On August 12, 1937, at 18 hours 15 minutes Moscow time, a four-engine aircraft with tail number N-209 launched from the Shchelkovsky airfield, near Moscow, for a flight across the North Pole to the United States. The N-209 was to land in the city of Fairbanks, State of Alaska, delivering commercial cargo there, and thereby proving the possibility of establishing regular trade relations between the two Great Powers along the shortest path. At the same time, this flight was to be demonstrated by I. V. Stalin the possibility of bombing the American continent through the Arctic in the event of a war between the USSR and the United States of America. Confirmation of this is the choice of an aircraft to fly over the Pole. It was a new long-range bomber DB-A, capable of carrying up to 5,000 kilograms of air bombs. The N-209 did not arrive at its destination and its searches undertaken by the Soviet and American sides had no results. Nine months later, the Government of the USSR decided to stop the search work and consider the crew dead.
There is still no answer to the question of where the plane and its crew disappeared. But there are enough facts indicating that the chances of a successful flight were few.
NONE OF THE CREW MEMBERS IN THE ARCTIC FLY
![Latest photos of the N-209 crew [1]. From left to right: N. Ya. Galkovsky, N. G. Kastanaev, S. A. Levanevsky, G. T. Pobezhimov, N. N. Godovikov, V. I. Levchenko](https://i.greatplainsparanormal.com/images/016/image-45646-2-j.webp "Latest photos of the N-209 crew [1]. From left to right: N. Ya. Galkovsky, N. G. Kastanaev, S. A. Levanevsky, G. T. Pobezhimov, N. N. Godovikov, V. I. Levchenko")
Latest photos of the N-209 crew [1]. From left to right: N. Ya. Galkovsky, N. G. Kastanaev, S. A. Levanevsky, G. T. Pobezhimov, N. N. Godovikov, V. I. Levchenko.
Sigismund Levanevsky - aircraft commander and first pilot. He was the first in the USSR to have the idea of flying over the North Pole. Born in St. Petersburg on May 02, 1902, in the family of an impoverished Polish nobleman. Graduate of the Sevastopol Naval Aviation School. In 1933 he began work in the Main Directorate of the North Sea Route. He flew on single-engine light seaplanes over the territories of Chukotka and Yakutia, several times over the American territory of the Alaska Peninsula. Its air routes almost did not cross the Arctic Circle, the conditional line of which runs at a north latitude of 66 degrees 33 minutes. Levanevsky never flew over the ice expanses of the Arctic and therefore did not have experience in flying in harsh Arctic meteorological conditions. In August 1935, he managed to obtain permission to fly on the USSR - North Pole - USA route on a single-engine ANT-25 aircraft, together with navigator V. Levchenko and co-pilot G. Baidukov. In a flight over the Barents Sea, an engine oil leak was discovered from the engine, and the crew had to return back. In the Kremlin, at a reception with Stalin, Levanevsky blamed all the blame for the unsuccessful flight on the aircraft designer A. N. Tupolev. Without holding back his emotions, he called him a pest and firmly declared that he would never fly on his planes again. The incident in the Kremlin characterizes Levanevsky as a man who could unpredictably lose control of himself. His tendency to inappropriate behavior is supported by other facts. In a flight over the Barents Sea, an engine oil leak was discovered from the engine, and the crew had to return back. In the Kremlin, at a reception with Stalin, Levanevsky blamed all the blame for the unsuccessful flight on the aircraft designer A. N. Tupolev. Without holding back his emotions, he called him a pest and firmly declared that he would never fly on his planes again. The incident in the Kremlin characterizes Levanevsky as a man who could unpredictably lose control of himself. His tendency to inappropriate behavior is supported by other facts. In a flight over the Barents Sea, an engine oil leak was discovered from the engine, and the crew had to return back. In the Kremlin, at a reception with Stalin, Levanevsky blamed all the blame for the unsuccessful flight on the aircraft designer A. N. Tupolev. Without holding back his emotions, he called him a pest and firmly declared that he would never fly on his planes again. The incident in the Kremlin characterizes Levanevsky as a man who could unpredictably lose control of himself. His tendency to inappropriate behavior is supported by other facts.that he will never fly on his planes again. The incident in the Kremlin characterizes Levanevsky as a man who could unpredictably lose control of himself. His tendency to inappropriate behavior is supported by other facts.that he will never fly on his planes again. The incident in the Kremlin characterizes Levanevsky as a man who could unpredictably lose control of himself. His tendency to inappropriate behavior is supported by other facts.
In 1933, American pilot James Mattern attempted a round-the-world flight, but crashed over Chukotka. Levanevsky was instructed to deliver the American to his homeland, to the United States of America. While performing this rescue mission, Levanevsky almost shot a sailor just because he dared to take a chocolate bar from the emergency supply of the aircraft crew.
Promotional video:
In 1935, at the first attempt to fly over the North Pole, engine oil was thrown out of the engine of the ANT-25 aircraft directly onto the windshield of the aircraft. Levanevsky gave the order to turn around on the opposite course, but Baidukov, the leading tester of this aircraft, who knew the machine well, began to convince the commander that the oil was released due to its overflow into the oil tank before the start, that this happened during the ANT-25 test flights, and this phenomenon should stop soon. Levanevsky, not listening to the arguments of the co-pilot, took out his personal weapon, put the barrel of the revolver to Baidukov's body and shouted: “I order you to turn. Otherwise, I cannot vouch for myself. On the way back, the engine oil leak from the engine really stopped.
In 1936, Levanevsky and navigator V. Levchenko flew from America to the USSR on a seaplane purchased from the USA. The seaplane made a planned water landing in Ambarchik Bay on the northern coast of Chukotka. While being towed to the pier, the plane slightly hit the side of the steamer "Lenin" at anchor and received insignificant damage. Polar pilot A. A. Kasha recalled that Levanevsky immediately took out a pistol and threatened to shoot all the towing vehicles.
And who knows, maybe during the flight of the N-209, somewhere over the North Pole, a conflict arose between Levanevsky and the crew members, and the emotionally unbalanced aircraft commander again grabbed his weapon. The possibility of a conflict situation existed. It was laid down in the process of preparing for the flight and could be realized in critical flight conditions.
