. Literally, the Soviet front hangs over every communication line. On an approximately 100-kilometer stretch of the Varshavskoe highway in the west of the Kaluga region, there are continuous oncoming battles. Sections of the highway were changed hands 70 times in 1942.
The situation is unique. One battalion captures 300 meters of the highway. And the highway is cut. One battalion captures half a kilometer of railroad tracks and cuts off several divisions from supplies. It is clear that the specified battalion can be dropped from the occupied section of the highway or railway track. You just need to drive tanks, motorized infantry (attack aircraft, generally speaking), bomb the battalion's positions and knock out the Russians.
But only Soviet fighter regiments know exactly where in the vast air ocean they will meet the German bombers. The assault air regiments know exactly on which roads they need to storm the enemy tank and motorized infantry battalions being transferred to eliminate the threat. Po-2 (U-2) plywood night light bombers know exactly which reserve unloading stations should be bombed. And the units of tank destroyers buried themselves in the ground and prepared to shoot from anti-tank rifles and release the demolition dogs not along the entire front, but exactly where they will actually be attacked tomorrow by German tanks.
The struggle for communications tied the German divisions to the central sector of the Soviet-German front more firmly than a chain of a dog. Group "Center" could not withdraw two or three divisions to provide assistance to the southern advancing grouping, because it instantly put 5-6 divisions, or even entire armies, at risk.
Manpower and equipment were expended in continuous counterattacks against Soviet companies and battalions where the Soviet side dictated it. Due to the state of the economy and the level of training of officers, pilots, artillerymen, and tankmen, the Soviet side was still unable to establish clear direct interaction of troops on the battlefield with aviation and artillery. But she managed to arrange the course of hostilities in such a way that the limited capabilities of the Red Army were used to the maximum. The fighters, which could not be aimed at an unknown place and where the flying group of Junkers, were actually attacked by Junkers flying to bomb Soviet positions in the area, for example, Zaitseva Gora between Spas-Demensk and Yukhnov (Kaluga region).
And all this was prepared like this. Literally two dozen Katyusha machines stepped into position unnoticed. They fired a volley. After that, the infantry without loss occupied a fortified point mixed with the ground. And this is not a guess, but, say, a specific combat episode of the Zhizdrinsko-Bolkhov offensive operation on July 5-12, 1942. It was a salvo of guards mortars, it was the fortified points that ceased to exist, which the infantry took without loss. Exactly the same month in the Pogorelo-Gorodishchensk operation, a powerful artillery barrage swept away the German defenses for several kilometers.
In modern warfare with a high density of artillery fire, no engineering structures can help. It's just that you can't provide a high density of fire for the entire front and for every day of the war. No economy can handle this. And to break through a small section and go forward is pointless. You yourself will be cut off. But if you create a huge threat with every small area you break through, then the war takes on a new quality. The fabulous losses incurred by two or three battalions on the march, in the attack and turning into hand-to-hand battles for high-rise buildings are justified in order to save several divisions from the danger of being cut off. One time, two, three … And 70 times? And 170 times?
So they fought on the Western Front. An unexpected destructive salvo of "Katyushas" in one place, serious artillery treatment or defense treatment by aviation in other places, then an offensive of infantry and tanks to a shallow depth. The threat to the communications sector was sharply increasing. The enemy could not have a powerful artillery reserve behind each of his companies. And he began to counterattack with the available forces without a sufficiently powerful artillery barrage. If the Soviet strike seemed large enough, he drove "firefighters" tank and motorized infantry units along the railways and highways
During the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation in the summer of 1942, it came to the transfer of troops by transport aircraft. And as a result, the enemy suffered the same classic losses of 3: 1 for ordinary, not prepared and not provided with serious artillery preparation, supplemented by losses at unloading stations and on the transfer routes of mobile reserves.
If you think about it, the Battle of Rzhev seems to be absolutely amazing. Throughout 1942, the Western and Kalinin fronts, with local battles, grinded the manpower and equipment of the Germans, placing them in such conditions that the losses were at least comparable (if not more severe for the Germans). The poorly equipped, insufficiently mobile Red Army did not yet have the opportunity to adequately respond to the offensive initiative of the Germans. But on the Western and Kalinin Fronts, for almost the entire 1942, the initiative was intercepted by the Red Army. It was the Red Army that dictated to the enemy where to transport tank divisions by rail, where to attack, where to incur losses. Simply - a threat to communications. Which are within easy reach.
