As you know, history does not know the subjunctive mood, but historical analysis is unthinkable without it. Fortune-telling of this kind, associated with Lenin, was especially widespread at the beginning of "perestroika". Then they were associated with the exposure of Stalin's atrocities. In them, the “good” Lenin was usually opposed to the “evil” Stalin.
The authors of such comparisons wanted to show that, if not for his serious illness caused by injury in 1918, Lenin, staying longer at the leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, would have been able to block Stalin's ambitions. Then, they say, there would be no massive violations of "socialist legality". Lenin's "Letter to the Congress" (December 1922) was cited as evidence, in which he recommended that the issue of removing Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) be considered.
Now, when much more information has been published about both Lenin and Stalin than at the end of the 1980s, it would be interesting to look anew at this historical alternative.
Long-livers in the family of Lenin
Let's start with the rationale why Lenin, in fact, could live longer. After all, his father, Ilya Nikolaevich Ulyanov, died at almost the same age (a year difference) for the same reason (if the diagnosis is correct in both cases) - from a stroke. However, Lenin also had long-livers in the family. There can hardly be any doubt that his death was precipitated by an illness, the reasons for which will not be discussed here. If not for her, then it is not known how much more Ilyich's health could have been enough. Moreover, the people who knew him always noted his very good health before the revolution.
Lenin's paternal grandfather died at 68, grandmother - at 71, his mother Maria Alexandrovna died at 81, older sister Anna - at 69, younger brother Dmitry - at 68, niece Olga - at 89. Lenin could have there may be chances to live to 70-75 years, at least to the age of Stalin (74 years). And if that were so, then Lenin would have died only in 1944, that is, he would have found the beginning and most of the Second World War at the post of the head of the Soviet state. Or would you not? Perhaps such a war would not have happened with him?
Let's try to imagine what the policy of the Soviet state could be, and how the situation in the world could develop if Lenin ruled the USSR, at least until the mid-1930s.
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Obvious differences from the Stalinist course
An intra-party struggle would have taken place under Lenin, but it would not have been able to achieve such bitterness if Lenin had maintained his position above the battle. Consequently, mass repressions in the party and the state apparatus would not have arisen under him. There would not have been numerous trials over "enemies of the people" and "counter-revolutionaries" from the intelligentsia. Moreover, not only Lenin, but also Trotsky, appreciated this stratum, since before the revolution they themselves belonged to it.
A specific model of the structure of the USSR with equal rights for the union republics was adopted at the end of 1922 at the insistence of Lenin, contrary to Stalin's plan to "autonomize" the union republics, that is, their inclusion in the RSFSR. It can be assumed that if Lenin continued to rule, then the real structure of the USSR would be closer to a true federation. The independence of the union republics from Moscow would have been much stronger than it was under Stalin. The formal division of the USSR into union and autonomous republics would differ insignificantly, but in terms of content it would be a different model of relations between the union center and the republics.
Lenin disliked the forms of the old regime. He would not have carried out the restoration of the names of officers' ranks and shoulder straps in the Red Army, would not have appealed to the "great historical past." Although Lenin was no stranger to his own understanding of patriotism (recall the decree “The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger!” Dated February 21, 1918), he would hardly have appealed to the images of Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible, Alexander Nevsky, and the tsarist generals. Stalin began to implement this policy even before the war. It is difficult to imagine her under Lenin.
It is also difficult to imagine that Lenin attached any importance to the conservative Orthodox Church and helped to restore its institutions. Rather, he would have allowed Lunacharsky to further experiment with the renovation version of Orthodoxy.
But a lot depended on the general course in building socialism both inside the country and outside it.
NEP as an anticipation of modern Chinese socialism
Lenin's statements could be adapted, as did later Stalin and his opponents in the struggle for power, to justify literally any turn of the "general party line". Lenin could find arguments both for the continuation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) with its market relations and limited private entrepreneurship, and for its curtailment, both for cooperation with bourgeois states and the construction of socialism in one country, and for the world revolution. Lenin was a flexible tactician. In addition, he, like no one else in the party, could come up with and substantiate some new course out of nothing.
The continuation of his reign would have such an important advantage over the battles of his epigones: he did not need sharp political turns in the struggle for power, because his authority within the party was indisputable. Lenin would react only to those signals that dictated changes in political course in order to preserve the power of the communists.
In this regard, the continuation of NEP after 1928 represented favorable conditions for the Bolshevik Party. It is unlikely that Lenin would have gone to his curtailment at this time. And at the end of 1929, the great economic crisis of the capitalist system broke out. In the real history of the USSR, he could not use it, since even earlier Stalin had started a ruinous alteration of the entire socio-economic system of the country. But if such a decisive leap had not taken place, then the USSR would have been in a winning, especially in terms of propaganda, situation in comparison with Western countries.
True, in this case, the possibility of a temptation could arise to bring the revolution to Western Europe on the bayonets of the Red Army, as it was already in 1919-1920. And further historical scenarios ramify so widely and diversely that it is no longer possible to review them in one article.
However, if Lenin had managed to come up with a "soft power" course in relation to the West, while maintaining the strategy of "peaceful coexistence", then it is very likely that the USSR could have occupied the position of the same dominant in a significant part of Europe earlier than it was done under Stalin, and at the cost of the multimillion-dollar victims of the Soviet peoples. The very same economic model of the Soviet Union could reveal similarities with the model of modern China, and again, without excessive shocks.
Yaroslav Butakov