In the description of Levanevsky, written by the head of the Main Directorate of the North Sea Route at the request of the Government Commission on the N-209 flight, it was indicated: he has a painful sense of pride, unfounded arrogance, a tendency to impulsive behavior.
Nikolay Kastanaev is the second pilot of the N-209 aircraft. In 1926 he graduated from the school of military pilots in the city of Borisoglebsk. Since 1929 he was a test pilot, worked in various research institutions, and since 1935 - at the aircraft plant number 22. Kastanaev took part in the tests of the DB-A aircraft, knew well its material part and the aircraft's shortcomings during piloting. By the nature of his activities, he has never flown either in the Far North or in the Arctic. He had poor preparation for flying in overcast clouds.
Viktor Levchenko - navigator of the N-209 aircraft. In 1925 he graduated from the Frunze Naval School in Leningrad, was sent to serve in the Black Sea Fleet. In 1929 he graduated from the military school of naval pilots in Sevastopol, having received a navigator's diploma. While studying at this school, he met S. Levanevsky. In 1932 he took part in the North-Eastern Polar Expedition led by the famous explorer of the Far North N. I. Evgenova. Since 1933, as a navigator, he flew with Levanevsky over the territories of Yakutia, Chukotka, Alaska. Friendly relations have developed between them. V. Levchenko had no experience of flying in severe meteorological conditions of the Arctic.
Nikolay Galkovsky - N-209 radio operator. Until 1928, he served in one of the units of the seaplane in the city of Sevastopol, then was sent to serve in the Moscow Air Force Research Institute. He had a reputation as a highly qualified specialist. He was the flagship radio operator at the festive aviation parades. In 1934 he took part in a flight on the route Moscow - Kiev - Vienna - Paris - Lyon - Strasbourg - Prague - Moscow. The crew of the N-209 was enrolled a few days before the flight. For this reason, he did not have time to master the new radio equipment of the aircraft. Never flew in the Far North and the Arctic.
Nikolay Godovikov - the first flight mechanic of the N-209. The oldest in the carriage. In 1915 he began to serve in the Baltic Fleet seaplane. After 1920 he worked at Moscow aviation plants. Received a diploma in mechanical engineering, his work has established himself as a high-class specialist in aircraft engines. He took part in factory tests of the DB-A aircraft and knew its engines very well. Godovikov could identify some engine malfunctions even by ear during its operation. The crew of the N-209 was enrolled on the recommendation of Kastanaev. I did not fly in the Far North and the Arctic.
Grigory Pobezhimov - the second flight mechanic of the N-209. In 1927, as part of the expedition of G. Krasinsky, he flew as a flight mechanic to Wrangel Island. In 1935-1937 he flew as part of the crew of the Hero of the Soviet Union V. Molokov. In 1936, they flew over the territory of the Far North along a circular route with a total length of 31,000 kilometers. Pobezhimov was considered one of the best mechanics of northern aviation, but did not fly directly in the Arctic. The crew was included at the direction of the Main Directorate of the North Sea Route. Pobezhimov had never encountered the design of the M-34RN engine and its maintenance. The three months allotted for him to study the motor was clearly not enough.
From the above it follows: firstly, the radio operator and the second flight mechanic practically did not have time to master the aircraft equipment well; secondly, all the crew members of the N-209 had no experience of flying in the Arctic. The Arctic is an area of the Arctic Ocean, covered throughout the year with non-melting ice with a thickness of two to four or more meters, which does not have any islands throughout its endless ice space, with meteorological conditions more severe than in the Far North. The Far North in the thirties of the twentieth century included the territories of the mainland of Russia, located north of the Arctic Circle, as well as the nearest islands and seas of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to the mainland. The Far North, in terms of its geographical location, has never belonged and still does not belong to the region called the Arctic.
THE PLANE HAD SERIOUS FAULTS
It was a long-range bomber developed by specialists from the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy under the guidance of the chief designer of the project V. F. Bolkhovitinov. When he found out that Levanevsky decided to fly over the North Pole on this machine, he was categorically against this idea. The aircraft was built in a single copy, passed factory tests, during which serious design flaws were revealed, and it took time to eliminate them. But Levanevsky did not want to wait, used his connections and Stalin's support. A strict order was given to Bolkhovitinov from the Kremlin - to immediately prepare the DB-A aircraft for the flight. The aircraft was designated N-209. "N" is the initial letter of the word NORD, that is, North. 209 is the serial number of the aircraft when registering it in the register of the Main Directorate of the North Sea Route.
Airplane N-209
All weapons were removed from the DB-A aircraft, to expand the view, the design of the front cockpit was changed (the navigator and radio operator of the crew were supposed to be in it during the flight). Instead of the direction finder APR-3, which had an automatic mode of direction finding of radio signals, provided by a small electric motor, a radio compass of the American company "Fairchild" with manual direction finding of radio signals was installed. This replacement was due to the fact that during a flight over the Arctic, in very low temperatures, the electric motor of the radio direction finder could simply freeze and fail for this reason. Due to its high cost, the radio semi-compass "Fairchild" was used on Soviet aircraft to a limited extent, so there were few specialists who perfectly mastered working with it.
Fairchild radio semi-compass
On the right is a loop rotating antenna receiving a signal; on the left is the device (a - a handle for rotating the antenna, in - an indicator for determining the direction of the received signal).
The location of the rotating antenna on the H-209
The DB-A aircraft was equipped with four M-34RN engines ("R" - geared, "N" - with a supercharger), to any of which, in flight conditions, the flight mechanic could easily reach the inner space of the aircraft wing and make its inspection and minor repairs. The presence of a gearbox and a supercharger in the engine made it possible to increase the flight altitude, however, during the tests, serious problems arose with the supercharger. There were cases when oil was sucked into it through poor-quality seals, and condensate appeared in it at a height at negative temperatures, which affected the stable operation of the motor and could even lead to its stop. The M-34RN engine had significant weight and constructive measures were taken to facilitate it, after which, under the designation M-34RNB (“B” - lightweight), the modified engines were installed on the N-209 aircraft. Another drawback of the engine was the lack of a mechanism for feathering the propeller blades, that is, turning them with an edge to the incoming air flow to reduce air resistance during an emergency stop of the engine.