The Germans' fear of being cut off along the thin lines of railroads and highways worked wonders. The cost of the four Rzhev-Vyazemsky and Rzhev-Sychevsky operations is 1 million 100 thousand losses, including sanitary losses. 370 thousand were spent in irrecoverable losses. And this turned out to be at the cost of keeping several dozen divisions in the forests and swamps during such an important year for our country, which themselves suffered losses in counterattacks, amounting to 50-80% of personnel and equipment.
In the offensive to the Caucasus, the Germans managed to concentrate as much as 170 thousand soldiers. Look at the map again. Hundreds of thousands of square kilometers captured by the Germans in the south were not provided with troops capable of holding these territories. And against the Western and Kalinin Fronts at exactly the same time, a million strong group stood and could not move anywhere. This is the essence of the Battle of Rzhev. Where the enemy could effectively attack, capture our important economic regions, where we had to spend our own soldiers as 10: 1 on defense, it was there that the Germans could not concentrate their efforts. After all, there were many effective ways of attack in the steppe and forest-steppe zones. There was a possibility of an offensive through Voronezh, through Liski (Georgiu-Dezh). Further - ample opportunities for maneuver on the steppe and forest-steppe plains with access to the heart of the Soviet defense industry - the Volga region. An offensive here would have been assured by air superiority, maneuverability, and troop qualifications.
But … the troops are bound by firefighting responses to local offensives of relatively small Soviet forces here and there in the forests of Kaluga, Smolensk and Kalinin regions. Meanwhile, the evacuated industry is gaining momentum. The schools train lieutenants, who in December 1942 on the Don will stop Manstein, aviation and tanks are radioed. But for all this, the time of the platoon and company gains on nameless heights, lost among the forests. In the high-rise buildings, which are being fiercely attacked by the Germans. Forced attacks with a purely tactical result of restoring the situation, which does not imply any strategic development of success.
The main success is lack of success
We are forced to utter this very phrase. In the Battle of Rzhev, which outwardly represented a long positional struggle for insignificant spaces, the deep strategic plan of the General Staff of the Red Army is read. No visible high-profile successes? But this is the main success! Putting some large enemy grouping in a disastrous position is no problem. But then he as a whole will retreat to more profitable frontiers and free his hands. In 1943, the withdrawal from the Rzhevsky bridgehead allowed the enemy to throw those tank divisions that were chained to Rzhev into the attack on Kursk. We straightened the front, "broke off the chain."
But the Germans considered this retreat a great success - they left the Rzhevsky bridgehead without suffering a crushing defeat. In 1942, they couldn't do it. We were in a strategic trap. It is nonsense to keep enormous forces in the forests aimlessly. But they are not allowed to withdraw either, maintaining the regime of constant threats to all these huge forces. However, it would be time and honor to know. For almost a year, they spun the enemy's brains. But in reality it was practically impossible to carry out offensives with decisive goals in this sector of the front. Indeed, the defense echeloned 80-100 kilometers in depth could only be crushed with too much blood. But this was precisely what the Soviet command did not plan. They will hand over themselves when they feel like it. I was impatient after Stalingrad and its subsequent operations. But the Red Army no longer needed positional warfare. The time has come for a strategic offensive. Now the Red Army could fight the Germans on equal terms in the steppe.
