Least of all, the analysis of the events of the war of 1812 is facilitated by the statements that the conqueror would never have been able to break the stubbornness of the Russian soldiers who fought for their Fatherland. As we know perfectly well from the experience of the whole world history, many countries (and ours is no exception), even with the most heroic resistance, were conquered by the enemy, if he turned out to be stronger.
So, the question for us is to analyze the political and strategic alternatives to the 1812 campaign in Russia.
Abolition of serfdom
One political alternative was pointed out a long time ago. We are talking about a proclamation on the emancipation of Russian peasants from serf slavery, which many close friends advised Napoleon to publish while he was in Moscow, not knowing what to do next.
In 1812, when Napoleon's troops approached, many serfs were worried, expecting freedom, thinking that they would gain it if they signed up for the militia against the "twelve heathens", and not receiving the expected, they rebelled and burned landlord estates. In the country where the Pugachevshchina was raging less than forty years ago, the peasants, feeling the weakening of power, riots everywhere.
Kutuzov, after leaving Moscow in a difficult situation, had to allocate military teams at the numerous requests of the landowners to suppress peasant uprisings. This is in Central Russia. In Belarus, in many places, the peasants themselves gave an enthusiastic welcome to Bonaparte's army, voluntarily providing it with provisions and fodder.
The well-known statements of Napoleon himself about the abolition of serfdom in Russia are quite transparent. “If I do this, I will have no one to make peace with,” “I don’t want to be king of Jacquerie.” The former Jacobin, an admirer of Rousseau, having become the emperor of the French, felt much closer to the royal courts of feudal Europe than to the elements of popular revolt. This alternative was not even seriously considered by Napoleon. In addition, it remains to be seen whether it led to victory. Undoubtedly, in this way Bonaparte would have managed to sow a strong confusion in the rear of the enemy. But the French emperor himself always considered as true only that victory that was achieved with a bayonet in a battle directly with the enemy army.
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Moscow or St. Petersburg?
The next alternative concerns the main direction of Bonaparte's offensive - towards Moscow or towards St. Petersburg? After all, Moscow at that time was rather a symbolic center of Russia. For a century, St. Petersburg has been the focus of the government apparatus and the embodiment of the new imperial power of Russia. What if Napoleon chose to move to the real capital of Russia? Along the way, he could declare the independence of the Baltic lands from the Russian Empire. From the sea side, his actions could support and supply the fleet of allied Denmark. Moreover, it was closer to Petersburg than to Moscow.
However, this plan was fraught with more dangers than benefits. Leaving the main forces of the Russian army on his right flank, Bonaparte jeopardized his main communications, which ran through Poland and Lithuania. The Danish fleet was weaker in comparison with the Baltic fleets of Sweden (Napoleon's opponent) and Russia, which would have combined their forces if necessary, not to mention the fact that part of the British fleet could come to their aid. The only political force in the Baltics was the German barons, but they were always the loyal support of the Russian throne, and they did not need independence from Napoleon's hands. Finally, under the threat of the enemy, the Russian government and the royal court would leave Petersburg and move to the same Moscow, which retained the importance of the ancient capital. Having occupied Petersburg, Napoleon would become the owner of the Baltic coast of Russia,but this would not have brought him victory over all of Russia.
So, in all respects, the direction of the offensive chosen by Napoleon - to Moscow - was the only correct one for him. Moreover, before Moscow, at Borodin, he won the general battle, although not as rapidly as he was used to. Why didn't this tactical victory lead to the success of the campaign as a whole?
What the experts think
The great military theorist who was then serving in Russia, Karl Clausewitz, has long analyzed the alternative. “The defeat and defeat of the Russian army, the conquest of Moscow - all these goals could be achieved in one campaign; but we believe that these goals had to be connected with one more essential condition, namely: it was necessary to remain formidable to the enemy in Moscow too. " After analyzing the successive reinforcements and losses of the "Great Army", he came to the conclusion: "He arrived in Moscow with 90 thousand people, but he should have brought 200 thousand with him." Only in this case, according to the authoritative opinion of Clausewitz, Napoleon would have enough strength to impose a general battle on the Russian army after the capture of Moscow and force it to peace. Thus, Bonaparte simply did not have enough military forces to conquer Russia, namely,about another 100 thousand soldiers in reserve.
Analyzing why this happened, Clausewitz draws attention to some subjective factors associated with the personality of Napoleon. "We believe that Napoleon overlooked this due to his characteristic arrogant frivolity." In addition, "the losses in the moral impact of his military successes, he probably hoped to make up for the weakness of the Russian government and the discord that he might be able to sow between the government and the Russian nobility." This was, obviously, a political utopia, since the entire ruling class of Russia was united with its government in an effort to expel Napoleon at any cost. On top of that, the preservation of forces on the way to Moscow was possible for Bonaparte, “if he were more thrifty and caring about his army. But this question has always been alien to him … With greater care and better organization of the food business, with a more deliberate organization of marches … he could have prevented the famine that prevailed in his army from the very beginning of the campaign, and thus would have kept it in a fuller composition ".
But the main reason why Napoleon did not have enough of these 100 thousand soldiers to win the war with Russia was the continuation of the war in Spain. Napoleon simply had nowhere to take these extra troops. Putting on the conquest of Russia, he had to abandon operations in Spain and withdraw the army from there.
Thus, Napoleon could, in 1812, force Russia to a peace that was beneficial to him only on condition that he sacrificed his goals in Spain, and he could not allow this. And in the end he lost.
Yaroslav Butakov