During the Arctic flight, it was expected that the propeller blades could undergo icing, and ice fragments thrown from them under the action of centrifugal force during the rotation of the propellers, like shells of a large-caliber machine gun or an aircraft cannon, could riddle the fuselage, making the further flight of the aircraft impossible. Therefore, to prevent the formation of ice, a special system was installed with a forced supply of alcohol to the propeller blades, but this system functioned only when the engine was running. The aircraft did not have anti-icing systems for the surfaces of the wings, fuselage and tail.
The lubrication system of the extreme engines had a big drawback. When 60 kilograms of oil remained in the oil tanks of these engines, its flow into the engines stopped. It was impossible to refuel the oil tank during the flight, because the filler neck of the tank was on the outer upper surface of the aircraft wing.
Refueling on the N-209 aircraft before its flight
The location of two oil tanks in the wings of the Н-209 (section E - E, number 7 - fuel tank).
Each oil tank had an internal impermeable partition dividing it into two isolated compartments, each containing 240 kilograms of lubricant. To lubricate the engine, oil from only one compartment was used, connected to this engine.
The DB-A aircraft had a number of significant comments related to its piloting, which, due to lack of time, were not eliminated, and the N-209 aircraft inherited them. These shortcomings in the control of the aircraft predetermined its subsequent death. The most serious of them were:
- insufficient controllability and longitudinal stability. The aircraft could spontaneously begin to climb or descend;
- insufficient efficiency of the ailerons (roll rudders), as well as rudders and elevators; to control them by means of the steering wheel and pedals, the pilot had to make great physical efforts;
- in the event of the "bumpiness" effect, when the aircraft fell into the streams of turbulence of air masses, the efficiency of the aircraft tail sharply decreased. The loads on the levers and controls increased many times over, a long flight in such conditions was not possible, because the pilot was physically exhausted very quickly, and, ultimately, completely lost control of the machine; the plane went into uncontrolled flight mode.
Levanevsky knew about these unresolved comments, but did not cancel his decision to fly on the N-209. He perfectly understood that if he refused to fly, he would completely lose the trust of Stalin and the Soviet government, with all the ensuing negative consequences for his career. The aircraft commander did not think about the lives and destinies of other crew members flying in an unprepared car. One gets the impression that Levanevsky viewed the N-209 crew as a disposable tool he needed to achieve two of his personal goals. First, so that it does not get up, to fulfill his dream of a flight across the Pole, even if the third after the crews of Chkalov and Gromov, who were ahead of him. Secondly, to justify with this flight the conferment of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union in 1934 for his participation in the rescue of the crew of the steamer "Chelyuskin". According to the recollections of people who knew Levanevsky, he painfully realized that he did not deserve a high award (he did not evacuate a single person from the ice camp, because his plane suffered a plane crash over Chukotka, and Levanevsky himself had to fall). He also knew that among the polar pilots of that time he was called a "loser", and the very proud Levanevsky needed to prove the opposite with this flight.
LACK OF CREW FOR FLIGHT
Work on preparing the aircraft for the flight was carried out at an accelerated pace. The second pilot Kastanaev, who was fascinated by the idea of Levanevsky to fly over the North Pole on this machine, in his reports on the preparatory flights of the N-209 gave mostly only positive conclusions, deliberately hiding the shortcomings in order to prevent the flight from being canceled for technical reasons. Such his actions can be qualified as a serious malfeasance, the consequences of which led to the death of the aircraft and its crew, as well as to significant material and financial costs of the Soviet state for organizing the search for the disappeared N-209.
Levanevsky's attitude to the preparation for the flight is simply shocking: he almost did not appear at the airfield, he was in test flights no more than three times. This was clearly not enough for the aircraft commander to acquire the skills of piloting a heavy four-engined aircraft, especially since he flew only on single-engine light seaplanes. The takeoff and landing of the N-209 was always performed only by N. Kastanaev. Levanevsky practically did not communicate with the crew members. When they appeared at the airport, only Levchenko and Kastanaev greeted with a handshake; radio operator and flight mechanics honored greetings with a dismissive nod of the head. At lunchtime, Levanevsiy and Levchenko sat at a separate table, and the rest of the crew at another. This behavior of the aircraft commander did not contribute to the cohesion of the team. Before flying over the North Pole, the N-209 aircraft was supposed to perform a test non-stop flight with a length of at least 2,000 kilometers. The most logical way would be to make it in a northern direction, for example, to Arkhangelsk, or even to the Barents Sea, having tested a heavy vehicle and checked the preparedness of the crew for flight in northern weather conditions. But Levanevsky did not want to risk it and chose the southern direction, with more favorable weather conditions for the flight, which ensured a positive result of its implementation and, as a result, the admission of the aircraft and the crew to the flight across the Pole.having tested a heavy aircraft and checked the crew's readiness for flight in northern weather conditions. But Levanevsky did not want to risk it and chose the southern direction, with more favorable weather conditions for the flight, which ensured a positive result of its implementation and, as a result, the admission of the aircraft and the crew to the flight across the pole.having tested a heavy aircraft and checked the crew's readiness for flight in northern weather conditions. But Levanevsky did not want to risk it and chose the southern direction, with more favorable weather conditions for the flight, which ensured a positive result of its implementation and, as a result, the admission of the aircraft and the crew to the flight across the Pole.
After the end of the test flight, mutual claims arose between the aircraft commander and some of his crew members. Levanevsky was very unhappy with the new radio operator N. Galkovsky, who only five days before the flight replaced the radio operator L. L. Kerber, arrested by the NKVD. Galkovsky did not have time to get acquainted in detail with the newest radio equipment N-209, and for this reason, during a test flight, he did not always manage to correctly detect the radio bearing. Also Levanevsky was dissatisfied with the co-pilot N. Kastanaev, who, in the absence of visibility of the ground, controlled the plane uncertainly, and when asked why he included Kastanaev in the crew, the aircraft commander cynically replied: “… I didn't care who to fly with, they proposed him and I agreed. Kastanaev, after this flight to the South, also spoke quite definitely: during the flight, Levanevsky almost did not control the car, only commanded; called him a white-handed and expressed distrust of him. Flight mechanic N. Godovikov told close friends that Levanevsky had never taken off on his own and that he delegated all control functions of the aircraft to Kastanaev; with the crew behaved constantly aloof and arrogant.