And in 1942, no one was going to crush the enemy on the Rzhev salient, he was only tied to the central sector of the front. They drove the enemy to the edge, where, due to the small number of roads and stations, it is difficult to deliver something quickly and just as difficult to evacuate something quickly. And they played cat and mouse with him. Researchers of the battles of the Battle of Rzhev note, for example, the non-synchronization of the offensive of the armies of the Western and Kalinin fronts in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation. On July 30, one army starts fighting (31st army of the Kalinin Front against a bridgehead on the northern bank of the Volga, then another goes on the offensive (5th August - 20th army of the Western Front - Pogorelo-Gorodishchenskaya operation), then 5th and 33rd armies of the Western Front strike. Why ? Was it really difficult to coordinate the time of the offensive so that the enemy could not maneuver the reserves,transferring them from site to site? It is not difficult, but now it is clear that no one needed this. It was necessary to force the enemy to wind up reserves for hundreds of kilometers along narrow and sparse roads, to substitute for the attacks of the Il-2 regiments, whose airfields were located right behind the advancing Soviet armies. It was necessary to force the enemy to be in constant tension, in anticipation of the next blow, no one knows where. And cling to every regiment, to every division. Do not give the divisions to Paulus advancing on Stalingrad, but rather ask for reinforcements. The beauty and pride of the Wehrmacht, the motorized infantry division "Great Germany" was not only transferred to the Rzhevsky bridgehead, but already in August the highest permission was obtained for its use in battles to eliminate threats. It was necessary to force the enemy to wind up reserves for hundreds of kilometers along narrow and sparse roads, substitute himself for the attacks of the Il-2 regiments, whose airfields were located right behind the advancing Soviet armies. It was necessary to force the enemy to be in constant tension, in anticipation of the next blow, no one knows where. And cling to every regiment, to every division. Do not give the divisions to Paulus advancing on Stalingrad, but rather ask for reinforcements. The beauty and pride of the Wehrmacht, the motorized infantry division "Great Germany" was not only transferred to the Rzhevsky bridgehead, but already in August the highest permission for its use in battles to eliminate threats was received. It was necessary to force the enemy to wind up reserves for hundreds of kilometers along narrow and sparse roads, substitute himself for the attacks of the Il-2 regiments, whose airfields were located right behind the advancing Soviet armies. It was necessary to force the enemy to be in constant tension, in anticipation of the next blow, no one knows where. And cling to every regiment, to every division. Do not give the divisions to Paulus advancing on Stalingrad, but rather ask for reinforcements. The beauty and pride of the Wehrmacht, the motorized infantry division "Great Germany" was not only transferred to the Rzhevsky bridgehead, but already in August the highest permission for its use in battles to eliminate threats was received.whose airfields were located directly behind the advancing Soviet armies. It was necessary to force the enemy to be in constant tension, in anticipation of the next blow, no one knows where. And cling to every regiment, to every division. Do not give the divisions to Paulus advancing on Stalingrad, but rather ask for reinforcements. The beauty and pride of the Wehrmacht, the motorized infantry division "Great Germany" was not only transferred to the Rzhevsky bridgehead, but already in August the highest permission for its use in battles to eliminate threats was received.whose airfields were located directly behind the advancing Soviet armies. It was necessary to force the enemy to be in constant tension, in anticipation of the next blow, no one knows where. And cling to every regiment, to every division. Do not give the divisions to Paulus advancing on Stalingrad, but rather ask for reinforcements. The beauty and pride of the Wehrmacht, the motorized infantry division "Great Germany" was not only transferred to the Rzhevsky bridgehead, but already in August the highest permission for its use in battles to eliminate threats was received. The beauty and pride of the Wehrmacht, the motorized infantry division "Great Germany" was not only transferred to the Rzhevsky bridgehead, but already in August the highest permission for its use in battles to eliminate threats was received. The beauty and pride of the Wehrmacht, the motorized infantry division "Great Germany" was not only transferred to the Rzhevsky bridgehead, but already in August the highest permission for its use in battles to eliminate threats was received.
Three months later, at the end of November 1942, the use of the "Great Germany" traffic police to eliminate the next impending threat looked like this. The troops of the Kalinin Front are breaking through the defenses and bringing the 1st Mechanized Corps of Salamatin into the breakthrough. The battalions of "Greater Germany" are trying to strike at the base of the breakthrough - to cut off the corps. This is exactly what is expected of them. 20 minutes of artillery ambush fire - and two attacking battalions of this division disappear from the face of the earth. The enemy is pulling up the next troops, hurling them into the next attacks. In the end, after heavy and bloody battles for the Germans, Salamatin's corps is cut off. But for attacks against this only cut off corps, 5 tank and motorized infantry divisions and a cavalry division have to be used. Everyone is busy with business, everyone understands the seriousness of the situation. Before Sychovka,it is very close to the railway passing through it and to the Salamatin corps, and the attacking 20th Army of the Western Front. Just look, the entire 9th army will be cut off.