As a result, there was no monolithic team in the previous flight, and Levanevsky bears full responsibility for this - both by his behavior towards the participants in the flight, and by his attitude to the very process of preparing for the flight. For example, instead of taking part in the training flights of the N-209, gaining experience in managing it and establishing coordination between the crew members, Levanevsky went to Sevastopol to conduct test flights of seaplanes purchased abroad. The aircraft crew was preparing for the flight without a commander.
TAKEOFF
The plane was standing on a special twelve-meter concrete slide, rolling down from which, he had to quickly pick up the speed necessary to lift the car overloaded from the ground. The total weight of the aircraft was 34,700 kilograms, including 16,400 kilograms of fuel, 960 kilograms of engine lubricating oil. Among those seeing off the crew of the N-209 were representatives of the government, the army, the Soviet press, well-known pilots and the chief designer were present.
Before take off
The mood of those present was festive, with the exception of the aircraft crew members. The co-pilot Kastanaev, trying on insulated boots prepared for the flight participants, sadly joked: "There will be something to run on the ice from bears," and later said - "there is no confidence in the success of the flight, we trained too little." Navigator Levchenko and flight mechanic Godovikov, saying goodbye to Georgy Baidukov, told him, independently of each other, the same phrase: "Farewell, Yegor, we will never see you again." Levanevsky, heading to the plane, told his friends that on this flight he would go to the end and would not return under any circumstances. Then he smiled sadly, perhaps remembered that he was a hereditary Polish nobleman, and mentally voiced the verdict to himself: "either pan, or disappeared." When the crew took their placesthen one of the first conquerors of the North Pole G. Baidukov was unpleasantly surprised to see that Levanevsky was located in the right seat of the aircraft, and Kastanaev took the left seat of the crew commander - this meant that the second pilot would take off. In his opinion, it was wrong. Perhaps Baidukov's reaction to this act of Levanevsky would be different if he knew that the commander of the N-209 could neither take off nor land on this heavy, four-engined aircraft.if he knew that the commander of the N-209 could neither take off nor land on this heavy, four-engined aircraft.if he knew that the commander of the N-209 could neither take off nor land on this heavy, four-engined aircraft.
The engines were started. The start signal was given, and the car rushed forward. The takeoff of the plane was filmed. Kastanaev, in order to lift the overloaded machine off the ground, gave the engines maximum load. The acceleration time of the aircraft and its separation from the runway of the airfield was 35 seconds. Within 30 seconds, the takeoff of the N-209 took place in normal mode.
Takeoff of the N-209. A still from the newsreel. The engines run flawlessly.
The last five seconds of takeoff. A still from the newsreel. The smoky trail from the right extreme engine is clearly visible.
The reason for the appearance of the smoke trail has a technical explanation. Before the aircraft took off from the runway at the maximum operating mode of the engines, the seal of the supercharger of the right extreme motor was destroyed, followed by suction of lubricating oil from the crankcase of the engine into it (such a defect had already occurred during test flights of the aircraft). The oil, mixing with the fuel-air mixture in the supercharger, began to flow through the intake pipe into the combustion chambers of the engine, and this process continued throughout the entire flight, leading to an increased consumption of lubricant by the right-hand extreme engine N-209.
Basic kinematic diagram of the supercharger
the direction of oil ingress into the combustion chambers of the engine through a broken seal.
the flow of the fuel-air mixture.
N-209 REACHED THE NORTH POLE
According to the penultimate radiogram received by the flight headquarters on August 13 at 13:40 Moscow time, the N-209 aircraft flew over the North Pole over overcast, having an altitude of 6,000 meters. At this altitude, the crew, of course, worked in oxygen masks, in which oxygen was supplied from cylinders installed permanently on board the aircraft. The operation of the engines in flight was controlled by the flight mechanics using special instruments that were located at their workplaces, while one of them monitored the work of the motor group of the right wing, the other - the work of the motor group of the left wing.
Location of control devices for engine operation on a four-engined aircraft on the dashboard of flight mechanics (recommended)
1 - tachometers, 2 - pressure gauges, 3 - gas analyzers, 4 - four-arrow pressure and temperature indicators.
Soon after the flight over the pole, flight mechanic Godovikov recorded a sharp drop in oil pressure to zero in the rightmost engine on the indicator, while, according to the tachometer, this engine continued to work in the established mode. The mechanic immediately reported this to Levanevsky. When asked by the aircraft commander what caused the pressure drop, Godovikov briefly replied: “Malfunctions in the oil system. The specific reason can be said after examining the engine. " But to inspect the engine at an altitude of 6,000 meters, portable oxygen equipment was required, which was not on the N-209. Consequently, Levanevsky had to descend to an altitude at which the mechanics could perform the corresponding work, and this meant the aircraft entered the continuous cloud. The pilots and flight mechanics perfectly understoodthat without lubrication, engine failure is inevitable; it's only a matter of time. The aircraft began to descend, however, a few minutes after the start of this maneuver, a new report was received from the flight mechanic: “The number of revolutions of the rightmost engine has dropped to zero. The motor has stopped."
Due to the failure of the rightmost motor, an asymmetrical thrust effect arose. The aircraft began to turn and roll towards the stopped engine, and the front of its fuselage began to descend. As a result of the turn, the N-209 flew with a slip on the left wing, which increased the drag of the aircraft, and reduced its speed, and this could lead to a stall of the N-209. To counter the negative impact of asymmetrical engine thrust, Levanevsky and Kastanaev used rudder (turn) and roll rudders (ailerons) controls. Levanevsky ordered the radio operator Godovikov to prepare for the transfer of information about the situation to the flight headquarters, and to the navigator to try to determine the coordinates of the location of the N-209 on the route using the solar heading indicator before the aircraft entered the cloud. Due to the rapid descent and unstable flight of the aircraft, the navigator could not cope with the task.