Meanwhile, on December 11, on Don Manstein, there are not enough tank and motorized infantry divisions to break through the corridor to the Paulus army surrounded at Stalingrad. In Manstein's strategic counterstrike on the Don, 17 divisions are involved, of which only 5 are tank divisions. And in the woods on the Rzhevsky bridgehead, 5 tank divisions have been fighting for weeks with only Salamatin's corps. This point must be emphasized. By the beginning of the offensive, the 1st mechanized corps of Salamatin had 16 thousand fighters with 200 with small tanks, including a large number of light T-60s. And several German mobile divisions are chained to these small forces even on the scale of the front. Let the divisions be incomplete, even though each of them does not have the required 100 tanks. But a Panzer Division is not one of tanks. It is also a motorized infantry that can perfectly interact with tanks. And it all got bogged down in battles againstin general, speaking insignificant, but posing a threat to enemy communication routes, Soviet forces. And in the fight against this threat, the Germans are suffering such losses that until the summer of 1943, these divisions are impossible to use anywhere. We have to replenish them.
However, when everything became clear with Manstein's blow in the south of the Soviet-German front, Salamatin's further sitting in the encirclement loses its meaning. On December 13, he quite calmly leaves the encirclement, taking out all his wounded. It is done. It could have been earlier, since everything is so simple. But by December 13, it became clear that the troops from near Rzhev would not help Manstein with anything, even if they tried very hard. Late. A few days later, left with open flanks, to close which there is simply not enough troops, the front of the Germans in the south begins to crumble as a result of a series of successive offensive operations of several Soviet fronts. In two months, everything that the enemy conquered in 1942 is lost.
And the Western and Kalinin fronts, which haunted the enemy throughout 1942, stopped active offensive operations in the region of the restless Rzhev salient. The fronts freeze. They did their job. And they did it perfectly. The question of the 1942 schooling still remains. He's really educational. In the same Zhizdrinsko-Bolkhov operation of the Western Front, it was specifically studied how many Katyusha machines are needed to break through the prepared enemy defense. 48 machines are enough for 2 reference points - verdict. The infantry takes these points without loss. With a density of fire of about 300 artillery barrels per kilometer, they broke the enemy's defenses in August 1942. The defense in the burnt-fortified direction in front of the 20th Army simply disappeared. The infantry passed it without loss. In the winter of 1943, it was with such a density of fire that the deeply prepared defense of the Germans was broken when the blockade of Leningrad was broken. Have learned.
They learned to deal with cutting off enemy counterattacks. They learned to anticipate the enemy's actions and place on the paths of his counterattacks, sweeping away all artillery ambushes and tank reserves. During Operation Mars in the last days of November 1942, the 72nd assault division of the Germans, within the framework of the established tactics, is trying to cut off the secular forces that had broken through. But its regiments themselves are immediately surrounded and shot by artillery. They learned to attack not in chains, but in assault groups. We learned to debug the interaction between the branches of the armed forces. But they learned all this not forcedly, not under pressure from the enemy, but on the contrary, firmly holding the initiative.
And, although all sorts of authors can say, referring to the bloodshed of individual local episodes of battles, on the whole this was done with relatively little blood. It is here, in the central section, around the Rzhevsky ledge. The growing Soviet economy fought here. A sea of artillery fire, armor, tracks, aircraft engines, bombs. But in order for them to be able to fight instead of soldiers, it was also necessary not to have visible territorial successes. This is a very interesting point.
We have already noted that behind the back of the Western Soviet Front was the Moscow railway junction, several railway and highways fanning out from Moscow, densely crossed by country roads of the Moscow and Kaluga regions. Any attempt by the enemy to attack was prevented by the rapid transfer of the reserve. And he himself had the opportunity to attack only from those bridgeheads that he could provide with the supply of ammunition and the delivery of troops. Those. in fact, the blows could be foreseen and prepared to parry them.
So in August 1942 the Germans tried to organize an offensive in the Kozelsk direction. 11 divisions were thrown into battle, including 4 tank divisions. Immediately to meet them from near Tula, a whole reserve tank army was advancing along the railway and along the highway at an accelerated march. And the artillery regiments located in the near rear of the forward Soviet troops simply knock out tanks from the enemy. And the southern wing launched a counteroffensive against the bloodless enemy. Just a week after the start of the offensive, an order came from Hitler's headquarters to turn the operation with the formidable name "Smerch" into a purely defensive one. To hold out where to advance there. And, pay attention, the reserve tank army is located in a fairly deep rear - inaccessible to the actions of enemy aircraft. But its transfer to the front in the shortest possible time is not a problem.
On the contrary, the Soviet side had the opportunity to strike threatening enemy communications wherever it chose. She could concentrate the required amount of shells, bombs and fuel for aircraft and tanks, almost everywhere. Taking advantage of the many country roads. And the troops themselves, artillery positions and warehouses were well covered by the forest. The troops of the Western Front could impose battles on the enemy in conditions of their own local superiority in artillery, shells, air support, and the enemy could oppose them only with tank guns, light mortars, and small arms fire. Not because, in principle, he did not have a sufficient amount of artillery and ammunition, but because he could not have them everywhere and could not quickly concentrate them where needed.