According to the last radiogram received in Moscow on August 13 at 1432 hours, the N-209 dropped to an altitude of 4,600 meters, and flew on three motors in overcast conditions. At this altitude, there was not enough oxygen, but Levanevsky and Kastanaev, perhaps, did not dare to go down even lower - they were afraid of severe icing of the aircraft. Both mechanics went to the engine. During his examination, Godovikov and Pobezhimov showed progressive signs of oxygen starvation: nosebleeds, severe weakness, dizziness, fatigue. Despite this, by the lack of rotation of the propeller from the incoming air flow, they were able to determine that the engine was jammed. The flight mechanics could not have known that during the takeoff of the aircraft, oil was sucked into the supercharger,due to which the amount of lubricant in the oil tank of the right extreme engine steadily decreased, and when it reached its critical value of 60 kilograms, the oil pump stopped supplying oil from the tank to the engine lubrication system. The lack of lubrication of parts of the powerful aircraft engine M-34RNB quickly led to its seizure.
Lubrication scheme for the M-34RNB engine
The mechanics came to the conclusion that it was impossible to repair the engine in flight. They also understood that even if the plane makes a successful emergency landing on the ice, then without spare parts, special devices and tools, such a complex repair in the Arctic is not feasible. The results of the engine inspection had to be urgently reported to the aircraft commander, but the flight mechanics did not have time to do this. They fainted from lack of oxygen, and then died within 15 minutes. In the last moment before his death, consciousness returned to Godovikov for a few seconds, and he, with difficulty moving his frostbitten lips, whispered: “Goodbye. I knew flying was crazy. Near the dead frozen engine lay the lifeless and rapidly cooling bodies of flight mechanics Pobezhimov and Godovikov.
With every minute of the emergency flight, the situation with the control of the aircraft was seriously complicated. First, the "bumpiness" effect arose, which manifested itself in the form of vibration and sharp throws of the aircraft in different directions, especially up and down in height by tens of meters. Secondly, at an altitude of 4,600 meters, the aircraft began to freeze. For example, the plane of Chkalov, Baidukov and Belyakov, who flew over the North Pole in June 1937, started at an altitude of 5,700 meters. Along the entire length of the external main antenna of the N-209 radio transmitter, a solid and massive ice crust formed, which, with its weight, as a result of "bumping", broke the antenna.
Location of the main radio antenna of the N-209 aircraft
The radio operator Galkovsky tried to catch the bearing to a Soviet or American radio beacon by the radio compass, but the mechanism for rotating the radio direction-finding frame also froze, so much that the radio operator broke the rotation lever of the loop antenna. To restore radio communication, Galkovsky and navigator Levchenko left the front cockpit and went to the rear of the aircraft fuselage in order to eject the exhaust antenna using a winch.
Airplane exhaust antenna
1- the working part of the antenna, 3 - the weight pulling it out of the plane.
However, either an ice plug formed in the antenna ejection channel, which did not allow its release, or the ejected antenna was cut off almost immediately due to the powerful turbulence of the air flow. An antenna break was quite possible. For example, according to the recollections of the famous navigator Valentin Akkuratov, when performing a night flight to the Pole in October 1945, a similar case of a breakdown of the exhaust antenna occurred on their plane. Due to the breakage of both antennas, the N-209 completely lost radio communications, and this was tantamount to a death sentence for the entire crew without the right to hope for a miracle.
Meanwhile, in the cockpit, Levanevsky and Kastanaev tried to keep the N-209 in horizontal flight. Due to the "bumpiness", icing and asymmetrical thrust of the engines, the loads on the levers and controls of the aircraft increased many times over, and both pilots, who were very tired after 20 hours of a difficult flight, could not control the flight of the N-209 for a long time; their physical strength was running out. Turn off the left extreme engine and continue flying on two engines at this altitude, in continuous clouds, with "turbulence" and a strong headwind or headwind, when the speed of ice growth on all parts of the aircraft could reach one, two or more millimeters per minute, it would be very dangerous. Two engines would not have enough power to keep a heavily iced plane in the air; he would just fall down like a stone. Therefore, unambiguously,The N-209 continued to fly on three engines, but with a rapid decrease in altitude. The aircraft progressively went into uncontrolled flight mode, in which a forced landing was generally unfeasible. The ending of this drama beyond the Pole was the swift and deadly airplane hitting the Arctic ice. Fuel remaining in the gas tanks detonated. During the explosion, the wreckage of the aircraft was scattered several tens of meters from the crash site. No one was left alive. No one was left alive. No one was left alive.
WHERE IS THE AIRCRAFT DISASTERED?
It is impossible to answer this question exactly. It is known that the plane flew over the North Pole over the overcast; during that period of flight over the plane, the sun was blindingly shining in the cold, crystal-clear and bright blue sky. The magnetic compass and gyroscopic semi-compass in the pole area did not work, but navigator Levchenko, using an instrument called a solar heading indicator, determined the further direction of the flight - it is necessary, according to the flight plan, to fly along the 148th meridian of west longitude. Following this course, the plane would definitely fly to the airfield of the city of Fairbansk. However, 52 minutes after the flight of the pole, the plane was already in continuous clouds, flying on three engines. The lack of visibility of the sun meant that it was impossible for the navigator to determine and correct the further course of the aircraft. The lack of data on the flight speed of the N-209 in cloudy conditions, on the speed and direction of the wind, on the rate of change in flight altitude and icing of the aircraft structure, as well as the absence of many other parameters, do not allow mathematically calculating the place of the aircraft crash. We can only assume that N-209 crashed at a distance of no more than 200 kilometers after the conquest of the pole, at 148 west longitude with a deviation from it either to the right or to the left, but no more than three degrees. The fall of the aircraft happened very quickly in time. No prospecting work was carried out in that region of the Arctic.do not allow you to mathematically calculate the crash site of the aircraft. We can only assume that N-209 crashed at a distance of no more than 200 kilometers after the conquest of the pole, at 148 west longitude with a deviation from it either to the right or to the left, but no more than three degrees. The fall of the aircraft happened very quickly in time. No prospecting work was carried out in that region of the Arctic.do not allow you to mathematically calculate the crash site of the aircraft. It can only be assumed that N-209 crashed at a distance of no more than 200 kilometers after the conquest of the pole, at 148 west longitude with a deviation from it either to the right or to the left, but not more than three degrees. The fall of the aircraft happened very quickly in time. No prospecting work was carried out in that region of the Arctic.
There is one indirect fact indicating that the plane fell on the ice. In the summer of 1947, English newspapers reported that Icelandic fishermen fishing off the coast of Greenland found boards from wooden boxes frozen into the ice, on which “AUGUST. 1937 . Perhaps these were fragments from a wooden container in which fur products were packed for delivery to the United States by an N-209 aircraft. After all, it is quite obvious that no one would pack expensive high-quality Russian furs in canvas bags, because this would lead to the loss of its presentation. These fur products were intended as gifts to dignitaries of America, including the family of the President of the United States.
Papanin's expedition, landed by polar aviation aircraft in the North Pole region on May 21, 1937 and called the North Pole-1 drifting station, as a result of research, established that the ice of the Arctic Ocean is constantly moving along a complex trajectory with a gradual release of them into warmer areas of the North Atlantic Ocean. The Arctic ice floes are melting there. The ice drift trajectory is influenced by underwater sea currents and weather conditions over the surface of the ice cover.
Scheme of the currents of the Arctic Ocean
cold
warm
Diagram of the main average directions of ice drift in the Arctic Ocean
The above diagrams show that the wooden fragments of the boxes could well have been carried by ice to the shores of Greenland from the North Pole, and the metal parts of the destroyed aircraft, as the ice melted, gradually sank to the ocean floor. Additional evidence confirming that the wreckage of the boxes could belong to the N-209 aircraft is the fact that in the archives of the North Sea Route Administration, there is no information about the death of any other aircraft, as well as ships in the Arctic and Far North in August 1937.
OTHER VERSIONS OF DEATH H-209
First, the plane crashed on the territory of Yakutia in the area of Lake Sebyan-Kuel, which is located at a distance of 2,500 kilometers from the pole. Second, the plane flew to the coastline of the American continent and fell into the water near Point Oliktok, between Thetis Island and Spy Island, at a distance of 2,000 kilometers from the North Pole. Third, the plane crashed near Ellesmere Island in the Canadian Arctic archipelago (750 kilometers from the pole). In all three directions, at the end of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, exploration work was undertaken, which, as one would expect, did not have success. No material evidence of the death of the aircraft and its crew was found. These search engines, in addition to believing in their hypothesis,first it would be necessary to get acquainted with the basics of aerodynamics. On three, and even more so on two engines, the N-209 aircraft, which had serious piloting deficiencies, in those difficult weather conditions could not fly 750-2,500 kilometers. And researchers who believe that the plane made an emergency landing on the Arctic ice, and then flight mechanics, having no spare parts and special tools, were able to repair it, after which the plane managed to take off, can be offered a simple practical experiment. Stop your own car in winter at an air temperature of -15 or -20 degrees Celsius, best of all during a strong gusty wind that raises snow whirlwinds that would inflict burning and painful pricks on the open areas of the skin of the face and hands. Allow the engine to cool down to ambient temperature. After that, completely disassemble it to the last nut in order to install a new piston group in it, which naturally will not be in the trunk of the car. Then, with fingers frostbitten by that time, it is necessary to assemble the motor again so that it will start working after that, while not forgetting to fill the engine crankcase with engine oil from a spare canister, which will not be in the trunk of the car either. If you fail to start the engine, then there is no need to despair, call a tow truck by mobile phone. And if your mobile phone is out of the network coverage area, I don't even know what to advise in this case. But it doesn't matter, the main thing is to personally make sure from personal experience that the version about repairing the failed engine of the N-209 aircraft in the ice of the Arctic is untenable.to install a new piston group in it, which naturally will not be in the trunk of the car. Then, with fingers frostbitten by that time, it is necessary to assemble the motor again so that it will start working after that, while not forgetting to fill the engine crankcase with engine oil from a spare canister, which will not be in the trunk of the car either. If you fail to start the engine, then there is no need to despair, call a tow truck by mobile phone. And if your mobile phone is out of the network coverage area, I don't even know what to advise in this case. But it doesn't matter, the main thing is to personally make sure from personal experience that the version about repairing the failed engine of the N-209 aircraft in the ice of the Arctic is untenable.to install a new piston group in it, which naturally will not be in the trunk of the car. Then, with fingers frostbitten by that time, it is necessary to assemble the motor again so that it will start working after that, while not forgetting to fill the engine crankcase with engine oil from a spare canister, which will not be in the trunk of the car either. If you fail to start the engine, then there is no need to despair, call a tow truck by mobile phone. And if your mobile phone is out of the network coverage area, I don't even know what to advise in this case. But it doesn't matter, the main thing is to personally make sure from personal experience that the version about repairing the failed engine of the N-209 aircraft in the ice of the Arctic is untenable.so that it will still work after that, at the same time, do not forget to fill the engine crankcase with engine oil from a spare canister, which will not be in the trunk of the car either. If you fail to start the engine, then there is no need to despair, call a tow truck by mobile phone. And if your mobile phone is out of the network coverage area, I don't even know what to advise in this case. But it doesn't matter, the main thing is to personally make sure from personal experience that the version about repairing the failed engine of the N-209 aircraft in the ice of the Arctic is untenable.so that it will still work after that, at the same time, do not forget to fill the engine crankcase with engine oil from a spare canister, which will not be in the trunk of the car either. If you fail to start the engine, then there is no need to despair, call a tow truck by mobile phone. And if your mobile phone is out of the network coverage area, I don't even know what to advise in this case. But it doesn't matter, the main thing is to personally make sure from personal experience that the version about repairing the failed engine of the N-209 aircraft in the ice of the Arctic is untenable. I don't even know what to advise in this case. But it doesn't matter, the main thing is to personally make sure from personal experience that the version about repairing the failed engine of the N-209 aircraft in the ice of the Arctic is untenable. I don't even know what to advise in this case. But it doesn't matter, the main thing is to personally make sure from personal experience that the version about repairing the failed engine of the N-209 aircraft in the ice of the Arctic is untenable.
TWO RIDDLES OF THE LAST RADIOGRAM
The flight headquarters in Moscow received 19 radiograms, which, as they were received, were published in the Soviet media of those years. The last radio message from the N-209 aircraft, received on August 13 at 14 hours 32 minutes Moscow time, contained the following text: “The extreme right engine was out of order due to a malfunction of the oil system. We go in continuous clouds. Heavy. Height is 4,600 meters. Wait. Levanevsky ". In the city of Seattle, Washington State (State of Washington), a radiogram No. 19 was also adopted. It coincided in the main content with the Moscow message, but had a line of numbers at the end of the text: "48 3400 92" This digital line is text, but encrypted with a special code, which was used by the N-209 radio operator to simplify radio communication and reduce the time of radio communication during the flight.