If behind the back of the Western Front were the same Vyazma forests and off-road, in which the enemy found himself, the situation would change to the strictly opposite. And it was known. The 39th Army of the Kalinin Front, which had gone far during the winter offensive and was half-cut off, which had only one road to provide supplies, could not oppose anything to Operation Seydlitz in early July 1942. For two weeks of fighting, she was exterminated. A rigid all-round defense of an army in a war of fire and maneuver is useless and practically impossible. And without roads there is no fire, no maneuver.
Without fire and the maneuver of supporting forces, long-term concrete fortifications are useless. Infantry destroyed by fire around them, leaves the pillboxes face to face with sappers and flamethrowers. A heroic but almost meaningless death. As long as the ridge was not broken to the enemy, as long as he could advance, it was senseless and dangerous for Soviet troops to enter the off-road of the Vyazma forests. This meant transferring the initiative to the enemy.
The lack of territorial successes made it possible to fully use the geographical superiority, which was converted into firepower. At first this was the advantage of the effectiveness of fire. Artillery and aviation with the necessary ammunition were concentrated where their work was most successful. Against the redeployed and counterattacking enemy reserves. And as the defense industry grew, superiority also grew in the mass of fire itself.
Output
The main conclusion should not relate to the battle itself, but to the fact that for 60 years after the Victory such an understanding of events in the central sector of the Soviet-German front not only did not become the main one, but was not even proposed by historical science. From the field of historical comprehension, the strategic game of the Soviet command and state leadership, brilliant in its implementation, was taken out. A game that made it possible, at the cost of relatively small losses for a year, to deprive the best army in the world of its advantages. And to impose on a significant part of it an unfavorable positional struggle to retain disadvantageous positions. To impose a struggle on this unit in such geographical conditions and according to such rules, under which the significant shortcomings in the technical equipment and training of the Red Army were almost completely leveled out. On the contrary, in these conditions, it acquired the ability to fully conduct firefight. Make full and effective use of the USSR's growing superiority in the production of tanks, cannons, artillery and ammunition.
Historical science has been unable to pronounce the key word: inequality. The theaters of war for the Red Army in 1942 were unequal. More mobile, better equipped with communications, the German army, which had unconditional air superiority, could be stopped on the steppe fronts only at the cost of huge losses. On the contrary, in a wooded and swampy area, German industry and technically well-equipped German engineering troops could provide the creation of a deeply echeloned defense that was difficult to overcome. Such as in the strip of the Leningrad, Volkhov, North-Western fronts, in fact, on the Rzhev salient and near its base. Such a front could be held by relatively small forces.
The greatest strategic success of the combat operations of the Western and Kalinin Fronts during the Battle of Rzhev was that during the year the enemy failed to use the advantages of engineering support for the defense in the central sector of the front to transfer the weight of its military vehicle to the mobile fronts. The mobile fronts lacked either mobile formations bogged down in the region of the Rzhev salient, or simply infantry, at least to reliably support the flanks of the advancing armies in the steppe. And this was not a mistake of the German command, it repeatedly tried to free the troops of Army Group Center for transfer to the south. This result was the result of the subtlest strategic game of the Soviet command to maintain the regime of the continuous threat of the defeat of the armies of the German group "Center", which in 1942, nevertheless, could not yet be realized.
Thanks to the success of the Soviet strategy in the region of the Rzhev salient - on the maneuvering fronts, the enemy had the opportunity to advance only with limited forces and, in fact, was powerless to create serious threats to the Soviet centers of the defense industry in the Volga region and the Urals. Moreover, due to the limited forces in the southern sector, he was unable to protect his own advancing troops from the threat of encirclement and defeat.
And this, undoubtedly, the most important strategic success of the Red Army for the outcome of the war, was achieved at the cost of relatively small losses. And even on the contrary, by grinding German manpower and equipment in the most unfavorable way for the enemy - on the roads, at unloading stations, in forced counterattacks, poorly provided with fire support. With regret I have to state the blindness and even the primitiveness of the thinking of the scientists of the Russian school of military history. She didn't notice the elephant! Or deliberately did not want to notice?