Fragment of binary code with its decryption
The text of the radiogram received in Seattle (from the archive of A. A. Vartanyan). Pay attention to the word "travelo" - this is how the American radio operator wrote down the Russian word "hard".
The Americans transferred the information they received from Seattle to Fairbanks, where representatives of the USSR were located, who were supposed to coordinate with the American side the actions to ensure the flight. Among them was the meteorologist M. V. Belyakov, whose main duty was to compile weather reports for the N-209 crew after the flight to the North Pole. He redirected a message from Seattle to Moscow.
Telegram sent to Moscow from Fairbanks by meteorologist M. Belyakov (at the bottom right is a fragment of the code table)
According to the code table, the string of numbers "48 3400 92" can be partially deciphered as follows: 48 - "we will do the landing", "92" is "Levanevsky", but the group of numbers "3400" did not exist in the table. What did "3400" mean? This is the first and rather widely known riddle of the nineteenth radiogram.
Now let's compare the text of the telegram from Seattle and its text, redirected to Moscow from Fairbanks, and a sensational discovery awaits us. The first radiogram, signed by a man named REED, indicated the code "28 3600", that is, the flight altitude was 3 600 meters. In a telegram signed by V. M. Belyakov - "28 4600", that is, the flight altitude is 4 600 meters. For an aircraft in distress, the difference in altitude is significant - 1,000 meters. How to explain such a discrepancy in the texts of telegrams, and what content of them to believe? This is the second mystery of radiogram No. 19 discovered by the author of this publication.
3400
Attempts have been made to decipher the mysterious string of four digits "3400". On the American meteorological map of the Arctic Ocean, divided at that time conditionally into squares with the corresponding numbering, there was a square numbered "34". It was suggested that it was there that Levanevsky decided to make an emergency landing of the N-209 aircraft. However, it is not known whether navigator Levchenko had such a map, and what then means "00". In general, the square "34" is a rather vast territory, where it is very difficult to find it without the exact coordinates of the landing site.
Squares on the U. S. Weather Map (box 34 is shaded)
It was suggested that "00" is the approximate landing time in this square (at 0 hours, 0 minutes). But, firstly, the plane flew in emergency mode, and at any moment in time a situation could arise when the N-209 would have to land ahead of schedule. Secondly, what time is indicated - either Moscow or Greenwich Civil Time (GCT for short) on the territory of the Alaska Peninsula. Time zones are different and the time values in them do not coincide with each other.
There is an assumption that "3400" meant the indication of a new course - 34 degrees north latitude and 00 degrees west longitude. It is wrong and even absurd. The plane flew in overcast clouds and the solar heading indicator did not work, the magnetic compass and gyroscopic semi-compass did not work. Without these instruments, the navigator could not determine the new course of the N-209. And most importantly, this direction points to Africa, to the province of Naama (Algeria).
NEW VERSION OF DECODING "3400"
After the flight of the North Pole, Levanevsky's plane was in the American Arctic zone, and therefore the radio operator carried out radio communications with Moscow and with radio stations in the USSR and the Alaska Peninsula, using only the international Morse Code, because the American radio operators did not understand the microphone transmission in Russian would.
Morse code (alphabet) is a different quantitative combination of characters in the form of a "point" and "dash", corresponding to a particular letter or number.
Fragment of the table of the Morse code (alphabet). Using this table, you can read the text of the radiogram from Seattle
During radio transmission, letters or numbers are separated from each other by a pause, the duration of which is equal to the mental transmission of three "points" by the radio operator, and words or groups of numbers are separated by a pause of seven "points" duration.
It can be assumed that the American radio operator in Seattle, due to interference in the air, could not understand the length of the pauses between the numbers, and therefore wrote down "3400". If this assumption is correct, then the chain of numbers should look like "34 00", and then the last digital message in the radiogram from Seattle should look like: "48 34 00 92", which fully corresponds in structure to the two-digit digital cipher used by the aircraft radio operator N-209 during the flight.
Until now, no one has objectively explained the meaning of the group of digits "00". You can try to establish the meaning of this sign by examining the last nineteenth radiogram received by the flight headquarters in Moscow. At the end of its text, the words “… Wait. Levanevsky. ", Which correspond to the numeric characters" 00 "and" 92 "in the radiogram received in Seattle. Thus, "48 34 00 92" can be deciphered: "we will do the landing (48) due to refusal (34) wait for messages (00) Levanevsky (92)". The content of this text is quite logical and convincing in its meaning, and, perhaps, it is the answer to the first riddle of radiogram No. 19.
It should be emphasized that the intention to land does not mean that it has been completed. First, the overcast, which most likely spread to the ice surface, would not have allowed the N-209 aircraft to reach the glide path (the trajectory of the aircraft during the landing approach). Secondly, due to the asymmetric thrust of the engines, icing and "bumpiness", when the loads on the controls increased many times compared to normal flight conditions, physically exhausted pilots Levanevsky and Kastanaev, who were fighting for the aircraft's survivability, lost control over it. An indiscriminate fall of the N-209 took place, which was stopped by the Arctic ice, which left no chance to save the life of any of the crew members.
"28 3600" CORRECTED TO "28 4600"
An emergency radiogram received in Moscow was immediately forwarded to the Soviet mission in the city of Fairbanks, and it indicated an altitude of 4,600 meters. Simultaneously with the message from the USSR, a radiogram from Seattle came there, the text of which stated that the plane's flight altitude was 3,600 meters. The employees of the representative office found themselves in a difficult situation. The Land of Soviets was the first year of mass repression; people were arrested and shot on absolutely absurd charges. And the representatives of Soviet Russia in Fairbanks were frightened - if the text of the American radiogram with the code "28 3600" was redirected to the flight headquarters, this could cause distrust of them from the NKVD with unpredictable consequences in the future. They could be suspected of conspiring with American intelligence,and even in the recruitment of Alaska Eskimos by the security service, with the sole purpose of hindering the search for Levanevsky's crew. Therefore, the heads of the representative office decided to indicate “28 4600” instead of “28 3600” so that there would be no discrepancy with the Moscow message. V. M. Belyakov implemented this instruction in a telegram sent from Fairbanks to the flight headquarters. This is a possible answer to the second riddle of the last radiogram.
The question naturally arises, what was the true flight altitude? Most likely, one should believe the text of the American radio message. After engine failure, Levanevsky's plane began to descend from 6,000 meters to a height that would allow flight mechanics to have access to the failed engine; and the fulfillment of this condition most likely corresponded to an altitude of 3600 meters. Of course, there was also a significant lack of oxygen on it, but to a much lesser extent than at an altitude of 4600 meters. However, the death of flight mechanics from oxygen starvation during their inspection of a stopped engine could occur at this altitude.
FROM WHOM THE RADIO SIGNALS RECEIVED AFTER THE DEATH OF N-209
In August - September 1937, some radio stations received obscure radio signals or scraps of radio messages of the typical content of "no orientation", "poor audibility", "overcast", "expect messages", "problems with the radio transmitter", and the like. However, they could not belong to the N-209 aircraft, which by that time had suffered a fatal crash. Most likely, these unintelligible signals and fragments of radio messages came from unknown Soviet or American aircraft, which during those tragic days performed daily flights in different regions of the Arctic basin of the Arctic Ocean, the Far North and the northern coast of the Alaska Peninsula, carrying out planned work on the delivery of goods, mail or, making meteorological surveys. Besides,Already on August 14, 1937, searches for the missing Levanevsky aircraft were organized from the American continent, and, quite likely, fragments of such radiograms could also be recorded from these search aircraft. Of course, each such received radio message was analyzed by the flight headquarters in Moscow with the involvement of experienced polar pilots and Arctic explorers, highly qualified radio operators and meteorologists, but after a thorough discussion, they always recognized this information as unreliable. There were reasons for this.highly qualified radio operators and meteorologists, but this information, after a thorough discussion, was always recognized by them as unreliable. There were reasons for this.highly qualified radio operators and meteorologists, but this information, after a thorough discussion, was always recognized by them as unreliable. There were reasons for this.
For example, the subjectivity of radio operators when receiving messages; they believed that they heard the signals from the radio station of the N-209 aircraft. Honored Polar Pilot of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union I. P. Mazuruk, almost thirty years after the plane crash, confessed: “I don't really know radio engineering, but if you put me at the receiver, in those days full of tragedy, I would also hear these signals. My faith, hope, stubbornness would convey them to me …”. Another example. In Yakutia, at 4:00 am local time, when it was already August 14 (in Moscow it was 22:00, August 13), they received the text of a radiogram with a mysterious content: "I'm going on two … I had to go down … I see ice mountains ahead." However, the phrase "I am going in two" could refer to a three-engined aircraft, which had one engine failure. In the Far North, a German-made aircraft of the Junkers company, which had three engines, and received the designation "YUG-1" in Soviet aviation, was operated for a long time.
The plane of the Soviet polar aviation YUG-1
“I had to go down” - this is a completely adequate decision of the pilot, due to the need to continue the flight in an emergency. The phrase "I see mountains of ice ahead." In his memoirs, the Chief Polar Flagship, USSR Navigator Valentin Akkuratov, who had many years of experience in the exploration of the Arctic, said: “When returning after a night flight to the Pole, already at dawn we saw ice mountains ahead of us, which should not have been on our route. Then it turned out that cumulus clouds created such an illusion”. Or perhaps the pilot of this unknown plane saw a mirage in the form of a mountainous surface of an island or mainland. The polar mirage is an amazing and mysterious natural phenomenon that is still recorded in northern latitudes, but has no convincing scientific explanation. The most famous mirages in the history of the exploration of the North are Andreev Land, Sannikov Land, Garissa Land, which have never been discovered.
Modern seekers of the possible place of death of Levanevsky's plane cannot provide a single official document confirming the reliability of the acceptance of a particular radiogram after the loss of radio communication with the N-209. The archive of the flight headquarters disappeared without a trace during the Second World War. Oral recollections of contemporaries of those tragic days are not reliable sources of information, since human memory has the properties of forgetfulness and loss of adequate perception of the events of past years. Subjective memories lead the search engines into serious delusions, which are currently confirmed by the fact that so far no traces of the N-209 disaster have been found either in the vicinity of Ellesmere Island in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, or in the area between the Tethys and Spye Islands on the northern coast of Alaska, nor near Lake Sebyan-Kuel in Yakutia. Therefore, the conclusion of the USSR Government Commission on the search for the Levanevsky plane, published in the Pravda newspaper on August 13, 1938, is the only fact of official recognition of the death of the N-209 and its crew near the North Pole due to engine failure.
CONCLUSION
In August 2017, 80 years have passed since the launch of the N-209 and its subsequent disappearance in the Arctic. The searches undertaken were inconclusive. The flight of Levanevsky, which was to become the first commercial flight laying the foundation for the establishment in the future of permanent air links between the USSR and the United States through the North Pole, had a sad end. The main culprit of the disaster that occurred is Levanevsky, who was irresponsible in preparing for the flight, starting with the choice of an aircraft for this purpose, which had serious piloting deficiencies, and ending with an arrogant attitude towards the crew members, which did not contribute to the establishment of mutual understanding and the development of coordination of actions between them.
July 2017 marks the 80th anniversary of another tragic event associated with the disappearance of the Lockheed-Electra 10E aircraft. On this plane, the American female pilot Amelia Earhart and her navigator Fred Noonan, known throughout the civilized world (except for the USSR), made a round-the-world flight with intermediate landings. On the penultimate leg of the route, Lockheed-Electra took off from Lae Island New Guinea and headed for the American island of Howland in the Pacific Ocean, where it was to land for refueling. Along the way, the plane and the crew disappeared without a trace; no traces of the disaster were found. But, this is another intriguing mystery of history, which can be found in detail in the publication, which indicates the possible reason for the disappearance of the plane and the alleged place of its death.
© Vasily Vladimirovich Sapozhnikov Snezhinsk April 15 - October 14, 2017.